c85580b · 4,671 commits · 3,566 files
Issued 2026-10-22
Reads strong: 4 of 6 rated dimensions are strong, 2 are adequate and none is significant.
102 checks ran across 6 assessable dimensions. Security & Reliability Posture and Product & Engineering Maturity are adequate. 10 findings, each with evidence. One dimension cannot be assessed without an acquirer.
This repository reads strong. Show it in your README: the badge links to a page where anyone can check the reading. If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.
[](https://borehole.dev/verify/RSKKXJY3Q749?via=badge)- The project does not take pull requests README.md:905
- 4 findings from checks Borehole's calibration found wrong more often than right are no longer published.
- The file and line of 5 credential-shaped matches are withheld. File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report.
| Dimension | Rating | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | strong | |
| 02 | Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | strong | |
| 03 | Organization & Key-Person Risk | strong | |
| 04 | Product & Engineering Maturity | adequate | |
| 05 | Security & Reliability Posture | adequate | |
| 06 | Observability & Operations | strong | |
| 07 | Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
- 25% of non-merge commits carry any trailer at all
- low trailer coverage: the convention may not be in consistent use
- 21% of commits show author/committer date divergence, which is the shape of replayed history that can drop trailers
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
01 · strong · ratings ↑pkg/pb/sourcespb/sources.pb.validate.go is 7,321 lines, 69× this codebase's median file
adequateThe median source file here is 105 lines. 12 files exceed 1,050 lines, the largest being 7,321. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.
A note that does not affect this rating: measured against its own codebase's median, it is below the 85th percentile of 382 surveyed projects' largest files, where this check begins to count.
| line-count | pkg/pb/sourcespb/sources.pb.validate.go:1 — 7,321 lines (69× median) |
| line-count | pkg/pb/source_metadatapb/source_metadata.pb.validate.go:1 — 6,091 lines (58× median) |
| line-count | pkg/sources/github/github.go:1 — 2,778 lines (26× median) |
| line-count | pkg/engine/defaults/defaults.go:1 — 1,955 lines (18× median) |
| line-count | pkg/sources/git/git.go:1 — 1,863 lines (17× median) |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
02 · strong · ratings ↑No finding. 16 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.
Organization & Key-Person Risk
03 · strong · ratings ↑No finding. 10 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.
Product & Engineering Maturity
04 · adequate · ratings ↑110 direct dependencies in a single manifest
adequatego.mod declares 110 direct dependencies. Each one is a maintenance obligation, a supply-chain surface and a potential licence question that transfers with the asset. The count says nothing about whether any given dependency was a good choice; it says how many such choices a buyer inherits.
| direct-dependencies | go.mod — 110 declared |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
5 files still carry code deprecated more than two years ago
adequate5 files were marked deprecated over two years ago and still are, the oldest since Jan 2022. A deprecation is a promise to remove. Ask what still depends on these, and whether removing them is scheduled.
A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.
| pkg/pb/source_metadatapb/source_metadata.pb.go | pkg/pb/source_metadatapb/source_metadata.pb.go — deprecated since Jan 2022 |
| pkg/pb/credentialspb/credentials.pb.go | pkg/pb/credentialspb/credentials.pb.go — deprecated since Jan 2022 |
| pkg/pb/detectorspb/detectors.pb.go | pkg/pb/detectorspb/detectors.pb.go — deprecated since Jan 2022 |
| pkg/pb/sourcespb/sources.pb.go | pkg/pb/sourcespb/sources.pb.go — deprecated since Jan 2022 |
| pkg/pb/custom_detectorspb/custom_detectors.pb.go | pkg/pb/custom_detectorspb/custom_detectors.pb.go — deprecated since Nov 2022 |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Security & Reliability Posture
05 · adequate · ratings ↑151 credential-shaped strings in the tree sit in tests, examples, documentation or local development settings
adequateStrings shaped like credentials appear only where fakes are usual: test fixtures, examples, documentation, placeholders and local stacks. They are almost always fakes. Ask someone to confirm that none of them works anywhere, because a real key in a development file is still a real key. 28 other matchs set aside: expired tokens, licence tokens a vendor verifies with a public key, or placeholder text where a key would go. None grants access to anything.
| AWS access key | 5 cited: AWS access key, where fakes are usual |
| File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report. |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
1 Dockerfile runs the application as root
adequateNo USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.
| no-USER-instruction | Dockerfile — runs as root |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
The build runs third-party code it does not pin
adequate2 steps pipe a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.
