Borehole · Risk register · free tier

pixie-io/pixie

Free reading: not for reliance

50cabe7 · 12,662 commits · 4,739 files
Issued 2026-11-03

Significant: one contributor carries the recent work.

1 of 6 assessable dimensions carries significant findings, 3 are adequate and 2 are strong. 2 findings are worth checking first. 13 findings, each with its evidence: the commit, path and lines it rests on, or, when something is missing, what was looked for. One dimension cannot be assessed without an acquirer.

What matters most

03.1 Significant: Bus factor 1: recent work is concentrated in one contributor

What the repository says about itself

05.60 Relicensed: proprietary → Apache-2.0 (2021-04-17) LICENSE.txt
names Linux Foundation CONTRIBUTING.md:76
names CNCF GOVERNANCE.md:11
names OpenSSF README.md:17
names Cloud Native Computing Foundation README.md:218

Worth checking first

Borehole's proprietary scoring is calibrated across hundreds of repositories. Each finding here reads significant, but its check has not yet held up often enough in that calibration to rate significant on its own. If one holds when someone checks it, it is significant.

05.26 68 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 6 high or critical in what ships
05.45 9 workload settings give a container the host

Published under today's rules. The verification code attests to this reading as it was stored. This page differs from it as follows.

4 findings from checks Borehole's calibration found wrong more often than right are no longer published.

	Dimension	Rating
01	Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance	strong
02	Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity	strong
03	Organization & Key-Person Risk	significant findings
04	Product & Engineering Maturity	adequate
05	Security & Reliability Posture	adequate
06	Observability & Operations	adequate
07	Fit with the Acquirer	not assessable

strong adequate significant findings not assessable from a repository

Provenance disclosure does not affect any rating

0% of added lines arrived in commits declaring an AI agent as co-author

The surviving-lines measurement was not run on this repository.

0% of lines added in the last 12 months (since 2025-11-03) arrived in AI-declared commits: 0/41 commits, confidence moderate. Also a floor.

0/12,662 commits declaring an agent

confidence: high

99% of non-merge commits carry any trailer at all
no widespread author/committer date divergence

156,073 lines excluded as lockfiles, vendored or generated.

This is a lower bound. It counts what the repository declares. Undeclared AI authorship is invisible here, and a single rebase removes the trailers this rests on. Absence of a declaration is absence of disclosure, not absence of AI authorship.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · strong · ratings ↑

A note that does not affect this rating

01.6

src/carnot/funcs/metadata/metadata_ops.h is 3,321 lines, 36× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 91 lines. 42 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 3,321. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

A note that does not affect this rating: measured against its own codebase's median, it is below the 85th percentile of 382 surveyed projects' largest files, where this check begins to count.

Evidence

line-count	`src/carnot/funcs/metadata/metadata_ops.h:1` — 3,321 lines (36× median)
line-count	`src/carnot/planner/compiler/compiler_test.cc:1` — 3,263 lines (35× median)
line-count	`src/carnot/planner/test_utils.h:1` — 2,398 lines (26× median)
line-count	`src/carnot/planner/ir/ir_nodes_test.cc:1` — 2,217 lines (24× median)
line-count	`src/carnot/planner/compiler/ast_visitor_test.cc:1` — 2,038 lines (22× median)

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · strong · ratings ↑

No finding. 16 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · significant findings · ratings ↑

03.1

Bus factor 1: recent work is concentrated in one contributor

significant findings

In the last 24 months, one contributor authored three-quarters or more of 132 non-merge commits among 10 authors; across all history, less than a quarter of 12,593. This is the single most expensive thing to discover after closing, and the repository cannot tell you whether that person is part of the transaction.

Evidence

git shortlog -sn

last 24 months: top author three-quarters or more of 132 commits; bus factor 1; 10 authors

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · adequate · ratings ↑

04.3

100 direct dependencies in a single manifest

adequate

go.mod declares 100 direct dependencies. Each one is a maintenance obligation, a supply-chain surface and a potential licence question that transfers with the asset. The count says nothing about whether any given dependency was a good choice; it says how many such choices a buyer inherits.

