Borehole · Risk register · free tier

mintplex-labs/anything-llm

Free reading: not for reliance

8239cd8 · 2,578 commits · 1,582 files
Issued 2026-10-23

Reads strong: 4 of 6 rated dimensions are strong, 2 are adequate and none is significant.

104 checks ran across 6 assessable dimensions. Observability & Operations and Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity are adequate. 13 findings, each with evidence. One dimension cannot be assessed without an acquirer.

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What the repository says about itself

states a policy on AI-generated contributions CONTRIBUTING.md:161
2 submodule(s) this survey does not read: browser-extension, embed .gitmodules:1

Published under today's rules. The verification code attests to this reading as it was stored. This page differs from it as follows.

2 findings from checks Borehole's calibration found wrong more often than right are no longer published.

	Dimension	Rating
01	Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance	strong
02	Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity	adequate
03	Organization & Key-Person Risk	strong
04	Product & Engineering Maturity	strong
05	Security & Reliability Posture	strong
06	Observability & Operations	adequate
07	Fit with the Acquirer	not assessable

strong adequate significant findings not assessable from a repository

Provenance disclosure does not affect any rating

1% of the code standing today was written in AI-declared commits

1% of lines still in the tree 2,729 of 337,031 1% of lines ever added these differ when early hand-written code has since been replaced

1% of lines added in the last 12 months (since 2025-10-23) arrived in AI-declared commits: 8/883 commits, confidence moderate. Also a floor.

8/2,423 commits declaring an agent · Claude Opus 4.6, Claude Opus 5.5, Claude Sonnet 4.6 and 2 more

confidence: moderate

31% of non-merge commits carry any trailer at all
low trailer coverage: the convention may not be in consistent use
no widespread author/committer date divergence
deep scan blamed 1,575 of 1,577 counted files

67,576 lines excluded as lockfiles, vendored or generated.

This is a lower bound. It counts what the repository declares. Undeclared AI authorship is invisible here, and a single rebase removes the trailers this rests on. Absence of a declaration is absence of disclosure, not absence of AI authorship.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · strong · ratings ↑

A note that does not affect this rating

01.6

frontend/src/locales/es/common.js is 2,123 lines, 17× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 118 lines. 40 files exceed 1,180 lines, the largest being 2,123. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

A note that does not affect this rating: measured against its own codebase's median, it is below the 85th percentile of 382 surveyed projects' largest files, where this check begins to count.

Evidence

line-count	`frontend/src/locales/es/common.js:1` — 2,123 lines (17× median)
line-count	`frontend/src/locales/it/common.js:1` — 2,123 lines (17× median)
line-count	`frontend/src/locales/de/common.js:1` — 2,115 lines (17× median)
line-count	`frontend/src/locales/ru/common.js:1` — 2,105 lines (17× median)
line-count	`frontend/src/locales/fr/common.js:1` — 2,104 lines (17× median)

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · adequate · ratings ↑

02.3

Tests cover a thin slice of the codebase

adequate

89 test files against 1,294 source files (6.9%). This does not measure whether the tests are good, only whether enough of them exist for the codebase to be changed safely by someone who did not write it — which is exactly the situation after an acquisition.

Evidence

test-file-ratio

89 test files / 1,294 source files

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · strong · ratings ↑

No finding. 10 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · strong · ratings ↑

A note that does not affect this rating

04.17

Node.js 18 is past end of life

adequate

The code is pinned to Node.js 18 (end of life 2025-04-30). None of these receives security fixes any more; the first stopped on 2025-04-30. Moving off an unsupported runtime is rarely a one-line change, so a buyer should ask whether the upgrade is planned and what it touches.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

.nvmrc .nvmrc — Node.js 18, end of life 2025-04-30

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · strong · ratings ↑

Notes that do not affect this rating

05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

7 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day; 4 steps pipe a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

.github/workflows/build-and-push-image-semver.yaml	`.github/workflows/build-and-push-image-semver.yaml:36` — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/build-and-push-image-semver.yaml	`.github/workflows/build-and-push-image-semver.yaml:67` — action pinned by tag
cloud-deployments/openshift/Dockerfile	`cloud-deployments/openshift/Dockerfile:45` — download piped into a shell

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.20

7 SQL statements built from strings

adequate

7 places in product code build SQL by formatting or joining strings rather than passing parameters. 1 of them put a value into the string; in the rest, what the code shows going in is a table or column name, a constant, or something the line does not show. Ask whether any value reaches these strings, rather than a parameter.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

server/utils/vectorDbProviders/pgvector/index.js	`server/utils/vectorDbProviders/pgvector/index.js:396` — SQL built from a string
server/utils/vectorDbProviders/pgvector/index.js	`server/utils/vectorDbProviders/pgvector/index.js:328` — SQL built from a string
server/utils/vectorDbProviders/pgvector/index.js	`server/utils/vectorDbProviders/pgvector/index.js:358` — SQL built from a string

