Borehole · Project · free tier
getredash/redash
Free reading: not for reliance
cdc39a2 · 8,009 commits · 1,420 files
Read 2026-10-23

getredash/redash: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in getredash/redash's code and history at cdc39a2: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenancestrong
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturitystrong
Product & Engineering Maturityadequate
Security & Reliability Postureadequate
Observability & Operationsadequate
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

What the repository says

  • Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

strong
01.6

redash/models/__init__.py is 1,539 lines, 21× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 72 lines. 1 file exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 1,539. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

Evidence
redash/models/__init__.py:1 — 1,539 lines (21× median)
01.33

A move from JavaScript to TypeScript began 76 months ago and is 38% done

adequate

174 product files are in the new language and 287 are still in the old one, 76 months after the first new file appeared. The new language's share of the lines rose from 0% to 34%, and moved 0 percentage points in the last year. Two languages for one job doubles what an engineer has to know, and the unmoved half is usually what nobody wants to touch. Ask whether finishing it is planned, and what it costs.

Evidence
287 old, 174 new

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

strong

No finding.

Product & Engineering Maturity

adequate
04.2

890 unresolved debt markers, 8.5 per thousand lines

adequate

The codebase carries 890 TODO, FIXME, HACK or XXX markers across 104,099 lines. These are the team's own notes about work they knew was unfinished. A high density is not automatically bad — it can mean an honest team — but every one of them is a decision deferred, and after an acquisition they are deferred onto someone who was not in the room.

Evidence
client/.eslintrc.js:49 — message: "Please use 'import XXX from antd/lib/XXX' import instead.",
client/.eslintrc.js:53 — message: "Please use 'import XXX from antd/lib/XXX' import instead.",
client/app/components/ApplicationArea/routeWithUserSession.tsx:64 — {/* @ts-expect-error FIXME */}
client/app/components/ApplicationArea/routeWithUserSession.tsx:70 — } /* : { handleError: UserSessionWrapperRenderChildrenProps<P>["onError"] } FIXME bring ba
client/app/components/InputWithCopy.jsx:47 — {/* TODO: lacks visual feedback */}
04.62

Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed

adequate

The newest release, v26.9.0, is not on the branch this survey read; the newest release on it is v5.0.0. The shipped product may differ from what this report describes. Survey the release branch too.

Evidence
tag v26.9.0

Security & Reliability Posture

adequate
05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

8 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

Evidence
.github/workflows/ci.yml:66 — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/ci.yml:90 — action pinned by tag
05.13

18 outbound calls can wait forever

adequate

18 HTTP calls use a client with no timeout (Python `requests` without `timeout=`, or Go's default client). When a dependency slows down, each one holds a worker until the connection gives up, and enough of them take the service down with the dependency.

Evidence
redash/authentication/google_oauth.py:34 — outbound call without a timeout
redash/authentication/jwt_auth.py:22 — outbound call without a timeout
redash/query_runner/big_query_gce.py:28 — outbound call without a timeout
05.17

9 of 29 migrations cannot be rolled back

adequate

9 schema migrations (31%) have no working way back: an empty `downgrade`, a `down` that does nothing, or a data migration with no reverse. A bad deploy that includes one is recovered from a backup, not reverted. Ask when a restore was last rehearsed.

05.26

67 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 21 high or critical in what ships

adequate

67 of 2,093 locked dependencies match 140 published advisories in OSV, 73 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version.

Evidence
uv.lock — certifi 2025.1.31: GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2 (critical), fixed in 2026.10.19
pnpm-lock.yaml — maplibre-gl 4.7.1: GHSA-jrc7-96c5-q579 (critical), fixed in 6.4.1
uv.lock — anyio 4.5.2: GHSA-82r6-8w77-94w6 (critical), fixed in 4.14.2; a development dependency
05.65

14 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 6 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-09-24. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 10 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 5.0.0. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version. The record is incomplete: NVD: 1 record names redash with nothing tying it to this repository (CVE-2025-5874).

Evidence
2026-09-24: GHSA-vf3c-8663-w8pf (high), fixed in 26.9.0: View-only users can execute arbitrary SQL through email addresses in query annotations
2026-09-24: GHSA-gcw6-vrqh-rpfg (high), fixed in 26.9.0: Query API keys can read unrelated queries through the dropdown endpoint
2026-09-24: GHSA-g5q6-jghf-254r (high), fixed in 26.9.0: Custom JavaScript visualizations are enabled by default and run with viewer privileges
2026-09-24: GHSA-v5m6-3vvm-h6gc (high), fixed in 26.9.0: View-only users can execute arbitrary SQL through text-pattern and undeclared query parameters
2026-09-24: GHSA-rpvq-m6v3-4qx3 (low), fixed in 26.9.0: Missing authorization on object ACL listing endpoint

Observability & Operations

adequate
06.2

No structured logging library is in use

adequate

Nothing references a structured logging library. Logs that are written to be read by a person are not searchable by a machine, which means incident response here is proportional to how well someone remembers the codebase rather than to what the tooling can find.

Evidence
searched 988 files for 10 structured logging libraries; 0 matched
06.8

One request cannot be followed through the logs

adequate

Nothing in the service carries a request or correlation id, and there is no tracing. When a customer reports a failure, the log lines that belong to their request cannot be picked out from everyone else's.

Evidence
no request id, correlation id or tracing found

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

Read more, or read your own

The full report on getredash/redash: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.

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