Evidence

direct-dependencies	`go.mod` — 100 declared
direct-dependencies	`src/ui/package.json` — 56 declared
direct-dependencies	`src/datagen/pii/privy/requirements.in` — 17 declared
direct-dependencies	`src/stirling/source_connectors/socket_tracer/protocols/amqp/amqp_code_generator/requirements.txt` — 5 declared

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · adequate · ratings ↑

05.6

1 Dockerfile runs the application as root

adequate

No USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.

Evidence

no-USER-instruction src/experimental/multi_arch/Dockerfile — runs as root

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.26

68 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 6 high or critical in what ships

adequate worth checking first

68 of 1,903 locked dependencies match 138 published advisories in OSV, 72 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.

The check that found this reads significant, but it has not yet held up often enough in Borehole's calibration to rate a finding significant on its own. Opening go.mod settles it. If it holds when someone checks it, this finding is significant.

Evidence

go.mod	`go.mod` — github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 v2.10.4: GHSA-fhg8-qxh5-7q3w (critical), fixed in 2.10.27
go.mod	`go.mod` — gopkg.in/src-d/go-git.v4 v4.13.1: GHSA-449p-3h89-pw88 (critical); the advisory applies only under a condition it states
go.mod	`go.mod` — golang.org/x/crypto v0.42.0: GHSA-5cgq-3rg8-m6cv (critical), fixed in 0.52.0

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.45

9 workload settings give a container the host

adequate worth checking first

9 places in the deployment configuration run a container privileged or in the host's network, process or IPC namespace. A compromise of that container is a compromise of the machine, and most acquirers' security reviews block it. Node agents (network, storage, monitoring) are excluded.

The check that found this reads significant, but it has not yet held up often enough in Borehole's calibration to rate a finding significant on its own. Opening k8s/cloud_deps/base/elastic/cluster/elastic_cluster.yaml:43 and the 1 other file it cites settles it. If it holds when someone checks it, this finding is significant.

Evidence

k8s/cloud_deps/base/elastic/cluster/elastic_cluster.yaml	`k8s/cloud_deps/base/elastic/cluster/elastic_cluster.yaml:43` — privileged or host namespace
k8s/cloud_deps/base/elastic/cluster/elastic_cluster.yaml	`k8s/cloud_deps/base/elastic/cluster/elastic_cluster.yaml:110` — privileged or host namespace
k8s/devinfra/buildbuddy-executor/values.yaml	`k8s/devinfra/buildbuddy-executor/values.yaml:85` — privileged or host namespace

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Notes that do not affect this rating

05.13

16 outbound calls can wait forever

adequate

16 HTTP calls use a client with no timeout (Python `requests` without `timeout=`, or Go's default client). When a dependency slows down, each one holds a worker until the connection gives up, and enough of them take the service down with the dependency.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

bazel/external/ubuntu_packages/push_ubuntu_debs_to_gcs.py	`bazel/external/ubuntu_packages/push_ubuntu_debs_to_gcs.py:104` — outbound call without a timeout
src/cloud/auth/controllers/auth0.go	`src/cloud/auth/controllers/auth0.go:122` — outbound call without a timeout
src/cloud/auth/controllers/auth0.go	`src/cloud/auth/controllers/auth0.go:170` — outbound call without a timeout

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.21

6 shell commands built from strings

adequate

6 places run a command through a shell (`shell=True`, `os.system`, `exec` with a template) rather than passing arguments. Where any part comes from outside, it is command injection. Ask where each one's input comes from.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

src/stirling/protocol_inference/data_collection.py	`src/stirling/protocol_inference/data_collection.py:52` — command run through a shell
src/stirling/protocol_inference/data_collection.py	`src/stirling/protocol_inference/data_collection.py:74` — command run through a shell
src/stirling/protocol_inference/data_collection.py	`src/stirling/protocol_inference/data_collection.py:86` — command run through a shell

