Borehole · Risk register · free tier

risingwavelabs/risingwave

Free reading: not for reliance

1c69fba · 15,198 commits · 6,721 files
Issued 2026-10-23

Nothing significant. Questions worth asking about Security & Reliability Posture, Product & Engineering Maturity.

104 checks ran across 6 assessable dimensions. 1 finding is worth checking first. 17 findings, each with evidence. One dimension cannot be assessed without an acquirer.

What the repository says about itself

04.62 Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed

Worth checking first

Borehole's proprietary scoring is calibrated across hundreds of repositories. Each finding here reads significant, but its check has not yet held up often enough in that calibration to rate significant on its own. If one holds when someone checks it, it is significant.

05.26 55 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 7 high or critical in what ships

What this survey read. This commit may not be the product users run: its Cargo.toml gives the version 3.2.0-alpha, a development or pre-release version; The newest release, v3.1.0, is not on the branch this survey read; the newest release on it is v0.1.11. Read this report as describing that commit, not the release users run. Survey the release branch or tag as well.

Published under today's rules. The verification code attests to this reading as it was stored. This page differs from it as follows.

2 findings from checks Borehole's calibration found wrong more often than right are no longer published.
The file and line of 2 credential-shaped matches are withheld. File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report.

	Dimension	Rating
01	Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance	strong
02	Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity	strong
03	Organization & Key-Person Risk	strong
04	Product & Engineering Maturity	adequate
05	Security & Reliability Posture	adequate
06	Observability & Operations	adequate
07	Fit with the Acquirer	not assessable

strong adequate significant findings not assessable from a repository

Provenance disclosure does not affect any rating

3% of added lines arrived in commits declaring an AI agent as co-author

The surviving-lines measurement was not run on this repository.

19% of lines added in the last 12 months (since 2025-10-23) arrived in AI-declared commits: 176/1,588 commits, confidence low. Also a floor.

198/15,198 commits declaring an agent · Claude, Claude Fable 5, Claude Fable 5.1 and 14 more

confidence: moderate

46% of non-merge commits carry any trailer at all
low trailer coverage: the convention may not be in consistent use
no widespread author/committer date divergence

153,747 lines excluded as lockfiles, vendored or generated.

This is a lower bound. It counts what the repository declares. Undeclared AI authorship is invisible here, and a single rebase removes the trailers this rests on. Absence of a declaration is absence of disclosure, not absence of AI authorship.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · strong · ratings ↑

A note that does not affect this rating

01.6

src/sqlparser/src/parser.rs is 6,960 lines, 62× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 111 lines. 163 files exceed 1,110 lines, the largest being 6,960. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

A note that does not affect this rating: measured against its own codebase's median, it is below the 85th percentile of 382 surveyed projects' largest files, where this check begins to count.

Evidence

line-count	`src/sqlparser/src/parser.rs:1` — 6,960 lines (62× median)
line-count	`src/meta/src/hummock/manager/tests.rs:1` — 5,033 lines (45× median)
line-count	`src/sqlparser/src/ast/mod.rs:1` — 4,328 lines (38× median)
line-count	`src/meta/src/controller/streaming_job.rs:1` — 4,302 lines (38× median)
line-count	`src/batch/executors/src/executor/join/hash_join.rs:1` — 4,177 lines (37× median)

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · strong · ratings ↑

No finding. 16 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · strong · ratings ↑

No finding. 10 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · adequate · ratings ↑

04.20

Fixes are 54% of recent work, up from 33%

adequate

In the last two quarters 54% of commits were fixes, against 33% in the quarters before. Rising fix work usually means quality debt is coming due, and it takes time that new work would have had.

