Borehole · Risk register · free tier

theonedev/onedev

Free reading: not for reliance

8f64006 · 7,682 commits · 6,089 files
Issued 2026-10-23

Nothing significant. Questions worth asking about Security & Reliability Posture, Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity.

103 checks ran across 6 assessable dimensions. None found a significant problem; 4 raised something worth a question. 16 findings, each with evidence. One dimension cannot be assessed without an acquirer.

What the repository says about itself

05.60 Relicensed: proprietary → MIT (2017-07-12) → proprietary (2017-07-13) → MIT (2018-11-06) license.txt
1 submodule(s) this survey does not read: server-ee .gitmodules:1

Published under today's rules. The verification code attests to this reading as it was stored. This page differs from it as follows.

1 finding from checks Borehole's calibration found wrong more often than right is no longer published.
2 findings about one contributor are withheld: one author wrote nearly all of this repository's commits; a buyer of this report reads them.

	Dimension	Rating
01	Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance	strong
02	Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity	adequate
03	Organization & Key-Person Risk	not assessable
04	Product & Engineering Maturity	adequate
05	Security & Reliability Posture	adequate
06	Observability & Operations	adequate
07	Fit with the Acquirer	not assessable

strong adequate significant findings not assessable from a repository

Provenance disclosure does not affect any rating

0% of added lines arrived in commits declaring an AI agent as co-author

The surviving-lines measurement was not run on this repository.

1% of lines added in the last 12 months (since 2025-10-23) arrived in AI-declared commits: 39/946 commits, confidence moderate. Also a floor.

39/7,180 commits declaring an agent · Cursor

confidence: moderate

1% of non-merge commits carry any trailer at all
low trailer coverage: the convention may not be in consistent use
no widespread author/committer date divergence

299,690 lines excluded as lockfiles, vendored or generated.

This is a lower bound. It counts what the repository declares. Undeclared AI authorship is invisible here, and a single rebase removes the trailers this rests on. Absence of a declaration is absence of disclosure, not absence of AI authorship.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · strong · ratings ↑

A note that does not affect this rating

01.6

server-core/src/main/java/io/onedev/server/web/asset/es6/pdfjs/pdf.mjs is 26,391 lines, 471× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 56 lines. 69 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 26,391. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down. Measured against its own codebase's median, it is larger than 97% of 382 surveyed projects' largest files.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

line-count	`server-core/src/main/java/io/onedev/server/web/asset/es6/pdfjs/pdf.mjs:1` — 26,391 lines (471× median)
line-count	`server-core/src/main/java/io/onedev/server/web/asset/codemirror/lib/codemirror.js:1` — 9,885 lines (176× median)
line-count	`server-core/src/main/java/io/onedev/server/data/migration/DataMigrator.java:1` — 9,598 lines (171× median)
line-count	`server-core/src/main/java/io/onedev/server/web/asset/bootstrap/js/bootstrap.bundle.js:1` — 7,024 lines (125× median)
line-count	`server-core/src/main/java/io/onedev/server/web/component/select2/res/select2.js:1` — 6,272 lines (112× median)

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · adequate · ratings ↑

02.3

Tests cover a thin slice of the codebase

adequate

292 test files against 4,338 source files (6.7%). This does not measure whether the tests are good, only whether enough of them exist for the codebase to be changed safely by someone who did not write it — which is exactly the situation after an acquisition.

Evidence

test-file-ratio

292 test files / 4,338 source files

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Notes that do not affect this rating

02.6

Almost no process scaffolding exists in the repository

adequate

Of five ordinary markers — CI workflows, CODEOWNERS, a pull-request template, pre-commit hooks, contribution guidance — 1 is present: CI workflows. Branch protection itself is a GitHub setting rather than a file, so this is a reading of proxies and not of the rules themselves. What it does establish is that the process is not written down anywhere a new engineer would find it.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

process-scaffolding

1 of 5 markers present across 6,089 tracked files

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

02.16

Tests are retried until they pass

adequate

The suite is configured to retry failing tests (e2e-test/playwright.config.js). A retry turns a flaky test green without saying why it failed, so a green build means the tests passed eventually. Ask how many retries a typical run needs, and which tests need them.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

e2e-test/playwright.config.js e2e-test/playwright.config.js:31 — test retry

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · not assessable · ratings ↑

Not rated: one author wrote nearly all of this repository's commits, so a finding about one contributor would be about someone its history all but names; the public report does not carry those, and does not rate this dimension without them. What a person adds here.

