Reads strong: 3 of 5 rated dimensions are strong, 2 are adequate and none is significant.
106 checks ran across 6 assessable dimensions. Security & Reliability Posture and Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance are adequate. 1 finding is worth checking first. 5 findings, each with evidence. One dimension cannot be assessed without an acquirer.
This repository reads strong. Show it in your README: the badge links to a page where anyone can check the reading. If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.
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Borehole's proprietary scoring is calibrated across hundreds of repositories. Each finding here reads significant, but its check has not yet held up often enough in that calibration to rate significant on its own. If one holds when someone checks it, it is significant.
- 05.26 25 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 13 high or critical in what ships
| Dimension | Rating | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | adequate | |
| 02 | Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | strong | |
| 03 | Organization & Key-Person Risk | strong | |
| 04 | Product & Engineering Maturity | strong | |
| 05 | Security & Reliability Posture | adequate | |
| 06 | Observability & Operations | not assessable | |
| 07 | Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
- 26% of non-merge commits carry any trailer at all
- low trailer coverage: the convention may not be in consistent use
- no widespread author/committer date divergence
- the declared share is neither decisive nor negligible, so the true figure is more sensitive to undeclared work
- deep scan blamed 1,351 of 1,351 counted files
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
01 · adequate · ratings ↑1 base image floats: no version, or `latest`
adequate1 of 1 `FROM` lines in product Dockerfiles name an image without a version, or with `latest`. Each build pulls whatever the registry serves that day, so the image that ships can change without a commit, and last month's build cannot be reproduced. Pin a version, or a digest.
| Dockerfile | Dockerfile:1 — base image without a version |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
unstructured/chunking/base.py is 3,518 lines, 51× this codebase's median file
adequateThe median source file here is 68 lines. 8 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 3,518. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.
A note that does not affect this rating: measured against its own codebase's median, it is below the 85th percentile of 382 surveyed projects' largest files, where this check begins to count.
| line-count | unstructured/chunking/base.py:1 — 3,518 lines (51× median) |
| line-count | unstructured/partition/pdf.py:1 — 1,951 lines (28× median) |
| line-count | unstructured/partition/docx.py:1 — 1,522 lines (22× median) |
| line-count | unstructured/partition/pdf_image/pdfminer_processing.py:1 — 1,433 lines (21× median) |
| line-count | unstructured/partition/html/parser.py:1 — 1,239 lines (18× median) |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
02 · strong · ratings ↑No finding. 16 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.
Organization & Key-Person Risk
03 · strong · ratings ↑No finding. 10 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.
Product & Engineering Maturity
04 · strong · ratings ↑No finding. 19 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.
Security & Reliability Posture
05 · adequate · ratings ↑25 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 13 high or critical in what ships
adequate worth checking first25 of 406 locked dependencies match 120 published advisories in OSV, 62 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version.
The check that found this reads significant, but it has not yet held up often enough in Borehole's calibration to rate a finding significant on its own. Opening uv.lock settles it. If it holds when someone checks it, this finding is significant.
| uv.lock | uv.lock — anyio 4.13.0: GHSA-82r6-8w77-94w6 (critical), fixed in 4.14.2 |
| uv.lock | uv.lock — authlib 1.6.9: GHSA-6v38-4h7w-rj9h (critical), fixed in 1.9.0; an optional extra |
| uv.lock | uv.lock — chromadb 1.5.7: GHSA-36p7-vc44-83pf (critical); an optional extra |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
The build runs third-party code it does not pin
adequate10 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day; 3 steps pipe a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.
A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.
| .github/workflows/ci.yml | .github/workflows/ci.yml:55 — action pinned by tag |
| .github/workflows/ci.yml | .github/workflows/ci.yml:99 — action pinned by tag |
| .github/workflows/build-opencv-wheels.yml | .github/workflows/build-opencv-wheels.yml:49 — download piped into a shell |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
4 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 2 high or critical
adequateThe newest was published on 2026-07-27. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. None of them affects the surveyed version. The record is incomplete: NVD: 1 record names unstructured with nothing tying it to this repository (CVE-2025-61677).