A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.
| scripts/install.sh | scripts/install.sh:40 — download piped into a shell |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
4 outbound calls can wait forever
adequate4 HTTP calls use a client with no timeout (Python `requests` without `timeout=`, or Go's default client). When a dependency slows down, each one holds a worker until the connection gives up, and enough of them take the service down with the dependency.
A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.
| pkg/common/http.go | pkg/common/http.go:260 — outbound call without a timeout |
| pkg/common/http.go | pkg/common/http.go:268 — outbound call without a timeout |
| pkg/detectors/html2pdf/html2pdf.go | pkg/detectors/html2pdf/html2pdf.go:59 — outbound call without a timeout |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
2 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 1 high or critical
adequate2 of 310 locked dependencies match 3 published advisories in OSV, 1 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.
A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.
| go.mod | go.mod — github.com/docker/docker v28.5.2+incompatible: GO-2026-4887 (high) |
| go.mod | go.mod — github.com/docker/distribution v2.8.3+incompatible: GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3 (moderate) |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
2 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 1 high or critical
adequateThe newest was published on 2026-10-08. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 1 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 3.99.4. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version.
A note that does not affect this rating: it describes the project's advisory record, and no advisory in it is known to affect the surveyed commit.
| GHSA-fg8w-m62h-jvvw | 2026-10-08: GHSA-fg8w-m62h-jvvw (moderate), fixed in 3.98.0: Workflow command injection via filenames in --github-actions output |
| CVE-2025-41390 | 2025-10-20: CVE-2025-41390 (high): An arbitrary code execution vulnerability exists in the git functionality of Truffle Security Co. TruffleHog 3.90.2. A specially crafted repository can lead to |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Observability & Operations
06 · strong · ratings ↑No error reporter is wired in
adequateNothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.
A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.
| error reporting | no error reporter initialised |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Fit with the Acquirer
07 · not assessable · ratings ↑Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository. What a person adds here.
Check it on the running system
7 checks against the running system follow from the findings above: what a buyer's engineer will try, how to run it first, and what to have ready. A paid survey of this repository includes them.
A paid survey of a public repository is also reviewed: a language model reads each finding against the code and withdraws only findings it judges the code contradicts, each listed with its reason. The review is a language model's reading of the findings against the code, and it can be wrong. It never adds a finding, never raises a band, and never removes a finding from a proven check or an advisory that affects the surveyed version.
What a person adds
The survey reads what the repository can show. The code cannot settle these questions, and on them this report states nothing. Each says where its answer lives: your own engineer, the company, or an assessor you choose can settle it. Questions marked measured open with something this repository shows.
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
01 · full coverage- measured No architecture or design document is in the tree, across 1,470 product files. Where does the design live, and who holds it?
- Is the architecture right for the next three years of the product?
- Were the home-grown components reasonable choices when they were made, and are they now?
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
02 · high coverage- Is review real or a rubber stamp? Comment depth and time to approve need the pull request history.
- Is delivery planned and measured, or heroic?
- How are incidents run, reviewed and learned from?
Organization & Key-Person Risk
03 · partial coverage- measured 217 people have committed here. Which of them are you acquiring, and which are you replacing?
- Who mentors whom, and would that survive a departure?
- Can the team grow, and who stands behind the top three contributors?
- Is the seniority mix sound, and will pay survive your salary bands?
- Is the pace sustainable? Commit times cannot say: git keeps no reliable local time.
- Does the team want to stay after close?
- How are decisions made and disagreements resolved?
Product & Engineering Maturity
04 · minimal coverage- Can this team deliver the stated roadmap on the stated timeline?
- Does leadership know about the debt, and is time budgeted to repay it?
- Is the engineering shape consistent with the commercial story?
Security & Reliability Posture
05 · partial coverage- measured 05.1 found credential-shaped strings in this repository. Was each one revoked at the provider? Deleting it from the code revokes nothing; only the provider's audit log shows that it was.