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · adequate · ratings ↑

04.19

12% of bug fixes add or change a test

adequate

Of 401 fixes in the last 24 months, 48 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.

Evidence

fix commits touching tests

48 of 401

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

A note that does not affect this rating

04.17

Node.js 10 is past end of life

adequate

The code is pinned to Node.js 10 (end of life 2021-04-30). None of these receives security fixes any more; the first stopped on 2021-04-30. Moving off an unsupported runtime is rarely a one-line change, so a buyer should ask whether the upgrade is planned and what it touches.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

server-plugin/server-plugin-buildspec-node/Dockerfile server-plugin/server-plugin-buildspec-node/Dockerfile — Node.js 10, end of life 2021-04-30

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · adequate · ratings ↑

05.2

None of the standard security guard rails are configured

adequate

There is no disclosure policy, no automated dependency updates, no named code owners and no pre-commit configuration. None of these is load-bearing on its own. Their collective absence says that security posture here is whatever the current team happens to remember to do, which is not a posture that survives the team changing.

Evidence

guardrail-scan

checked 5 kinds of guard rail across 6,089 tracked files; 0 present

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.6

1 Dockerfile runs the application as root

adequate

No USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.

Evidence

no-USER-instruction server-plugin/server-plugin-buildspec-node/Dockerfile — runs as root

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Notes that do not affect this rating

05.20

1 SQL statement built from strings

adequate

1 places in product code build SQL by formatting or joining strings rather than passing parameters. In each, what the code shows going in is a table or column name, a constant, or something the line does not show, not a request's value. Ask whether any value reaches these strings, rather than a parameter.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

server-core/src/main/java/io/onedev/server/persistence/SequenceGenerator.java server-core/src/main/java/io/onedev/server/persistence/SequenceGenerator.java:85 — SQL built from a string

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.22

1 deserialiser that can run code

adequate

1 places read data with a deserialiser that executes what it reads (Java object streams). That is safe on data the system wrote itself and remote code execution on anything else. Ask where each one's input comes from.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

server-core/src/main/java/io/onedev/server/logging/LogEntryReader.java server-core/src/main/java/io/onedev/server/logging/LogEntryReader.java:74 — code-executing deserialiser

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.34

1 of 1 Kubernetes workloads declare no resource limits

adequate

1 workload manifests set no CPU or memory limits. One pod that leaks memory or spins can starve everything else on its node, and the scheduler cannot plan capacity for what it cannot see.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

server-product/helm/templates/statefulset.yaml server-product/helm/templates/statefulset.yaml — workload with no limits

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.60

Relicensed: proprietary → MIT (2017-07-12) → proprietary (2017-07-13) → MIT (2018-11-06)

adequate

The root licence changed 3 time(s). Code taken under earlier terms stays under them; check which terms any fork or customer relied on.

A note that does not affect this rating: a licence change is a fact for the first screen, and only a narrowing of rights within two years of the surveyed commit costs "strong".

Evidence

6f25bbafc	`license.txt` — proprietary from 2016-12-14
763665833	`license.txt` — MIT from 2017-07-12
9684bc319	`license.txt` — proprietary from 2017-07-13
fa440736d	`license.txt` — MIT from 2018-11-06

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.65

11 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 6 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-10-18. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 4 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 16.9.7. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version. The record is incomplete: NVD: 1 record names onedev with nothing tying it to this repository (CVE-2026-60018).

A note that does not affect this rating: it describes the project's advisory record, and no advisory in it is known to affect the surveyed commit.