A note that does not affect this rating: it describes the project's advisory record, and no advisory in it is known to affect the surveyed commit.
| GHSA-v5mq-3xhg-98m9 | 2026-07-27: GHSA-v5mq-3xhg-98m9 (moderate), fixed in 0.24.1: unstructured: Stored XSS via unescaped HTML generation |
| GHSA-4mvj-m6j5-pmf7 | 2026-07-10: GHSA-4mvj-m6j5-pmf7 (critical), fixed in 0.24.0: unstructured: Server-Side Request Forgery in the URL-based partitioning |
| GHSA-gm8q-m8mv-jj5m | 2026-02-03: GHSA-gm8q-m8mv-jj5m (critical), fixed in 0.18.18: Unstructured has Path Traversal via Malicious MSG Attachment that Allows Arbitrary File Write |
| GHSA-32r8-54hf-c9p3 | 2024-12-09: GHSA-32r8-54hf-c9p3 (moderate), fixed in 0.14.3: unstructured XML External Entity (XXE) |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Observability & Operations
06 · not assessable · ratings ↑Not rated: only 5 of 16 checks could reach a conclusion here; the rest do not apply to this repository or could not read it. What a person adds here.
Fit with the Acquirer
07 · not assessable · ratings ↑Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository. What a person adds here.
Check it on the running system
2 checks against the running system follow from the findings above: what a buyer's engineer will try, how to run it first, and what to have ready. A paid survey of this repository includes them.
A paid survey of a public repository is also reviewed: a language model reads each finding against the code and withdraws only findings it judges the code contradicts, each listed with its reason. The review is a language model's reading of the findings against the code, and it can be wrong. It never adds a finding, never raises a band, and never removes a finding from a proven check or an advisory that affects the surveyed version.
What a person adds
The survey reads what the repository can show. The code cannot settle these questions, and on them this report states nothing. Each says where its answer lives: your own engineer, the company, or an assessor you choose can settle it. Questions marked measured open with something this repository shows.
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
01 · full coverage- measured No architecture or design document is in the tree, across 448 product files. Where does the design live, and who holds it?
- Is the architecture right for the next three years of the product?
- Were the home-grown components reasonable choices when they were made, and are they now?
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
02 · high coverage- Is review real or a rubber stamp? Comment depth and time to approve need the pull request history.
- Is delivery planned and measured, or heroic?
- How are incidents run, reviewed and learned from?
Organization & Key-Person Risk
03 · partial coverage- measured 181 people have committed here. Which of them are you acquiring, and which are you replacing?
- Who mentors whom, and would that survive a departure?
- Can the team grow, and who stands behind the top three contributors?
- Is the seniority mix sound, and will pay survive your salary bands?
- Is the pace sustainable? Commit times cannot say: git keeps no reliable local time.
- Does the team want to stay after close?
- How are decisions made and disagreements resolved?
Product & Engineering Maturity
04 · minimal coverage- measured 242 commits landed in the last year, against 163 the year before (+48%). What drove it: new people, a deadline, or code produced faster than before?
- measured No experiment tracking is configured in the repository. How was the shipped model trained and evaluated, and could it be reproduced?
- measured No model card is in the tree. What is the model's intended use, what was it trained on, and where does it fail?
- Can this team deliver the stated roadmap on the stated timeline?
- Does leadership know about the debt, and is time budgeted to repay it?
- Is the engineering shape consistent with the commercial story?
Security & Reliability Posture
05 · partial coverage- What has actually broken, how often, and how badly?
- What did external testing find, and was it fixed?
- What is the SOC 2, ISO 27001 or GDPR status, and where is the evidence?
Observability & Operations
06 · partial coverageNot rated: only 5 of 16 checks could reach a conclusion here; the rest do not apply to this repository or could not read it.
- Are the dashboards opened, the alerts acknowledged and the pages answered?
- Are the service-level objectives actually met?
- Who carries the pager, and how often does it go off?
- What does it cost to run, and how much headroom is there?