- measured No threat model is in the tree of what looks like a running service. Does one exist elsewhere, and who owns it?
- What has actually broken, how often, and how badly?
- What did external testing find, and was it fixed?
- What is the SOC 2, ISO 27001 or GDPR status, and where is the evidence?
Observability & Operations
06 · partial coverage- measured Nothing in the tree backs up or restores data. How is data backed up, and has a restore ever been rehearsed?
- measured No alert rule is defined in the repository. Where are alerts defined, who receives them, and when did one last fire?
- Are the dashboards opened, the alerts acknowledged and the pages answered?
- Are the service-level objectives actually met?
- Who carries the pager, and how often does it go off?
- What does it cost to run, and how much headroom is there?
Fit with the Acquirer
07 · none coverageNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
- This is primarily a Go codebase. Does your engineering organisation already run Go in production, or would this be the first?
- The bulk of this system sits in pkg/, proto/, assets/. Which of your existing systems would each of those have to absorb or replace?
- The repository carries deployment configuration (Dockerfile and 1 more). Does that match your deployment and on-call model, or does it need rehosting first?
- What is your tolerance for the findings above remaining unaddressed for the first two quarters after close, given everything else that will compete for this team's time?
- Which of these systems duplicate yours, and which get retired?
- What will integration cost, and in what order?
- Where does the team land in your organisation, and who reports to whom?
- Are there earn-outs, retention packages or contractor IP to assign?
- Do customer contracts limit hosting, regions or vendors?
A human assessment is Borehole's own paid service, €12,000+ (total price is determined per engagement; travel billed at cost). It is not independent of this report: the same business produced both. It is a separate contract, with its own scope, terms and reliance.
Embed the badge
Tied to this commit and this date, and it fades after 90 days — an honest badge is one that expires. A repository with significant findings gets a neutral "read" badge rather than a red one: the library is where the range is visible, not someone else's README.
[](/r/trufflesecurity/trufflehog/c85580b)If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.
Rejection log — 92 signals that ran and did not fire
Appendix: rejection log — 92 signals that ran and did not fire
Published on purpose. A signal that looked and decided not to fire has told you something, and this is the calibration data behind every threshold above.
Looked, and found nothing — 70
| Signal | What it found |
|---|---|
| 04.hotspot_concentration | change is spread across the codebase rather than pooling in a few filesfiles 4,038 · top5 share 0.035 |
| 04.debt_markers | debt markers are sparsemarkers 178 · per kloc 0.34 · lines read 522,134 |
| 04.test_growth | test effort kept pace with code writtenlate test per code 2.039 · early test per code 0.961 |
| 04.churn_trend | rework is not rising against new worklate delete per insert 0.273 · early delete per insert 0.267 |
| 04.fixes_with_tests | fixes usually come with a testfixes 230 · share 0.683 · with tests 157 |
| 04.fix_share_trend | fixing is not crowding out building |
| 04.compat_layers | little code is kept for the old wayshare 0.002 · code files 1,323 · compat files 2 |
| 06.telemetry_presence | a telemetry or error-reporting library is referencednote presence only; whether anyone watches it is not visible here · matches 32 |
| 06.structured_logging | a structured logging library is referencedmatches 15 |
| 06.healthcheck_presence | a health or readiness check is defined |
| 06.telemetry_depth | the service is visible in more than one way |
| 06.print_logging | raw prints are few, or outnumbered by logger callsprints 40 · logger calls 44 |
| 06.correlation_ids | a request can be followed through the logstracing True · request id sites 6 |
| 06.usage_reporting_default | the product's code names no reporting hostsettings on 1 · settings off 0 |
| 06.environment_branching | environment differences live in configurationsites 0 |
| 06.release_markers | releases are markedtags last year 52 · release commits 0 · changelog commits 5 |
| 06.migrate_on_start | migrations do not run at container start |
| 03.contributor_concentration | no single contributor dominates the last 24 monthsyears 4.8 · window last 24 months · authors 217 |
| 03.active_contributors | more than one contributor active in the trailing yearall time 217 · active 12mo 62 |
| 03.knowledge_silos | every substantial directory has been touched by more than one personauthors 217 · directories 3 |
| 03.drive_by_contributors | an open contributor base, where one-commit contributors are normalauthors 217 · one off share 0.567 |
| 03.contributor_attrition | no contributor dominates enough for their absence to matterauthors 217 · top share less than a quarter · top contributor last committed more than a year ago |
