Borehole · Risk register · free tier

projectdiscovery/nuclei

Free reading: not for reliance

bc53323 · 6,736 commits · 1,416 files
Issued 2026-10-23

Nothing significant. Questions worth asking about Security & Reliability Posture, Observability & Operations.

103 checks ran across 6 assessable dimensions. 1 finding is worth checking first. 15 findings, each with evidence. One dimension cannot be assessed without an acquirer.

Worth checking first

Borehole's proprietary scoring is calibrated across hundreds of repositories. Each finding here reads significant, but its check has not yet held up often enough in that calibration to rate significant on its own. If one holds when someone checks it, it is significant.

05.26 3 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 5 high or critical in what ships

Published under today's rules. The verification code attests to this reading as it was stored. This page differs from it as follows.

3 findings from checks Borehole's calibration found wrong more often than right are no longer published.
The file and line of 1 credential-shaped match is withheld. File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report.

	Dimension	Rating
01	Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance	adequate
02	Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity	strong
03	Organization & Key-Person Risk	strong
04	Product & Engineering Maturity	adequate
05	Security & Reliability Posture	adequate
06	Observability & Operations	adequate
07	Fit with the Acquirer	not assessable

strong adequate significant findings not assessable from a repository

Provenance disclosure does not affect any rating

3% of the code standing today was written in AI-declared commits

3% of lines still in the tree 7,191 of 253,901 2% of lines ever added these differ when early hand-written code has since been replaced

5% of lines added in the last 12 months (since 2025-10-23) arrived in AI-declared commits: 13/640 commits, confidence moderate. Also a floor.

17/4,993 commits declaring an agent · Claude Opus 4.5, Claude Opus 4.6, Claude Opus 4.8 and 3 more

confidence: moderate

30% of non-merge commits carry any trailer at all
low trailer coverage: the convention may not be in consistent use
no widespread author/committer date divergence
deep scan blamed 1,349 of 1,349 counted files

25,512 lines excluded as lockfiles, vendored or generated.

This is a lower bound. It counts what the repository declares. Undeclared AI authorship is invisible here, and a single rebase removes the trailers this rests on. Absence of a declaration is absence of disclosure, not absence of AI authorship.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · adequate · ratings ↑

01.25

1 base image floats: no version, or `latest`

adequate

1 of 2 `FROM` lines in product Dockerfiles name an image without a version, or with `latest`. Each build pulls whatever the registry serves that day, so the image that ships can change without a commit, and last month's build cannot be reproduced. Pin a version, or a digest.

Evidence

Dockerfile Dockerfile:11 — base image without a version

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.

A note that does not affect this rating

01.6

pkg/templates/templates_doc.go is 2,386 lines, 21× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 111 lines. 4 files exceed 1,110 lines, the largest being 2,386. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

A note that does not affect this rating: measured against its own codebase's median, it is below the 85th percentile of 382 surveyed projects' largest files, where this check begins to count.

Evidence

line-count	`pkg/templates/templates_doc.go:1` — 2,386 lines (21× median)
line-count	`pkg/protocols/http/request.go:1` — 1,771 lines (15× median)
line-count	`pkg/installer/template_ownership.go:1` — 1,460 lines (13× median)
line-count	`internal/runner/runner.go:1` — 1,259 lines (11× median)

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · strong · ratings ↑

No finding. 16 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · strong · ratings ↑

No finding. 10 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · adequate · ratings ↑

04.3

133 direct dependencies in a single manifest

adequate

go.mod declares 133 direct dependencies. Each one is a maintenance obligation, a supply-chain surface and a potential licence question that transfers with the asset. The count says nothing about whether any given dependency was a good choice; it says how many such choices a buyer inherits.