Evidence

GHSA-f9rv-8qpc-j4mv	2026-10-18: GHSA-f9rv-8qpc-j4mv (high), fixed in 16.8.5: Arbitrary server file read via untrusted CI/CD job
GHSA-c296-25jw-hc2x	2026-09-12: GHSA-c296-25jw-hc2x (high), fixed in 16.5.8: Stored XSS in Maven package page via unescaped POM `packaging` element
GHSA-4g92-hmfv-3f9h	2026-09-12: GHSA-4g92-hmfv-3f9h (critical), fixed in 16.5.7: Authenticated pre-authorization Groovy RCE via settings validation
GHSA-f544-q7fq-359r	2026-09-12: GHSA-f544-q7fq-359r (high), fixed in 16.5.10: A Package Writer can read server-local files through Maven POM XXE
GHSA-p3rv-f672-8x57	2026-08-07: GHSA-p3rv-f672-8x57 (moderate), fixed in 16.0.0: Sensitive CI/CD job secrets exposure through /forks endpoint

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Observability & Operations

06 · adequate · ratings ↑

06.1

No telemetry or error reporting is wired in anywhere

adequate

None of 5,081 readable files references an instrumentation, metrics or error-reporting library. If this system is in production, nobody learns that it broke from the system itself — they learn it from a customer. That is a reliability finding before it is an observability one.

Evidence

telemetry-scan

searched 5,081 tracked text files for 16 known instrumentation libraries; manifests for metrics, tracing and error-reporting families; locked dependencies for the packages that emit; 0 matched

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

06.2

No structured logging library is in use

adequate

Nothing references a structured logging library. Logs that are written to be read by a person are not searchable by a machine, which means incident response here is proportional to how well someone remembers the codebase rather than to what the tooling can find.

Evidence

logging-scan

searched 5,081 files for 10 structured logging libraries; 0 matched

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

A note that does not affect this rating

06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

error reporting

no error reporter initialised

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · not assessable · ratings ↑

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository. What a person adds here.

Check it on the running system

10 checks against the running system follow from the findings above: what a buyer's engineer will try, how to run it first, and what to have ready. A paid survey of this repository includes them. See the tiers.

A paid survey of a public repository is also reviewed: a language model reads each finding against the code and withdraws only findings it judges the code contradicts, each listed with its reason. The review is a language model's reading of the findings against the code, and it can be wrong. It never adds a finding, never raises a band, and never removes a finding from a proven check or an advisory that affects the surveyed version.

What a person adds

The survey reads what the repository can show. The code cannot settle these questions, and on them this report states nothing. Each says where its answer lives: your own engineer, the company, or an assessor you choose can settle it. Questions marked measured open with something this repository shows.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · full coverage

measured No architecture or design document is in the tree, across 5,702 product files. Where does the design live, and who holds it? Answer lives in: The team01.38
measured The repository pulls code in through git submodules (.gitmodules). A buyer receives pointers, not that code. Can every submodule be fetched without the team's credentials, and who owns each one? Answer lives in: The team and the submodule owners01.35
Is the architecture right for the next three years of the product? Answer lives in: Your architects, with the product roadmap01.39
Were the home-grown components reasonable choices when they were made, and are they now? Answer lives in: The team's reasoning at the time01.40

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · high coverage

Is review real or a rubber stamp? Comment depth and time to approve need the pull request history. Answer lives in: The code host's pull request data02.32
Is delivery planned and measured, or heroic? Answer lives in: The issue tracker: backlog, sprint history, estimate accuracy02.38
How are incidents run, reviewed and learned from? Answer lives in: Tickets, chat and postmortems02.37

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · partial coverage

Which of the people who wrote this are part of the transaction, and for how long after it? Answer lives in: The deal terms03.29
Who mentors whom, and would that survive a departure? Answer lives in: The team; review history only suggests candidates03.28
Can the team grow, and who stands behind the top three contributors? Answer lives in: Recruiting data and the org chart03.30
Is the seniority mix sound, and will pay survive your salary bands? Answer lives in: HR data03.31
Is the pace sustainable? Commit times cannot say: git keeps no reliable local time. Answer lives in: Interviews and on-call history03.14
Does the team want to stay after close? Answer lives in: Interviews03.32
How are decisions made and disagreements resolved? Answer lives in: Time with the team03.33

