Borehole · Risk register · free tier
tokio-rs/axum
Free reading: not for reliance
Borehole badge for tokio-rs/axum
bc8d491 · 2,006 commits · 503 files
Issued 2026-09-27

Nothing significant. Questions worth asking about Security & Reliability Posture, Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance.

102 checks ran across 6 assessable dimensions. None found a significant problem; 3 raised something worth a question. 5 findings, each with evidence. One dimension cannot be assessed without an acquirer.

An earlier reading. This is the survey of 2026-09-27 by borehole 0.7.1, which is what its verification code attests to. A newer reading of the same commit exists: read the newest.
Published under today's rules. The verification code attests to this reading as it was stored. This page differs from it as follows.
  • Words about people are today's: bands rather than exact shares, dates or day counts, and what the history measured rather than why.
  • 1 finding from checks Borehole's calibration found wrong more often than right is no longer published.
  • The file and line of 1 credential-shaped match is withheld. File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report.
strong adequate significant findings not assessable from a repository
Provenance disclosure does not affect any rating
1% of the code standing today was written in AI-declared commits
1% of lines still in the tree 809 of 57,801 1% of lines ever added these differ when early hand-written code has since been replaced
4/1,993 commits declaring an agent · Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context), Claude Sonnet 4.6, Cursor
confidence: moderate
  • 12% of non-merge commits carry any trailer at all
  • low trailer coverage: the convention may not be in consistent use
  • no widespread author/committer date divergence
  • deep scan blamed 501 of 501 counted files
16,963 lines excluded as lockfiles, vendored or generated.
This is a lower bound. It counts what the repository declares. Undeclared AI authorship is invisible here, and a single rebase removes the trailers this rests on. Absence of a declaration is absence of disclosure, not absence of AI authorship.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · adequate · ratings ↑
01.6

axum/src/serve/mod.rs is 2,010 lines, 33× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 60 lines. 6 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 2,010. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

Evidence
line-count axum/src/serve/mod.rs:1 — 2,010 lines (33× median)
line-count axum/src/routing/method_routing.rs:1 — 1,771 lines (29× median)
line-count axum/src/extract/ws.rs:1 — 1,317 lines (21× median)
line-count axum/src/extract/path/mod.rs:1 — 1,087 lines (18× median)
line-count axum-macros/src/from_request/mod.rs:1 — 1,076 lines (17× median)
Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · strong · ratings ↑

No finding. 16 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · strong · ratings ↑

No finding. 10 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · adequate · ratings ↑
04.19

11% of bug fixes add or change a test

adequate

Of 89 fixes in the last 24 months, 10 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.

Evidence
fix commits touching tests 10 of 89
Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · adequate · ratings ↑
05.1

1 credential-shaped string in the tree sit in tests, examples, documentation or local development settings

adequate

Strings shaped like credentials appear only where fakes are usual: test fixtures, examples, documentation, placeholders and local stacks. They are almost always fakes. Ask someone to confirm that none of them works anywhere, because a real key in a development file is still a real key.

Evidence
JWT JWT, where fakes are usual
File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report.
Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.

05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

6 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

Evidence
.github/workflows/CI.yml .github/workflows/CI.yml:22 — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/CI.yml .github/workflows/CI.yml:25 — action pinned by tag
Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.

05.26

2 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities

adequate

2 of 238 locked dependencies match 2 published advisories in OSV. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.

Evidence
Cargo.lock Cargo.lock — rand 0.8.5: GHSA-cq8v-f236-94qc (low), fixed in 0.8.6
Cargo.lock Cargo.lock — rand 0.9.2: GHSA-cq8v-f236-94qc (low), fixed in 0.9.3
Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.

Observability & Operations

06 · not assessable · ratings ↑

Not rated: only 3 of 15 checks could reach a conclusion here; the rest do not apply to this repository or could not read it. What a person adds here.

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · not assessable · ratings ↑

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository. What a person adds here.