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.21

2 shell commands built from strings

adequate

2 places run a command through a shell (`shell=True`, `os.system`, `exec` with a template) rather than passing arguments. Where any part comes from outside, it is command injection. Ask where each one's input comes from.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

collector/utils/WhisperProviders/ffmpeg/index.js	`collector/utils/WhisperProviders/ffmpeg/index.js:39` — command run through a shell
collector/utils/WhisperProviders/ffmpeg/index.js	`collector/utils/WhisperProviders/ffmpeg/index.js:65` — command run through a shell

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.26

84 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 90 high or critical

adequate

84 of 1,722 locked dependencies match 171 published advisories in OSV, 90 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

collector/yarn.lock	`collector/yarn.lock` — basic-ftp 5.0.5: GHSA-5rq4-664w-9x2c (critical), fixed in 5.2.0
server/yarn.lock	`server/yarn.lock` — @grpc/grpc-js 1.8.17: GHSA-5375-pq7m-f5r2 (high), fixed in 1.9.16
server/yarn.lock	`server/yarn.lock` — @modelcontextprotocol/sdk 1.24.3: GHSA-22jm-h49p-29qw (high), fixed in 1.32.0

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.48

13 places insert HTML from a variable without sanitising it

adequate

13 places set HTML from a value that is neither a literal nor passed through a sanitiser. Where the value can come from a user, that is stored cross-site scripting, and it is the first thing a buyer's security review looks for in a frontend.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

frontend/public/embed/anythingllm-chat-widget.min.js	`frontend/public/embed/anythingllm-chat-widget.min.js:37` — HTML from a variable
frontend/public/embed/anythingllm-chat-widget.min.js	`frontend/public/embed/anythingllm-chat-widget.min.js:37` — HTML from a variable
frontend/public/embed/anythingllm-chat-widget.min.js	`frontend/public/embed/anythingllm-chat-widget.min.js:37` — HTML from a variable

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.65

24 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 7 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-09-21. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 1 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 1.18.0. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version.

A note that does not affect this rating: it describes the project's advisory record, and no advisory in it is known to affect the surveyed commit.

Evidence

GHSA-3f4c-xj8r-h4cr	2026-09-21: GHSA-3f4c-xj8r-h4cr (moderate), fixed in 27cf88c6d1a52cff0f67a8a9ee8ba2548d1f117f: Path traversal via stored raw docpath allows a manager to write/read files outside storage/documents
GHSA-p9pc-ccw4-fxc5	2026-09-21: GHSA-p9pc-ccw4-fxc5 (low), fixed in d6e7a8be6fb617d95d99c30a2377b1c47c7a9386: Automatic memory extraction can overwrite another user's workspace memory through an unscoped update ID
GHSA-8wh8-3v68-whwj	2026-09-14: GHSA-8wh8-3v68-whwj (moderate), fixed in 08ff2c733661dcceef54e11b852a4f0224c29187: Anonymous embed-widget visitors receive the instance owner's private Memories in the system prompt
GHSA-rh3m-xv7m-9jhf	2026-09-01: GHSA-rh3m-xv7m-9jhf (moderate), fixed in 6dff9d71ab585e87a3145a48abc63c2b60151149: Stored XSS Due to Unescaped Server-Side HTML Concatenation in MetaGenerator
GHSA-vv8w-wg6r-hq56	2026-07-15: GHSA-vv8w-wg6r-hq56 (moderate), fixed in 61766d06b77b903f66dc4afd8dffb3a39012db14: Password recovery accepts one recovery code twice after whitespace normalization

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Observability & Operations

06 · adequate · ratings ↑

06.1

No telemetry or error reporting is wired in anywhere

adequate

None of 1,412 readable files references an instrumentation, metrics or error-reporting library. If this system is in production, nobody learns that it broke from the system itself — they learn it from a customer. That is a reliability finding before it is an observability one.

Evidence

telemetry-scan

searched 1,412 tracked text files for 16 known instrumentation libraries; manifests for metrics, tracing and error-reporting families; locked dependencies for the packages that emit; 0 matched

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

06.14

Readiness and liveness probes are identical in 2 of 2 workloads

adequate

Both probes call the same endpoint. When a dependency slows down, the liveness probe fails with the readiness probe, so the platform restarts pods that only needed taking out of rotation, and a partial outage becomes a full one. Liveness should ask whether the process is alive; readiness whether it can serve.

