Nothing significant. Questions worth asking about Security & Reliability Posture, Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance.
105 checks ran across 6 assessable dimensions. 1 finding is worth checking first. 10 findings, each with evidence. One dimension cannot be assessed without an acquirer.
- 03.60 The project says one person maintains it CONTRIBUTING.md:10
- states a policy on AI-generated contributions CONTRIBUTING.md:46
Borehole's proprietary scoring is calibrated across hundreds of repositories. Each finding here reads significant, but its check has not yet held up often enough in that calibration to rate significant on its own. If one holds when someone checks it, it is significant.
- 05.26 44 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 38 high or critical in what ships
- 1 finding from checks Borehole's calibration found wrong more often than right is no longer published.
- The file and line of 1 credential-shaped match is withheld. File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report.
| Dimension | Rating | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | adequate | |
| 02 | Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | strong | |
| 03 | Organization & Key-Person Risk | adequate | |
| 04 | Product & Engineering Maturity | strong | |
| 05 | Security & Reliability Posture | adequate | |
| 06 | Observability & Operations | strong | |
| 07 | Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
- 14% of non-merge commits carry any trailer at all
- low trailer coverage: the convention may not be in consistent use
- no widespread author/committer date divergence
- the declared share is neither decisive nor negligible, so the true figure is more sensitive to undeclared work
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
01 · adequate · ratings ↑1 base image floats: no version, or `latest`
adequate1 of 14 `FROM` lines in product Dockerfiles name an image without a version, or with `latest`. Each build pulls whatever the registry serves that day, so the image that ships can change without a commit, and last month's build cannot be reproduced. Pin a version, or a digest.
| infra/tailscale/Dockerfile | infra/tailscale/Dockerfile:1 — base image without a version |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
server/migrations/versions/2026-06-17-1455_initial_migration_june_2026_squash.py is 6,903 lines, 86× this codebase's median file
adequateThe median source file here is 80 lines. 39 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 6,903. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.
A note that does not affect this rating: measured against its own codebase's median, it is below the 85th percentile of 382 surveyed projects' largest files, where this check begins to count.
| line-count | server/migrations/versions/2026-06-17-1455_initial_migration_june_2026_squash.py:1 — 6,903 lines (86× median) |
| line-count | server/polar/backoffice/organizations_v2/endpoints.py:1 — 5,135 lines (64× median) |
| line-count | server/polar/subscription/service.py:1 — 4,825 lines (60× median) |
| line-count | server/polar/order/service.py:1 — 3,558 lines (44× median) |
| line-count | server/emails/src/types/openapi.ts:1 — 3,402 lines (42× median) |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
02 · strong · ratings ↑No finding. 16 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.
Organization & Key-Person Risk
03 · adequate · ratings ↑The project says one person maintains it
adequateIts own files say so. Whatever the commit counts show, the project describes itself as depending on one person.
| CONTRIBUTING.md | CONTRIBUTING.md:10 — says it has a single maintainer |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Product & Engineering Maturity
04 · strong · ratings ↑No finding. 19 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.
Security & Reliability Posture
05 · adequate · ratings ↑1 credential-shaped string committed to the tree
adequateMatches for Google API key appear in tracked files outside test and fixture paths. They stay in the history even after they leave the tree, so what matters is whether each was rotated. The code cannot tell whether any of them is live, and that decides whether this matters: none sits in production configuration, and none is in a format its provider keeps for live keys. Is any of these live? Show that each was rotated after it was committed, and when. Only Google API keys matched. Those are often public by design, in a browser app's Firebase or Maps configuration; the question is whether each is restricted to the app's domains and APIs.
| Google API key | Google API key pattern matched |
| File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report. |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
1 Dockerfile runs the application as root
adequateNo USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.
| no-USER-instruction | server/Dockerfile — runs as root |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
44 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 38 high or critical in what ships
adequate worth checking first44 of 3,583 locked dependencies match 131 published advisories in OSV, 73 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version.