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · minimal coverage

measured 946 commits landed in the last year, against 508 the year before (+86%). What drove it: new people, a deadline, or code produced faster than before? Answer lives in: The team04.11
Can this team deliver the stated roadmap on the stated timeline? Answer lives in: The data room and the team's record of estimates04.32
Does leadership know about the debt, and is time budgeted to repay it? Answer lives in: Budget and roadmap decisions04.31
Is the engineering shape consistent with the commercial story? Answer lives in: Revenue, customer and churn data04.33

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · partial coverage

measured 05.5 found credential-shaped strings in this repository. Was each one revoked at the provider? Deleting it from the code revokes nothing; only the provider's audit log shows that it was. Answer lives in: The provider's console and audit log05.38
measured No threat model is in the tree of what looks like a running service. Does one exist elsewhere, and who owns it? Answer lives in: The security owner05.43
What has actually broken, how often, and how badly? Answer lives in: Ticketing and chat05.41
What did external testing find, and was it fixed? Answer lives in: Reports in the data room05.42
What is the SOC 2, ISO 27001 or GDPR status, and where is the evidence? Answer lives in: Audit reports; policy files in the tree are not evidence05.44

Observability & Operations

06 · partial coverage

measured Backup or restore tooling is in the tree (server-product/wrapper/distribution/bin/backup-db.sh). Has a restore ever been rehearsed, and how long did it take? Answer lives in: The operations team06.19
measured No alert rule is defined in the repository. Where are alerts defined, who receives them, and when did one last fire? Answer lives in: The alerting tool and the on-call rota06.10
Are the dashboards opened, the alerts acknowledged and the pages answered? Answer lives in: Pager history and dashboard logs06.29
Are the service-level objectives actually met? Answer lives in: Production metrics06.30
Who carries the pager, and how often does it go off? Answer lives in: Pager exports and interviews06.31
What does it cost to run, and how much headroom is there? Answer lives in: Cloud billing and capacity plans06.32

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · none coverage

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

This is primarily a Java codebase. Does your engineering organisation already run Java in production, or would this be the first? 07.1
The bulk of this system sits in server-core/, server-plugin/, server-product/. Which of your existing systems would each of those have to absorb or replace? 07.10
The repository carries deployment configuration (server-plugin/server-plugin-buildspec-node/Dockerfile and 34 more). Does that match your deployment and on-call model, or does it need rehosting first? 07.2
What is your tolerance for the findings above remaining unaddressed for the first two quarters after close, given everything else that will compete for this team's time?
Which of these systems duplicate yours, and which get retired? Answer lives in: Your architecture07.11
What will integration cost, and in what order? Answer lives in: The engagement07.12
Where does the team land in your organisation, and who reports to whom? Answer lives in: Your org design07.13
Are there earn-outs, retention packages or contractor IP to assign? Answer lives in: Deal terms07.14
Do customer contracts limit hosting, regions or vendors? Answer lives in: Customer contracts07.15

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Rejection log — 87 signals that ran and did not fire

Appendix: rejection log — 87 signals that ran and did not fire

Published on purpose. A signal that looked and decided not to fire has told you something, and this is the calibration data behind every threshold above.