Check it on the running system

3 checks against the running system follow from the findings above: what a buyer's engineer will try, how to run it first, and what to have ready. A paid survey of this repository includes them. See the tiers.

A paid survey of a public repository is also reviewed: a language model reads each finding against the code and withdraws only findings it judges the code contradicts, each listed with its reason. The review is a language model's reading of the findings against the code, and it can be wrong. It never adds a finding, never raises a band, and never removes a finding from a proven check or an advisory that affects the surveyed version.

What a person adds

The survey reads what the repository can show. The code cannot settle these questions, and on them this report states nothing. Each says where its answer lives: your own engineer, the company, or an assessor you choose can settle it. Questions marked measured open with something this repository shows.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · full coverage
  1. Is the architecture right for the next three years of the product? Answer lives in: Your architects, with the product roadmap01.39
  2. Were the home-grown components reasonable choices when they were made, and are they now? Answer lives in: The team's reasoning at the time01.40

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · high coverage
  1. Is review real or a rubber stamp? Comment depth and time to approve need the pull request history. Answer lives in: The code host's pull request data02.32
  2. Is delivery planned and measured, or heroic? Answer lives in: The issue tracker: backlog, sprint history, estimate accuracy02.38
  3. How are incidents run, reviewed and learned from? Answer lives in: Tickets, chat and postmortems02.37

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · partial coverage
  1. measured One contributor authored a quarter or more of the commits in this history. Is that person part of the transaction, and for how long after it? Answer lives in: The deal terms03.29
  2. Who mentors whom, and would that survive a departure? Answer lives in: The team; review history only suggests candidates03.28
  3. Can the team grow, and who stands behind the top three contributors? Answer lives in: Recruiting data and the org chart03.30
  4. Is the seniority mix sound, and will pay survive your salary bands? Answer lives in: HR data03.31
  5. Is the pace sustainable? Commit times cannot say: git keeps no reliable local time. Answer lives in: Interviews and on-call history03.14
  6. Does the team want to stay after close? Answer lives in: Interviews03.32
  7. How are decisions made and disagreements resolved? Answer lives in: Time with the team03.33

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · minimal coverage
  1. Can this team deliver the stated roadmap on the stated timeline? Answer lives in: The data room and the team's record of estimates04.32
  2. Does leadership know about the debt, and is time budgeted to repay it? Answer lives in: Budget and roadmap decisions04.31
  3. Is the engineering shape consistent with the commercial story? Answer lives in: Revenue, customer and churn data04.33

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · partial coverage
  1. measured 05.1 and 05.5 found credential-shaped strings in this repository. Was each one revoked at the provider? Deleting it from the code revokes nothing; only the provider's audit log shows that it was. Answer lives in: The provider's console and audit log05.38
  2. What has actually broken, how often, and how badly? Answer lives in: Ticketing and chat05.41
  3. What did external testing find, and was it fixed? Answer lives in: Reports in the data room05.42
  4. What is the SOC 2, ISO 27001 or GDPR status, and where is the evidence? Answer lives in: Audit reports; policy files in the tree are not evidence05.44

Observability & Operations

06 · partial coverage

Not rated: only 3 of 15 checks could reach a conclusion here; the rest do not apply to this repository or could not read it.

  1. Are the dashboards opened, the alerts acknowledged and the pages answered? Answer lives in: Pager history and dashboard logs06.29
  2. Are the service-level objectives actually met? Answer lives in: Production metrics06.30
  3. Who carries the pager, and how often does it go off? Answer lives in: Pager exports and interviews06.31
  4. What does it cost to run, and how much headroom is there? Answer lives in: Cloud billing and capacity plans06.32

