Borehole · Risk register · free tier

getredash/redash

Free reading: not for reliance

cdc39a2 · 8,009 commits · 1,420 files
Issued 2026-10-23

Nothing significant. Questions worth asking about Security & Reliability Posture, Product & Engineering Maturity.

105 checks ran across 6 assessable dimensions. 2 findings are worth checking first. 11 findings, each with evidence. One dimension cannot be assessed without an acquirer.

What the repository says about itself

04.62 Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed

Worth checking first

Borehole's proprietary scoring is calibrated across hundreds of repositories. Each finding here reads significant, but its check has not yet held up often enough in that calibration to rate significant on its own. If one holds when someone checks it, it is significant.

05.26 67 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 21 high or critical in what ships
04.2 890 unresolved debt markers, 8.5 per thousand lines

What this survey read. This commit may not be the product users run: its package.json gives the version 26.10.0-dev, a development or pre-release version; The newest release, v26.9.0, is not on the branch this survey read; the newest release on it is v5.0.0. Read this report as describing that commit, not the release users run. Survey the release branch or tag as well.

Published under today's rules. The verification code attests to this reading as it was stored. This page differs from it as follows.

1 finding from checks Borehole's calibration found wrong more often than right is no longer published.

	Dimension	Rating
01	Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance	strong
02	Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity	strong
03	Organization & Key-Person Risk	strong
04	Product & Engineering Maturity	adequate
05	Security & Reliability Posture	adequate
06	Observability & Operations	adequate
07	Fit with the Acquirer	not assessable

strong adequate significant findings not assessable from a repository

Provenance disclosure does not affect any rating

16% of the code standing today was written in AI-declared commits

16% of lines still in the tree 25,977 of 158,746 2% of lines ever added these differ when early hand-written code has since been replaced

67% of lines added in the last 12 months (since 2025-10-23) arrived in AI-declared commits: 27/84 commits, confidence low. Also a floor.

27/6,521 commits declaring an agent · Claude Fable 5, Claude Fable 5.1, Claude Opus 4.6 and 5 more

confidence: moderate

7% of non-merge commits carry any trailer at all
low trailer coverage: the convention may not be in consistent use
no widespread author/committer date divergence
deep scan blamed 1,401 of 1,401 counted files

178,888 lines excluded as lockfiles, vendored or generated.

This is a lower bound. It counts what the repository declares. Undeclared AI authorship is invisible here, and a single rebase removes the trailers this rests on. Absence of a declaration is absence of disclosure, not absence of AI authorship.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · strong · ratings ↑

Notes that do not affect this rating

01.6

redash/models/init.py is 1,539 lines, 21× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 72 lines. 1 file exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 1,539. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

A note that does not affect this rating: measured against its own codebase's median, it is below the 85th percentile of 382 surveyed projects' largest files, where this check begins to count.

Evidence

line-count redash/models/__init__.py:1 — 1,539 lines (21× median)

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.

01.33

A move from JavaScript to TypeScript began 76 months ago and is 38% done

adequate

174 product files are in the new language and 287 are still in the old one, 76 months after the first new file appeared. The new language's share of the lines rose from 0% to 34%, and moved 0 percentage points in the last year. Two languages for one job doubles what an engineer has to know, and the unmoved half is usually what nobody wants to touch. Ask whether finishing it is planned, and what it costs.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

file counts

287 old, 174 new

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · strong · ratings ↑

No finding. 16 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · strong · ratings ↑

No finding. 10 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · adequate · ratings ↑

04.2

890 unresolved debt markers, 8.5 per thousand lines

adequate worth checking first

The codebase carries 890 TODO, FIXME, HACK or XXX markers across 104,099 lines. These are the team's own notes about work they knew was unfinished. A high density is not automatically bad — it can mean an honest team — but every one of them is a decision deferred, and after an acquisition they are deferred onto someone who was not in the room.

The check that found this reads significant, but it has not yet held up often enough in Borehole's calibration to rate a finding significant on its own. Opening client/.eslintrc.js:49 and the 2 other files it cites settles it. If it holds when someone checks it, this finding is significant.

