Borehole · Risk register · free tier

termix-ssh/termix

Free reading: not for reliance

6b06059 · 406 commits · 1,845 files
Issued 2026-11-03

Nothing significant. Questions worth asking about Security & Reliability Posture, Observability & Operations.

102 checks ran across 6 assessable dimensions. None found a significant problem; 5 raised something worth a question. 17 findings, each with evidence. One dimension cannot be assessed without an acquirer. Last commit 2 November 2026.

Published under today's rules. The verification code attests to this reading as it was stored. This page differs from it as follows.

4 findings from checks Borehole's calibration found wrong more often than right are no longer published.

	Dimension	Rating
01	Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance	strong
02	Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity	adequate
03	Organization & Key-Person Risk	adequate
04	Product & Engineering Maturity	adequate
05	Security & Reliability Posture	adequate
06	Observability & Operations	adequate
07	Fit with the Acquirer	not assessable

strong adequate significant findings not assessable from a repository

Provenance disclosure does not affect any rating

36% of the code standing today was written in AI-declared commits

36% of lines still in the tree 721,944 of 2,017,380 32% of lines ever added these differ when early hand-written code has since been replaced

31% of lines added in the last 12 months (since 2025-11-03) arrived in AI-declared commits: 17/234 commits, confidence low. Also a floor.

21/382 commits declaring an agent · Claude, Claude Fable 5, Claude Opus 4.8 and 10 more

confidence: low

13% of non-merge commits carry any trailer at all
low trailer coverage: the convention may not be in consistent use
no widespread author/committer date divergence
the declared share is neither decisive nor negligible, so the true figure is more sensitive to undeclared work
deep scan blamed 1,833 of 1,833 counted files

128,431 lines excluded as lockfiles, vendored or generated.

This is a lower bound. It counts what the repository declares. Undeclared AI authorship is invisible here, and a single rebase removes the trailers this rests on. Absence of a declaration is absence of disclosure, not absence of AI authorship.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · strong · ratings ↑

A note that does not affect this rating

01.6

packages/plugin-sdk/src/backend.ts is 3,198 lines, 33× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 95 lines. 23 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 3,198. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

A note that does not affect this rating: measured against its own codebase's median, it is below the 85th percentile of 382 surveyed projects' largest files, where this check begins to count.

Evidence

line-count	`packages/plugin-sdk/src/backend.ts:1` — 3,198 lines (33× median)
line-count	`src/backend/database/routes/plugins.ts:1` — 2,853 lines (30× median)
line-count	`packages/plugin-sdk/src/manifest.ts:1` — 2,714 lines (28× median)
line-count	`packages/plugin-sdk/src/testing.ts:1` — 2,669 lines (28× median)
line-count	`src/backend/database/routes/rbac.ts:1` — 2,384 lines (25× median)

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · adequate · ratings ↑

02.24

14% of recent commits change more than 2,000 lines

adequate

41 of 300 commits in the last 24 months changed over 2,000 lines of code, not counting reformatting, renames, vendored or generated code. A change that size is rarely reviewed line by line. Ask how they were reviewed, and what made them that large.

Evidence

git log --numstat

41 commits over 2,000 lines

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

A note that does not affect this rating

02.16

Tests are retried until they pass

adequate

The suite is configured to retry failing tests (src/backend/tests/plugins/settings-routes.test.ts). A retry turns a flaky test green without saying why it failed, so a green build means the tests passed eventually. Ask how many retries a typical run needs, and which tests need them.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

src/backend/tests/plugins/settings-routes.test.ts src/backend/tests/plugins/settings-routes.test.ts:261 — test retry

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · adequate · ratings ↑

03.1

Bus factor 1: recent work is concentrated in one contributor

adequate

In the last 24 months, one contributor authored more than half of 370 non-merge commits among 12 authors; across all history, more than half of 370. This is the single most expensive thing to discover after closing, and the repository cannot tell you whether that person is part of the transaction.