The check that found this reads significant, but it has not yet held up often enough in Borehole's calibration to rate a finding significant on its own. Opening lambda/image-resizer/uv.lock and the 1 other file it cites settles it. If it holds when someone checks it, this finding is significant.
| lambda/image-resizer/uv.lock | lambda/image-resizer/uv.lock — pillow 12.3.0: GHSA-332p-7hrc-92wf (critical), fixed in 13.0.0 |
| clients/pnpm-lock.yaml | clients/pnpm-lock.yaml — dompurify 3.4.16: GHSA-cg2g-xh64-v4q7 (critical), fixed in 3.4.17 |
| clients/pnpm-lock.yaml | clients/pnpm-lock.yaml — next 16.3.8: GHSA-2464-fhr4-w9xw (critical), fixed in 16.4.1 |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
The build runs third-party code it does not pin
adequate25 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day; 4 steps pipe a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.
A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.
| .github/workflows/backoffice_reachability.yml | .github/workflows/backoffice_reachability.yml:50 — action pinned by tag |
| .github/workflows/benchmark_sdk.yaml | .github/workflows/benchmark_sdk.yaml:60 — action pinned by tag |
| .github/workflows/test_server.yaml | .github/workflows/test_server.yaml:151 — download piped into a shell |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
2 shell commands built from strings
adequate2 places run a command through a shell (`shell=True`, `os.system`, `exec` with a template) rather than passing arguments. Where any part comes from outside, it is command injection. Ask where each one's input comes from.
A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.
| clients/apps/app/tooling/push-notifications/send-push.js | clients/apps/app/tooling/push-notifications/send-push.js:25 — command run through a shell |
| sdk/generator/generator/emitter.py | sdk/generator/generator/emitter.py:149 — command run through a shell |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
10 places insert HTML from a variable without sanitising it
adequate10 places set HTML from a value that is neither a literal nor passed through a sanitiser. Where the value can come from a user, that is stored cross-site scripting, and it is the first thing a buyer's security review looks for in a frontend.
A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.
| clients/apps/demo-app/app/code-panel.tsx | clients/apps/demo-app/app/code-panel.tsx:48 — HTML from a variable |
| clients/apps/web/src/app/(main)/(website)/(landing)/layout.tsx | clients/apps/web/src/app/(main)/(website)/(landing)/layout.tsx:41 — HTML from a variable |
| clients/apps/web/src/app/layout.tsx | clients/apps/web/src/app/layout.tsx:60 — HTML from a variable |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Observability & Operations
06 · strong · ratings ↑1 of 8 deployed images carry no version, or `latest`
adequate1 images in the deployment configuration are named without a version or as `latest`. A redeploy can change the software without a commit, a rollback has nothing to roll back to, and nobody can say from the repository what is running.
A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.
| server/docker-compose.yml | server/docker-compose.yml:112 — image without a version |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Fit with the Acquirer
07 · not assessable · ratings ↑Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository. What a person adds here.
Check it on the running system
5 checks against the running system follow from the findings above: what a buyer's engineer will try, how to run it first, and what to have ready. A paid survey of this repository includes them.
A paid survey of a public repository is also reviewed: a language model reads each finding against the code and withdraws only findings it judges the code contradicts, each listed with its reason. The review is a language model's reading of the findings against the code, and it can be wrong. It never adds a finding, never raises a band, and never removes a finding from a proven check or an advisory that affects the surveyed version.
What a person adds
The survey reads what the repository can show. The code cannot settle these questions, and on them this report states nothing. Each says where its answer lives: your own engineer, the company, or an assessor you choose can settle it. Questions marked measured open with something this repository shows.
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
01 · full coverage- measured No architecture or design document is in the tree, across 4,794 product files. Where does the design live, and who holds it?
- Is the architecture right for the next three years of the product?
- Were the home-grown components reasonable choices when they were made, and are they now?
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
02 · high coverage- Is review real or a rubber stamp? Comment depth and time to approve need the pull request history.
- Is delivery planned and measured, or heroic?
- How are incidents run, reviewed and learned from?