Fit with the Acquirer
07 · none coverageNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
- This is primarily a Python codebase. Does your engineering organisation already run Python in production, or would this be the first?
- The bulk of this system sits in unstructured/, example-docs/, typings/. Which of your existing systems would each of those have to absorb or replace?
- 84% of lines added in the last 12 months (11% of added lines) came through AI-declared commits. Does your organisation have a policy on inheriting and maintaining that code, and does your engineering team's tooling match how it was produced?
- The repository carries deployment configuration (Dockerfile). Does that match your deployment and on-call model, or does it need rehosting first?
- What is your tolerance for the findings above remaining unaddressed for the first two quarters after close, given everything else that will compete for this team's time?
- Which of these systems duplicate yours, and which get retired?
- What will integration cost, and in what order?
- Where does the team land in your organisation, and who reports to whom?
- Are there earn-outs, retention packages or contractor IP to assign?
- Do customer contracts limit hosting, regions or vendors?
A human assessment is Borehole's own paid service, €12,000+ (total price is determined per engagement; travel billed at cost). It is not independent of this report: the same business produced both. It is a separate contract, with its own scope, terms and reliance.
Embed the badge
Tied to this commit and this date, and it fades after 90 days — an honest badge is one that expires. A repository with significant findings gets a neutral "read" badge rather than a red one: the library is where the range is visible, not someone else's README.
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If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.
Rejection log — 101 signals that ran and did not fire
Appendix: rejection log — 101 signals that ran and did not fire
Published on purpose. A signal that looked and decided not to fire has told you something, and this is the calibration data behind every threshold above.
Looked, and found nothing — 70
| Signal | What it found |
|---|---|
| 04.hotspot_concentration | change is spread across the codebase rather than pooling in a few filesfiles 3,339 · top5 share 0.095 |
| 04.debt_markers | debt markers are sparsemarkers 42 · per kloc 0.14 · lines read 296,894 |
| 04.dependency_sprawl | direct dependency counts are unremarkable |
| 04.test_growth | test effort kept pace with code writtenlate test per code 1.419 · early test per code 0.528 |
| 04.churn_trend | rework is not rising against new worklate delete per insert 0.41 · early delete per insert 0.391 |
| 04.eol_runtime | every pinned runtime is still supportedeol as of 2026-09-24 |
| 04.fixes_with_tests | fixes usually come with a testfixes 183 · share 0.754 · with tests 138 |
| 06.telemetry_presence | this repository does not deploy a running service, so instrumentation is not expected of itbasis nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere · files read 1,097 |
| 06.structured_logging | not a running service; structured logging is not expected of a librarybasis nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.healthcheck_presence | not a running service, so a health endpoint is not expectedbasis nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.usage_reporting_default | the product's code names no reporting hostsettings on 0 · settings off 0 |
| 06.migrate_on_start | migrations do not run at container start |
| 03.contributor_concentration | no single contributor dominates the last 24 monthsyears 4.1 · window last 24 months · authors 181 |
| 03.active_contributors | more than one contributor active in the trailing yearall time 181 · active 12mo 63 |
| 03.knowledge_silos | every substantial directory has been touched by more than one personauthors 181 · directories 5 |
| 03.drive_by_contributors | an open contributor base, where one-commit contributors are normalauthors 181 · one off share 0.503 |
| 03.contributor_attrition | no contributor dominates enough for their absence to matterauthors 181 · top share less than a quarter · top contributor last committed more than two years ago |
| 03.critical_path_ownership | more than one person changes the critical pathsauthors 93 |
| 03.second_contributor_attrition | the second and third contributors are still active |
| 03.bus_factor_trend | the team has not narrowed to one person |
| 03.joiners_and_leavers | the team is not shrinkingleft 9 · joined 18 · regular last year 23 |
| 02.merge_discipline | a meaningful share of recent change carries evidence of reviewmerges 2 · window last 24 months · with tracked 46 |
| 02.ci_presence | CI configuration is present in the working treecount 9 |
| 02.test_presence | tests are present in a normal proportion to sourcetests 215 · source 401 · test ratio 0.536 |