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · none coverage

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

  1. This is primarily a Rust codebase. Does your engineering organisation already run Rust in production, or would this be the first? 07.1
  2. The bulk of this system sits in axum/, axum-extra/, axum-macros/. Which of your existing systems would each of those have to absorb or replace? 07.10
  3. Nothing in the repository says how this is deployed. Is it shipped as a library, a binary or a service, and if it runs somewhere, who owns that environment? 07.2
  4. What is your tolerance for the findings above remaining unaddressed for the first two quarters after close, given everything else that will compete for this team's time?
  5. Which of these systems duplicate yours, and which get retired? Answer lives in: Your architecture07.11
  6. What will integration cost, and in what order? Answer lives in: The engagement07.12
  7. Where does the team land in your organisation, and who reports to whom? Answer lives in: Your org design07.13
  8. Are there earn-outs, retention packages or contractor IP to assign? Answer lives in: Deal terms07.14
  9. Do customer contracts limit hosting, regions or vendors? Answer lives in: Customer contracts07.15

A human assessment is Borehole's own paid service, €12,000+ (total price is determined per engagement; travel billed at cost). It is not independent of this report: the same business produced both. It is a separate contract, with its own scope, terms and reliance.

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Rejection log — 97 signals that ran and did not fire

Appendix: rejection log — 97 signals that ran and did not fire

Published on purpose. A signal that looked and decided not to fire has told you something, and this is the calibration data behind every threshold above.

Looked, and found nothing — 56

SignalWhat it found
04.hotspot_concentration change is spread across the codebase rather than pooling in a few filesfiles 953 · top5 share 0.1
04.debt_markers debt markers are sparsemarkers 7 · per kloc 0.12 · lines read 56,745
04.churn_trend rework is not rising against new worklate delete per insert 0.43 · early delete per insert 0.572
04.fix_share_trend fixing is not crowding out building
06.telemetry_presence this repository does not deploy a running service, so instrumentation is not expected of itbasis nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere · files read 430
06.healthcheck_presence not a running service, so a health endpoint is not expectedbasis nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere
06.migrate_on_start migrations do not run at container start
03.contributor_concentration no single contributor dominates the last 24 monthsyears 5.3 · window last 24 months · authors 453
03.active_contributors more than one contributor active in the trailing yearall time 453 · active 12mo 88
03.knowledge_silos every substantial directory has been touched by more than one personauthors 453 · directories 5
03.drive_by_contributors an open contributor base, where one-commit contributors are normalauthors 453 · one off share 0.706
03.contributor_attrition the dominant contributor is still activeauthors 453 · top share a quarter or more · top contributor last committed between three and six months ago
03.critical_path_ownership more than one person changes the critical pathsauthors 159
03.second_contributor_attrition the second and third contributors are still active
03.bus_factor_trend the team has not narrowed to one person
03.joiners_and_leavers the team is not shrinkingleft 5 · joined 6 · regular last year 12
02.merge_discipline a meaningful share of recent change carries evidence of reviewmerges 12 · window last 24 months · with tracked 0
02.ci_presence CI configuration is present in the working treecount 2
02.test_presence tests are present in a normal proportion to sourcetests 196 · source 242 · test ratio 0.81
02.release_cadence tags are presenttags 223
02.conventional_commits commit subjects generally carry contentsampled 1,993 · low content share 0.007
02.branch_protection_hints process scaffolding is present in the repository
02.ci_runs_tests CI invokes a test runnerconfigs 2 · with tests 1
02.skipped_tests few tests are switched offfocused 0 · skipped 0 · test files 186
02.ci_test_gating no test run in CI is written so that it cannot failconfigs 2
02.revert_share change is rarely undoneshare 0.005 · reverts 3 · recent commits 572
02.dependency_update_cadence dependencies move with the codelockfiles 2 · commits since 10 · days since lockfile changed 15
02.flaky_test_markers tests are not retried until they passtest retries 0 · suite retries 0
02.lint_in_build a linter or formatter runs in the buildwired 1 · ci configs 2 · product files 108
02.commit_size changes arrive in reviewable sizesshare 0.0 · commits 509 · over 2000 lines 0
01.burst_import no commit run met both the rate and the net-addition thresholdgap seconds 180 · min add ratio 3.0 · min net added 2,000
01.initial_dump first commit is not a disproportionate share of the codebaseinsertions 453 · share of insertions 0.0032
01.message_uniformity commit subjects vary in wording and lengthlength stdev 17.54 · repeat share 0.017
01.revision_depth most files were revisited after they were first writtenfiles seen 134 · write once share 0.045
01.duplicated_blocks little shipping code is repeated verbatim across filesshare 0.0144 · product files 108 · distinct blocks 17,357
01.unfinished_migration no language migration is stalled halfway
01.weights_in_git no model weights are committedfiles 0
05.security_guardrails at least one standard guard rail is configured
05.license_present a licence file is presentfound True
05.secrets_management_pattern no environment file is committed outside tests and examplesenv files 0
05.privileged_workloads no workload runs privileged or in the host's namespacessites 0
05.credentials_in_deploy_config deployment configuration references secrets, never holds themfiles 0 · sites 0
05.signing_material no signing keystore or profile is committedfiles 0
05.license_vendored_unlicensed no vendored third-party code is committedcomponents 0
05.license_grant_unclear the licence is recognisable as MITclass permissive · license MIT
04.dependency_churn few dependencies were added and dropped within 60 daysdependencies seen 171 · added in two years 56 · removed within 60 days 1
04.ci_platforms_dropped no platform was dropped from CI in the last two years
04.repository_status the README's first screen states no end, move or freezestatements 0
02.development_elsewhere nothing says development happens elsewhereno pr statements 0 · mirror statements 0 · replayed commit share 0.0
05.licence_changes the root licence has not changed in the history readlicence versions 1
05.paid_edition no directory carries a separate paid-edition licencedirectories 0
04.releases_stopped releases keep pace with developmentmedian gap days 0.0 · days since last tag 167 · commits last 90 days 57
04.release_branch the newest release was cut from the branch surveyedelsewhere 35 · on branch 188 · tags in window 223
03.single_maintainer no file says one person maintains itstatements 0
05.project_advisories no published advisory affects the surveyed versionaffecting 0 · exploited 0 · advisories 0
05.project_exploited no affecting advisory is on CISA's Known Exploited listexploited 0

