2485e44 · 6,924 commits · 2,364 files
Issued 2026-10-28
Nothing significant. Questions worth asking about Security & Reliability Posture, Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity.
105 checks ran across 6 assessable dimensions. None found a significant problem; 4 raised something worth a question. 7 findings, each with evidence. One dimension cannot be assessed without an acquirer.
- 1 finding from checks Borehole's calibration found wrong more often than right is no longer published.
| Dimension | Rating | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | strong | |
| 02 | Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | adequate | |
| 03 | Organization & Key-Person Risk | adequate | |
| 04 | Product & Engineering Maturity | adequate | |
| 05 | Security & Reliability Posture | adequate | |
| 06 | Observability & Operations | not assessable | |
| 07 | Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
- 1% of non-merge commits carry any trailer at all
- low trailer coverage: the convention may not be in consistent use
- no widespread author/committer date divergence
- deep scan blamed 2,340 of 2,340 counted files
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
01 · strong · ratings ↑Commit messages are templated rather than written
adequate55% of commit subjects are exact repeats of another subject, and subject length varies by only 15.2 characters. A log written by someone explaining their reasoning to a future reader does not look like this. The log is therefore weak evidence of intent, whatever the code is like.
A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.
| commit-subjects | 731× 'Fix styling' |
| commit-subjects | 550× 'Build assets' |
| commit-subjects | 404× '[rector] Rector fixes' |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
02 · adequate · ratings ↑Tests cover a thin slice of the codebase
adequate184 test files against 2,186 source files (8.4%). This does not measure whether the tests are good, only whether enough of them exist for the codebase to be changed safely by someone who did not write it — which is exactly the situation after an acquisition.
| test-file-ratio | 184 test files / 2,186 source files |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Organization & Key-Person Risk
03 · adequate · ratings ↑Regular contributors fell from 17 to 11 in a year
adequate9 people who committed regularly the year before made no commits in the last year, and 5 new regular contributors arrived. Ask whether the work they did is still covered.
| regular contributors by year | 17 then 11; 9 stopped committing, 5 began |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Product & Engineering Maturity
04 · adequate · ratings ↑9% of bug fixes add or change a test
adequateOf 1058 fixes in the last 24 months, 97 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.
| fix commits touching tests | 97 of 1058 |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Security & Reliability Posture
05 · adequate · ratings ↑None of the standard security guard rails are configured
adequateThere is no disclosure policy, no automated dependency updates, no named code owners and no pre-commit configuration. None of these is load-bearing on its own. Their collective absence says that security posture here is whatever the current team happens to remember to do, which is not a posture that survives the team changing.
| guardrail-scan | checked 5 kinds of guard rail across 2,364 tracked files; 0 present |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
The build runs third-party code it does not pin
adequate3 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.
A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.
| .github/workflows/analyse.yml | .github/workflows/analyse.yml:24 — action pinned by tag |
| .github/workflows/lint.yml | .github/workflows/lint.yml:24 — action pinned by tag |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
5 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 1 high or critical
adequateThe newest was published on 2026-09-03. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 4 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 4.20.0. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version.
A note that does not affect this rating: it describes the project's advisory record, and no advisory in it is known to affect the surveyed commit.
| GHSA-54q6-6rhc-7gc4 | 2026-09-03: GHSA-54q6-6rhc-7gc4 (high), fixed in 3.18.1: File extension allowlist bypass when preserving or customizing uploaded filenames |
| CVE-2025-51487 | 2025-08-19: CVE-2025-51487 (moderate): A Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in MoonShine version < 3.12.5, allowing to execute arbitrary JavaScript by using "javascript:" payload, |
| CVE-2025-51488 | 2025-08-19: CVE-2025-51488 (moderate): A Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in MoonShine version < 3.12.4, allowing remote attackers to store and execute arbitrary JavaScript by i |
| CVE-2025-51489 | 2025-08-19: CVE-2025-51489 (moderate): A Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in MoonShine version < 3.12.5, allowing remote attackers to upload a malicious SVG file when creating/u |
| CVE-2025-51510 | 2025-08-19: CVE-2025-51510 (moderate): MoonShine was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability under the Blog -> Categories page when using the moonshine-tree-resource (version < 2.0.2) com |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Observability & Operations
06 · not assessable · ratings ↑Not rated: only 5 of 16 checks could reach a conclusion here; the rest do not apply to this repository or could not read it. What a person adds here.
Fit with the Acquirer
07 · not assessable · ratings ↑Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository. What a person adds here.
Check it on the running system
2 checks against the running system follow from the findings above: what a buyer's engineer will try, how to run it first, and what to have ready. A paid survey of this repository includes them.
A paid survey of a public repository is also reviewed: a language model reads each finding against the code and withdraws only findings it judges the code contradicts, each listed with its reason. The review is a language model's reading of the findings against the code, and it can be wrong. It never adds a finding, never raises a band, and never removes a finding from a proven check or an advisory that affects the surveyed version.