| 02.release_cadence | tags are presenttags 265 |
| 02.conventional_commits | commit subjects generally carry contentsampled 2,026 · low content share 0.0 |
| 02.branch_protection_hints | process scaffolding is present in the repository |
| 02.ci_runs_tests | CI invokes a test runnerconfigs 9 · with tests 3 |
| 02.skipped_tests | few tests are switched offfocused 0 · skipped 3 · test files 781 |
| 02.ci_test_gating | no test run in CI is written so that it cannot failconfigs 9 |
| 02.revert_share | change is rarely undoneshare 0.0 · reverts 0 · recent commits 405 |
| 02.dependency_update_cadence | dependencies move with the codelockfiles 1 · commits since 2 · days since lockfile changed 3 |
| 02.flaky_test_markers | tests are not retried until they passtest retries 0 · suite retries 0 |
| 02.lint_in_build | a linter or formatter runs in the buildwired 4 · ci configs 9 · product files 186 |
| 02.commit_size | changes arrive in reviewable sizesshare 0.034 · commits 355 · over 2000 lines 12 |
| 01.burst_import | no commit run met both the rate and the net-addition thresholdgap seconds 180 · min add ratio 3.0 · min net added 2,000 |
| 01.initial_dump | first commit is not a disproportionate share of the codebaseinsertions 19,039 · share of insertions 0.0113 |
| 01.message_uniformity | commit subjects vary in wording and lengthlength stdev 16.65 · repeat share 0.001 |
| 01.revision_depth | most files were revisited after they were first writtenfiles seen 387 · write once share 0.584 |
| 01.duplicated_blocks | little shipping code is repeated verbatim across filesshare 0.004 · product files 186 · distinct blocks 28,376 |
| 01.swallowed_errors | errors are rarely thrown awayloc 297,609 · files 8 · per kloc 0.04 |
| 01.unfinished_migration | no language migration is stalled halfway |
| 01.weights_in_git | no model weights are committedfiles 0 |
| 05.committed_secrets | no credential-shaped strings outside test and fixture pathsnote the working tree only; the history is 05.5 · patterns 8 · files read 1,097 |
| 05.security_guardrails | at least one standard guard rail is configured |
| 05.dependency_pinning | a lockfile is committed, so builds are reproduciblelockfile True |
| 05.license_present | a licence file is presentfound True |
| 05.secrets_in_history | no credential-shaped string was ever added outside test and fixture pathspatterns 8 · truncated False · added lines 1,599,494 |
| 05.container_runs_as_root | every shipped Dockerfile drops to a non-root user or builds on a non-root base imagedockerfiles 1 |
| 05.secrets_management_pattern | no environment file is committed outside tests and examplesenv files 0 |
| 05.shell_from_strings | product code does not build shell commands from stringssites 0 |
| 05.unsafe_deserialization | no code-executing deserialiser in product codesites 0 |
| 05.tls_verification_off | no TLS verification is switched off in product codefiles 0 · sites 0 · pinned instead 0 |
| 05.privileged_workloads | no workload runs privileged or in the host's namespacessites 0 · behind a setting or built here 0 |
| 05.credentials_in_deploy_config | deployment configuration references secrets, never holds themfiles 0 · sites 0 |
| 05.signing_material | no signing keystore or profile is committedfiles 0 |
| 05.dataset_provenance | little data is committeddata files 0 · licence or card files 0 |
| 05.license_manifest_conflict | manifest and licence file agree on Apache-2.0license Apache-2.0 |
| 05.license_vendored_unlicensed | no vendored third-party code is committedcomponents 0 |
| 05.license_grant_unclear | the licence is recognisable as Apache-2.0class permissive · license Apache-2.0 |
| 05.committed_native_libraries | no widely used compiled library is committed to the productlibraries 0 |
| 04.dependency_churn | few dependencies were added and dropped within 60 daysdependencies seen 359 · added in two years 43 · removed within 60 days 1 |
| 04.ci_platforms_dropped | no platform was dropped from CI in the last two years |
| 04.repository_status | the README's first screen states no end, move or freezestatements 0 |
| 02.development_elsewhere | nothing says development happens elsewhereno pr statements 0 · mirror statements 0 · replayed commit share 0.0 |
| 05.licence_changes | the root licence has not changed in the history readlicence versions 1 · unreleased changes 0 |
| 05.paid_edition | no directory carries a separate paid-edition licencedirectories 0 |
| 04.releases_stopped | releases keep pace with developmentmedian gap days 1.5 · days since last tag 4 · commits last 90 days 117 |
| 04.release_branch | the newest release was cut from the branch surveyedelsewhere 3 · on branch 257 · tags in window 260 |
| 03.single_maintainer | no file says one person maintains itstatements 0 |
Could not conclude, or did not apply — 31
Not a clean result. Each says why it could not answer here.
