Borehole · Risk register · free tier

goauthentik/authentik

Free reading: not for reliance

678beb6 · 24,728 commits · 6,522 files
Issued 2026-10-22

Reads strong: 4 of 6 rated dimensions are strong, 2 are adequate and none is significant.

104 checks ran across 6 assessable dimensions. Security & Reliability Posture and Product & Engineering Maturity are adequate. 1 finding is worth checking first. 14 findings, each with evidence. One dimension cannot be assessed without an acquirer.

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What the repository says about itself

04.62 Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed
05.60 Relicensed: MIT → GPL-3.0 (2020-12-24) → MIT (2022-11-03) LICENSE
05.61 Part of the code is under a separate licence: authentik/enterprise/ authentik/enterprise/LICENSE
states a policy on AI-generated contributions .github/pull_request_template.md:27

Worth checking first

Borehole's proprietary scoring is calibrated across hundreds of repositories. Each finding here reads significant, but its check has not yet held up often enough in that calibration to rate significant on its own. If one holds when someone checks it, it is significant.

05.26 63 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 69 high or critical in what ships

What this survey read. This commit may not be the product users run: The newest release, version/2026.8.5, is not on the branch this survey read; the newest release on it is version/2024.6.0. Read this report as describing that commit, not the release users run. Survey the release branch or tag as well.

Published under today's rules. The verification code attests to this reading as it was stored. This page differs from it as follows.

2 findings from checks Borehole's calibration found wrong more often than right are no longer published.
The file and line of 3 credential-shaped matches are withheld. File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report.

	Dimension	Rating
01	Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance	strong
02	Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity	strong
03	Organization & Key-Person Risk	strong
04	Product & Engineering Maturity	adequate
05	Security & Reliability Posture	adequate
06	Observability & Operations	strong
07	Fit with the Acquirer	not assessable

strong adequate significant findings not assessable from a repository

Provenance disclosure does not affect any rating

1% of added lines arrived in commits declaring an AI agent as co-author

The surviving-lines measurement was not run on this repository.

2% of lines added in the last 12 months (since 2025-10-22) arrived in AI-declared commits: 35/5,305 commits, confidence high. Also a floor.

35/24,361 commits declaring an agent · Claude Fable 5, Claude Opus 4.6, Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) and 10 more

confidence: high

71% of non-merge commits carry any trailer at all
no widespread author/committer date divergence

2,798,184 lines excluded as lockfiles, vendored or generated.

This is a lower bound. It counts what the repository declares. Undeclared AI authorship is invisible here, and a single rebase removes the trailers this rests on. Absence of a declaration is absence of disclosure, not absence of AI authorship.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · strong · ratings ↑

A note that does not affect this rating

01.6

authentik/core/models.py is 1,698 lines, 28× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 59 lines. 3 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 1,698. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

A note that does not affect this rating: measured against its own codebase's median, it is below the 85th percentile of 382 surveyed projects' largest files, where this check begins to count.

Evidence

line-count	`authentik/core/models.py:1` — 1,698 lines (28× median)
line-count	`web/src/elements/table/Table.ts:1` — 1,285 lines (21× median)
line-count	`authentik/core/api/users.py:1` — 1,121 lines (19× median)

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · strong · ratings ↑

A note that does not affect this rating

02.16

Tests are retried until they pass

adequate

The suite is configured to retry failing tests (authentik/root/test_runner.py). A retry turns a flaky test green without saying why it failed, so a green build means the tests passed eventually. Ask how many retries a typical run needs, and which tests need them.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

authentik/root/test_runner.py authentik/root/test_runner.py:62 — test retry

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · strong · ratings ↑

No finding. 10 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · adequate · ratings ↑

04.3

106 direct dependencies in a single manifest

adequate

web/package.json declares 106 direct dependencies. Each one is a maintenance obligation, a supply-chain surface and a potential licence question that transfers with the asset. The count says nothing about whether any given dependency was a good choice; it says how many such choices a buyer inherits.

Evidence

direct-dependencies	`web/package.json` — 106 declared
direct-dependencies	`pyproject.toml` — 79 declared
direct-dependencies	`go.mod` — 26 declared
direct-dependencies	`website/api/package.json` — 26 declared

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

04.19

20% of bug fixes add or change a test

adequate

Of 998 fixes in the last 24 months, 197 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.