Evidence

debt-marker	`client/.eslintrc.js:49` — message: "Please use 'import XXX from antd/lib/XXX' import instead.",
debt-marker	`client/.eslintrc.js:53` — message: "Please use 'import XXX from antd/lib/XXX' import instead.",
debt-marker	`client/app/components/ApplicationArea/routeWithUserSession.tsx:64` — {/* @ts-expect-error FIXME */}
debt-marker	`client/app/components/ApplicationArea/routeWithUserSession.tsx:70` — } /* : { handleError: UserSessionWrapperRenderChildrenProps<P>["onError"] } FIXME bring ba
debt-marker	`client/app/components/InputWithCopy.jsx:47` — {/* TODO: lacks visual feedback */}

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

A note that does not affect this rating

04.62

Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed

adequate

The newest release, v26.9.0, is not on the branch this survey read; the newest release on it is v5.0.0. The shipped product may differ from what this report describes. Survey the release branch too.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

42fdf9d4a

tag v26.9.0

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · adequate · ratings ↑

05.17

9 of 29 migrations cannot be rolled back

adequate

9 schema migrations (31%) have no working way back: an empty `downgrade`, a `down` that does nothing, or a data migration with no reverse. A bad deploy that includes one is recovered from a backup, not reverted. Ask when a restore was last rehearsed.

Evidence

migrations/versions/0f740a081d20_inline_tags.py	`migrations/versions/0f740a081d20_inline_tags.py:37` — migration with no way back
migrations/versions/1655999df5e3_default_alert_selector.py	`migrations/versions/1655999df5e3_default_alert_selector.py:25` — migration with no way back
migrations/versions/73beceabb948_bring_back_null_schedule.py	`migrations/versions/73beceabb948_bring_back_null_schedule.py:56` — migration with no way back

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.26

67 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 21 high or critical in what ships

adequate worth checking first

67 of 2,093 locked dependencies match 140 published advisories in OSV, 73 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version.

The check that found this reads significant, but it has not yet held up often enough in Borehole's calibration to rate a finding significant on its own. Opening uv.lock and the 1 other file it cites settles it. If it holds when someone checks it, this finding is significant.

Evidence

uv.lock	`uv.lock` — certifi 2025.1.31: GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2 (critical), fixed in 2026.10.19
pnpm-lock.yaml	`pnpm-lock.yaml` — maplibre-gl 4.7.1: GHSA-jrc7-96c5-q579 (critical), fixed in 6.4.1
uv.lock	`uv.lock` — anyio 4.5.2: GHSA-82r6-8w77-94w6 (critical), fixed in 4.14.2; a development dependency

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Notes that do not affect this rating

05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

8 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

.github/workflows/ci.yml	`.github/workflows/ci.yml:66` — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/ci.yml	`.github/workflows/ci.yml:90` — action pinned by tag

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.13

18 outbound calls can wait forever

adequate

18 HTTP calls use a client with no timeout (Python `requests` without `timeout=`, or Go's default client). When a dependency slows down, each one holds a worker until the connection gives up, and enough of them take the service down with the dependency.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

redash/authentication/google_oauth.py	`redash/authentication/google_oauth.py:34` — outbound call without a timeout
redash/authentication/jwt_auth.py	`redash/authentication/jwt_auth.py:22` — outbound call without a timeout
redash/query_runner/big_query_gce.py	`redash/query_runner/big_query_gce.py:28` — outbound call without a timeout

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.65

14 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 6 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-09-24. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 10 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 5.0.0. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version. The record is incomplete: NVD: 1 record names redash with nothing tying it to this repository (CVE-2025-5874).

A note that does not affect this rating: it describes the project's advisory record, and no advisory in it is known to affect the surveyed commit.

Evidence

GHSA-vf3c-8663-w8pf	2026-09-24: GHSA-vf3c-8663-w8pf (high), fixed in 26.9.0: View-only users can execute arbitrary SQL through email addresses in query annotations
GHSA-gcw6-vrqh-rpfg	2026-09-24: GHSA-gcw6-vrqh-rpfg (high), fixed in 26.9.0: Query API keys can read unrelated queries through the dropdown endpoint
GHSA-g5q6-jghf-254r	2026-09-24: GHSA-g5q6-jghf-254r (high), fixed in 26.9.0: Custom JavaScript visualizations are enabled by default and run with viewer privileges
GHSA-v5m6-3vvm-h6gc	2026-09-24: GHSA-v5m6-3vvm-h6gc (high), fixed in 26.9.0: View-only users can execute arbitrary SQL through text-pattern and undeclared query parameters
GHSA-rpvq-m6v3-4qx3	2026-09-24: GHSA-rpvq-m6v3-4qx3 (low), fixed in 26.9.0: Missing authorization on object ACL listing endpoint

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Observability & Operations

06 · adequate · ratings ↑

06.2

No structured logging library is in use

adequate

Nothing references a structured logging library. Logs that are written to be read by a person are not searchable by a machine, which means incident response here is proportional to how well someone remembers the codebase rather than to what the tooling can find.