Evidence

fix share by quarter

54%, 53%, 37%, 34%, 32%, 34%, 30%, 31%

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Notes that do not affect this rating

04.17

Node.js 20 is past end of life

adequate

The code is pinned to Node.js 20 (end of life 2026-04-30). None of these receives security fixes any more; the first stopped on 2026-04-30. Moving off an unsupported runtime is rarely a one-line change, so a buyer should ask whether the upgrade is planned and what it touches.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

dashboard/.node-version dashboard/.node-version — Node.js 20, end of life 2026-04-30

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

04.38

9 files still carry code deprecated more than two years ago

adequate

9 files were marked deprecated over two years ago and still are, the oldest since Feb 2024. A deprecation is a promise to remove. Ask what still depends on these, and whether removing them is scheduled.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

src/stream/src/common/log_store_impl/kv_log_store/mod.rs	`src/stream/src/common/log_store_impl/kv_log_store/mod.rs` — deprecated since Feb 2024
src/meta/node/src/lib.rs	`src/meta/node/src/lib.rs` — deprecated since Mar 2024
src/compute/src/lib.rs	`src/compute/src/lib.rs` — deprecated since Mar 2024
src/storage/hummock_sdk/src/level.rs	`src/storage/hummock_sdk/src/level.rs` — deprecated since Jul 2024
src/storage/src/hummock/sstable/mod.rs	`src/storage/src/hummock/sstable/mod.rs` — deprecated since Sep 2024

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

04.62

Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed

adequate

The newest release, v3.1.0, is not on the branch this survey read; the newest release on it is v0.1.11. The shipped product may differ from what this report describes. Survey the release branch too.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

45baf6460

tag v3.1.0

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · adequate · ratings ↑

05.1

2 credential-shaped strings in the tree sit in tests, examples, documentation or local development settings

adequate

Strings shaped like credentials appear only where fakes are usual: test fixtures, examples, documentation, placeholders and local stacks. They are almost always fakes. Ask someone to confirm that none of them works anywhere, because a real key in a development file is still a real key.

Evidence

JWT	2 cited: JWT, where fakes are usual
	File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report.

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.6

2 Dockerfiles run the application as root

adequate

No USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.

Evidence

no-USER-instruction	`docker/Dockerfile` — runs as root
no-USER-instruction	`docker/aws/Dockerfile` — runs as root

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.26

55 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 7 high or critical in what ships

adequate worth checking first

55 of 2,426 locked dependencies match 103 published advisories in OSV, 25 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.

The check that found this reads significant, but it has not yet held up often enough in Borehole's calibration to rate a finding significant on its own. Opening dashboard/pnpm-lock.yaml settles it. If it holds when someone checks it, this finding is significant.

Evidence

dashboard/pnpm-lock.yaml	`dashboard/pnpm-lock.yaml` — dompurify 3.4.8: GHSA-cg2g-xh64-v4q7 (critical), fixed in 3.4.17
dashboard/pnpm-lock.yaml	`dashboard/pnpm-lock.yaml` — next 16.3.8: GHSA-2464-fhr4-w9xw (critical), fixed in 16.4.1
dashboard/pnpm-lock.yaml	`dashboard/pnpm-lock.yaml` — proxy-addr 2.0.7: GHSA-jqcg-44mw-7w3h (critical), fixed in 2.0.8; a development dependency

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Notes that do not affect this rating

05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

18 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day; 11 steps pipe a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

.github/workflows/assign-issue-milestone.yml	`.github/workflows/assign-issue-milestone.yml:15` — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/audit.yml	`.github/workflows/audit.yml:16` — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/copilot-setup-steps.yml	`.github/workflows/copilot-setup-steps.yml:40` — download piped into a shell

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.20

1 SQL statement built from strings

adequate

1 places in product code build SQL by formatting or joining strings rather than passing parameters. In each, what the code shows going in is a table or column name, a constant, or something the line does not show, not a request's value. Ask whether any value reaches these strings, rather than a parameter.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

java/connector-node/risingwave-sink-jdbc/src/main/java/com/risingwave/connector/jdbc/JdbcDialect.java java/connector-node/risingwave-sink-jdbc/src/main/java/com/risingwave/connector/jdbc/JdbcDialect.java:78 — SQL built from a string

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.21

4 shell commands built from strings

adequate

4 places run a command through a shell (`shell=True`, `os.system`, `exec` with a template) rather than passing arguments. Where any part comes from outside, it is command injection. Ask where each one's input comes from.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

develop/sql_bench/main.py	`develop/sql_bench/main.py:154` — command run through a shell
develop/sql_bench/main.py	`develop/sql_bench/main.py:199` — command run through a shell
src/stream/benches/stream_hash_join.py	`src/stream/benches/stream_hash_join.py:39` — command run through a shell

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.22

1 deserialiser that can run code

adequate

1 places read data with a deserialiser that executes what it reads (Java object streams). That is safe on data the system wrote itself and remote code execution on anything else. Ask where each one's input comes from.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

java/common-utils/src/main/java/com/risingwave/java/utils/ObjectSerde.java java/common-utils/src/main/java/com/risingwave/java/utils/ObjectSerde.java:46 — code-executing deserialiser

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.65

1 advisory against this project in the last 24 months, 1 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-10-19. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. None of them affects the surveyed version.