| 03.critical_path_ownership | more than one person changes the critical pathsauthors 108 |
| 03.second_contributor_attrition | the second and third contributors are still active |
| 03.bus_factor_trend | the team has not narrowed to one person |
| 03.joiners_and_leavers | the team is not shrinkingleft 9 · joined 13 · regular last year 27 |
| 02.merge_discipline | a meaningful share of recent change carries evidence of reviewmerges 0 · window last 24 months · with tracked 11 |
| 02.ci_presence | CI configuration is present in the working treecount 12 |
| 02.test_presence | tests are present in a normal proportion to sourcetests 2,031 · source 3,346 · test ratio 0.607 |
| 02.release_cadence | tags are presenttags 372 |
| 02.conventional_commits | commit subjects generally carry contentsampled 4,669 · low content share 0.002 |
| 02.branch_protection_hints | process scaffolding is present in the repository |
| 02.ci_runs_tests | CI invokes a test runnerconfigs 10 · with tests 3 |
| 02.skipped_tests | few tests are switched offfocused 0 · skipped 0 · test files 2,048 |
| 02.ci_test_gating | no test run in CI is written so that it cannot failconfigs 12 |
| 02.revert_share | change is rarely undoneshare 0.004 · reverts 4 · recent commits 960 |
| 02.dependency_update_cadence | dependencies move with the codelockfiles 1 · commits since 1 · days since lockfile changed 0 |
| 02.flaky_test_markers | tests are not retried until they passtest retries 0 · suite retries 0 |
| 02.lint_in_build | a linter or formatter runs in the buildwired 3 · ci configs 12 · product files 1,323 |
| 02.commit_size | changes arrive in reviewable sizesshare 0.025 · commits 921 · over 2000 lines 23 |
| 01.burst_import | the largest burst was a patch series written together and landed commit by commit over 652 hours (100% of it), which explains the rate: translations arrive from a vendor in bulk, dependencies and generated code are committed whole, a merged pull request is dated when it merged, not when it was written, a branch merged by a merge commit was reviewed as one piece, and an export or mirror tool dates history when it replays itlargest commits 135efda..0f6210d · bursts explained 1 · largest net added 46,532 |
| 01.initial_dump | first commit is not a disproportionate share of the codebaseinsertions 675 · share of insertions 0.0008 |
| 01.message_uniformity | commit subjects vary in wording and lengthlength stdev 20.27 · repeat share 0.235 |
| 01.revision_depth | most files were revisited after they were first writtenfiles seen 1,446 · write once share 0.187 |
| 01.swallowed_errors | errors are rarely thrown awayloc 525,605 · files 0 · per kloc 0.0 |
| 01.build_reproducibility | every base image names a versionfloating 0 · from lines 2 |
| 01.unfinished_migration | no language migration is stalled halfway |
| 01.weights_in_git | no model weights are committedfiles 0 |
| 05.security_guardrails | at least one standard guard rail is configured |
| 05.license_present | a licence file is presentfound True |
| 05.secrets_management_pattern | no environment file is committed outside tests and examplesenv files 0 |
| 05.sql_from_strings | no SQL is assembled from strings in product codefiles 0 · sites 0 · value interpolated 0 |
| 05.shell_from_strings | product code does not build shell commands from stringssites 0 |
| 05.unsafe_deserialization | no code-executing deserialiser in product codesites 0 |
| 05.privileged_workloads | no workload runs privileged or in the host's namespacessites 0 · behind a setting or built here 0 |
| 05.credentials_in_deploy_config | deployment configuration references secrets, never holds themfiles 0 · sites 0 |
| 05.signing_material | no signing keystore or profile is committedfiles 0 |
| 05.license_vendored_unlicensed | no vendored third-party code is committedcomponents 0 |
| 05.license_grant_unclear | the licence is recognisable as AGPL-3.0class network-copyleft · license AGPL-3.0 |
| 05.committed_native_libraries | no widely used compiled library is committed to the productlibraries 1 |
| 04.api_versions_coexisting | one API version is served, or none |
| 04.dependency_churn | few dependencies were added and dropped within 60 daysdependencies seen 400 · added in two years 54 · removed within 60 days 2 |
| 04.ci_platforms_dropped | no platform was dropped from CI in the last two years |
| 04.repository_status | the README's first screen states no end, move or freezestatements 0 |
| 05.licence_changes | the root licence has not changed in the history readlicence versions 1 · unreleased changes 0 |
| 05.paid_edition | no directory carries a separate paid-edition licencedirectories 0 |
| 04.releases_stopped | releases keep pace with developmentmedian gap days 1.0 · days since last tag 0 · commits last 90 days 169 |
| 04.release_branch | the newest release was cut from the branch surveyedelsewhere 8 · on branch 362 · tags in window 370 |
| 03.single_maintainer | no file says one person maintains itstatements 0 |
| 05.project_exploited | no affecting advisory is on CISA's Known Exploited listexploited 0 |
Could not conclude, or did not apply — 22
Not a clean result. Each says why it could not answer here.