What a person adds
The survey reads what the repository can show. The code cannot settle these questions, and on them this report states nothing. Each says where its answer lives: your own engineer, the company, or an assessor you choose can settle it. Questions marked measured open with something this repository shows.
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
01 · full coverage- measured No architecture or design document is in the tree, across 2,141 product files. Where does the design live, and who holds it?
- Is the architecture right for the next three years of the product?
- Were the home-grown components reasonable choices when they were made, and are they now?
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
02 · high coverage- Is review real or a rubber stamp? Comment depth and time to approve need the pull request history.
- Is delivery planned and measured, or heroic?
- How are incidents run, reviewed and learned from?
Organization & Key-Person Risk
03 · partial coverage- measured 63 people have committed here. Which of them are you acquiring, and which are you replacing?
- Who mentors whom, and would that survive a departure?
- Can the team grow, and who stands behind the top three contributors?
- Is the seniority mix sound, and will pay survive your salary bands?
- Is the pace sustainable? Commit times cannot say: git keeps no reliable local time.
- Does the team want to stay after close?
- How are decisions made and disagreements resolved?
Product & Engineering Maturity
04 · minimal coverage- measured 508 commits landed in the last year, against 1,455 the year before (-65%). Is that maintenance mode, a pivot, or fewer people working on it? The count looks the same for all three.
- Can this team deliver the stated roadmap on the stated timeline?
- Does leadership know about the debt, and is time budgeted to repay it?
- Is the engineering shape consistent with the commercial story?
Security & Reliability Posture
05 · partial coverage- What has actually broken, how often, and how badly?
- What did external testing find, and was it fixed?
- What is the SOC 2, ISO 27001 or GDPR status, and where is the evidence?
Observability & Operations
06 · partial coverageNot rated: only 5 of 16 checks could reach a conclusion here; the rest do not apply to this repository or could not read it.
- Are the dashboards opened, the alerts acknowledged and the pages answered?
- Are the service-level objectives actually met?
- Who carries the pager, and how often does it go off?
- What does it cost to run, and how much headroom is there?
Fit with the Acquirer
07 · none coverageNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
- This is primarily a PHP codebase. Does your engineering organisation already run PHP in production, or would this be the first?
- The bulk of this system sits in src/, skills/, node_modules/. Which of your existing systems would each of those have to absorb or replace?
- Nothing in the repository says how this is deployed. Is it shipped as a library, a binary or a service, and if it runs somewhere, who owns that environment?
- What is your tolerance for the findings above remaining unaddressed for the first two quarters after close, given everything else that will compete for this team's time?
- Which of these systems duplicate yours, and which get retired?
- What will integration cost, and in what order?
- Where does the team land in your organisation, and who reports to whom?
- Are there earn-outs, retention packages or contractor IP to assign?
- Do customer contracts limit hosting, regions or vendors?
A human assessment is Borehole's own paid service, €12,000+ (total price is determined per engagement; travel billed at cost). It is not independent of this report: the same business produced both. It is a separate contract, with its own scope, terms and reliance.
Embed the badge
Tied to this commit and this date, and it fades after 90 days — an honest badge is one that expires. A repository with significant findings gets a neutral "read" badge rather than a red one: the library is where the range is visible, not someone else's README.
[](/r/moonshine-software/moonshine/2485e44)If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.
Rejection log — 98 signals that ran and did not fire
Appendix: rejection log — 98 signals that ran and did not fire
Published on purpose. A signal that looked and decided not to fire has told you something, and this is the calibration data behind every threshold above.