Evidence

direct-dependencies go.mod — 133 declared

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

A note that does not affect this rating

04.38

7 files still carry code deprecated more than two years ago

adequate

7 files were marked deprecated over two years ago and still are, the oldest since Nov 2023. A deprecation is a promise to remove. Ask what still depends on these, and whether removing them is scheduled.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

pkg/protocols/headless/headless.go	`pkg/protocols/headless/headless.go` — deprecated since Nov 2023
pkg/protocols/http/http.go	`pkg/protocols/http/http.go` — deprecated since Nov 2023
cmd/nuclei/main.go	`cmd/nuclei/main.go` — deprecated since Mar 2024
pkg/types/types.go	`pkg/types/types.go` — deprecated since Apr 2024
lib/config.go	`lib/config.go` — deprecated since May 2024

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · adequate · ratings ↑

05.1

1 credential-shaped string in the tree sit in tests, examples, documentation or local development settings

adequate

Strings shaped like credentials appear only where fakes are usual: test fixtures, examples, documentation, placeholders and local stacks. They are almost always fakes. Ask someone to confirm that none of them works anywhere, because a real key in a development file is still a real key. 1 other match set aside: expired tokens, licence tokens a vendor verifies with a public key, or placeholder text where a key would go. None grants access to anything.

Evidence

private key block	private key block, where fakes are usual
	File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report.

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.6

1 Dockerfile runs the application as root

adequate

No USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.

Evidence

no-USER-instruction Dockerfile — runs as root

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.26

3 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 5 high or critical in what ships

adequate worth checking first

3 of 462 locked dependencies match 13 published advisories in OSV, 5 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.

The check that found this reads significant, but it has not yet held up often enough in Borehole's calibration to rate a finding significant on its own. Opening go.mod settles it. If it holds when someone checks it, this finding is significant.

Evidence

go.mod	`go.mod` — github.com/getkin/kin-openapi v0.144.0: GHSA-23vg-4cjm-66q5 (high), fixed in 0.147.0
go.mod	`go.mod` — go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk v1.44.0: GHSA-8wmf-6v46-5gfg (low), fixed in 1.45.0
go.mod	`go.mod` — golang.org/x/net v0.59.0: GO-2026-6603 (unrated), fixed in 0.60.0

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Notes that do not affect this rating

05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

15 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

.github/workflows/auto-merge.yaml	`.github/workflows/auto-merge.yaml:21` — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/auto-merge.yaml	`.github/workflows/auto-merge.yaml:22` — action pinned by tag

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.13

8 outbound calls can wait forever

adequate

8 HTTP calls use a client with no timeout (Python `requests` without `timeout=`, or Go's default client). When a dependency slows down, each one holds a worker until the connection gives up, and enough of them take the service down with the dependency.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

internal/fuzzplayground/server.go	`internal/fuzzplayground/server.go:215` — outbound call without a timeout
internal/fuzzplayground/server.go	`internal/fuzzplayground/server.go:230` — outbound call without a timeout
pkg/js/libs/http/http.go	`pkg/js/libs/http/http.go:204` — outbound call without a timeout

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.20

1 SQL statement built from strings

adequate

1 places in product code build SQL by formatting or joining strings rather than passing parameters. 1 of them put a value into the string; in the rest, what the code shows going in is a table or column name, a constant, or something the line does not show. Ask whether any value reaches these strings, rather than a parameter.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

internal/fuzzplayground/db.go internal/fuzzplayground/db.go:85 — SQL built from a string

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.9

1 vendored component with no licence

adequate

Third-party code is committed into this repository without any statement of the terms it arrived under. Unknown terms are harder to deal with than inconvenient ones: an awkward licence can be complied with, an absent one cannot. Each of these needs its origin established before the code changes hands.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

pkg/external/customtemplates pkg/external/customtemplates — 5 tracked files, no licence file

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.65

7 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 1 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-07-16. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. None of them affects the surveyed version.

A note that does not affect this rating: it describes the project's advisory record, and no advisory in it is known to affect the surveyed commit.