Evidence

git shortlog -sn

last 24 months: top author more than half of 370 commits; bus factor 1; 12 authors

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

A note that does not affect this rating

03.3

2 of 6 major areas have only ever had one author

adequate

Across 12 contributors, 2 substantial top-level areas have been touched by exactly one person. The headline bus factor does not show this: a team can look well spread in aggregate and still have subsystems that stop moving the day one person stops working on them. For these areas, ask who else can change them today.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

sole-author	`packages/` — 18,647 lines added
sole-author	`drizzle/` — 5,620 lines added

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · adequate · ratings ↑

04.19

5% of bug fixes add or change a test

adequate

Of 84 fixes in the last 24 months, 4 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.

Evidence

fix commits touching tests

4 of 84

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · adequate · ratings ↑

05.2

None of the standard security guard rails are configured

adequate

There is no disclosure policy, no automated dependency updates, no named code owners and no pre-commit configuration. None of these is load-bearing on its own. Their collective absence says that security posture here is whatever the current team happens to remember to do, which is not a posture that survives the team changing.

Evidence

guardrail-scan

checked 5 kinds of guard rail across 1,845 tracked files; 0 present

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.6

1 Dockerfile runs the application as root

adequate

No USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.

Evidence

no-USER-instruction docker/Dockerfile — runs as root

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.65

49 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 35 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-10-18. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. The record is incomplete: NVD: 2 records name termix with nothing tying them to this repository (CVE-2025-59951, CVE-2026-120322).

Evidence

GHSA-ccmp-2wpj-x458	2026-10-18: GHSA-ccmp-2wpj-x458 (high), fixed in 1.0.2: Unauthenticated Exposure of Internal Web Services via Web Endpoint Non-Loopback Binding
GHSA-frx8-qqgg-7j7g	2026-10-11: GHSA-frx8-qqgg-7j7g (high), fixed in >= 26.10.0: Termix Desktop: any website can obtain a session on the embedded backend (CORS allows all origins + passwordless loopback auto-session)
GHSA-3q2m-5r5p-w45r	2026-10-11: GHSA-3q2m-5r5p-w45r (high), fixed in >= 26.10.0: Cross-user nested automation execution bypasses ownership checks and runs actions with victim privileges
GHSA-rgf3-2q88-q4wp	2026-10-11: GHSA-rgf3-2q88-q4wp (high), fixed in >= 26.10.0: Cross-User File Manager SSH Session Termination and State Replacement
GHSA-v3vp-ffww-q7pw	2026-10-11: GHSA-v3vp-ffww-q7pw (high), fixed in >= 26.10.0: Credential disclosure vulnerability in Termix

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Notes that do not affect this rating

05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

5 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

.github/workflows/docker.yml	`.github/workflows/docker.yml:71` — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/docker.yml	`.github/workflows/docker.yml:76` — action pinned by tag

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.20

3 SQL statements built from strings

adequate

3 places in product code build SQL by formatting or joining strings rather than passing parameters. In each, what the code shows going in is a table or column name, a constant, or something the line does not show, not a request's value. Ask whether any value reaches these strings, rather than a parameter.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

src/backend/plugins/data.ts	`src/backend/plugins/data.ts:284` — SQL built from a string
src/backend/upgrade/snippets-schema-migration.ts	`src/backend/upgrade/snippets-schema-migration.ts:39` — SQL built from a string
src/backend/utils/audit-retention-migration.ts	`src/backend/utils/audit-retention-migration.ts:99` — SQL built from a string

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.21

6 shell commands built from strings

adequate

6 places run a command through a shell (`shell=True`, `os.system`, `exec` with a template) rather than passing arguments. Where any part comes from outside, it is command injection. Ask where each one's input comes from.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

src/backend/tls/self-signed.ts	`src/backend/tls/self-signed.ts:156` — command run through a shell
src/backend/tls/self-signed.ts	`src/backend/tls/self-signed.ts:160` — command run through a shell
src/backend/tls/self-signed.ts	`src/backend/tls/self-signed.ts:190` — command run through a shell