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.22

1 deserialiser that can run code

adequate

1 places read data with a deserialiser that executes what it reads (pickle). That is safe on data the system wrote itself and remote code execution on anything else. Ask where each one's input comes from.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

src/stirling/source_connectors/socket_tracer/protocols/amqp/amqp_code_generator/amqp_test_code_gen.py src/stirling/source_connectors/socket_tracer/protocols/amqp/amqp_code_generator/amqp_test_code_gen.py:351 — code-executing deserialiser

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.9

66 vendored components with no licence

adequate

Third-party code is committed into this repository without any statement of the terms it arrived under. Unknown terms are harder to deal with than inconvenient ones: an awkward licence can be complied with, an absent one cannot. Each of these needs its origin established before the code changes hands.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

bazel/external/BUILD.bazel	`bazel/external/BUILD.bazel` — 1 tracked files, no licence file
bazel/external/antlr4.BUILD	`bazel/external/antlr4.BUILD` — 1 tracked files, no licence file
bazel/external/antlr_grammars.BUILD	`bazel/external/antlr_grammars.BUILD` — 1 tracked files, no licence file
bazel/external/antlr_grammars.patch	`bazel/external/antlr_grammars.patch` — 1 tracked files, no licence file
bazel/external/arrow.BUILD	`bazel/external/arrow.BUILD` — 1 tracked files, no licence file
bazel/external/bcc.BUILD	`bazel/external/bcc.BUILD` — 1 tracked files, no licence file

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.60

Relicensed: proprietary → Apache-2.0 (2021-04-17)

adequate

The root licence changed 1 time(s). Code taken under earlier terms stays under them; check which terms any fork or customer relied on.

A note that does not affect this rating: a licence change is a fact for the first screen, and only a narrowing of rights within two years of the surveyed commit costs "strong".

Evidence

d88307247	`LICENSE.txt` — proprietary from 2019-02-15
2fcd3b0ba	`LICENSE` — Apache-2.0 from 2021-04-17

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Observability & Operations

06 · adequate · ratings ↑

06.14

Readiness and liveness probes are identical in 18 of 23 workloads

adequate

Both probes call the same endpoint. When a dependency slows down, the liveness probe fails with the readiness probe, so the platform restarts pods that only needed taking out of rotation, and a partial outage becomes a full one. Liveness should ask whether the process is alive; readiness whether it can serve.

Evidence

k8s/cloud/base/api_deployment.yaml	`k8s/cloud/base/api_deployment.yaml` — same probe endpoint twice
k8s/cloud/base/artifact_tracker_deployment.yaml	`k8s/cloud/base/artifact_tracker_deployment.yaml` — same probe endpoint twice
k8s/cloud/base/auth_deployment.yaml	`k8s/cloud/base/auth_deployment.yaml` — same probe endpoint twice

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

A note that does not affect this rating

06.18

28 of 56 deployed images carry no version, or `latest`

adequate

28 images in the deployment configuration are named without a version or as `latest`. A redeploy can change the software without a commit, a rollback has nothing to roll back to, and nobody can say from the repository what is running.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

k8s/cloud/base/api_deployment.yaml	`k8s/cloud/base/api_deployment.yaml:18` — image without a version
k8s/cloud/base/artifact_tracker_deployment.yaml	`k8s/cloud/base/artifact_tracker_deployment.yaml:20` — image without a version
k8s/cloud/base/auth_deployment.yaml	`k8s/cloud/base/auth_deployment.yaml:20` — image without a version

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · not assessable · ratings ↑

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository. What a person adds here.

Check it on the running system

7 checks against the running system follow from the findings above: what a buyer's engineer will try, how to run it first, and what to have ready. A paid survey of this repository includes them. See the tiers.

A paid survey of a public repository is also reviewed: a language model reads each finding against the code and withdraws only findings it judges the code contradicts, each listed with its reason. The review is a language model's reading of the findings against the code, and it can be wrong. It never adds a finding, never raises a band, and never removes a finding from a proven check or an advisory that affects the surveyed version.