Evidence

logging-scan

searched 988 files for 10 structured logging libraries; 0 matched

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

06.8

One request cannot be followed through the logs

adequate

Nothing in the service carries a request or correlation id, and there is no tracing. When a customer reports a failure, the log lines that belong to their request cannot be picked out from everyone else's.

Evidence

request ids

no request id, correlation id or tracing found

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · not assessable · ratings ↑

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository. What a person adds here.

Check it on the running system

4 checks against the running system follow from the findings above: what a buyer's engineer will try, how to run it first, and what to have ready. A paid survey of this repository includes them. See the tiers.

A paid survey of a public repository is also reviewed: a language model reads each finding against the code and withdraws only findings it judges the code contradicts, each listed with its reason. The review is a language model's reading of the findings against the code, and it can be wrong. It never adds a finding, never raises a band, and never removes a finding from a proven check or an advisory that affects the surveyed version.

What a person adds

The survey reads what the repository can show. The code cannot settle these questions, and on them this report states nothing. Each says where its answer lives: your own engineer, the company, or an assessor you choose can settle it. Questions marked measured open with something this repository shows.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · full coverage

measured No architecture or design document is in the tree, across 1,031 product files. Where does the design live, and who holds it? Answer lives in: The team01.38
Is the architecture right for the next three years of the product? Answer lives in: Your architects, with the product roadmap01.39
Were the home-grown components reasonable choices when they were made, and are they now? Answer lives in: The team's reasoning at the time01.40

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · high coverage

Is review real or a rubber stamp? Comment depth and time to approve need the pull request history. Answer lives in: The code host's pull request data02.32
Is delivery planned and measured, or heroic? Answer lives in: The issue tracker: backlog, sprint history, estimate accuracy02.38
How are incidents run, reviewed and learned from? Answer lives in: Tickets, chat and postmortems02.37

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · partial coverage

measured One contributor authored a quarter or more of the commits in this history. Is that person part of the transaction, and for how long after it? Answer lives in: The deal terms03.29
Who mentors whom, and would that survive a departure? Answer lives in: The team; review history only suggests candidates03.28
Can the team grow, and who stands behind the top three contributors? Answer lives in: Recruiting data and the org chart03.30
Is the seniority mix sound, and will pay survive your salary bands? Answer lives in: HR data03.31
Is the pace sustainable? Commit times cannot say: git keeps no reliable local time. Answer lives in: Interviews and on-call history03.14
Does the team want to stay after close? Answer lives in: Interviews03.32
How are decisions made and disagreements resolved? Answer lives in: Time with the team03.33

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · minimal coverage

Can this team deliver the stated roadmap on the stated timeline? Answer lives in: The data room and the team's record of estimates04.32
Does leadership know about the debt, and is time budgeted to repay it? Answer lives in: Budget and roadmap decisions04.31
Is the engineering shape consistent with the commercial story? Answer lives in: Revenue, customer and churn data04.33

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · partial coverage

measured No threat model is in the tree of what looks like a running service. Does one exist elsewhere, and who owns it? Answer lives in: The security owner05.43
What has actually broken, how often, and how badly? Answer lives in: Ticketing and chat05.41
What did external testing find, and was it fixed? Answer lives in: Reports in the data room05.42
What is the SOC 2, ISO 27001 or GDPR status, and where is the evidence? Answer lives in: Audit reports; policy files in the tree are not evidence05.44

Observability & Operations

06 · partial coverage

measured Nothing in the tree backs up or restores data. How is data backed up, and has a restore ever been rehearsed? Answer lives in: The operations team06.19
measured No alert rule is defined in the repository. Where are alerts defined, who receives them, and when did one last fire? Answer lives in: The alerting tool and the on-call rota06.10
Are the dashboards opened, the alerts acknowledged and the pages answered? Answer lives in: Pager history and dashboard logs06.29
Are the service-level objectives actually met? Answer lives in: Production metrics06.30
Who carries the pager, and how often does it go off? Answer lives in: Pager exports and interviews06.31
What does it cost to run, and how much headroom is there? Answer lives in: Cloud billing and capacity plans06.32