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.9

1 vendored component with no licence

adequate

Third-party code is committed into this repository without any statement of the terms it arrived under. Unknown terms are harder to deal with than inconvenient ones: an awkward licence can be complied with, an absent one cannot. Each of these needs its origin established before the code changes hands.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

vendor/rimraf-compat vendor/rimraf-compat — 2 tracked files, no licence file

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Observability & Operations

06 · adequate · ratings ↑

06.1

No telemetry or error reporting is wired in anywhere

adequate

None of 1,790 readable files references an instrumentation, metrics or error-reporting library. If this system is in production, nobody learns that it broke from the system itself — they learn it from a customer. That is a reliability finding before it is an observability one.

Evidence

telemetry-scan

searched 1,790 tracked text files for 16 known instrumentation libraries; manifests for metrics, tracing and error-reporting families; locked dependencies for the packages that emit; 0 matched

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

06.2

No structured logging library is in use

adequate

Nothing references a structured logging library. Logs that are written to be read by a person are not searchable by a machine, which means incident response here is proportional to how well someone remembers the codebase rather than to what the tooling can find.

Evidence

logging-scan

searched 1,790 files for 10 structured logging libraries; 0 matched

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Notes that do not affect this rating

06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

error reporting

no error reporter initialised

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

06.18

1 of 1 deployed images carry no version, or `latest`

adequate

1 images in the deployment configuration are named without a version or as `latest`. A redeploy can change the software without a commit, a rollback has nothing to roll back to, and nobody can say from the repository what is running.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

docker/docker-compose.yml docker/docker-compose.yml:3 — image without a version

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · not assessable · ratings ↑

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository. What a person adds here.

Check it on the running system

10 checks against the running system follow from the findings above: what a buyer's engineer will try, how to run it first, and what to have ready. A paid survey of this repository includes them. See the tiers.

A paid survey of a public repository is also reviewed: a language model reads each finding against the code and withdraws only findings it judges the code contradicts, each listed with its reason. The review is a language model's reading of the findings against the code, and it can be wrong. It never adds a finding, never raises a band, and never removes a finding from a proven check or an advisory that affects the surveyed version.

What a person adds

The survey reads what the repository can show. The code cannot settle these questions, and on them this report states nothing. Each says where its answer lives: your own engineer, the company, or an assessor you choose can settle it. Questions marked measured open with something this repository shows.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · full coverage

measured No architecture or design document is in the tree, across 1,272 product files. Where does the design live, and who holds it? Answer lives in: The team01.38
Is the architecture right for the next three years of the product? Answer lives in: Your architects, with the product roadmap01.39
Were the home-grown components reasonable choices when they were made, and are they now? Answer lives in: The team's reasoning at the time01.40

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · high coverage

Is review real or a rubber stamp? Comment depth and time to approve need the pull request history. Answer lives in: The code host's pull request data02.32
Is delivery planned and measured, or heroic? Answer lives in: The issue tracker: backlog, sprint history, estimate accuracy02.38
How are incidents run, reviewed and learned from? Answer lives in: Tickets, chat and postmortems02.37

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · partial coverage

measured One contributor authored more than half of the commits in this history. Is that person part of the transaction, and for how long after it? Answer lives in: The deal terms03.29
Who mentors whom, and would that survive a departure? Answer lives in: The team; review history only suggests candidates03.28
Can the team grow, and who stands behind the top three contributors? Answer lives in: Recruiting data and the org chart03.30
Is the seniority mix sound, and will pay survive your salary bands? Answer lives in: HR data03.31
Is the pace sustainable? Commit times cannot say: git keeps no reliable local time. Answer lives in: Interviews and on-call history03.14
Does the team want to stay after close? Answer lives in: Interviews03.32
How are decisions made and disagreements resolved? Answer lives in: Time with the team03.33

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · minimal coverage

Can this team deliver the stated roadmap on the stated timeline? Answer lives in: The data room and the team's record of estimates04.32
Does leadership know about the debt, and is time budgeted to repay it? Answer lives in: Budget and roadmap decisions04.31
Is the engineering shape consistent with the commercial story? Answer lives in: Revenue, customer and churn data04.33