Evidence

fix commits touching tests

197 of 998

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

A note that does not affect this rating

04.62

Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed

adequate

The newest release, version/2026.8.5, is not on the branch this survey read; the newest release on it is version/2024.6.0. The shipped product may differ from what this report describes. Survey the release branch too.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

4ec0d19b9

tag version/2026.8.5

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · adequate · ratings ↑

05.1

3 credential-shaped strings in the tree sit in tests, examples, documentation or local development settings

adequate

Strings shaped like credentials appear only where fakes are usual: test fixtures, examples, documentation, placeholders and local stacks. They are almost always fakes. Ask someone to confirm that none of them works anywhere, because a real key in a development file is still a real key.

Evidence

Slack token	2 cited: Slack token, where fakes are usual
private key block	private key block, where fakes are usual
	File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report.

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.6

1 Dockerfile runs the application as root

adequate

No USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.

Evidence

no-USER-instruction website/Dockerfile — runs as root

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.26

63 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 69 high or critical in what ships

adequate worth checking first

63 of 3,449 locked dependencies match 160 published advisories in OSV, 89 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.

The check that found this reads significant, but it has not yet held up often enough in Borehole's calibration to rate a finding significant on its own. Opening web/pnpm-lock.yaml and the 1 other file it cites settles it. If it holds when someone checks it, this finding is significant.

Evidence

web/pnpm-lock.yaml	`web/pnpm-lock.yaml` — @xhmikosr/decompress 11.1.3: GHSA-hrh2-vp3x-79xf (critical), fixed in 11.1.4
website/pnpm-lock.yaml	`website/pnpm-lock.yaml` — dompurify 3.4.12: GHSA-cg2g-xh64-v4q7 (critical), fixed in 3.4.17
web/pnpm-lock.yaml	`web/pnpm-lock.yaml` — dompurify 3.4.13: GHSA-cg2g-xh64-v4q7 (critical), fixed in 3.4.17

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.61

Part of the code is under a separate licence: authentik/enterprise/

adequate

A directory named for a paid edition carries its own licence. That code is usually not open source even where the rest is; what the buyer may do with each part differs.

Evidence

authentik/enterprise/LICENSE authentik/enterprise/LICENSE — licence: unrecognised

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.65

35 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 25 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-09-09. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. GHSA-cxwx-9x59-28qm (high), GHSA-qgqp-xh8r-v73r (high), GHSA-h6c5-mpvq-j4jc (high) and 11 more are fixed in the surveyed commit; which release carries them cannot be told from this history, which does not place the release users run. Answer lives in: the version you run.

Evidence

GHSA-cxwx-9x59-28qm	2026-09-09: GHSA-cxwx-9x59-28qm (high), fixed in 2026.2.7: Denial of Service via Malformed SAML Messages
GHSA-qgqp-xh8r-v73r	2026-09-09: GHSA-qgqp-xh8r-v73r (high), fixed in 2026.2.7: MFA bypass via recipient override in the email authenticator
GHSA-h6c5-mpvq-j4jc	2026-09-09: GHSA-h6c5-mpvq-j4jc (high), fixed in 2026.2.7: Privilege escalation via delegated group and user management
GHSA-m9h4-7j9c-55x9	2026-09-09: GHSA-m9h4-7j9c-55x9 (high), fixed in 2026.2.7: Certain stored credentials readable with view permission alone
GHSA-cqj8-fxxf-9pg7	2026-09-09: GHSA-cqj8-fxxf-9pg7 (high), fixed in 2026.2.7: Authentication bypass in SAML Sources via assertion confusion and replay

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Notes that do not affect this rating

05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

2 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day; 1 step pipes a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

.github/workflows/release-publish.yml	`.github/workflows/release-publish.yml:82` — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/release-publish.yml	`.github/workflows/release-publish.yml:196` — action pinned by tag
lifecycle/container/Dockerfile	`lifecycle/container/Dockerfile:77` — download piped into a shell

