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goauthentik/authentik
Free reading: not for reliance
678beb6 · 24,728 commits · 6,522 files
Read 2026-10-22

goauthentik/authentik: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in goauthentik/authentik's code and history at 678beb6: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenancestrong
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturitystrong
Product & Engineering Maturityadequate
Security & Reliability Postureadequate
Observability & Operationsstrong
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

What the repository says

  • Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed
  • LICENSE: Relicensed: MIT → GPL-3.0 (2020-12-24) → MIT (2022-11-03)
  • authentik/enterprise/LICENSE: Part of the code is under a separate licence: authentik/enterprise/
  • .github/pull_request_template.md:27: states a policy on AI-generated contributions

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

strong
01.6

authentik/core/models.py is 1,698 lines, 28× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 59 lines. 3 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 1,698. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

Evidence
authentik/core/models.py:1 — 1,698 lines (28× median)
web/src/elements/table/Table.ts:1 — 1,285 lines (21× median)
authentik/core/api/users.py:1 — 1,121 lines (19× median)

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

strong
02.16

Tests are retried until they pass

adequate

The suite is configured to retry failing tests (authentik/root/test_runner.py). A retry turns a flaky test green without saying why it failed, so a green build means the tests passed eventually. Ask how many retries a typical run needs, and which tests need them.

Evidence
authentik/root/test_runner.py:62 — test retry

Product & Engineering Maturity

adequate
04.3

106 direct dependencies in a single manifest

adequate

web/package.json declares 106 direct dependencies. Each one is a maintenance obligation, a supply-chain surface and a potential licence question that transfers with the asset. The count says nothing about whether any given dependency was a good choice; it says how many such choices a buyer inherits.

Evidence
web/package.json — 106 declared
pyproject.toml — 79 declared
go.mod — 26 declared
website/api/package.json — 26 declared
04.19

20% of bug fixes add or change a test

adequate

Of 998 fixes in the last 24 months, 197 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.

Evidence
197 of 998
04.62

Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed

adequate

The newest release, version/2026.8.5, is not on the branch this survey read; the newest release on it is version/2024.6.0. The shipped product may differ from what this report describes. Survey the release branch too.

Evidence
tag version/2026.8.5

Security & Reliability Posture

adequate
05.1

3 credential-shaped strings in the tree sit in tests, examples, documentation or local development settings

adequate

Strings shaped like credentials appear only where fakes are usual: test fixtures, examples, documentation, placeholders and local stacks. They are almost always fakes. Ask someone to confirm that none of them works anywhere, because a real key in a development file is still a real key.

Evidence
2 cited: Slack token, where fakes are usual
private key block, where fakes are usual
05.6

1 Dockerfile runs the application as root

adequate

No USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.

Evidence
website/Dockerfile — runs as root
05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

2 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day; 1 step pipes a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

Evidence
.github/workflows/release-publish.yml:82 — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/release-publish.yml:196 — action pinned by tag
lifecycle/container/Dockerfile:77 — download piped into a shell
05.22

5 deserialisers that can run code

adequate

5 places read data with a deserialiser that executes what it reads (pickle). That is safe on data the system wrote itself and remote code execution on anything else. Ask where each one's input comes from.

05.26

63 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 69 high or critical in what ships

adequate

63 of 3,449 locked dependencies match 160 published advisories in OSV, 89 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.

Evidence
web/pnpm-lock.yaml — @xhmikosr/decompress 11.1.3: GHSA-hrh2-vp3x-79xf (critical), fixed in 11.1.4
website/pnpm-lock.yaml — dompurify 3.4.12: GHSA-cg2g-xh64-v4q7 (critical), fixed in 3.4.17
web/pnpm-lock.yaml — dompurify 3.4.13: GHSA-cg2g-xh64-v4q7 (critical), fixed in 3.4.17
05.9

2 vendored components with no licence

adequate

Third-party code is committed into this repository without any statement of the terms it arrived under. Unknown terms are harder to deal with than inconvenient ones: an awkward licence can be complied with, an absent one cannot. Each of these needs its origin established before the code changes hands.

Evidence
authentik/sources/ldap/sync/vendor/freeipa.py — 1 tracked files, no licence file
authentik/sources/ldap/sync/vendor/ms_ad.py — 1 tracked files, no licence file
05.60

Relicensed: MIT → GPL-3.0 (2020-12-24) → MIT (2022-11-03)

adequate

The root licence changed 2 time(s). Code taken under earlier terms stays under them; check which terms any fork or customer relied on.

Evidence
LICENSE — MIT from 2018-12-26
LICENSE — GPL-3.0 from 2020-12-24
LICENSE — MIT from 2022-11-03
05.61

Part of the code is under a separate licence: authentik/enterprise/

adequate

A directory named for a paid edition carries its own licence. That code is usually not open source even where the rest is; what the buyer may do with each part differs.

Evidence
authentik/enterprise/LICENSE — licence: unrecognised
05.65

35 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 25 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-09-09. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. GHSA-cxwx-9x59-28qm (high), GHSA-qgqp-xh8r-v73r (high), GHSA-h6c5-mpvq-j4jc (high) and 11 more are fixed in the surveyed commit; which release carries them cannot be told from this history, which does not place the release users run. Answer lives in: the version you run.

Evidence
2026-09-09: GHSA-cxwx-9x59-28qm (high), fixed in 2026.2.7: Denial of Service via Malformed SAML Messages
2026-09-09: GHSA-qgqp-xh8r-v73r (high), fixed in 2026.2.7: MFA bypass via recipient override in the email authenticator
2026-09-09: GHSA-h6c5-mpvq-j4jc (high), fixed in 2026.2.7: Privilege escalation via delegated group and user management
2026-09-09: GHSA-m9h4-7j9c-55x9 (high), fixed in 2026.2.7: Certain stored credentials readable with view permission alone
2026-09-09: GHSA-cqj8-fxxf-9pg7 (high), fixed in 2026.2.7: Authentication bypass in SAML Sources via assertion confusion and replay

Observability & Operations

strong

No finding.

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

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The full report on goauthentik/authentik: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.

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