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · partial coverage

measured No threat model is in the tree of what looks like a running service. Does one exist elsewhere, and who owns it? Answer lives in: The security owner05.43
What has actually broken, how often, and how badly? Answer lives in: Ticketing and chat05.41
What did external testing find, and was it fixed? Answer lives in: Reports in the data room05.42
What is the SOC 2, ISO 27001 or GDPR status, and where is the evidence? Answer lives in: Audit reports; policy files in the tree are not evidence05.44

Observability & Operations

06 · partial coverage

measured Nothing in the tree backs up or restores data. How is data backed up, and has a restore ever been rehearsed? Answer lives in: The operations team06.19
measured No alert rule is defined in the repository. Where are alerts defined, who receives them, and when did one last fire? Answer lives in: The alerting tool and the on-call rota06.10
Are the dashboards opened, the alerts acknowledged and the pages answered? Answer lives in: Pager history and dashboard logs06.29
Are the service-level objectives actually met? Answer lives in: Production metrics06.30
Who carries the pager, and how often does it go off? Answer lives in: Pager exports and interviews06.31
What does it cost to run, and how much headroom is there? Answer lives in: Cloud billing and capacity plans06.32

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · none coverage

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

This is primarily a TypeScript codebase. Does your engineering organisation already run TypeScript in production, or would this be the first? 07.1
The bulk of this system sits in src/, drizzle/, public/. Which of your existing systems would each of those have to absorb or replace? 07.10
32% of added lines came through AI-declared commits. Does your organisation have a policy on inheriting and maintaining that code, and does your engineering team's tooling match how it was produced? 07.9
The repository carries deployment configuration (docker/Dockerfile and 1 more). Does that match your deployment and on-call model, or does it need rehosting first? 07.2
What is your tolerance for the findings above remaining unaddressed for the first two quarters after close, given everything else that will compete for this team's time?
Which of these systems duplicate yours, and which get retired? Answer lives in: Your architecture07.11
What will integration cost, and in what order? Answer lives in: The engagement07.12
Where does the team land in your organisation, and who reports to whom? Answer lives in: Your org design07.13
Are there earn-outs, retention packages or contractor IP to assign? Answer lives in: Deal terms07.14
Do customer contracts limit hosting, regions or vendors? Answer lives in: Customer contracts07.15

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Rejection log — 85 signals that ran and did not fire

Appendix: rejection log — 85 signals that ran and did not fire

Published on purpose. A signal that looked and decided not to fire has told you something, and this is the calibration data behind every threshold above.