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.22

5 deserialisers that can run code

adequate

5 places read data with a deserialiser that executes what it reads (pickle). That is safe on data the system wrote itself and remote code execution on anything else. Ask where each one's input comes from.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

authentik/core/sessions.py	`authentik/core/sessions.py:113` — code-executing deserialiser
packages/django-dramatiq-postgres/django_dramatiq_postgres/models.py	`packages/django-dramatiq-postgres/django_dramatiq_postgres/models.py:187` — code-executing deserialiser
packages/django-dramatiq-postgres/django_dramatiq_postgres/models.py	`packages/django-dramatiq-postgres/django_dramatiq_postgres/models.py:188` — code-executing deserialiser

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.9

2 vendored components with no licence

adequate

Third-party code is committed into this repository without any statement of the terms it arrived under. Unknown terms are harder to deal with than inconvenient ones: an awkward licence can be complied with, an absent one cannot. Each of these needs its origin established before the code changes hands.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

authentik/sources/ldap/sync/vendor/freeipa.py	`authentik/sources/ldap/sync/vendor/freeipa.py` — 1 tracked files, no licence file
authentik/sources/ldap/sync/vendor/ms_ad.py	`authentik/sources/ldap/sync/vendor/ms_ad.py` — 1 tracked files, no licence file

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.60

Relicensed: MIT → GPL-3.0 (2020-12-24) → MIT (2022-11-03)

adequate

The root licence changed 2 time(s). Code taken under earlier terms stays under them; check which terms any fork or customer relied on.

A note that does not affect this rating: a licence change is a fact for the first screen, and only a narrowing of rights within two years of the surveyed commit costs "strong".

Evidence

d307d142d	`LICENSE` — MIT from 2018-12-26
4998ccbe4	`LICENSE` — GPL-3.0 from 2020-12-24
47132faff	`LICENSE` — MIT from 2022-11-03

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Observability & Operations

06 · strong · ratings ↑

No finding. 16 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · not assessable · ratings ↑

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository. What a person adds here.

Check it on the running system

5 checks against the running system follow from the findings above: what a buyer's engineer will try, how to run it first, and what to have ready. A paid survey of this repository includes them. See the tiers.

A paid survey of a public repository is also reviewed: a language model reads each finding against the code and withdraws only findings it judges the code contradicts, each listed with its reason. The review is a language model's reading of the findings against the code, and it can be wrong. It never adds a finding, never raises a band, and never removes a finding from a proven check or an advisory that affects the surveyed version.

What a person adds

The survey reads what the repository can show. The code cannot settle these questions, and on them this report states nothing. Each says where its answer lives: your own engineer, the company, or an assessor you choose can settle it. Questions marked measured open with something this repository shows.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · full coverage

measured No architecture or design document is in the tree, across 5,051 product files. Where does the design live, and who holds it? Answer lives in: The team01.38
Is the architecture right for the next three years of the product? Answer lives in: Your architects, with the product roadmap01.39
Were the home-grown components reasonable choices when they were made, and are they now? Answer lives in: The team's reasoning at the time01.40

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · high coverage

Is review real or a rubber stamp? Comment depth and time to approve need the pull request history. Answer lives in: The code host's pull request data02.32
Is delivery planned and measured, or heroic? Answer lives in: The issue tracker: backlog, sprint history, estimate accuracy02.38
How are incidents run, reviewed and learned from? Answer lives in: Tickets, chat and postmortems02.37

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · partial coverage

measured One contributor authored more than half of the commits in this history. Is that person part of the transaction, and for how long after it? Answer lives in: The deal terms03.29
Who mentors whom, and would that survive a departure? Answer lives in: The team; review history only suggests candidates03.28
Can the team grow, and who stands behind the top three contributors? Answer lives in: Recruiting data and the org chart03.30
Is the seniority mix sound, and will pay survive your salary bands? Answer lives in: HR data03.31
Is the pace sustainable? Commit times cannot say: git keeps no reliable local time. Answer lives in: Interviews and on-call history03.14
Does the team want to stay after close? Answer lives in: Interviews03.32
How are decisions made and disagreements resolved? Answer lives in: Time with the team03.33