Could not conclude, or did not apply — 41

Not a clean result. Each says why it could not answer here.

SignalWhy
04.dependency_sprawlno recognised dependency manifest found
04.test_growthRust keeps unit tests inside the files they test, which a count by file name cannot see
04.eol_runtimeno pinned runtime version to check
04.schema_churnno schema migrations to read
04.compat_layersa library, whose compatibility code is usually deliberate
04.dependency_redundancyno JavaScript manifest to read
06.structured_loggingnot assessed for Rust, the main language here: this check's patterns read other languages only
06.telemetry_depthnot expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere
06.print_loggingnot expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere
06.correlation_idsnot expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere
06.error_reportingnot expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere
06.alert_rulesnot expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere
06.deployed_image_floatsnot expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere
06.probes_identicalno Kubernetes probes
06.single_replicano Kubernetes deployments
06.environment_branchingnot expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere
06.release_markersnot expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere
06.feature_flagsno feature-flag service; flags may live elsewhere
02.long_lived_branchestoo few merges to judge (squash and rebase leave none)
01.swallowed_errorsnot assessed for Rust, the main language here: this check's patterns read other languages only
01.build_reproducibilityno product Dockerfile to read
01.notebook_outputsnot a data or machine-learning repository
05.dependency_pinningno manifest whose pinning can be read without a lockfile
05.container_runs_as_rootno Dockerfile to read
05.outbound_timeoutsnot a running service
05.migration_reversibilitytoo few migrations to judge
05.sql_from_stringsnot a running service; a library that builds SQL is doing its job
05.shell_from_stringsnot assessed for Rust, the main language here: this check's patterns read other languages only
05.unsafe_deserializationnot assessed for Rust, the main language here: this check's patterns read other languages only
05.tls_verification_offnot assessed for Rust, the main language here: this check's patterns read other languages only
05.resource_limitsno Kubernetes workload manifests
05.public_env_secretnot a frontend
05.unsafe_htmlnot a frontend
05.source_maps_shippednot a frontend
05.cleartext_trafficnot a mobile app
05.dataset_provenancenot a data or machine-learning repository
05.license_copyleft_inheritedno third-party code is committed to this repository, so the licences it depends on are resolved at build time and are not readable here
05.license_manifest_conflictno packaging manifest states a licence
04.flags_accumulatingfew or no feature flags in the history
04.api_versions_coexistingnot a running service
04.deprecations_lingeringa library, which keeps deprecated interfaces for its users
BOREHOLE READING NOT A CERTIFICATION JHDE-CJWT-3TPJ 2026-09-27 · BC8D491 BOREHOLE.DEV/VERIFY