Looked, and found nothing — 65

Signal	What it found
04.hotspot_concentration	change is spread across the codebase rather than pooling in a few filesfiles 7,731 · top5 share 0.013
04.debt_markers	debt markers are sparsemarkers 1 · per kloc 0.0 · lines read 1,919,333
04.dependency_sprawl	direct dependency counts are unremarkable
04.test_growth	test effort kept pace with code writtenlate test per code 0.34 · early test per code 0.0
04.churn_trend	rework is not rising against new worklate delete per insert 0.597 · early delete per insert 0.349
04.eol_runtime	every pinned runtime is still supportedeol as of 2026-09-24
04.compat_layers	little code is kept for the old wayshare 0.003 · code files 908 · compat files 3
04.dependency_redundancy	one library per job, mostly
06.healthcheck_presence	a health or readiness check is defined
06.correlation_ids	a request can be followed through the logstracing False · request id sites 5
06.usage_reporting_default	the product's code names no reporting hostsettings on 0 · settings off 0
06.environment_branching	environment differences live in configurationsites 0
06.release_markers	releases are markedtags last year 55 · release commits 36 · changelog commits 26
06.migrate_on_start	migrations do not run at container start
03.active_contributors	more than one contributor active in the trailing yearall time 12 · active 12mo 10
03.drive_by_contributors	a healthy share of contributors committed more than onceshare 0.667 · authors 12 · one commit authors 8
03.contributor_attrition	the dominant contributor is still activeauthors 12 · top share more than half · top contributor last committed within the last three months
03.critical_path_ownership	more than one person changes the critical pathsauthors 12
03.second_contributor_attrition	the second and third contributors are still active
02.merge_discipline	a meaningful share of recent change carries evidence of reviewmerges 24 · window last 24 months · with tracked 17
02.ci_presence	CI configuration is present in the working treecount 6
02.test_presence	tests are present in a normal proportion to sourcetests 504 · source 1,407 · test ratio 0.358
02.release_cadence	tags are presenttags 75
02.conventional_commits	commit subjects generally carry contentsampled 382 · low content share 0.018
02.branch_protection_hints	process scaffolding is present in the repository
02.ci_runs_tests	CI invokes a test runnerconfigs 6 · with tests 3
02.skipped_tests	few tests are switched offfocused 0 · skipped 0 · test files 505
02.ci_test_gating	no test run in CI is written so that it cannot failconfigs 6
02.revert_share	change is rarely undoneshare 0.011 · reverts 4 · recent commits 370
02.dependency_update_cadence	dependencies move with the codelockfiles 1 · commits since 1 · days since lockfile changed 0
02.lint_in_build	a linter or formatter runs in the buildwired 2 · ci configs 6 · product files 908
01.burst_import	no commit run met both the rate and the net-addition thresholdgap seconds 180 · min add ratio 3.0 · min net added 2,000
01.initial_dump	first commit is not a disproportionate share of the codebaseinsertions 22,902 · share of insertions 0.006
01.message_uniformity	commit subjects vary in wording and lengthlength stdev 20.27 · repeat share 0.196
01.duplicated_blocks	little shipping code is repeated verbatim across filesshare 0.0053 · product files 903 · distinct blocks 110,947
01.swallowed_errors	errors are rarely thrown awayloc 1,920,750 · files 0 · per kloc 0.0
01.build_reproducibility	every base image names a versionfloating 0 · from lines 7
01.unfinished_migration	no language migration is stalled halfway
01.weights_in_git	no model weights are committedfiles 0
05.committed_secrets	no credential-shaped strings outside test and fixture pathsnote the working tree only; the history is 05.5 · patterns 8 · files read 1,790
05.dependency_pinning	a lockfile is committed, so builds are reproduciblelockfile True
05.license_present	a licence file is presentfound True
05.secrets_in_history	no credential-shaped string was ever added outside test and fixture pathspatterns 8 · truncated False · added lines 3,759,457
05.secrets_management_pattern	no environment file is committed outside tests and examplesenv files 0
05.unsafe_deserialization	no code-executing deserialiser in product codesites 0
05.privileged_workloads	no workload runs privileged or in the host's namespacessites 0 · behind a setting or built here 0
05.credentials_in_deploy_config	deployment configuration references secrets, never holds themfiles 0 · sites 0
05.public_env_secret	only publishable values carry a public prefixnames 0 · sites 0 · not secrets 0
05.unsafe_html	raw HTML is rare, literal or sanitisedsites 0
05.source_maps_shipped	production builds do not publish source mapssites 0
05.signing_material	no signing keystore or profile is committedfiles 0
05.license_copyleft_inherited	every licence found in vendored code is permissive or weak-copyleftvendored paths 2
05.license_grant_unclear	the licence is recognisable as Apache-2.0class permissive · license Apache-2.0
05.committed_native_libraries	no widely used compiled library is committed to the productlibraries 0
04.api_versions_coexisting	one API version is served, or none
04.deprecations_lingering	few deprecations have outlived two yearsolder than two years 0 · files with deprecations 4
04.dependency_churn	few dependencies were added and dropped within 60 daysdependencies seen 171 · added in two years 171 · removed within 60 days 19
04.ci_platforms_dropped	no platform was dropped from CI in the last two years
04.repository_status	the README's first screen states no end, move or freezestatements 0
02.development_elsewhere	nothing says development happens elsewhereno pr statements 0 · mirror statements 0 · replayed commit share 0.0
05.licence_changes	the root licence has not changed in the history readlicence versions 1 · unreleased changes 0
05.paid_edition	no directory carries a separate paid-edition licencedirectories 0
04.releases_stopped	releases keep pace with developmentmedian gap days 0.0 · days since last tag 0 · commits last 90 days 87
04.release_branch	the newest release, v26.11.1-beta.1, was made after the surveyed commit on the branch surveyedelsewhere 3 · on branch 8 · tags in window 12
03.single_maintainer	no file says one person maintains itstatements 0