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · minimal coverage

measured 2,670 commits landed in the last year, against 1,890 the year before (+41%). What drove it: new people, a deadline, or code produced faster than before? Answer lives in: The team04.11
measured No experiment tracking is configured in the repository. How was the shipped model trained and evaluated, and could it be reproduced? Answer lives in: The ML team and its run history04.34
measured No model card is in the tree. What is the model's intended use, what was it trained on, and where does it fail? Answer lives in: The ML team04.35
Can this team deliver the stated roadmap on the stated timeline? Answer lives in: The data room and the team's record of estimates04.32
Does leadership know about the debt, and is time budgeted to repay it? Answer lives in: Budget and roadmap decisions04.31
Is the engineering shape consistent with the commercial story? Answer lives in: Revenue, customer and churn data04.33

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · partial coverage

measured No threat model is in the tree of what looks like a running service. Does one exist elsewhere, and who owns it? Answer lives in: The security owner05.43
What has actually broken, how often, and how badly? Answer lives in: Ticketing and chat05.41
What did external testing find, and was it fixed? Answer lives in: Reports in the data room05.42
What is the SOC 2, ISO 27001 or GDPR status, and where is the evidence? Answer lives in: Audit reports; policy files in the tree are not evidence05.44

Observability & Operations

06 · partial coverage

measured Nothing in the tree backs up or restores data. How is data backed up, and has a restore ever been rehearsed? Answer lives in: The operations team06.19
measured No alert rule is defined in the repository. Where are alerts defined, who receives them, and when did one last fire? Answer lives in: The alerting tool and the on-call rota06.10
Are the dashboards opened, the alerts acknowledged and the pages answered? Answer lives in: Pager history and dashboard logs06.29
Are the service-level objectives actually met? Answer lives in: Production metrics06.30
Who carries the pager, and how often does it go off? Answer lives in: Pager exports and interviews06.31
What does it cost to run, and how much headroom is there? Answer lives in: Cloud billing and capacity plans06.32

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · none coverage

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

This is primarily a TypeScript codebase, with Python alongside (43% of source files). Does your engineering organisation already run TypeScript in production, or would this be the first? 07.1
The bulk of this system sits in web/, packages/, website/. Which of your existing systems would each of those have to absorb or replace? 07.10
The repository carries deployment configuration (authentik/outposts/controllers/k8s/__init__.py and 19 more). Does that match your deployment and on-call model, or does it need rehosting first? 07.2
What is your tolerance for the findings above remaining unaddressed for the first two quarters after close, given everything else that will compete for this team's time?
Which of these systems duplicate yours, and which get retired? Answer lives in: Your architecture07.11
What will integration cost, and in what order? Answer lives in: The engagement07.12
Where does the team land in your organisation, and who reports to whom? Answer lives in: Your org design07.13
Are there earn-outs, retention packages or contractor IP to assign? Answer lives in: Deal terms07.14
Do customer contracts limit hosting, regions or vendors? Answer lives in: Customer contracts07.15

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Rejection log — 90 signals that ran and did not fire

Appendix: rejection log — 90 signals that ran and did not fire

Published on purpose. A signal that looked and decided not to fire has told you something, and this is the calibration data behind every threshold above.