Anyone can check this report against the authoritative record — click the stamp, or enter JHDE-CJWT-3TPJ at borehole.dev/verify.

The code commits to the 103 checks this run performed, the bands they produced, and the commit they were read at. It does not cover checks written since.

Put the mark in your README

The image is wrapped in a link to the verification page, so a reader can check it rather than take it on trust. If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.

[![Borehole reading, not a certification](https://borehole.dev/badge/tokio-rs/axum/bc8d491.svg "Borehole free reading: not for reliance. See the full report.")](https://borehole.dev/verify/JHDECJWT3TPJ?via=badge)

Borehole reading JHDE-CJWT-3TPJ, not a certification

This commit has been surveyed 13 times

A survey is a reading by a particular version of the assessor. Older readings are kept rather than replaced, because a verification mark attests to the survey it was issued for — overwriting one would make every code already in circulation read as tampered.

ReadAssessorFindingsBand
2026-09-27 · shown borehole 0.7.1 6 adequate
12 other readings (show)
2026-10-04 borehole 0.7.13 6 strong
2026-10-03 borehole 0.7.12 6 strong
2026-10-03 borehole 0.7.11 6 strong
2026-10-02 borehole 0.7.10 6 strong
2026-10-01 borehole 0.7.9 6 strong
2026-09-30 borehole 0.7.8 6 adequate
2026-09-29 borehole 0.7.6 6 adequate
2026-09-28 borehole 0.7.5 6 adequate
2026-09-28 borehole 0.7.4 6 adequate
2026-09-27 borehole 0.7.3 6 adequate
2026-09-27 borehole 0.7.2 6 adequate
2026-09-26 borehole 0.7.0 6 adequate

Where this scan ran

This scan ran on ordinary cloud infrastructure (cloud-run), not in a hardware-isolated confidential VM. Nothing about it is attested by Google.

What an attested survey proves, and what it does not.

What this scan did with the repository — 7 steps

Written by the steps themselves as they ran, not described afterwards. A hand-written account of a data flow drifts the first time somebody changes the flow and not the account.

AtStepDetail
0.0s read repository metadata from the GitHub API authenticated: False
1.9s cloned the repository to a temporary directory depth: full
3.1s read the git history commits: 2006tracked files: 503
24.8s ran the deterministic checks blame pass: Trueread working tree: False
24.8s recorded where this scan ran attested: Falseenvironment: cloud-run
27.9s kept the facts, never the source, for re-reading under new checks
27.9s deleting the working copy

Total 27.9s ·source content sent off this machine: none · calls to a language model: 0 · the clone was deleted when the survey ended

An automated reading of a repository's code and its history up to one commit, with public advisory records. It may be wrong, it is not legal, financial, investment or security advice, and it does not replace diligence by a qualified person. It is provided for information: nobody may rely on it (Borehole's terms, section 3).

BOREHOLE 0.7.1 DETERMINISTIC LAYER · NO MODEL CALLSREAD ON BOREHOLE'S SERVER · CLONE DELETED TAKEDOWNCONTRIBUTED TO THIS REPOSITORY? YOUR RIGHTS