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · none coverage

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

This is primarily a JavaScript codebase, with Python alongside (30% of source files). Does your engineering organisation already run JavaScript in production, or would this be the first? 07.1
The bulk of this system sits in client/, redash/, viz-lib/. Which of your existing systems would each of those have to absorb or replace? 07.10
67% of lines added in the last 12 months (2% of added lines) came through AI-declared commits. Does your organisation have a policy on inheriting and maintaining that code, and does your engineering team's tooling match how it was produced? 07.9
The repository carries deployment configuration (.ci/Dockerfile.cypress and 1 more). Does that match your deployment and on-call model, or does it need rehosting first? 07.2
What is your tolerance for the findings above remaining unaddressed for the first two quarters after close, given everything else that will compete for this team's time?
Which of these systems duplicate yours, and which get retired? Answer lives in: Your architecture07.11
What will integration cost, and in what order? Answer lives in: The engagement07.12
Where does the team land in your organisation, and who reports to whom? Answer lives in: Your org design07.13
Are there earn-outs, retention packages or contractor IP to assign? Answer lives in: Deal terms07.14
Do customer contracts limit hosting, regions or vendors? Answer lives in: Customer contracts07.15

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Rejection log — 94 signals that ran and did not fire

Appendix: rejection log — 94 signals that ran and did not fire

Published on purpose. A signal that looked and decided not to fire has told you something, and this is the calibration data behind every threshold above.