Looked, and found nothing — 77

Signal	What it found
04.hotspot_concentration	change is spread across the codebase rather than pooling in a few filesfiles 18,461 · top5 share 0.025
04.debt_markers	debt markers are sparsemarkers 92 · per kloc 0.14 · lines read 655,676
04.churn_trend	rework is not rising against new worklate delete per insert 0.233 · early delete per insert 0.665
04.eol_runtime	every pinned runtime is still supportedeol as of 2026-09-24
04.fix_share_trend	fixing is not crowding out building
04.schema_churn	columns, once added, staydropped within 90 days 1 · columns added last year 113
04.compat_layers	little code is kept for the old wayshare 0.001 · code files 4,274 · compat files 3
04.dependency_redundancy	one library per job, mostly
06.telemetry_presence	a telemetry or error-reporting library is referencednote presence only; whether anyone watches it is not visible here · matches 72
06.structured_logging	a structured logging library is referencedmatches 268
06.healthcheck_presence	a health or readiness check is defined
06.telemetry_depth	the service is visible in more than one way
06.correlation_ids	a request can be followed through the logstracing True · request id sites 32
06.error_reporting	an error reporter is initialisedinitialised 2 · config files 0
06.usage_reporting_default	the product's code names no reporting hostsettings on 0 · settings off 0
06.deployed_image_floats	every deployed image names a versionimages 3 · floating 0
06.environment_branching	environment differences live in configurationsites 0
06.release_markers	releases are markedtags last year 58 · release commits 0 · changelog commits 15
06.migrate_on_start	migrations do not run at container start
03.contributor_concentration	no single contributor dominates the last 24 monthsyears 7.9 · window last 24 months · authors 629
03.active_contributors	more than one contributor active in the trailing yearall time 629 · active 12mo 221
03.knowledge_silos	every substantial directory has been touched by more than one personauthors 629 · directories 10
03.drive_by_contributors	an open contributor base, where one-commit contributors are normalauthors 629 · one off share 0.741
03.contributor_attrition	the dominant contributor is still activeauthors 629 · top share more than half · top contributor last committed within the last three months
03.critical_path_ownership	more than one person changes the critical pathsauthors 353
03.second_contributor_attrition	the second and third contributors are still active
03.bus_factor_trend	the team has not narrowed to one person
03.joiners_and_leavers	the team is not shrinkingleft 5 · joined 22 · regular last year 33
02.merge_discipline	a meaningful share of recent change carries evidence of reviewmerges 0 · window last 24 months · with tracked 132
02.ci_presence	CI configuration is present in the working treecount 27
02.test_presence	tests are present in a normal proportion to sourcetests 695 · source 4,930 · test ratio 0.141
02.release_cadence	tags are presenttags 470
02.conventional_commits	commit subjects generally carry contentsampled 24,361 · low content share 0.0
02.branch_protection_hints	process scaffolding is present in the repository
02.ci_runs_tests	CI invokes a test runnerconfigs 27 · with tests 6
02.skipped_tests	few tests are switched offfocused 0 · skipped 4 · test files 759
02.ci_test_gating	no test run in CI is written so that it cannot failconfigs 27
02.revert_share	change is rarely undoneshare 0.002 · reverts 7 · recent commits 4,562
02.dependency_update_cadence	dependencies move with the codelockfiles 6 · commits since 6 · days since lockfile changed 0
02.lint_in_build	a linter or formatter runs in the buildwired 17 · ci configs 27 · product files 4,274
02.commit_size	changes arrive in reviewable sizesshare 0.018 · commits 3,515 · over 2000 lines 64
01.burst_import	no commit run met both the rate and the net-addition thresholdgap seconds 180 · min add ratio 3.0 · min net added 2,000
01.initial_dump	first commit is not a disproportionate share of the codebaseinsertions 360 · share of insertions 0.0001
01.message_uniformity	commit subjects vary in wording and lengthlength stdev 17.83 · repeat share 0.029
01.revision_depth	most files were revisited after they were first writtenfiles seen 4,742 · write once share 0.255
01.duplicated_blocks	little shipping code is repeated verbatim across filesshare 0.0124 · product files 3,006 · distinct blocks 161,117
01.swallowed_errors	errors are rarely thrown awayloc 661,040 · files 34 · per kloc 0.06
01.build_reproducibility	every base image names a versionfloating 0 · from lines 18
01.unfinished_migration	no language migration is stalled halfway
01.weights_in_git	no model weights are committedfiles 0
05.security_guardrails	at least one standard guard rail is configured
05.dependency_pinning	a lockfile is committed, so builds are reproduciblelockfile True
05.license_present	a licence file is presentfound True
05.secrets_management_pattern	no environment file is committed outside tests and examplesenv files 0
05.outbound_timeouts	outbound calls set timeouts, or are fewcalls without timeout 0
05.migration_reversibility	migrations can be rolled backshare 0.057 · migrations 597 · irreversible 34
05.sql_from_strings	no SQL is assembled from strings in product codefiles 0 · sites 0 · value interpolated 0
05.shell_from_strings	product code does not build shell commands from stringssites 0
05.tls_verification_off	no TLS verification is switched off in product codefiles 0 · sites 0 · pinned instead 0
05.privileged_workloads	no workload runs privileged or in the host's namespacessites 0 · behind a setting or built here 0
05.credentials_in_deploy_config	deployment configuration references secrets, never holds themfiles 0 · sites 0
05.public_env_secret	only publishable values carry a public prefixnames 0 · sites 0 · not secrets 0
05.unsafe_html	raw HTML is rare, literal or sanitisedsites 0
05.source_maps_shipped	production builds do not publish source mapssites 0
05.signing_material	no signing keystore or profile is committedfiles 0
05.dataset_provenance	little data is committeddata files 0 · licence or card files 0
05.license_copyleft_inherited	every licence found in vendored code is permissive or weak-copyleftvendored paths 12
05.license_grant_unclear	the licence is recognisable as MITclass permissive · license MIT
05.committed_native_libraries	no widely used compiled library is committed to the productlibraries 0
04.api_versions_coexisting	one API version is served, or none
04.deprecations_lingering	few deprecations have outlived two yearsolder than two years 0 · files with deprecations 18
04.dependency_churn	few dependencies were added and dropped within 60 daysdependencies seen 349 · added in two years 209 · removed within 60 days 3
04.ci_platforms_dropped	no platform was dropped from CI in the last two years
04.repository_status	the README's first screen states no end, move or freezestatements 0
02.development_elsewhere	nothing says development happens elsewhereno pr statements 0 · mirror statements 0 · replayed commit share 0.0
04.releases_stopped	releases keep pace with developmentmedian gap days 6.0 · days since last tag 1 · commits last 90 days 1,518
03.single_maintainer	no file says one person maintains itstatements 0