Organization & Key-Person Risk
03 · partial coverage- measured 130 people have committed here. Which of them are you acquiring, and which are you replacing?
- Who mentors whom, and would that survive a departure?
- Can the team grow, and who stands behind the top three contributors?
- Is the seniority mix sound, and will pay survive your salary bands?
- Is the pace sustainable? Commit times cannot say: git keeps no reliable local time.
- Does the team want to stay after close?
- How are decisions made and disagreements resolved?
Product & Engineering Maturity
04 · minimal coverage- measured 6,600 commits landed in the last year, against 3,482 the year before (+90%). What drove it: new people, a deadline, or code produced faster than before?
- Can this team deliver the stated roadmap on the stated timeline?
- Does leadership know about the debt, and is time budgeted to repay it?
- Is the engineering shape consistent with the commercial story?
Security & Reliability Posture
05 · partial coverage- measured 05.1 and 05.5 found credential-shaped strings in this repository. Was each one revoked at the provider? Deleting it from the code revokes nothing; only the provider's audit log shows that it was.
- measured No threat model is in the tree of what looks like a running service. Does one exist elsewhere, and who owns it?
- What has actually broken, how often, and how badly?
- What did external testing find, and was it fixed?
- What is the SOC 2, ISO 27001 or GDPR status, and where is the evidence?
Observability & Operations
06 · partial coverage- measured Nothing in the tree backs up or restores data. How is data backed up, and has a restore ever been rehearsed?
- measured Alert rules are defined in the repository. Who receives them, and when did one last fire?
- measured Service-level objectives are defined in the tree (server/monitoring/grafana/dashboards/api-slo.json). Are they met? The repository holds the target, not the measurement.
- Are the dashboards opened, the alerts acknowledged and the pages answered?
- Who carries the pager, and how often does it go off?
- What does it cost to run, and how much headroom is there?
Fit with the Acquirer
07 · none coverageNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
- This is primarily a TypeScript codebase, with Python alongside (39% of source files). Does your engineering organisation already run TypeScript in production, or would this be the first?
- The bulk of this system sits in clients/, server/, sdk/. Which of your existing systems would each of those have to absorb or replace?
- The repository carries deployment configuration (infra/pgbouncer/Dockerfile and 180 more). Does that match your deployment and on-call model, or does it need rehosting first?
- What is your tolerance for the findings above remaining unaddressed for the first two quarters after close, given everything else that will compete for this team's time?
- Which of these systems duplicate yours, and which get retired?
- What will integration cost, and in what order?
- Where does the team land in your organisation, and who reports to whom?
- Are there earn-outs, retention packages or contractor IP to assign?
- Do customer contracts limit hosting, regions or vendors?
A human assessment is Borehole's own paid service, €12,000+ (total price is determined per engagement; travel billed at cost). It is not independent of this report: the same business produced both. It is a separate contract, with its own scope, terms and reliance.
Embed the badge
Tied to this commit and this date, and it fades after 90 days — an honest badge is one that expires. A repository with significant findings gets a neutral "read" badge rather than a red one: the library is where the range is visible, not someone else's README.
[](/r/polarsource/polar/bb1bac7)
If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.
Rejection log — 95 signals that ran and did not fire
Appendix: rejection log — 95 signals that ran and did not fire
Published on purpose. A signal that looked and decided not to fire has told you something, and this is the calibration data behind every threshold above.