Could not conclude, or did not apply — 20

Not a clean result. Each says why it could not answer here.

Signal	Why
04.fix_share_trend	fewer than six busy quarters to compare
04.schema_churn	no schema migrations to read
06.telemetry_depth	none at all is 06.1
06.print_logging	a frontend: console output is the browser's, not the server's
06.alert_rules	no alert rules in the repository; they may live in a console
06.probes_identical	no Kubernetes probes
06.single_replica	no Kubernetes deployments
06.feature_flags	no feature-flag service; flags may live elsewhere
03.bus_factor_trend	fewer than three active years to compare
03.joiners_and_leavers	too few regular contributors to see a trend
02.long_lived_branches	too few merges to judge (squash and rebase leave none)
01.notebook_outputs	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.outbound_timeouts	not assessed for TypeScript or SQL, the languages the product is written in: this check's patterns read other languages only
05.migration_reversibility	too few migrations to judge
05.resource_limits	no Kubernetes workload manifests
05.cleartext_traffic	not a mobile app
05.dataset_provenance	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.license_manifest_conflict	no packaging manifest states a licence
04.flags_accumulating	few or no feature flags in the history
05.project_exploited	no affecting advisory is on CISA's Known Exploited list

Anyone can check this report against the authoritative record — click the stamp, or enter 6Y0X-393T-GNQS at borehole.dev/verify.

The code commits to the 106 checks this run performed, the bands they produced, and the commit they were read at. It does not cover checks written since.

Put the mark in your README

The image is wrapped in a link to the verification page, so a reader can check it rather than take it on trust. If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.

[![Borehole reading, not a certification](https://borehole.dev/badge/termix-ssh/termix/6b06059.svg "Borehole free reading: not for reliance. See the full report.")](https://borehole.dev/verify/6Y0X393TGNQS?via=badge)

Where this scan ran

This scan ran on ordinary cloud infrastructure (cloud-run), not in a hardware-isolated confidential VM. Nothing about it is attested by Google.

What an attested survey proves, and what it does not.

What this scan did with the repository — 7 steps

Written by the steps themselves as they ran, not described afterwards. A hand-written account of a data flow drifts the first time somebody changes the flow and not the account.

At	Step	Detail
0.0s	read repository metadata from the GitHub API	size mb: 84.7authenticated: False
12.3s	cloned the repository to a temporary directory	depth: full
20.0s	read the git history	commits: 406tracked files: 1845
261.2s	ran the deterministic checks	blame pass: Trueread working tree: False
261.2s	recorded where this scan ran	attested: Falseenvironment: cloud-run
389.7s	kept the facts, never the source, for re-reading under new checks
389.7s	deleting the working copy

Total 389.7s ·source content sent off this machine: none · calls to a language model: 0 · the clone was deleted when the survey ended

An automated reading of a repository's code and its history up to one commit, with public advisory records. It may be wrong, it is not legal, financial, investment or security advice, and it does not replace diligence by a qualified person. It is provided for information: nobody may rely on it (Borehole's terms, section 3).

BOREHOLE 0.7.15 DETERMINISTIC LAYER · NO MODEL CALLSREAD ON BOREHOLE'S SERVER · CLONE DELETED TAKEDOWNCONTRIBUTED TO THIS REPOSITORY? YOUR RIGHTS