A note that does not affect this rating: it describes the project's advisory record, and no advisory in it is known to affect the surveyed commit.

Evidence

CVE-2026-112262

2026-10-19: CVE-2026-112262 (high): RisingWave before 3.1.0 contains a missing authorization vulnerability that allows low-privileged SQL users to read and write arbitrary server files by creating

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Observability & Operations

06 · adequate · ratings ↑

06.8

One request cannot be followed through the logs

adequate

Nothing in the service carries a request or correlation id, and there is no tracing. When a customer reports a failure, the log lines that belong to their request cannot be picked out from everyone else's.

Evidence

request ids

no request id, correlation id or tracing found

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

06.35

Sends usage data to telemetry.risingwave.dev by default

adequate

src/common/telemetry_event/src/lib.rs sends to telemetry.risingwave.dev, and docker/docker-compose-distributed.yml leaves reporting on as shipped. Every installation reports to the vendor unless its operator turns this off. For a buyer running it inside their own product, that is an outbound data flow to a third party: ask what is sent, how often, and whether the buyer's customers were told.

Evidence

src/common/telemetry_event/src/lib.rs	`src/common/telemetry_event/src/lib.rs:40` — reports to telemetry.risingwave.dev
docker/docker-compose-distributed.yml	`docker/docker-compose-distributed.yml:31` — the reporting setting is on by default

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Notes that do not affect this rating

06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

error reporting

no error reporter initialised

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

06.18

4 of 10 deployed images carry no version, or `latest`

adequate

4 images in the deployment configuration are named without a version or as `latest`. A redeploy can change the software without a commit, a rollback has nothing to roll back to, and nobody can say from the repository what is running.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

docker/docker-compose.yml	`docker/docker-compose.yml:107` — image without a version
docker/docker-compose.yml	`docker/docker-compose.yml:132` — image without a version
docker/docker-compose.yml	`docker/docker-compose.yml:178` — image without a version

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · not assessable · ratings ↑

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository. What a person adds here.

Check it on the running system

9 checks against the running system follow from the findings above: what a buyer's engineer will try, how to run it first, and what to have ready. A paid survey of this repository includes them. See the tiers.

A paid survey of a public repository is also reviewed: a language model reads each finding against the code and withdraws only findings it judges the code contradicts, each listed with its reason. The review is a language model's reading of the findings against the code, and it can be wrong. It never adds a finding, never raises a band, and never removes a finding from a proven check or an advisory that affects the surveyed version.

What a person adds

The survey reads what the repository can show. The code cannot settle these questions, and on them this report states nothing. Each says where its answer lives: your own engineer, the company, or an assessor you choose can settle it. Questions marked measured open with something this repository shows.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · full coverage

measured No architecture or design document is in the tree, across 3,114 product files. Where does the design live, and who holds it? Answer lives in: The team01.38
Is the architecture right for the next three years of the product? Answer lives in: Your architects, with the product roadmap01.39
Were the home-grown components reasonable choices when they were made, and are they now? Answer lives in: The team's reasoning at the time01.40

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · high coverage

Is review real or a rubber stamp? Comment depth and time to approve need the pull request history. Answer lives in: The code host's pull request data02.32
Is delivery planned and measured, or heroic? Answer lives in: The issue tracker: backlog, sprint history, estimate accuracy02.38
How are incidents run, reviewed and learned from? Answer lives in: Tickets, chat and postmortems02.37