Looked, and found nothing — 73

Signal	What it found
04.hotspot_concentration	change is spread across the codebase rather than pooling in a few filesfiles 3,739 · top5 share 0.051
04.dependency_sprawl	direct dependency counts are unremarkable
04.test_growth	test effort kept pace with code writtenlate test per code 0.497 · early test per code 0.177
04.churn_trend	rework is not rising against new worklate delete per insert 0.604 · early delete per insert 0.581
04.eol_runtime	every pinned runtime is still supportedeol as of 2026-09-24
04.compat_layers	little code is kept for the old wayshare 0.0 · code files 669 · compat files 0
04.dependency_redundancy	one library per job, mostly
06.telemetry_presence	a telemetry or error-reporting library is referencednote presence only; whether anyone watches it is not visible here · matches 17
06.healthcheck_presence	a health or readiness check is defined
06.telemetry_depth	the service is visible in more than one way
06.error_reporting	an error reporter is initialisedinitialised 1 · config files 0
06.usage_reporting_default	the product's code names no reporting hostsettings on 0 · settings off 0
06.environment_branching	environment differences live in configurationsites 0
06.migrate_on_start	migrations do not run at container start
03.contributor_concentration	no single contributor dominates the last 24 monthsyears 13.0 · window last 24 months · authors 529
03.active_contributors	more than one contributor active in the trailing yearall time 529 · active 12mo 26
03.knowledge_silos	every substantial directory has been touched by more than one personauthors 529 · directories 7
03.drive_by_contributors	an open contributor base, where one-commit contributors are normalauthors 529 · one off share 0.556
03.contributor_attrition	the dominant contributor is still activeauthors 529 · top share a quarter or more · top contributor last committed within the last three months
03.critical_path_ownership	more than one person changes the critical pathsauthors 44
03.second_contributor_attrition	the second and third contributors are still active
03.bus_factor_trend	the team has not narrowed to one person
02.merge_discipline	a meaningful share of recent change carries evidence of reviewmerges 0 · window last 24 months · with tracked 5
02.ci_presence	CI configuration is present in the working treecount 4
02.test_presence	tests are present in a normal proportion to sourcetests 209 · source 878 · test ratio 0.238
02.release_cadence	tags are presenttags 343
02.conventional_commits	commit subjects generally carry contentsampled 6,521 · low content share 0.015
02.branch_protection_hints	process scaffolding is present in the repository
02.ci_runs_tests	CI invokes a test runnerconfigs 4 · with tests 1
02.skipped_tests	few tests are switched offfocused 0 · skipped 2 · test files 324
02.ci_test_gating	no test run in CI is written so that it cannot failconfigs 4
02.revert_share	change is rarely undoneshare 0.0 · reverts 0 · recent commits 160
02.dependency_update_cadence	dependencies move with the codelockfiles 2 · commits since 4 · days since lockfile changed 24
02.flaky_test_markers	tests are not retried until they passtest retries 0 · suite retries 0
02.lint_in_build	a linter or formatter runs in the buildwired 6 · ci configs 4 · product files 669
02.commit_size	changes arrive in reviewable sizesshare 0.008 · commits 130 · over 2000 lines 1
01.burst_import	no commit run met both the rate and the net-addition thresholdgap seconds 180 · min add ratio 3.0 · min net added 2,000
01.initial_dump	first commit is not a disproportionate share of the codebaseinsertions 4,415 · share of insertions 0.008
01.message_uniformity	commit subjects vary in wording and lengthlength stdev 22.33 · repeat share 0.246
01.revision_depth	most files were revisited after they were first writtenfiles seen 931 · write once share 0.248
01.duplicated_blocks	little shipping code is repeated verbatim across filesshare 0.0116 · product files 669 · distinct blocks 47,991
01.swallowed_errors	errors are rarely thrown awayloc 105,080 · files 7 · per kloc 0.09
01.build_reproducibility	every base image names a versionfloating 0 · from lines 2
01.weights_in_git	no model weights are committedfiles 0
05.committed_secrets	no credential-shaped strings outside test and fixture pathsnote the working tree only; the history is 05.5 · patterns 8 · files read 988
05.security_guardrails	at least one standard guard rail is configured
05.dependency_pinning	a lockfile is committed, so builds are reproduciblelockfile True
05.license_present	a licence file is presentfound True
05.secrets_in_history	no credential-shaped string was ever added outside test and fixture pathspatterns 8 · truncated False · added lines 504,769
05.container_runs_as_root	every shipped Dockerfile drops to a non-root user or builds on a non-root base imagedockerfiles 1
05.secrets_management_pattern	no environment file is committed outside tests and examplesenv files 0
05.sql_from_strings	no SQL is assembled from strings in product codefiles 0 · sites 0 · value interpolated 0
05.shell_from_strings	product code does not build shell commands from stringssites 1
05.unsafe_deserialization	no code-executing deserialiser in product codesites 0
05.tls_verification_off	no TLS verification is switched off in product codefiles 0 · sites 0 · pinned instead 0
05.privileged_workloads	no workload runs privileged or in the host's namespacessites 0 · behind a setting or built here 0
05.public_env_secret	only publishable values carry a public prefixnames 0 · sites 0 · not secrets 0
05.unsafe_html	raw HTML is rare, literal or sanitisedsites 0
05.source_maps_shipped	production builds do not publish source mapssites 0
05.signing_material	no signing keystore or profile is committedfiles 0
05.license_manifest_conflict	manifest and licence file agree on BSD-2-Clauselicense BSD-2-Clause
05.license_vendored_unlicensed	no vendored third-party code is committedcomponents 0
05.license_grant_unclear	the licence is recognisable as BSD-2-Clauseclass permissive · license BSD-2-Clause
05.committed_native_libraries	no widely used compiled library is committed to the productlibraries 0
04.deprecations_lingering	few deprecations have outlived two yearsolder than two years 1 · files with deprecations 2
04.dependency_churn	few dependencies were added and dropped within 60 daysdependencies seen 312 · added in two years 18 · removed within 60 days 0
04.ci_platforms_dropped	no platform was dropped from CI in the last two years
04.repository_status	the README's first screen states no end, move or freezestatements 0
02.development_elsewhere	nothing says development happens elsewhereno pr statements 0 · mirror statements 0 · replayed commit share 0.0
05.licence_changes	the root licence has not changed in the history readlicence versions 1 · unreleased changes 0
05.paid_edition	no directory carries a separate paid-edition licencedirectories 0
04.releases_stopped	releases keep pace with developmentmedian gap days 28.0 · days since last tag 22 · commits last 90 days 34
03.single_maintainer	no file says one person maintains itstatements 0

Could not conclude, or did not apply — 21

Not a clean result. Each says why it could not answer here.