What a person adds

The survey reads what the repository can show. The code cannot settle these questions, and on them this report states nothing. Each says where its answer lives: your own engineer, the company, or an assessor you choose can settle it. Questions marked measured open with something this repository shows.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · full coverage

measured No architecture or design document is in the tree, across 3,593 product files. Where does the design live, and who holds it? Answer lives in: The team01.38
measured The repository pulls code in through git submodules (.gitmodules). A buyer receives pointers, not that code. Can every submodule be fetched without the team's credentials, and who owns each one? Answer lives in: The team and the submodule owners01.35
Is the architecture right for the next three years of the product? Answer lives in: Your architects, with the product roadmap01.39
Were the home-grown components reasonable choices when they were made, and are they now? Answer lives in: The team's reasoning at the time01.40

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · high coverage

Is review real or a rubber stamp? Comment depth and time to approve need the pull request history. Answer lives in: The code host's pull request data02.32
Is delivery planned and measured, or heroic? Answer lives in: The issue tracker: backlog, sprint history, estimate accuracy02.38
How are incidents run, reviewed and learned from? Answer lives in: Tickets, chat and postmortems02.37

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · partial coverage

measured 89 people have committed here. Which of them are you acquiring, and which are you replacing? Answer lives in: The deal terms03.29
Who mentors whom, and would that survive a departure? Answer lives in: The team; review history only suggests candidates03.28
Can the team grow, and who stands behind the top three contributors? Answer lives in: Recruiting data and the org chart03.30
Is the seniority mix sound, and will pay survive your salary bands? Answer lives in: HR data03.31
Is the pace sustainable? Commit times cannot say: git keeps no reliable local time. Answer lives in: Interviews and on-call history03.14
Does the team want to stay after close? Answer lives in: Interviews03.32
How are decisions made and disagreements resolved? Answer lives in: Time with the team03.33

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · minimal coverage

measured 40 commits landed in the last year, against 92 the year before (-57%). Is that maintenance mode, a pivot, or fewer people working on it? The count looks the same for all three. Answer lives in: The team04.11
measured No experiment tracking is configured in the repository. How was the shipped model trained and evaluated, and could it be reproduced? Answer lives in: The ML team and its run history04.34
measured No model card is in the tree. What is the model's intended use, what was it trained on, and where does it fail? Answer lives in: The ML team04.35
Can this team deliver the stated roadmap on the stated timeline? Answer lives in: The data room and the team's record of estimates04.32
Does leadership know about the debt, and is time budgeted to repay it? Answer lives in: Budget and roadmap decisions04.31
Is the engineering shape consistent with the commercial story? Answer lives in: Revenue, customer and churn data04.33

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · partial coverage

measured 05.5 found credential-shaped strings in this repository. Was each one revoked at the provider? Deleting it from the code revokes nothing; only the provider's audit log shows that it was. Answer lives in: The provider's console and audit log05.38
measured No threat model is in the tree of what looks like a running service. Does one exist elsewhere, and who owns it? Answer lives in: The security owner05.43
What has actually broken, how often, and how badly? Answer lives in: Ticketing and chat05.41
What did external testing find, and was it fixed? Answer lives in: Reports in the data room05.42
What is the SOC 2, ISO 27001 or GDPR status, and where is the evidence? Answer lives in: Audit reports; policy files in the tree are not evidence05.44

Observability & Operations

06 · partial coverage

measured Nothing in the tree backs up or restores data. How is data backed up, and has a restore ever been rehearsed? Answer lives in: The operations team06.19
measured No alert rule is defined in the repository. Where are alerts defined, who receives them, and when did one last fire? Answer lives in: The alerting tool and the on-call rota06.10
Are the dashboards opened, the alerts acknowledged and the pages answered? Answer lives in: Pager history and dashboard logs06.29
Are the service-level objectives actually met? Answer lives in: Production metrics06.30
Who carries the pager, and how often does it go off? Answer lives in: Pager exports and interviews06.31
What does it cost to run, and how much headroom is there? Answer lives in: Cloud billing and capacity plans06.32