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · partial coverage

measured 229 people have committed here. Which of them are you acquiring, and which are you replacing? Answer lives in: The deal terms03.29
Who mentors whom, and would that survive a departure? Answer lives in: The team; review history only suggests candidates03.28
Can the team grow, and who stands behind the top three contributors? Answer lives in: Recruiting data and the org chart03.30
Is the seniority mix sound, and will pay survive your salary bands? Answer lives in: HR data03.31
Is the pace sustainable? Commit times cannot say: git keeps no reliable local time. Answer lives in: Interviews and on-call history03.14
Does the team want to stay after close? Answer lives in: Interviews03.32
How are decisions made and disagreements resolved? Answer lives in: Time with the team03.33

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · minimal coverage

Can this team deliver the stated roadmap on the stated timeline? Answer lives in: The data room and the team's record of estimates04.32
Does leadership know about the debt, and is time budgeted to repay it? Answer lives in: Budget and roadmap decisions04.31
Is the engineering shape consistent with the commercial story? Answer lives in: Revenue, customer and churn data04.33

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · partial coverage

measured No threat model is in the tree of what looks like a running service. Does one exist elsewhere, and who owns it? Answer lives in: The security owner05.43
What has actually broken, how often, and how badly? Answer lives in: Ticketing and chat05.41
What did external testing find, and was it fixed? Answer lives in: Reports in the data room05.42
What is the SOC 2, ISO 27001 or GDPR status, and where is the evidence? Answer lives in: Audit reports; policy files in the tree are not evidence05.44

Observability & Operations

06 · partial coverage

measured Nothing in the tree backs up or restores data. How is data backed up, and has a restore ever been rehearsed? Answer lives in: The operations team06.19
measured No alert rule is defined in the repository. Where are alerts defined, who receives them, and when did one last fire? Answer lives in: The alerting tool and the on-call rota06.10
Are the dashboards opened, the alerts acknowledged and the pages answered? Answer lives in: Pager history and dashboard logs06.29
Are the service-level objectives actually met? Answer lives in: Production metrics06.30
Who carries the pager, and how often does it go off? Answer lives in: Pager exports and interviews06.31
What does it cost to run, and how much headroom is there? Answer lives in: Cloud billing and capacity plans06.32

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · none coverage

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

This is primarily a Rust codebase. Does your engineering organisation already run Rust in production, or would this be the first? 07.1
The bulk of this system sits in src/, java/, dashboard/. Which of your existing systems would each of those have to absorb or replace? 07.10
The repository carries deployment configuration (docker/Dockerfile and 13 more). Does that match your deployment and on-call model, or does it need rehosting first? 07.2
What is your tolerance for the findings above remaining unaddressed for the first two quarters after close, given everything else that will compete for this team's time?
Which of these systems duplicate yours, and which get retired? Answer lives in: Your architecture07.11
What will integration cost, and in what order? Answer lives in: The engagement07.12
Where does the team land in your organisation, and who reports to whom? Answer lives in: Your org design07.13
Are there earn-outs, retention packages or contractor IP to assign? Answer lives in: Deal terms07.14
Do customer contracts limit hosting, regions or vendors? Answer lives in: Customer contracts07.15

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Rejection log — 87 signals that ran and did not fire

Appendix: rejection log — 87 signals that ran and did not fire

Published on purpose. A signal that looked and decided not to fire has told you something, and this is the calibration data behind every threshold above.