Evidence

GHSA-jpf4-98qj-qr67	2026-07-16: GHSA-jpf4-98qj-qr67 (moderate), fixed in 3.10.0: Nuclei: Arbitrary Command Execution via DAST Code Signature Bypass
GHSA-jpvm-9frm-hjcq	2026-07-16: GHSA-jpvm-9frm-hjcq (moderate), fixed in 3.10.0: Nuclei: Environment Variable Disclosure via Response-Derived Data in DAST/Fuzz Mode
GHSA-qgw5-7j4f-fg97	2026-07-16: GHSA-qgw5-7j4f-fg97 (moderate), fixed in 3.10.0: Nuclei: Local File Read via Workflow File-Protocol Gate Bypass
GHSA-vxg7-f2jj-jmqm	2026-07-16: GHSA-vxg7-f2jj-jmqm (high), fixed in 3.10.0: Nuclei: Arbitrary Code Execution via Goja JavaScript Engine Vulnerability
GHSA-xhmx-w2j4-rw3q	2026-07-16: GHSA-xhmx-w2j4-rw3q (moderate), fixed in 3.10.0: Nuclei: Local File Read via MySQL Client Sandbox Bypass

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Observability & Operations

06 · adequate · ratings ↑

06.7

The service logs with print: 53 calls against 7 logger calls

adequate

53 `print` or `console.log` calls in the service's code, and 7 calls through a logger. Printed lines carry no level and no context, cannot be switched off, and are hard to find again in production.

Evidence

internal/fuzzplayground/server.go	`internal/fuzzplayground/server.go:251` — print used for logging
internal/server/server.go	`internal/server/server.go:309` — print used for logging
internal/server/server.go	`internal/server/server.go:316` — print used for logging

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

06.14

Readiness and liveness probes are identical in 1 of 1 workloads

adequate

Both probes call the same endpoint. When a dependency slows down, the liveness probe fails with the readiness probe, so the platform restarts pods that only needed taking out of rotation, and a partial outage becomes a full one. Liveness should ask whether the process is alive; readiness whether it can serve.

Evidence

helm/templates/interactsh-deployment.yaml helm/templates/interactsh-deployment.yaml — same probe endpoint twice

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

A note that does not affect this rating

06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

error reporting

no error reporter initialised

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · not assessable · ratings ↑

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository. What a person adds here.

Check it on the running system

9 checks against the running system follow from the findings above: what a buyer's engineer will try, how to run it first, and what to have ready. A paid survey of this repository includes them. See the tiers.

A paid survey of a public repository is also reviewed: a language model reads each finding against the code and withdraws only findings it judges the code contradicts, each listed with its reason. The review is a language model's reading of the findings against the code, and it can be wrong. It never adds a finding, never raises a band, and never removes a finding from a proven check or an advisory that affects the surveyed version.

What a person adds

The survey reads what the repository can show. The code cannot settle these questions, and on them this report states nothing. Each says where its answer lives: your own engineer, the company, or an assessor you choose can settle it. Questions marked measured open with something this repository shows.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · full coverage

measured The tree carries design documentation (DESIGN.md and 1 more). Does it match what the team believes today? Ask them to walk through it against the code. Answer lives in: The team01.38
Is the architecture right for the next three years of the product? Answer lives in: Your architects, with the product roadmap01.39
Were the home-grown components reasonable choices when they were made, and are they now? Answer lives in: The team's reasoning at the time01.40

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · high coverage

Is review real or a rubber stamp? Comment depth and time to approve need the pull request history. Answer lives in: The code host's pull request data02.32
Is delivery planned and measured, or heroic? Answer lives in: The issue tracker: backlog, sprint history, estimate accuracy02.38
How are incidents run, reviewed and learned from? Answer lives in: Tickets, chat and postmortems02.37

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · partial coverage

measured 277 people have committed here. Which of them are you acquiring, and which are you replacing? Answer lives in: The deal terms03.29
Who mentors whom, and would that survive a departure? Answer lives in: The team; review history only suggests candidates03.28
Can the team grow, and who stands behind the top three contributors? Answer lives in: Recruiting data and the org chart03.30
Is the seniority mix sound, and will pay survive your salary bands? Answer lives in: HR data03.31
Is the pace sustainable? Commit times cannot say: git keeps no reliable local time. Answer lives in: Interviews and on-call history03.14
Does the team want to stay after close? Answer lives in: Interviews03.32
How are decisions made and disagreements resolved? Answer lives in: Time with the team03.33