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · none coverage

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

This is primarily a C++ codebase, with C alongside (29% of source files). Does your engineering organisation already run C++ in production, or would this be the first? 07.1
The bulk of this system sits in src/, k8s/, bazel/. Which of your existing systems would each of those have to absorb or replace? 07.10
The repository carries deployment configuration (k8s/BUILD.bazel and 372 more). Does that match your deployment and on-call model, or does it need rehosting first? 07.2
What is your tolerance for the findings above remaining unaddressed for the first two quarters after close, given everything else that will compete for this team's time?
Which of these systems duplicate yours, and which get retired? Answer lives in: Your architecture07.11
What will integration cost, and in what order? Answer lives in: The engagement07.12
Where does the team land in your organisation, and who reports to whom? Answer lives in: Your org design07.13
Are there earn-outs, retention packages or contractor IP to assign? Answer lives in: Deal terms07.14
Do customer contracts limit hosting, regions or vendors? Answer lives in: Customer contracts07.15

Request a human assessment Download JSON Badge PDF Post on X

A human assessment is Borehole's own paid service, €12,000+ (total price is determined per engagement; travel billed at cost). It is not independent of this report: the same business produced both. It is a separate contract, with its own scope, terms and reliance.

Embed the badge

Tied to this commit and this date, and it fades after 90 days — an honest badge is one that expires. A repository with significant findings gets a neutral "read" badge rather than a red one: the library is where the range is visible, not someone else's README.

[![Borehole](/badge/pixie-io/pixie.svg "Borehole free reading: not for reliance. See the full report.")](/r/pixie-io/pixie/50cabe7)

If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.

Rejection log — 89 signals that ran and did not fire

Appendix: rejection log — 89 signals that ran and did not fire

Published on purpose. A signal that looked and decided not to fire has told you something, and this is the calibration data behind every threshold above.