Looked, and found nothing — 67
| Signal | What it found |
|---|---|
| 04.hotspot_concentration | change is spread across the codebase rather than pooling in a few filesfiles 10,278 · top5 share 0.032 |
| 04.debt_markers | debt markers are sparsemarkers 0 · per kloc 0.0 · lines read 92,896 |
| 04.dependency_sprawl | direct dependency counts are unremarkable |
| 04.test_growth | test effort kept pace with code writtenlate test per code 0.178 · early test per code 0.162 |
| 04.churn_trend | rework is not rising against new worklate delete per insert 0.549 · early delete per insert 0.718 |
| 04.fix_share_trend | fixing is not crowding out building |
| 04.dependency_redundancy | one library per job, mostly |
| 06.telemetry_presence | this repository does not deploy a running service, so instrumentation is not expected of itbasis nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere · files read 2,250 |
| 06.structured_logging | not a running service; structured logging is not expected of a librarybasis nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.healthcheck_presence | not a running service, so a health endpoint is not expectedbasis nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.usage_reporting_default | the product's code names no reporting hostsettings on 0 · settings off 0 |
| 06.migrate_on_start | migrations do not run at container start |
| 03.contributor_concentration | no single contributor dominates the last 24 monthsyears 4.5 · window last 24 months · authors 63 |
| 03.active_contributors | more than one contributor active in the trailing yearall time 63 · active 12mo 23 |
| 03.drive_by_contributors | an open contributor base, where one-commit contributors are normalauthors 63 · one off share 0.27 |
| 03.contributor_attrition | the dominant contributor is still activeauthors 63 · top share a quarter or more · top contributor last committed within the last three months |
| 03.critical_path_ownership | more than one person changes the critical pathsauthors 38 |
| 03.second_contributor_attrition | the second and third contributors are still active |
| 03.bus_factor_trend | the team has not narrowed to one person |
| 02.merge_discipline | a meaningful share of recent change carries evidence of reviewmerges 535 · window last 24 months · with tracked 2 |
| 02.ci_presence | CI configuration is present in the working treecount 11 |
| 02.release_cadence | tags are presenttags 415 |
| 02.conventional_commits | commit subjects generally carry contentsampled 5,416 · low content share 0.2 |
| 02.branch_protection_hints | process scaffolding is present in the repository |
| 02.ci_runs_tests | CI invokes a test runnerconfigs 11 · with tests 3 |
| 02.skipped_tests | few tests are switched offfocused 0 · skipped 0 · test files 186 |
| 02.ci_test_gating | no test run in CI is written so that it cannot failconfigs 11 |
| 02.revert_share | change is rarely undoneshare 0.001 · reverts 1 · recent commits 1,966 |
| 02.dependency_update_cadence | dependencies move with the codelockfiles 2 · commits since 1 · days since lockfile changed 0 |
| 02.flaky_test_markers | tests are not retried until they passtest retries 0 · suite retries 0 |
| 02.lint_in_build | a linter or formatter runs in the buildwired 5 · ci configs 11 · product files 2,002 |
| 02.long_lived_branches | the typical branch reaches the trunk quicklyshare 0.006 · merges 330 · long lived 2 |
| 02.commit_size | changes arrive in reviewable sizesshare 0.003 · commits 1,819 · over 2000 lines 6 |
| 01.burst_import | no commit run met both the rate and the net-addition thresholdgap seconds 180 · min add ratio 3.0 · min net added 2,000 |
| 01.initial_dump | first commit is not a disproportionate share of the codebaseinsertions 27,678 · share of insertions 0.0839 |
| 01.revision_depth | most files were revisited after they were first writtenfiles seen 811 · write once share 0.229 |
| 01.oversized_modules | no module is an outlier against this codebase's own normlargest 788 · threshold 1,000 · median lines 5 |
| 01.duplicated_blocks | little shipping code is repeated verbatim across filesshare 0.0087 · product files 2,002 · distinct blocks 34,534 |
| 01.swallowed_errors | errors are rarely thrown awayloc 95,134 · files 4 · per kloc 0.04 |
| 01.unfinished_migration | no language migration is stalled halfway |
| 01.weights_in_git | no model weights are committedfiles 0 |
| 05.committed_secrets | no credential-shaped strings outside test and fixture pathsnote the working tree only; the history is 05.5 · patterns 8 · files read 2,250 |
| 05.dependency_pinning | a lockfile is committed, so builds are reproduciblelockfile True |
| 05.license_present | a licence file is presentfound True |
| 05.secrets_in_history | no credential-shaped string was ever added outside test and fixture pathspatterns 8 · truncated False · added lines 292,129 |
| 05.secrets_management_pattern | no environment file is committed outside tests and examplesenv files 0 |
| 05.shell_from_strings | product code does not build shell commands from stringssites 0 |
| 05.unsafe_deserialization | no code-executing deserialiser in product codesites 0 |
| 05.tls_verification_off | no TLS verification is switched off in product codefiles 0 · sites 0 · pinned instead 0 |
| 05.known_vulnerabilities | no locked dependency has a published advisoryadvisories 0 · dependencies 39 · high or critical 0 |
| 05.privileged_workloads | no workload runs privileged or in the host's namespacessites 0 · behind a setting or built here 0 |
| 05.credentials_in_deploy_config | deployment configuration references secrets, never holds themfiles 0 · sites 0 |
| 05.signing_material | no signing keystore or profile is committedfiles 0 |
| 05.license_copyleft_inherited | every licence found in vendored code is permissive or weak-copyleftvendored paths 1 |
| 05.license_manifest_conflict | manifest and licence file agree on MITlicense MIT |
| 05.license_vendored_unlicensed | no vendored third-party code is committedcomponents 0 |
| 05.license_grant_unclear | the licence is recognisable as MITclass permissive · license MIT |
| 05.committed_native_libraries | no widely used compiled library is committed to the productlibraries 0 |
| 04.dependency_churn | few dependencies were added and dropped within 60 daysdependencies seen 84 · added in two years 16 · removed within 60 days 4 |
| 04.ci_platforms_dropped | no platform was dropped from CI in the last two years |
| 04.repository_status | the README's first screen states no end, move or freezestatements 0 |
| 02.development_elsewhere | nothing says development happens elsewhereno pr statements 0 · mirror statements 0 · replayed commit share 0.0 |
| 05.licence_changes | the root licence has not changed in the history readlicence versions 1 · unreleased changes 0 |
| 05.paid_edition | no directory carries a separate paid-edition licencedirectories 0 |
| 04.releases_stopped | releases keep pace with developmentmedian gap days 4.5 · days since last tag 7 · commits last 90 days 59 |
| 04.release_branch | the newest release was cut from the branch surveyedelsewhere 67 · on branch 347 · tags in window 414 |
| 03.single_maintainer | no file says one person maintains itstatements 0 |
Could not conclude, or did not apply — 31
Not a clean result. Each says why it could not answer here.