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · minimal coverage

measured 543 commits landed in the last year, against 289 the year before (+88%). What drove it: new people, a deadline, or code produced faster than before? Answer lives in: The team04.11
Can this team deliver the stated roadmap on the stated timeline? Answer lives in: The data room and the team's record of estimates04.32
Does leadership know about the debt, and is time budgeted to repay it? Answer lives in: Budget and roadmap decisions04.31
Is the engineering shape consistent with the commercial story? Answer lives in: Revenue, customer and churn data04.33

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · partial coverage

measured No threat model is in the tree of what looks like a running service. Does one exist elsewhere, and who owns it? Answer lives in: The security owner05.43
measured Infrastructure code (helm/Chart.yaml) last changed 49 months before the newest commit, while 1,822 commits landed. Is the infrastructure now changed by hand? Compare the live account with the code. Answer lives in: The cloud console05.36
What has actually broken, how often, and how badly? Answer lives in: Ticketing and chat05.41
What did external testing find, and was it fixed? Answer lives in: Reports in the data room05.42
What is the SOC 2, ISO 27001 or GDPR status, and where is the evidence? Answer lives in: Audit reports; policy files in the tree are not evidence05.44

Observability & Operations

06 · partial coverage

measured Nothing in the tree backs up or restores data. How is data backed up, and has a restore ever been rehearsed? Answer lives in: The operations team06.19
measured No alert rule is defined in the repository. Where are alerts defined, who receives them, and when did one last fire? Answer lives in: The alerting tool and the on-call rota06.10
Are the dashboards opened, the alerts acknowledged and the pages answered? Answer lives in: Pager history and dashboard logs06.29
Are the service-level objectives actually met? Answer lives in: Production metrics06.30
Who carries the pager, and how often does it go off? Answer lives in: Pager exports and interviews06.31
What does it cost to run, and how much headroom is there? Answer lives in: Cloud billing and capacity plans06.32

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · none coverage

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

This is primarily a Go codebase. Does your engineering organisation already run Go in production, or would this be the first? 07.1
The bulk of this system sits in pkg/, internal/, cmd/. Which of your existing systems would each of those have to absorb or replace? 07.10
The repository carries deployment configuration (Dockerfile and 12 more). Does that match your deployment and on-call model, or does it need rehosting first? 07.2
What is your tolerance for the findings above remaining unaddressed for the first two quarters after close, given everything else that will compete for this team's time?
Which of these systems duplicate yours, and which get retired? Answer lives in: Your architecture07.11
What will integration cost, and in what order? Answer lives in: The engagement07.12
Where does the team land in your organisation, and who reports to whom? Answer lives in: Your org design07.13
Are there earn-outs, retention packages or contractor IP to assign? Answer lives in: Deal terms07.14
Do customer contracts limit hosting, regions or vendors? Answer lives in: Customer contracts07.15

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Rejection log — 88 signals that ran and did not fire

Appendix: rejection log — 88 signals that ran and did not fire

Published on purpose. A signal that looked and decided not to fire has told you something, and this is the calibration data behind every threshold above.