Looked, and found nothing — 60

Signal	What it found
04.hotspot_concentration	change is spread across the codebase rather than pooling in a few filesfiles 12,824 · top5 share 0.019
04.debt_markers	debt markers are sparsemarkers 649 · per kloc 0.74 · lines read 878,171
04.test_growth	test effort kept pace with code writtenlate test per code 0.291 · early test per code 0.159
04.churn_trend	rework is not rising against new worklate delete per insert 0.522 · early delete per insert 0.466
04.compat_layers	little code is kept for the old wayshare 0.0 · code files 2,307 · compat files 0
04.dependency_redundancy	one library per job, mostly
06.telemetry_presence	a telemetry or error-reporting library is referencednote presence only; whether anyone watches it is not visible here · matches 48
06.healthcheck_presence	a health or readiness check is defined
06.telemetry_depth	the service is visible in more than one way
06.error_reporting	an error reporter is initialisedinitialised 2 · config files 0
06.single_replica	an autoscaler or disruption budget is definedworkloads 62
06.migrate_on_start	migrations do not run at container start
03.active_contributors	more than one contributor active in the trailing yearall time 89 · active 12mo 4
03.knowledge_silos	every substantial directory has been touched by more than one personauthors 89 · directories 7
03.drive_by_contributors	an open contributor base, where one-commit contributors are normalauthors 89 · one off share 0.562
03.contributor_attrition	no contributor dominates enough for their absence to matterauthors 89 · top share less than a quarter · top contributor last committed more than three years ago
03.critical_path_ownership	more than one person changes the critical pathsauthors 10
03.second_contributor_attrition	the second and third contributors are still active
03.bus_factor_trend	the team has not narrowed to one person
02.merge_discipline	a meaningful share of recent change carries evidence of reviewmerges 0 · window last 24 months · with tracked 0
02.ci_presence	CI configuration is present in the working treecount 26
02.test_presence	tests are present in a normal proportion to sourcetests 802 · source 2,669 · test ratio 0.3
02.release_cadence	tags are presenttags 841
02.conventional_commits	commit subjects generally carry contentsampled 12,662 · low content share 0.005
02.branch_protection_hints	process scaffolding is present in the repository
02.skipped_tests	few tests are switched offfocused 0 · skipped 0 · test files 805
02.ci_test_gating	no test run in CI is written so that it cannot failconfigs 26
02.revert_share	change is rarely undoneshare 0.008 · reverts 1 · recent commits 132
02.dependency_update_cadence	dependencies move with the codelockfiles 2 · commits since 30 · days since lockfile changed 314
02.flaky_test_markers	tests are not retried until they passtest retries 0 · suite retries 0
02.lint_in_build	a linter or formatter runs in the buildwired 4 · ci configs 26 · product files 2,307
01.burst_import	no commit run met both the rate and the net-addition thresholdgap seconds 180 · min add ratio 3.0 · min net added 2,000
01.initial_dump	first commit is not a disproportionate share of the codebaseinsertions 0 · share of insertions 0.0
01.message_uniformity	commit subjects vary in wording and lengthlength stdev 20.39 · repeat share 0.008
01.revision_depth	most files were revisited after they were first writtenfiles seen 3,380 · write once share 0.214
01.duplicated_blocks	little shipping code is repeated verbatim across filesshare 0.0046 · product files 2,235 · distinct blocks 225,376
01.build_reproducibility	every base image names a versionfloating 0 · from lines 1
01.unfinished_migration	no language migration is stalled halfway
01.weights_in_git	no model weights are committedfiles 0
05.committed_secrets	no credential-shaped strings outside test and fixture pathsnote the working tree only; the history is 05.5 · patterns 8 · files read 3,744
05.security_guardrails	at least one standard guard rail is configured
05.dependency_pinning	a lockfile is committed, so builds are reproduciblelockfile True
05.license_present	a licence file is presentfound True
05.secrets_management_pattern	no environment file is committed outside tests and examplesenv files 0
05.supply_chain_pinning	third-party build steps are pinned, or fewaction refs 124 · pipe to shell 0 · unpinned third party 0
05.resource_limits	every workload declares limitsworkloads 73 · without limits 0
05.credentials_in_deploy_config	deployment configuration references secrets, never holds themfiles 0 · sites 0
05.source_maps_shipped	production builds do not publish source mapssites 0
05.signing_material	no signing keystore or profile is committedfiles 0
05.dataset_provenance	little data is committeddata files 0 · licence or card files 0
05.license_grant_unclear	the licence is recognisable as Apache-2.0class permissive · license Apache-2.0
05.committed_native_libraries	no widely used compiled library is committed to the productlibraries 0
04.deprecations_lingering	few deprecations have outlived two yearsolder than two years 0 · files with deprecations 3
04.dependency_churn	few dependencies were added and dropped within 60 daysdependencies seen 379 · added in two years 3 · removed within 60 days 0
04.ci_platforms_dropped	no platform was dropped from CI in the last two years
04.repository_status	the README's first screen states no end, move or freezestatements 0
02.development_elsewhere	nothing says development happens elsewhereno pr statements 0 · mirror statements 0 · replayed commit share 0.0
05.paid_edition	no directory carries a separate paid-edition licencedirectories 0
04.releases_stopped	releases keep pace with developmentmedian gap days 2.5 · days since last tag 113 · commits last 90 days 9
03.single_maintainer	no file says one person maintains itstatements 0

Could not conclude, or did not apply — 29

Not a clean result. Each says why it could not answer here.