Looked, and found nothing — 80
| Signal | What it found |
|---|---|
| 04.hotspot_concentration | change is spread across the codebase rather than pooling in a few filesfiles 21,893 · top5 share 0.021 |
| 04.debt_markers | debt markers are sparsemarkers 28 · per kloc 0.02 · lines read 1,139,123 |
| 04.dependency_sprawl | direct dependency counts are unremarkable |
| 04.test_growth | test effort kept pace with code writtenlate test per code 0.28 · early test per code 0.168 |
| 04.churn_trend | rework is not rising against new worklate delete per insert 0.494 · early delete per insert 0.636 |
| 04.eol_runtime | every pinned runtime is still supportedeol as of 2026-09-24 |
| 04.fixes_with_tests | fixes usually come with a testfixes 1,841 · share 0.275 · with tests 507 |
| 04.fix_share_trend | fixing is not crowding out building |
| 04.schema_churn | columns, once added, staydropped within 90 days 4 · columns added last year 82 |
| 04.compat_layers | little code is kept for the old wayshare 0.001 · code files 4,000 · compat files 4 |
| 04.dependency_redundancy | one library per job, mostly |
| 06.telemetry_presence | a telemetry or error-reporting library is referencednote presence only; whether anyone watches it is not visible here · matches 191 |
| 06.structured_logging | a structured logging library is referencedmatches 191 |
| 06.healthcheck_presence | a health or readiness check is defined |
| 06.telemetry_depth | the service is visible in more than one way |
| 06.correlation_ids | a request can be followed through the logstracing True · request id sites 13 |
| 06.error_reporting | an error reporter is initialisedinitialised 5 · config files 4 |
| 06.usage_reporting_default | the product's code names no reporting hostsettings on 9 · settings off 4 |
| 06.alert_rules | alert rules are defined as codealert files 1 |
| 06.environment_branching | environment differences live in configurationsites 9 |
| 06.release_markers | releases are markedtags last year 67 · release commits 5 · changelog commits 32 |
| 06.migrate_on_start | migrations do not run at container start |
| 03.contributor_concentration | no single contributor dominates the last 24 monthsyears 3.7 · window last 24 months · authors 130 |
| 03.active_contributors | more than one contributor active in the trailing yearall time 130 · active 12mo 55 |
| 03.knowledge_silos | every substantial directory has been touched by more than one personauthors 130 · directories 7 |
| 03.drive_by_contributors | an open contributor base, where one-commit contributors are normalauthors 130 · one off share 0.6 |
| 03.contributor_attrition | the dominant contributor is still activeauthors 130 · top share a quarter or more · top contributor last committed within the last three months |
| 03.critical_path_ownership | more than one person changes the critical pathsauthors 107 |
| 03.second_contributor_attrition | the second and third contributors are still active |
| 03.bus_factor_trend | the team has not narrowed to one person |
| 03.joiners_and_leavers | the team is not shrinkingleft 9 · joined 12 · regular last year 22 |
| 02.merge_discipline | a meaningful share of recent change carries evidence of reviewmerges 0 · window last 24 months · with tracked 101 |
| 02.ci_presence | CI configuration is present in the working treecount 40 |
| 02.test_presence | tests are present in a normal proportion to sourcetests 996 · source 4,996 · test ratio 0.199 |
| 02.release_cadence | tags are presenttags 97 |
| 02.conventional_commits | commit subjects generally carry contentsampled 18,432 · low content share 0.011 |
| 02.branch_protection_hints | process scaffolding is present in the repository |
| 02.ci_runs_tests | CI invokes a test runnerconfigs 40 · with tests 5 |
| 02.skipped_tests | few tests are switched offfocused 0 · skipped 0 · test files 1,031 |
| 02.ci_test_gating | no test run in CI is written so that it cannot failconfigs 40 |
| 02.revert_share | change is rarely undoneshare 0.01 · reverts 106 · recent commits 10,104 |
| 02.dependency_update_cadence | dependencies move with the codelockfiles 14 · commits since 10 · days since lockfile changed 0 |
| 02.flaky_test_markers | tests are not retried until they passtest retries 0 · suite retries 0 |