Looked, and found nothing — 70

Signal	What it found
04.hotspot_concentration	change is spread across the codebase rather than pooling in a few filesfiles 3,406 · top5 share 0.087
04.debt_markers	debt markers are sparsemarkers 101 · per kloc 0.51 · lines read 198,739
04.test_growth	test effort kept pace with code writtenlate test per code 0.659 · early test per code 0.243
04.churn_trend	rework is not rising against new worklate delete per insert 0.284 · early delete per insert 0.556
04.eol_runtime	every pinned runtime is still supportedeol as of 2026-09-24
04.fixes_with_tests	fixes usually come with a testfixes 296 · share 0.503 · with tests 149
04.fix_share_trend	fixing is not crowding out building
04.compat_layers	little code is kept for the old wayshare 0.0 · code files 615 · compat files 0
06.telemetry_presence	a telemetry or error-reporting library is referencednote presence only; whether anyone watches it is not visible here · matches 5
06.structured_logging	a structured logging library is referencedmatches 4
06.healthcheck_presence	a health or readiness check is defined
06.correlation_ids	a request can be followed through the logstracing False · request id sites 8
06.usage_reporting_default	the product's code names no reporting hostsettings on 0 · settings off 0
06.single_replica	an autoscaler or disruption budget is definedworkloads 1
06.environment_branching	environment differences live in configurationsites 0
06.release_markers	releases are markedtags last year 12 · release commits 7 · changelog commits 3
06.migrate_on_start	migrations do not run at container start
03.contributor_concentration	no single contributor dominates the last 24 monthsyears 6.6 · window last 24 months · authors 277
03.active_contributors	more than one contributor active in the trailing yearall time 277 · active 12mo 68
03.knowledge_silos	every substantial directory has been touched by more than one personauthors 277 · directories 4
03.drive_by_contributors	an open contributor base, where one-commit contributors are normalauthors 277 · one off share 0.585
03.contributor_attrition	no contributor dominates enough for their absence to matterauthors 277 · top share less than a quarter · top contributor last committed within the last three months
03.critical_path_ownership	more than one person changes the critical pathsauthors 119
03.second_contributor_attrition	the second and third contributors are still active
03.bus_factor_trend	the team has not narrowed to one person
03.joiners_and_leavers	the team is not shrinkingleft 9 · joined 12 · regular last year 20
02.merge_discipline	a meaningful share of recent change carries evidence of reviewmerges 325 · window last 24 months · with tracked 69
02.ci_presence	CI configuration is present in the working treecount 14
02.test_presence	tests are present in a normal proportion to sourcetests 357 · source 907 · test ratio 0.394
02.release_cadence	tags are presenttags 147
02.conventional_commits	commit subjects generally carry contentsampled 4,993 · low content share 0.064
02.branch_protection_hints	process scaffolding is present in the repository
02.ci_runs_tests	CI invokes a test runnerconfigs 14 · with tests 2
02.skipped_tests	few tests are switched offfocused 0 · skipped 0 · test files 673
02.ci_test_gating	no test run in CI is written so that it cannot failconfigs 14
02.revert_share	change is rarely undoneshare 0.008 · reverts 7 · recent commits 832
02.dependency_update_cadence	dependencies move with the codelockfiles 1 · commits since 12 · days since lockfile changed 3
02.flaky_test_markers	tests are not retried until they passtest retries 0 · suite retries 0
02.lint_in_build	a linter or formatter runs in the buildwired 1 · ci configs 14 · product files 615
02.long_lived_branches	the typical branch reaches the trunk quicklyshare 0.115 · merges 218 · long lived 25
02.commit_size	changes arrive in reviewable sizesshare 0.016 · commits 736 · over 2000 lines 12
01.burst_import	no commit run met both the rate and the net-addition thresholdgap seconds 180 · min add ratio 3.0 · min net added 2,000
01.initial_dump	first commit is not a disproportionate share of the codebaseinsertions 279 · share of insertions 0.0008
01.message_uniformity	commit subjects vary in wording and lengthlength stdev 23.19 · repeat share 0.197
01.revision_depth	most files were revisited after they were first writtenfiles seen 593 · write once share 0.277
01.duplicated_blocks	little shipping code is repeated verbatim across filesshare 0.0085 · product files 550 · distinct blocks 66,973
01.swallowed_errors	errors are rarely thrown awayloc 199,880 · files 0 · per kloc 0.0
01.unfinished_migration	no language migration is stalled halfway
01.weights_in_git	no model weights are committedfiles 0
05.security_guardrails	at least one standard guard rail is configured
05.license_present	a licence file is presentfound True
05.secrets_management_pattern	no environment file is committed outside tests and examplesenv files 0
05.shell_from_strings	product code does not build shell commands from stringssites 0
05.unsafe_deserialization	no code-executing deserialiser in product codesites 0
05.resource_limits	every workload declares limitsworkloads 1 · without limits 0
05.privileged_workloads	no workload runs privileged or in the host's namespacessites 0 · behind a setting or built here 0
05.credentials_in_deploy_config	deployment configuration references secrets, never holds themfiles 0 · sites 0
05.signing_material	no signing keystore or profile is committedfiles 0
05.license_copyleft_inherited	every licence found in vendored code is permissive or weak-copyleftvendored paths 9
05.license_grant_unclear	the licence is recognisable as MITclass permissive · license MIT
05.committed_native_libraries	no widely used compiled library is committed to the productlibraries 0
04.dependency_churn	few dependencies were added and dropped within 60 daysdependencies seen 400 · added in two years 149 · removed within 60 days 1
04.ci_platforms_dropped	no platform was dropped from CI in the last two years
04.repository_status	the README's first screen states no end, move or freezestatements 0
02.development_elsewhere	nothing says development happens elsewhereno pr statements 0 · mirror statements 0 · replayed commit share 0.0
05.licence_changes	the root licence has not changed in the history readlicence versions 1 · unreleased changes 0
05.paid_edition	no directory carries a separate paid-edition licencedirectories 0
04.releases_stopped	releases keep pace with developmentmedian gap days 24.0 · days since last tag 76 · commits last 90 days 321
04.release_branch	the newest release was cut from the branch surveyedelsewhere 0 · on branch 146 · tags in window 146
03.single_maintainer	no file says one person maintains itstatements 0