| Signal | Why |
|---|---|
| 04.eol_runtime | no pinned runtime version to check |
| 04.schema_churn | no schema migrations to read |
| 04.compat_layers | a library, whose compatibility code is usually deliberate |
| 06.telemetry_depth | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.print_logging | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.correlation_ids | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.error_reporting | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.alert_rules | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.deployed_image_floats | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.probes_identical | no Kubernetes probes |
| 06.single_replica | no Kubernetes deployments |
| 06.environment_branching | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.release_markers | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.feature_flags | no feature-flag service; flags may live elsewhere |
| 01.build_reproducibility | no product Dockerfile to read |
| 01.notebook_outputs | not a data or machine-learning repository |
| 05.container_runs_as_root | no Dockerfile to read |
| 05.outbound_timeouts | not a running service |
| 05.migration_reversibility | too few migrations to judge |
| 05.sql_from_strings | not a running service; a library that builds SQL is doing its job |
| 05.resource_limits | no Kubernetes workload manifests |
| 05.public_env_secret | not a frontend |
| 05.unsafe_html | not a frontend |
| 05.source_maps_shipped | not a frontend |
| 05.cleartext_traffic | not a mobile app |
| 05.dataset_provenance | not a data or machine-learning repository |
| 04.flags_accumulating | few or no feature flags in the history |
| 04.api_versions_coexisting | not a running service |
| 04.deprecations_lingering | a library, which keeps deprecated interfaces for its users |
| 05.project_advisories | record incomplete: no advisory found in the sources that answered; OSV Packagist moonshine/asset-manager (an empty record for a package published here), OSV Packagist moonshine/color-manager (an empty record for a package published here), OSV Packagist moonshine/contracts (an empty record for a package published here), OSV Packagist moonshine/core (an empty record for a package published here), OSV Packagist moonshine/crud (an empty record for a package published here), OSV Packagist moonshine/menu-manager (an empty record for a package published here), OSV Packagist moonshine/support (an empty record for a package published here), OSV Packagist moonshine/ui (an empty record for a package published here) did not |
| 05.project_exploited | no affecting advisory is on CISA's Known Exploited list |
Anyone can check this report against the authoritative record — click the stamp, or enter JA64-7MEB-G374 at borehole.dev/verify.
The code commits to the 106 checks this run performed, the bands they produced, and the commit they were read at. It does not cover checks written since.
Put the mark in your README
The image is wrapped in a link to the verification page, so a reader can check it rather than take it on trust. If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.
[](https://borehole.dev/verify/JA647MEBG374?via=badge)
Where this scan ran
This scan ran on ordinary cloud infrastructure (cloud-run), not in a hardware-isolated confidential VM. Nothing about it is attested by Google.
What an attested survey proves, and what it does not.
What this scan did with the repository — 7 steps
Written by the steps themselves as they ran, not described afterwards. A hand-written account of a data flow drifts the first time somebody changes the flow and not the account.
| At | Step | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0s | read repository metadata from the GitHub API | size mb: 34.6authenticated: False |
| 7.4s | cloned the repository to a temporary directory | depth: full |
| 13.9s | read the git history | commits: 6924tracked files: 2364 |
| 225.2s | ran the deterministic checks | blame pass: Trueread working tree: False |
| 225.2s | recorded where this scan ran | attested: Falseenvironment: cloud-run |
| 257.9s | kept the facts, never the source, for re-reading under new checks | |
| 257.9s | deleting the working copy |
Total 257.9s ·source content sent off this machine: none · calls to a language model: 0 · the clone was deleted when the survey ended
An automated reading of a repository's code and its history up to one commit, with public advisory records. It may be wrong, it is not legal, financial, investment or security advice, and it does not replace diligence by a qualified person. It is provided for information: nobody may rely on it (Borehole's terms, section 3).