| 02.lint_in_build | a linter or formatter runs in the buildwired 33 · ci configs 40 · product files 4,000 |
| 02.commit_size | changes arrive in reviewable sizesshare 0.017 · commits 9,363 · over 2000 lines 160 |
| 01.burst_import | the largest burst was merged pull requests, each developed and reviewed on its own branch (100% of it), which explains the rate: translations arrive from a vendor in bulk, dependencies and generated code are committed whole, a merged pull request is dated when it merged, not when it was written, a branch merged by a merge commit was reviewed as one piece, and an export or mirror tool dates history when it replays itlargest commits 951b943..5b6e767 · bursts explained 1 · largest net added 2,219 |
| 01.initial_dump | first commit is not a disproportionate share of the codebaseinsertions 1,361 · share of insertions 0.0003 |
| 01.message_uniformity | commit subjects vary in wording and lengthlength stdev 19.57 · repeat share 0.059 |
| 01.revision_depth | most files were revisited after they were first writtenfiles seen 4,602 · write once share 0.299 |
| 01.duplicated_blocks | little shipping code is repeated verbatim across filesshare 0.0152 · product files 3,671 · distinct blocks 340,624 |
| 01.swallowed_errors | errors are rarely thrown awayloc 1,144,782 · files 30 · per kloc 0.04 |
| 01.unfinished_migration | no language migration is stalled halfway |
| 01.weights_in_git | no model weights are committedfiles 0 |
| 05.security_guardrails | at least one standard guard rail is configured |
| 05.dependency_pinning | a lockfile is committed, so builds are reproduciblelockfile True |
| 05.license_present | a licence file is presentfound True |
| 05.secrets_management_pattern | no environment file is committed outside tests and examplesenv files 0 |
| 05.outbound_timeouts | outbound calls set timeouts, or are fewcalls without timeout 0 |
| 05.migration_reversibility | migrations can be rolled backshare 0.027 · migrations 150 · irreversible 4 |
| 05.sql_from_strings | no SQL is assembled from strings in product codefiles 0 · sites 0 · value interpolated 0 |
| 05.unsafe_deserialization | no code-executing deserialiser in product codesites 0 |
| 05.tls_verification_off | no TLS verification is switched off in product codefiles 0 · sites 0 · pinned instead 0 |
| 05.privileged_workloads | no workload runs privileged or in the host's namespacessites 0 · behind a setting or built here 0 |
| 05.credentials_in_deploy_config | deployment configuration references secrets, never holds themfiles 0 · sites 0 |
| 05.public_env_secret | only publishable values carry a public prefixnames 0 · sites 0 · not secrets 0 |
| 05.source_maps_shipped | production builds do not publish source mapssites 0 |
| 05.signing_material | no signing keystore or profile is committedfiles 0 |
| 05.license_vendored_unlicensed | no vendored third-party code is committedcomponents 0 |
| 05.license_grant_unclear | the licence is recognisable as Apache-2.0class permissive · license Apache-2.0 |
| 05.committed_native_libraries | no widely used compiled library is committed to the productlibraries 0 |
| 04.flags_accumulating | flags are retired about as fast as they are addedlive 2 · retired 16 · flags seen 18 |
| 04.api_versions_coexisting | one API version is served, or none |
| 04.deprecations_lingering | few deprecations have outlived two yearsolder than two years 2 · files with deprecations 21 |
| 04.dependency_churn | few dependencies were added and dropped within 60 daysdependencies seen 345 · added in two years 223 · removed within 60 days 14 |
| 04.ci_platforms_dropped | no platform was dropped from CI in the last two years |
| 04.repository_status | the README's first screen states no end, move or freezestatements 0 |
| 02.development_elsewhere | nothing says development happens elsewhereno pr statements 0 · mirror statements 0 · replayed commit share 0.0 |
| 05.licence_changes | the root licence has not changed in the history readlicence versions 1 · unreleased changes 0 |
| 05.paid_edition | no directory carries a separate paid-edition licencedirectories 0 |
| 04.releases_stopped | releases keep pace with developmentmedian gap days 0.0 · days since last tag 0 · commits last 90 days 1,931 |
Could not conclude, or did not apply — 15
Not a clean result. Each says why it could not answer here.