Could not conclude, or did not apply — 18

Not a clean result. Each says why it could not answer here.

Signal	Why
04.schema_churn	no schema migrations to read
04.dependency_redundancy	no JavaScript manifest to read
06.alert_rules	no alert rules in the repository; they may live in a console
06.deployed_image_floats	no deployment descriptor names an image
06.feature_flags	no feature-flag service; flags may live elsewhere
01.notebook_outputs	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.dependency_pinning	no manifest whose pinning can be read without a lockfile
05.migration_reversibility	too few migrations to judge
05.public_env_secret	not a frontend
05.unsafe_html	not a frontend
05.source_maps_shipped	not a frontend
05.cleartext_traffic	not a mobile app
05.dataset_provenance	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.license_manifest_conflict	no packaging manifest states a licence
04.flags_accumulating	few or no feature flags in the history
04.api_versions_coexisting	one API version is served, or none
05.project_advisories	record incomplete: no advisory found in the sources that answered; NVD did not
05.project_exploited	no affecting advisory is on CISA's Known Exploited list

Anyone can check this report against the authoritative record — click the stamp, or enter ZRQ1-3Z1M-TBWR at borehole.dev/verify.

The code commits to the 106 checks this run performed, the bands they produced, and the commit they were read at. It does not cover checks written since.

Put the mark in your README

The image is wrapped in a link to the verification page, so a reader can check it rather than take it on trust. If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.

[![Borehole reading, not a certification](https://borehole.dev/badge/projectdiscovery/nuclei/bc53323.svg "Borehole free reading: not for reliance. See the full report.")](https://borehole.dev/verify/ZRQ13Z1MTBWR?via=badge)

Where this scan ran

This scan ran on ordinary cloud infrastructure (cloud-run), not in a hardware-isolated confidential VM. Nothing about it is attested by Google.

What an attested survey proves, and what it does not.

What this scan did with the repository — 7 steps

Written by the steps themselves as they ran, not described afterwards. A hand-written account of a data flow drifts the first time somebody changes the flow and not the account.

At	Step	Detail
0.0s	read repository metadata from the GitHub API	size mb: 46.0authenticated: False
5.3s	cloned the repository to a temporary directory	depth: full
9.8s	read the git history	commits: 6736tracked files: 1416
116.8s	ran the deterministic checks	blame pass: Trueread working tree: False
116.8s	recorded where this scan ran	attested: Falseenvironment: cloud-run
151.9s	kept the facts, never the source, for re-reading under new checks
151.9s	deleting the working copy

Total 151.9s ·source content sent off this machine: none · calls to a language model: 0 · the clone was deleted when the survey ended

An automated reading of a repository's code and its history up to one commit, with public advisory records. It may be wrong, it is not legal, financial, investment or security advice, and it does not replace diligence by a qualified person. It is provided for information: nobody may rely on it (Borehole's terms, section 3).

BOREHOLE 0.7.15 DETERMINISTIC LAYER · NO MODEL CALLSREAD ON BOREHOLE'S SERVER · CLONE DELETED TAKEDOWNCONTRIBUTED TO THIS REPOSITORY? YOUR RIGHTS