Looked, and found nothing — 64

Signal	What it found
04.hotspot_concentration	change is spread across the codebase rather than pooling in a few filesfiles 15,487 · top5 share 0.014
04.debt_markers	debt markers are sparsemarkers 1,146 · per kloc 0.96 · lines read 1,191,528
04.dependency_sprawl	direct dependency counts are unremarkable
04.churn_trend	rework is not rising against new worklate delete per insert 0.508 · early delete per insert 0.577
04.fixes_with_tests	fixes usually come with a testfixes 1,158 · share 0.41 · with tests 475
04.compat_layers	little code is kept for the old wayshare 0.0 · code files 2,819 · compat files 1
04.dependency_redundancy	one library per job, mostly
06.telemetry_presence	a telemetry or error-reporting library is referencednote presence only; whether anyone watches it is not visible here · matches 123
06.healthcheck_presence	a health or readiness check is defined
06.release_markers	releases are markedtags last year 25 · release commits 0 · changelog commits 36
06.migrate_on_start	migrations do not run at container start
03.contributor_concentration	no single contributor dominates the last 24 monthsyears 5.3 · window last 24 months · authors 229
03.active_contributors	more than one contributor active in the trailing yearall time 229 · active 12mo 63
03.knowledge_silos	every substantial directory has been touched by more than one personauthors 229 · directories 10
03.drive_by_contributors	an open contributor base, where one-commit contributors are normalauthors 229 · one off share 0.354
03.contributor_attrition	no contributor dominates enough for their absence to matterauthors 229 · top share less than a quarter · top contributor last committed more than six months ago
03.critical_path_ownership	more than one person changes the critical pathsauthors 94
03.second_contributor_attrition	the second and third contributors are still active
03.bus_factor_trend	the team has not narrowed to one person
03.joiners_and_leavers	the team is not shrinkingleft 14 · joined 11 · regular last year 33
02.merge_discipline	a meaningful share of recent change carries evidence of reviewmerges 0 · window last 24 months · with tracked 0
02.ci_presence	CI configuration is present in the working treecount 33
02.test_presence	tests are present in a normal proportion to sourcetests 1,630 · source 3,697 · test ratio 0.441
02.release_cadence	tags are presenttags 144
02.conventional_commits	commit subjects generally carry contentsampled 15,196 · low content share 0.0
02.branch_protection_hints	process scaffolding is present in the repository
02.skipped_tests	few tests are switched offfocused 0 · skipped 13 · test files 3,176
02.ci_test_gating	no test run in CI is written so that it cannot failconfigs 33
02.revert_share	change is rarely undoneshare 0.0 · reverts 1 · recent commits 3,167
02.dependency_update_cadence	dependencies move with the codelockfiles 9 · commits since 5 · days since lockfile changed 1
02.flaky_test_markers	tests are not retried until they passtest retries 0 · suite retries 0
02.lint_in_build	a linter or formatter runs in the buildwired 3 · ci configs 33 · product files 2,819
02.commit_size	changes arrive in reviewable sizesshare 0.024 · commits 2,891 · over 2000 lines 70
01.burst_import	no commit run met both the rate and the net-addition thresholdgap seconds 180 · min add ratio 3.0 · min net added 2,000
01.initial_dump	first commit is not a disproportionate share of the codebaseinsertions 1,201 · share of insertions 0.0004
01.message_uniformity	commit subjects vary in wording and lengthlength stdev 16.94 · repeat share 0.0
01.revision_depth	most files were revisited after they were first writtenfiles seen 3,072 · write once share 0.091
01.duplicated_blocks	little shipping code is repeated verbatim across filesshare 0.0063 · product files 2,816 · distinct blocks 585,497
01.build_reproducibility	every base image names a versionfloating 0 · from lines 7
01.unfinished_migration	no language migration is stalled halfway
01.weights_in_git	no model weights are committedfiles 0
05.security_guardrails	at least one standard guard rail is configured
05.dependency_pinning	a lockfile is committed, so builds are reproduciblelockfile True
05.license_present	a licence file is presentfound True
05.secrets_management_pattern	no environment file is committed outside tests and examplesenv files 0
05.privileged_workloads	no workload runs privileged or in the host's namespacessites 0 · behind a setting or built here 0
05.credentials_in_deploy_config	deployment configuration references secrets, never holds themfiles 0 · sites 0
05.source_maps_shipped	production builds do not publish source mapssites 0
05.signing_material	no signing keystore or profile is committedfiles 0
05.license_copyleft_inherited	every licence found in vendored code is permissive or weak-copyleftvendored paths 7
05.license_manifest_conflict	manifest and licence file agree on Apache-2.0license Apache-2.0
05.license_vendored_unlicensed	no vendored third-party code is committedcomponents 0
05.license_grant_unclear	the licence is recognisable as Apache-2.0class permissive · license Apache-2.0
05.committed_native_libraries	no widely used compiled library is committed to the productlibraries 0
04.dependency_churn	few dependencies were added and dropped within 60 daysdependencies seen 383 · added in two years 100 · removed within 60 days 7
04.ci_platforms_dropped	no platform was dropped from CI in the last two years
04.repository_status	the README's first screen states no end, move or freezestatements 0
02.development_elsewhere	nothing says development happens elsewhereno pr statements 0 · mirror statements 0 · replayed commit share 0.0
05.licence_changes	the root licence has not changed in the history readlicence versions 1 · unreleased changes 0
05.paid_edition	no directory carries a separate paid-edition licencedirectories 0
04.releases_stopped	releases keep pace with developmentmedian gap days 17.0 · days since last tag 11 · commits last 90 days 416
03.single_maintainer	no file says one person maintains itstatements 0
05.project_advisories	no published advisory affects the surveyed versionaffecting 0 · exploited 0 · advisories 1
05.project_exploited	no affecting advisory is on CISA's Known Exploited listexploited 0

Could not conclude, or did not apply — 23

Not a clean result. Each says why it could not answer here.