| Signal | Why |
|---|---|
| 06.print_logging | a frontend: console output is the browser's, not the server's |
| 06.probes_identical | no Kubernetes probes |
| 06.single_replica | no Kubernetes deployments |
| 06.feature_flags | no feature-flag service; flags may live elsewhere |
| 02.long_lived_branches | too few merges to judge (squash and rebase leave none) |
| 01.notebook_outputs | not a data or machine-learning repository |
| 05.resource_limits | no Kubernetes workload manifests |
| 05.cleartext_traffic | not a mobile app |
| 05.dataset_provenance | not a data or machine-learning repository |
| 05.license_copyleft_inherited | no third-party code is committed to this repository, so the licences it depends on are resolved at build time and are not readable here |
| 05.license_manifest_conflict | no packaging manifest states a licence |
| 04.release_branch | too few release tags to tell |
| 05.project_advisories | record incomplete: no advisory found in the sources that answered; OSV PyPI polar-sdk (an empty record for a package published here), OSV npm @polar-sh/sdk (an empty record for a package published here), OSV npm @polar-sh/adapter-utils (an empty record for a package published here), OSV npm @polar-sh/better-auth (an empty record for a package published here), OSV npm @polar-sh/nextjs (an empty record for a package published here), OSV npm @polar-sh/nuxt (an empty record for a package published here), OSV npm @polar-sh/tanstack-start (an empty record for a package published here), OSV npm @polar-sh/checkout (an empty record for a package published here), OSV npm @polar-sh/ui (an empty record for a package published here), OSV PyPI polar-sdk (an empty record for a package published here) did not; NVD: 3 records name polar with nothing tying them to this repository (CVE-2024-56949, CVE-2025-11820, CVE-2026-60122) |
| 05.advisory_record | record incomplete: no advisory against the project in the last 24 months; OSV PyPI polar-sdk (an empty record for a package published here), OSV npm @polar-sh/sdk (an empty record for a package published here), OSV npm @polar-sh/adapter-utils (an empty record for a package published here), OSV npm @polar-sh/better-auth (an empty record for a package published here), OSV npm @polar-sh/nextjs (an empty record for a package published here), OSV npm @polar-sh/nuxt (an empty record for a package published here), OSV npm @polar-sh/tanstack-start (an empty record for a package published here), OSV npm @polar-sh/checkout (an empty record for a package published here), OSV npm @polar-sh/ui (an empty record for a package published here), OSV PyPI polar-sdk (an empty record for a package published here) did not answer; NVD: 3 records name polar with nothing tying them to this repository (CVE-2024-56949, CVE-2025-11820, CVE-2026-60122) |
| 05.project_exploited | no affecting advisory is on CISA's Known Exploited list |
Anyone can check this report against the authoritative record — click the stamp, or enter ZJVT-HYZ4-KPKV at borehole.dev/verify.
The code commits to the 106 checks this run performed, the bands they produced, and the commit they were read at. It does not cover checks written since.
Where this scan ran
This scan ran on ordinary cloud infrastructure (cloud-run), not in a hardware-isolated confidential VM. Nothing about it is attested by Google.
What an attested survey proves, and what it does not.
What this scan did with the repository — 7 steps
Written by the steps themselves as they ran, not described afterwards. A hand-written account of a data flow drifts the first time somebody changes the flow and not the account.
| At | Step | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0s | read repository metadata from the GitHub API | size mb: 549.1authenticated: False |
| 36.1s | cloned the repository to a temporary directory | depth: full |
| 66.5s | read the git history | commits: 18480tracked files: 6382 |
| 379.2s | ran the deterministic checks | blame pass: Falseread working tree: False |
| 379.2s | recorded where this scan ran | attested: Falseenvironment: cloud-run |
| 576.5s | kept the facts, never the source, for re-reading under new checks | |
| 576.5s | deleting the working copy |
Total 576.5s ·source content sent off this machine: none · calls to a language model: 0 · the clone was deleted when the survey ended
An automated reading of a repository's code and its history up to one commit, with public advisory records. It may be wrong, it is not legal, financial, investment or security advice, and it does not replace diligence by a qualified person. It is provided for information: nobody may rely on it (Borehole's terms, section 3).