Signal	Why
04.fixes_with_tests	too few fixes in 24 months to judge
04.fix_share_trend	fewer than six busy quarters to compare
04.schema_churn	columns, once added, stay
06.print_logging	a frontend: console output is the browser's, not the server's
06.alert_rules	no alert rules in the repository; they may live in a console
06.deployed_image_floats	no deployment descriptor names an image
06.probes_identical	no Kubernetes probes
06.single_replica	no Kubernetes deployments
06.release_markers	fewer than 100 commits in the last year
06.feature_flags	no feature-flag service; flags may live elsewhere
03.joiners_and_leavers	too few regular contributors to see a trend
02.long_lived_branches	too few merges to judge (squash and rebase leave none)
01.notebook_outputs	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.resource_limits	no Kubernetes workload manifests
05.cleartext_traffic	not a mobile app
05.dataset_provenance	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.license_copyleft_inherited	no third-party code is committed to this repository, so the licences it depends on are resolved at build time and are not readable here
04.flags_accumulating	few or no feature flags in the history
04.api_versions_coexisting	one API version is served, or none
05.project_advisories	record incomplete: no advisory found in the sources that answered; OSV npm @redash/viz (an empty record for a package published here) did not; NVD: 1 record names redash with nothing tying it to this repository (CVE-2025-5874); 3 are fixed in the surveyed commit, and the release users run is not placed by this history
05.project_exploited	no affecting advisory is on CISA's Known Exploited list

Anyone can check this report against the authoritative record — click the stamp, or enter FAD7-MZYH-Z3GZ at borehole.dev/verify.

The code commits to the 106 checks this run performed, the bands they produced, and the commit they were read at. It does not cover checks written since.

Put the mark in your README

The image is wrapped in a link to the verification page, so a reader can check it rather than take it on trust. If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.

[![Borehole reading, not a certification](https://borehole.dev/badge/getredash/redash/cdc39a2.svg "Borehole free reading: not for reliance. See the full report.")](https://borehole.dev/verify/FAD7MZYHZ3GZ?via=badge)

Quoted evidence

5 pieces of evidence on this report quote the repository directly. Four checks quote text: up to five TODO-style comments, up to four commit subjects, up to five unpinned dependency lines and one status line from the README's first screen, such as “no longer maintained”. In each case the text is the evidence, which is why it is kept by default.

This rewrites every stored reading of this repository, and every later reading, including a re-read, is stored without the quoted text. The facts we keep to re-read it still hold the lines, as the privacy notice says. The pointers stay.

Where this scan ran

This scan ran on ordinary cloud infrastructure (cloud-run), not in a hardware-isolated confidential VM. Nothing about it is attested by Google.

What an attested survey proves, and what it does not.

What this scan did with the repository — 7 steps

Written by the steps themselves as they ran, not described afterwards. A hand-written account of a data flow drifts the first time somebody changes the flow and not the account.

At	Step	Detail
0.0s	read repository metadata from the GitHub API	size mb: 39.9authenticated: False
5.5s	cloned the repository to a temporary directory	depth: full
10.7s	read the git history	commits: 8009tracked files: 1420
138.2s	ran the deterministic checks	blame pass: Trueread working tree: False
138.2s	recorded where this scan ran	attested: Falseenvironment: cloud-run
168.7s	kept the facts, never the source, for re-reading under new checks
168.7s	deleting the working copy

Total 168.7s ·source content sent off this machine: none · calls to a language model: 0 · the clone was deleted when the survey ended

An automated reading of a repository's code and its history up to one commit, with public advisory records. It may be wrong, it is not legal, financial, investment or security advice, and it does not replace diligence by a qualified person. It is provided for information: nobody may rely on it (Borehole's terms, section 3).

BOREHOLE 0.7.15 DETERMINISTIC LAYER · NO MODEL CALLSREAD ON BOREHOLE'S SERVER · CLONE DELETED TAKEDOWNCONTRIBUTED TO THIS REPOSITORY? YOUR RIGHTS

Nothing significant. Questions worth asking about Security & Reliability Posture, Product & Engineering Maturity.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

redash/models/__init__.py is 1,539 lines, 21× this codebase's median file

A move from JavaScript to TypeScript began 76 months ago and is 38% done

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

Organization & Key-Person Risk

Product & Engineering Maturity

890 unresolved debt markers, 8.5 per thousand lines

Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed

Security & Reliability Posture

9 of 29 migrations cannot be rolled back

67 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 21 high or critical in what ships

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

18 outbound calls can wait forever

14 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 6 high or critical

Observability & Operations

No structured logging library is in use

One request cannot be followed through the logs

Fit with the Acquirer

Check it on the running system

What a person adds

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

Organization & Key-Person Risk

Product & Engineering Maturity

Security & Reliability Posture

Observability & Operations

Fit with the Acquirer

Appendix: rejection log — 94 signals that ran and did not fire

Looked, and found nothing — 73

Could not conclude, or did not apply — 21

Where this scan ran

redash/models/init.py is 1,539 lines, 21× this codebase's median file