Signal	Why
04.eol_runtime	no pinned runtime version to check
04.fixes_with_tests	too few fixes in 24 months to judge
04.fix_share_trend	fewer than six busy quarters to compare
04.schema_churn	no schema migrations to read
06.structured_logging	not assessed for C++ or C, the languages the product is written in: this check's patterns read other languages only
06.print_logging	a frontend: console output is the browser's, not the server's
06.correlation_ids	not assessed for C++ or C, the languages the product is written in: this check's patterns read other languages only
06.usage_reporting_default	the reporting hosts the product's code names are not the project's own
06.alert_rules	no alert rules in the repository; they may live in a console
06.environment_branching	not assessed for C++ or C, the languages the product is written in: this check's patterns read other languages only
06.release_markers	fewer than 100 commits in the last year
06.feature_flags	no feature-flag service; flags may live elsewhere
03.joiners_and_leavers	too few regular contributors to see a trend
02.long_lived_branches	too few merges to judge (squash and rebase leave none)
02.commit_size	too few recent commits
01.swallowed_errors	not assessed for C++ or C, the languages the product is written in: this check's patterns read other languages only
01.notebook_outputs	too few notebooks
05.migration_reversibility	too few migrations to judge
05.sql_from_strings	not assessed for C++ or C, the languages the product is written in: this check's patterns read other languages only
05.public_env_secret	not assessed for C++ or C, the languages the product is written in: this check's patterns read other languages only
05.unsafe_html	not assessed for C++ or C, the languages the product is written in: this check's patterns read other languages only
05.cleartext_traffic	not a mobile app
05.license_manifest_conflict	no packaging manifest states a licence
04.flags_accumulating	few or no feature flags in the history
04.api_versions_coexisting	one API version is served, or none
04.release_branch	too few release tags to tell
05.project_advisories	record incomplete: no advisory found in the sources that answered; NVD: 14 records name pixie with nothing tying them to this repository (CVE-2009-1065, CVE-2009-1066, CVE-2009-1067, …)
05.advisory_record	record incomplete: no advisory against the project in the last 24 months; NVD: 14 records name pixie with nothing tying them to this repository (CVE-2009-1065, CVE-2009-1066, CVE-2009-1067, …)
05.project_exploited	no affecting advisory is on CISA's Known Exploited list

Anyone can check this report against the authoritative record — click the stamp, or enter MND0-V2HB-T3ZY at borehole.dev/verify.

The code commits to the 106 checks this run performed, the bands they produced, and the commit they were read at. It does not cover checks written since.

Put the mark in your README

The image is wrapped in a link to the verification page, so a reader can check it rather than take it on trust. If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.

[![Borehole reading, not a certification](https://borehole.dev/badge/pixie-io/pixie/50cabe7.svg "Borehole free reading: not for reliance. See the full report.")](https://borehole.dev/verify/MND0V2HBT3ZY?via=badge)

Where this scan ran

This scan ran on ordinary cloud infrastructure (cloud-run), not in a hardware-isolated confidential VM. Nothing about it is attested by Google.

What an attested survey proves, and what it does not.

What this scan did with the repository — 7 steps

Written by the steps themselves as they ran, not described afterwards. A hand-written account of a data flow drifts the first time somebody changes the flow and not the account.

At	Step	Detail
0.0s	read repository metadata from the GitHub API	size mb: 119.0authenticated: False
16.1s	cloned the repository to a temporary directory	depth: full
30.1s	read the git history	commits: 12662tracked files: 4739
186.5s	ran the deterministic checks	blame pass: Falseread working tree: False
186.5s	recorded where this scan ran	attested: Falseenvironment: cloud-run
300.4s	kept the facts, never the source, for re-reading under new checks
300.4s	deleting the working copy

Total 300.4s ·source content sent off this machine: none · calls to a language model: 0 · the clone was deleted when the survey ended

An automated reading of a repository's code and its history up to one commit, with public advisory records. It may be wrong, it is not legal, financial, investment or security advice, and it does not replace diligence by a qualified person. It is provided for information: nobody may rely on it (Borehole's terms, section 3).

BOREHOLE 0.7.15 DETERMINISTIC LAYER · NO MODEL CALLSREAD ON BOREHOLE'S SERVER · CLONE DELETED TAKEDOWNCONTRIBUTED TO THIS REPOSITORY? YOUR RIGHTS