Looked, and found nothing — 62

Signal	What it found
04.hotspot_concentration	change is spread across the codebase rather than pooling in a few filesfiles 58,642 · top5 share 0.023
04.debt_markers	debt markers are sparsemarkers 81 · per kloc 0.12 · lines read 654,698
04.test_growth	test effort kept pace with code writtenlate test per code 0.035 · early test per code 0.033
04.churn_trend	rework is not rising against new worklate delete per insert 0.513 · early delete per insert 0.969
04.fix_share_trend	fixing is not crowding out building
04.compat_layers	little code is kept for the old wayshare 0.0 · code files 4,171 · compat files 0
06.healthcheck_presence	a health or readiness check is defined
06.correlation_ids	a request can be followed through the logstracing False · request id sites 76
06.usage_reporting_default	the product's code names no reporting hostsettings on 0 · settings off 1
06.deployed_image_floats	every deployed image names a versionimages 1 · floating 0
06.probes_identical	readiness and liveness are distinct, or not both setidentical 0 · workloads with both 1
06.single_replica	workloads run more than one replicaworkloads 1 · single replica 0
06.environment_branching	environment differences live in configurationsites 0
06.release_markers	releases are markedtags last year 108 · release commits 0 · changelog commits 2
06.migrate_on_start	migrations do not run at container start
03.active_contributors	withheld: this check's result would describe one person
03.knowledge_silos	withheld: this check's result would describe one person
03.drive_by_contributors	withheld: this check's result would describe one person
03.contributor_attrition	withheld: this check's result would describe one person
03.second_contributor_attrition	withheld: this check's result would describe one person
03.bus_factor_trend	withheld: this check's result would describe one person
02.merge_discipline	a meaningful share of recent change carries evidence of reviewmerges 112 · window last 24 months · with tracked 58
02.ci_presence	CI configuration is present in the working treecount 1
02.release_cadence	tags are presenttags 569
02.conventional_commits	commit subjects generally carry contentsampled 7,180 · low content share 0.081
02.ci_runs_tests	CI invokes a test runnerconfigs 1 · with tests 1
02.skipped_tests	few tests are switched offfocused 0 · skipped 0 · test files 327
02.ci_test_gating	no test run in CI is written so that it cannot failconfigs 1
02.revert_share	change is rarely undoneshare 0.001 · reverts 2 · recent commits 1,458
02.dependency_update_cadence	dependencies move with the codelockfiles 1 · commits since 161 · days since lockfile changed 30
02.lint_in_build	a linter or formatter runs in the buildwired 14 · ci configs 1 · product files 4,171
02.long_lived_branches	the typical branch reaches the trunk quicklyshare 0.0 · merges 43 · long lived 0
02.commit_size	changes arrive in reviewable sizesshare 0.031 · commits 1,208 · over 2000 lines 38
01.burst_import	no commit run met both the rate and the net-addition thresholdgap seconds 180 · min add ratio 3.0 · min net added 2,000
01.initial_dump	first commit is not a disproportionate share of the codebaseinsertions 0 · share of insertions 0.0
01.message_uniformity	commit subjects vary in wording and lengthlength stdev 26.1 · repeat share 0.223
01.revision_depth	most files were revisited after they were first writtenfiles seen 5,076 · write once share 0.316
01.duplicated_blocks	little shipping code is repeated verbatim across filesshare 0.0259 · product files 4,050 · distinct blocks 390,230
01.swallowed_errors	errors are rarely thrown awayloc 659,027 · files 70 · per kloc 0.2
01.build_reproducibility	every base image names a versionfloating 0 · from lines 1
01.unfinished_migration	no language migration is stalled halfway
01.weights_in_git	no model weights are committedfiles 0
05.committed_secrets	no credential-shaped strings outside test and fixture pathsnote the working tree only; the history is 05.5 · patterns 8 · files read 5,081
05.dependency_pinning	a lockfile is committed, so builds are reproduciblelockfile True
05.license_present	a licence file is presentfound True
05.secrets_management_pattern	no environment file is committed outside tests and examplesenv files 0
05.shell_from_strings	product code does not build shell commands from stringssites 0
05.tls_verification_off	no TLS verification is switched off in product codefiles 0 · sites 0 · pinned instead 0
05.privileged_workloads	no workload runs privileged or in the host's namespacessites 0 · behind a setting or built here 0
05.credentials_in_deploy_config	deployment configuration references secrets, never holds themfiles 0 · sites 0
05.signing_material	no signing keystore or profile is committedfiles 0
05.license_vendored_unlicensed	no vendored third-party code is committedcomponents 0
05.license_grant_unclear	the licence is recognisable as MITclass permissive · license MIT
05.committed_native_libraries	no widely used compiled library is committed to the productlibraries 0
04.deprecations_lingering	few deprecations have outlived two yearsolder than two years 1 · files with deprecations 19
04.dependency_churn	few dependencies were added and dropped within 60 daysdependencies seen 2 · added in two years 2 · removed within 60 days 0
04.repository_status	the README's first screen states no end, move or freezestatements 0
02.development_elsewhere	nothing says development happens elsewhereno pr statements 0 · mirror statements 0 · replayed commit share 0.0
05.paid_edition	no directory carries a separate paid-edition licencedirectories 0
04.releases_stopped	releases keep pace with developmentmedian gap days 1.0 · days since last tag 0 · commits last 90 days 516
04.release_branch	the newest release was cut from the branch surveyedelsewhere 8 · on branch 490 · tags in window 498
03.single_maintainer	withheld: this check's result would describe one person

Could not conclude, or did not apply — 25

Not a clean result. Each says why it could not answer here.