Could not conclude, or did not apply — 13

Not a clean result. Each says why it could not answer here.

Signal	Why
04.test_growth	tests are kept inside the files they test, which a count by file name cannot see
06.print_logging	a frontend: console output is the browser's, not the server's
06.alert_rules	no alert rules in the repository; they may live in a console
06.probes_identical	no Kubernetes probes
06.single_replica	no Kubernetes deployments
06.feature_flags	no feature-flag service; flags may live elsewhere
02.long_lived_branches	too few merges to judge (squash and rebase leave none)
01.notebook_outputs	too few notebooks
05.resource_limits	no Kubernetes workload manifests
05.cleartext_traffic	not a mobile app
05.license_manifest_conflict	no packaging manifest states a licence
04.flags_accumulating	few or no feature flags in the history
05.project_exploited	no affecting advisory is on CISA's Known Exploited list

Anyone can check this report against the authoritative record — click the stamp, or enter J25D-PZ9R-KQ7W at borehole.dev/verify.

The code commits to the 106 checks this run performed, the bands they produced, and the commit they were read at. It does not cover checks written since.

Put the mark in your README

The image is wrapped in a link to the verification page, so a reader can check it rather than take it on trust. If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.

[![Borehole reading, not a certification](https://borehole.dev/badge/goauthentik/authentik/678beb6.svg "Borehole free reading: not for reliance. See the full report.")](https://borehole.dev/verify/J25DPZ9RKQ7W?via=badge)

Where this scan ran

This scan ran on ordinary cloud infrastructure (cloud-run), not in a hardware-isolated confidential VM. Nothing about it is attested by Google.

What an attested survey proves, and what it does not.

What this scan did with the repository — 7 steps

Written by the steps themselves as they ran, not described afterwards. A hand-written account of a data flow drifts the first time somebody changes the flow and not the account.

At	Step	Detail
0.0s	read repository metadata from the GitHub API	size mb: 747.7authenticated: False
71.2s	cloned the repository to a temporary directory	depth: full
130.9s	read the git history	commits: 24728tracked files: 6522
417.8s	ran the deterministic checks	blame pass: Falseread working tree: False
417.9s	recorded where this scan ran	attested: Falseenvironment: cloud-run
588.9s	kept the facts, never the source, for re-reading under new checks
588.9s	deleting the working copy

Total 588.9s ·source content sent off this machine: none · calls to a language model: 0 · the clone was deleted when the survey ended

An automated reading of a repository's code and its history up to one commit, with public advisory records. It may be wrong, it is not legal, financial, investment or security advice, and it does not replace diligence by a qualified person. It is provided for information: nobody may rely on it (Borehole's terms, section 3).

BOREHOLE 0.7.15 DETERMINISTIC LAYER · NO MODEL CALLSREAD ON BOREHOLE'S SERVER · CLONE DELETED TAKEDOWNCONTRIBUTED TO THIS REPOSITORY? YOUR RIGHTS