| Signal | Why |
|---|---|
| 04.eol_runtime | no pinned runtime version to check |
| 04.schema_churn | no schema migrations to read |
| 04.dependency_redundancy | no JavaScript manifest to read |
| 06.alert_rules | no alert rules in the repository; they may live in a console |
| 06.deployed_image_floats | no deployment descriptor names an image |
| 06.probes_identical | no Kubernetes probes |
| 06.single_replica | no Kubernetes deployments |
| 06.feature_flags | no feature-flag service; flags may live elsewhere |
| 02.long_lived_branches | too few merges to judge (squash and rebase leave none) |
| 01.notebook_outputs | not a data or machine-learning repository |
| 05.dependency_pinning | no manifest whose pinning can be read without a lockfile |
| 05.migration_reversibility | too few migrations to judge |
| 05.resource_limits | no Kubernetes workload manifests |
| 05.public_env_secret | not a frontend |
| 05.unsafe_html | not a frontend |
| 05.source_maps_shipped | not a frontend |
| 05.cleartext_traffic | not a mobile app |
| 05.dataset_provenance | not a data or machine-learning repository |
| 05.license_copyleft_inherited | no third-party code is committed to this repository, so the licences it depends on are resolved at build time and are not readable here |
| 05.license_manifest_conflict | no packaging manifest states a licence |
| 04.flags_accumulating | few or no feature flags in the history |
| 05.project_advisories | could not tell whether 1 published advisory affects the surveyed code: its version could not be placed |
Anyone can check this report against the authoritative record — click the stamp, or enter RSKK-XJY3-Q749 at borehole.dev/verify.
The code commits to the 106 checks this run performed, the bands they produced, and the commit they were read at. It does not cover checks written since.
Put the mark in your README
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Where this scan ran
This scan ran on ordinary cloud infrastructure (cloud-run), not in a hardware-isolated confidential VM. Nothing about it is attested by Google.
What an attested survey proves, and what it does not.
What this scan did with the repository — 7 steps
Written by the steps themselves as they ran, not described afterwards. A hand-written account of a data flow drifts the first time somebody changes the flow and not the account.
| At | Step | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0s | read repository metadata from the GitHub API | size mb: 51.8authenticated: False |
| 4.8s | cloned the repository to a temporary directory | depth: full |
| 8.0s | read the git history | commits: 4671tracked files: 3566 |
| 105.1s | ran the deterministic checks | blame pass: Falseread working tree: False |
| 105.2s | recorded where this scan ran | attested: Falseenvironment: cloud-run |
| 167.8s | kept the facts, never the source, for re-reading under new checks | |
| 167.8s | deleting the working copy |
Total 167.8s ·source content sent off this machine: none · calls to a language model: 0 · the clone was deleted when the survey ended
An automated reading of a repository's code and its history up to one commit, with public advisory records. It may be wrong, it is not legal, financial, investment or security advice, and it does not replace diligence by a qualified person. It is provided for information: nobody may rely on it (Borehole's terms, section 3).