| Signal | Why |
|---|---|
| 04.fix_share_trend | fewer than six busy quarters to compare |
| 04.schema_churn | no schema migrations to read |
| 04.compat_layers | a library, whose compatibility code is usually deliberate |
| 04.dependency_redundancy | no JavaScript manifest to read |
| 06.telemetry_depth | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.print_logging | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.correlation_ids | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.error_reporting | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.alert_rules | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.deployed_image_floats | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.probes_identical | no Kubernetes probes |
| 06.single_replica | no Kubernetes deployments |
| 06.environment_branching | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.release_markers | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.feature_flags | no feature-flag service; flags may live elsewhere |
| 02.long_lived_branches | too few merges to judge (squash and rebase leave none) |
| 01.notebook_outputs | too few notebooks |
| 05.outbound_timeouts | not a running service |
| 05.migration_reversibility | too few migrations to judge |
| 05.sql_from_strings | not a running service; a library that builds SQL is doing its job |
| 05.resource_limits | no Kubernetes workload manifests |
| 05.public_env_secret | not a frontend |
| 05.unsafe_html | not a frontend |
| 05.source_maps_shipped | not a frontend |
| 05.cleartext_traffic | not a mobile app |
| 05.license_copyleft_inherited | no third-party code is committed to this repository, so the licences it depends on are resolved at build time and are not readable here |
| 04.flags_accumulating | few or no feature flags in the history |
| 04.api_versions_coexisting | not a running service |
| 04.deprecations_lingering | a library, which keeps deprecated interfaces for its users |
| 05.project_advisories | record incomplete: no advisory found in the sources that answered; NVD: 1 record names unstructured with nothing tying it to this repository (CVE-2025-61677) |
| 05.project_exploited | no affecting advisory is on CISA's Known Exploited list |
Anyone can check this report against the authoritative record — click the stamp, or enter K4TE-GEXE-HQ0C at borehole.dev/verify.
The code commits to the 106 checks this run performed, the bands they produced, and the commit they were read at. It does not cover checks written since.
Where this scan ran
This scan ran on ordinary cloud infrastructure (cloud-run), not in a hardware-isolated confidential VM. Nothing about it is attested by Google.
What an attested survey proves, and what it does not.
What this scan did with the repository — 7 steps
Written by the steps themselves as they ran, not described afterwards. A hand-written account of a data flow drifts the first time somebody changes the flow and not the account.
| At | Step | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0s | read repository metadata from the GitHub API | size mb: 232.2authenticated: False |
| 14.1s | cloned the repository to a temporary directory | depth: full |
| 19.8s | read the git history | commits: 2028tracked files: 1352 |
| 139.5s | ran the deterministic checks | blame pass: Trueread working tree: False |
| 139.5s | recorded where this scan ran | attested: Falseenvironment: cloud-run |
| 190.8s | kept the facts, never the source, for re-reading under new checks | |
| 190.8s | deleting the working copy |
Total 190.8s ·source content sent off this machine: none · calls to a language model: 0 · the clone was deleted when the survey ended
An automated reading of a repository's code and its history up to one commit, with public advisory records. It may be wrong, it is not legal, financial, investment or security advice, and it does not replace diligence by a qualified person. It is provided for information: nobody may rely on it (Borehole's terms, section 3).