Signal	Why
04.dependency_sprawl	no recognised dependency manifest found
04.schema_churn	no schema migrations to read
04.dependency_redundancy	no JavaScript manifest to read
06.telemetry_depth	none at all is 06.1
06.print_logging	not assessed for Java: its logger calls are not read
06.alert_rules	no alert rules in the repository; they may live in a console
06.feature_flags	no feature-flag service; flags may live elsewhere
03.joiners_and_leavers	withheld: this check's result would describe one person
01.notebook_outputs	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.supply_chain_pinning	no CI actions or pipe-to-shell installs to check
05.outbound_timeouts	not assessed for Java, the language the product is written in: this check's patterns read other languages only
05.migration_reversibility	too few migrations to judge
05.known_vulnerabilities	not assessed for Maven: this survey does not read their dependency files
05.public_env_secret	not a frontend
05.unsafe_html	not a frontend
05.source_maps_shipped	not a frontend
05.cleartext_traffic	not a mobile app
05.dataset_provenance	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.license_copyleft_inherited	no third-party code is committed to this repository, so the licences it depends on are resolved at build time and are not readable here
05.license_manifest_conflict	no packaging manifest states a licence
04.flags_accumulating	few or no feature flags in the history
04.api_versions_coexisting	one API version is served, or none
04.ci_platforms_dropped	no platform was dropped from CI in the last two years
05.project_advisories	record incomplete: no advisory found in the sources that answered; NVD: 1 record names onedev with nothing tying it to this repository (CVE-2026-60018)
05.project_exploited	no affecting advisory is on CISA's Known Exploited list

Anyone can check this report against the authoritative record — click the stamp, or enter RFAM-A1C8-YMT4 at borehole.dev/verify.

The code commits to the 106 checks this run performed, the bands they produced, and the commit they were read at. It does not cover checks written since.

Put the mark in your README

The image is wrapped in a link to the verification page, so a reader can check it rather than take it on trust. If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.

[![Borehole reading, not a certification](https://borehole.dev/badge/theonedev/onedev/8f64006.svg "Borehole free reading: not for reliance. See the full report.")](https://borehole.dev/verify/RFAMA1C8YMT4?via=badge)

Where this scan ran

This scan ran on ordinary cloud infrastructure (cloud-run), not in a hardware-isolated confidential VM. Nothing about it is attested by Google.

What an attested survey proves, and what it does not.

What this scan did with the repository — 7 steps

Written by the steps themselves as they ran, not described afterwards. A hand-written account of a data flow drifts the first time somebody changes the flow and not the account.

At	Step	Detail
0.0s	read repository metadata from the GitHub API	size mb: 253.4authenticated: False
16.6s	cloned the repository to a temporary directory	depth: full
33.6s	read the git history	commits: 7682tracked files: 6089
282.4s	ran the deterministic checks	blame pass: Falseread working tree: False
282.4s	recorded where this scan ran	attested: Falseenvironment: cloud-run
422.0s	kept the facts, never the source, for re-reading under new checks
422.0s	deleting the working copy

Total 422.0s ·source content sent off this machine: none · calls to a language model: 0 · the clone was deleted when the survey ended

An automated reading of a repository's code and its history up to one commit, with public advisory records. It may be wrong, it is not legal, financial, investment or security advice, and it does not replace diligence by a qualified person. It is provided for information: nobody may rely on it (Borehole's terms, section 3).

BOREHOLE 0.7.15 DETERMINISTIC LAYER · NO MODEL CALLSREAD ON BOREHOLE'S SERVER · CLONE DELETED TAKEDOWNCONTRIBUTED TO THIS REPOSITORY? YOUR RIGHTS