Signal	Why
04.test_growth	Rust keeps unit tests inside the files they test, which a count by file name cannot see
04.schema_churn	columns, once added, stay
06.structured_logging	not assessed for Rust, the language the product is written in: this check's patterns read other languages only
06.telemetry_depth	none at all is 06.1
06.print_logging	a frontend: console output is the browser's, not the server's
06.alert_rules	no alert rules in the repository; they may live in a console
06.probes_identical	no Kubernetes probes
06.single_replica	no Kubernetes deployments
06.environment_branching	not assessed for Rust, the language the product is written in: this check's patterns read other languages only
06.feature_flags	no feature-flag service; flags may live elsewhere
02.long_lived_branches	too few merges to judge (squash and rebase leave none)
01.swallowed_errors	not assessed for Rust, the language the product is written in: this check's patterns read other languages only
01.notebook_outputs	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.outbound_timeouts	not assessed for Rust, the language the product is written in: this check's patterns read other languages only
05.migration_reversibility	too few migrations to judge
05.tls_verification_off	not assessed for Rust, the language the product is written in: this check's patterns read other languages only
05.resource_limits	no Kubernetes workload manifests
05.public_env_secret	not assessed for Rust, the language the product is written in: this check's patterns read other languages only
05.unsafe_html	not assessed for Rust, the language the product is written in: this check's patterns read other languages only
05.cleartext_traffic	not a mobile app
05.dataset_provenance	not a data or machine-learning repository
04.flags_accumulating	few or no feature flags in the history
04.api_versions_coexisting	one API version is served, or none

Anyone can check this report against the authoritative record — click the stamp, or enter VNKR-102C-Y4CR at borehole.dev/verify.

The code commits to the 106 checks this run performed, the bands they produced, and the commit they were read at. It does not cover checks written since.

Put the mark in your README

The image is wrapped in a link to the verification page, so a reader can check it rather than take it on trust. If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.

[![Borehole reading, not a certification](https://borehole.dev/badge/risingwavelabs/risingwave/1c69fba.svg "Borehole free reading: not for reliance. See the full report.")](https://borehole.dev/verify/VNKR102CY4CR?via=badge)

Where this scan ran

This scan ran on ordinary cloud infrastructure (cloud-run), not in a hardware-isolated confidential VM. Nothing about it is attested by Google.

What an attested survey proves, and what it does not.

What this scan did with the repository — 7 steps

Written by the steps themselves as they ran, not described afterwards. A hand-written account of a data flow drifts the first time somebody changes the flow and not the account.

At	Step	Detail
0.0s	read repository metadata from the GitHub API	size mb: 235.5authenticated: False
30.5s	cloned the repository to a temporary directory	depth: full
56.7s	read the git history	commits: 15198tracked files: 6721
305.4s	ran the deterministic checks	blame pass: Falseread working tree: False
305.5s	recorded where this scan ran	attested: Falseenvironment: cloud-run
425.2s	kept the facts, never the source, for re-reading under new checks
425.2s	deleting the working copy

Total 425.2s ·source content sent off this machine: none · calls to a language model: 0 · the clone was deleted when the survey ended

An automated reading of a repository's code and its history up to one commit, with public advisory records. It may be wrong, it is not legal, financial, investment or security advice, and it does not replace diligence by a qualified person. It is provided for information: nobody may rely on it (Borehole's terms, section 3).

BOREHOLE 0.7.15 DETERMINISTIC LAYER · NO MODEL CALLSREAD ON BOREHOLE'S SERVER · CLONE DELETED TAKEDOWNCONTRIBUTED TO THIS REPOSITORY? YOUR RIGHTS