Evidence

cloud-deployments/helm/charts/anythingllm/values.yaml	`cloud-deployments/helm/charts/anythingllm/values.yaml` — same probe endpoint twice
cloud-deployments/k8/manifest.yaml	`cloud-deployments/k8/manifest.yaml` — same probe endpoint twice

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Notes that do not affect this rating

06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

error reporting

no error reporter initialised

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

06.33

1 of 2 deployments run a single replica

adequate

1 deployments set `replicas: 1`, and nothing (an autoscaler, a disruption budget) adds more. Every deploy and every node drain is downtime, and the availability the buyer inherits has a ceiling.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

cloud-deployments/k8/manifest.yaml cloud-deployments/k8/manifest.yaml — replicas: 1

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · not assessable · ratings ↑

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository. What a person adds here.

Check it on the running system

9 checks against the running system follow from the findings above: what a buyer's engineer will try, how to run it first, and what to have ready. A paid survey of this repository includes them. See the tiers.

A paid survey of a public repository is also reviewed: a language model reads each finding against the code and withdraws only findings it judges the code contradicts, each listed with its reason. The review is a language model's reading of the findings against the code, and it can be wrong. It never adds a finding, never raises a band, and never removes a finding from a proven check or an advisory that affects the surveyed version.

What a person adds

The survey reads what the repository can show. The code cannot settle these questions, and on them this report states nothing. Each says where its answer lives: your own engineer, the company, or an assessor you choose can settle it. Questions marked measured open with something this repository shows.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · full coverage

measured No architecture or design document is in the tree, across 1,463 product files. Where does the design live, and who holds it? Answer lives in: The team01.38
measured The repository pulls code in through git submodules (.gitmodules). A buyer receives pointers, not that code. Can every submodule be fetched without the team's credentials, and who owns each one? Answer lives in: The team and the submodule owners01.35
Is the architecture right for the next three years of the product? Answer lives in: Your architects, with the product roadmap01.39
Were the home-grown components reasonable choices when they were made, and are they now? Answer lives in: The team's reasoning at the time01.40

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · high coverage

Is review real or a rubber stamp? Comment depth and time to approve need the pull request history. Answer lives in: The code host's pull request data02.32
Is delivery planned and measured, or heroic? Answer lives in: The issue tracker: backlog, sprint history, estimate accuracy02.38
How are incidents run, reviewed and learned from? Answer lives in: Tickets, chat and postmortems02.37

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · partial coverage

measured One contributor authored more than half of the commits in this history. Is that person part of the transaction, and for how long after it? Answer lives in: The deal terms03.29
Who mentors whom, and would that survive a departure? Answer lives in: The team; review history only suggests candidates03.28
Can the team grow, and who stands behind the top three contributors? Answer lives in: Recruiting data and the org chart03.30
Is the seniority mix sound, and will pay survive your salary bands? Answer lives in: HR data03.31
Is the pace sustainable? Commit times cannot say: git keeps no reliable local time. Answer lives in: Interviews and on-call history03.14
Does the team want to stay after close? Answer lives in: Interviews03.32
How are decisions made and disagreements resolved? Answer lives in: Time with the team03.33

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · minimal coverage

measured 883 commits landed in the last year, against 549 the year before (+61%). What drove it: new people, a deadline, or code produced faster than before? Answer lives in: The team04.11
Can this team deliver the stated roadmap on the stated timeline? Answer lives in: The data room and the team's record of estimates04.32
Does leadership know about the debt, and is time budgeted to repay it? Answer lives in: Budget and roadmap decisions04.31
Is the engineering shape consistent with the commercial story? Answer lives in: Revenue, customer and churn data04.33

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · partial coverage

measured No threat model is in the tree of what looks like a running service. Does one exist elsewhere, and who owns it? Answer lives in: The security owner05.43
measured Infrastructure code (cloud-deployments/aws/cloudformation/DEPLOY.md and 5 more) last changed 12 months before the newest commit, while 907 commits landed. Is the infrastructure now changed by hand? Compare the live account with the code. Answer lives in: The cloud console05.36
What has actually broken, how often, and how badly? Answer lives in: Ticketing and chat05.41
What did external testing find, and was it fixed? Answer lives in: Reports in the data room05.42
What is the SOC 2, ISO 27001 or GDPR status, and where is the evidence? Answer lives in: Audit reports; policy files in the tree are not evidence05.44

Observability & Operations

06 · partial coverage

measured Nothing in the tree backs up or restores data. How is data backed up, and has a restore ever been rehearsed? Answer lives in: The operations team06.19
measured No alert rule is defined in the repository. Where are alerts defined, who receives them, and when did one last fire? Answer lives in: The alerting tool and the on-call rota06.10
Are the dashboards opened, the alerts acknowledged and the pages answered? Answer lives in: Pager history and dashboard logs06.29
Are the service-level objectives actually met? Answer lives in: Production metrics06.30
Who carries the pager, and how often does it go off? Answer lives in: Pager exports and interviews06.31
What does it cost to run, and how much headroom is there? Answer lives in: Cloud billing and capacity plans06.32

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · none coverage

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

This is primarily a JavaScript codebase. Does your engineering organisation already run JavaScript in production, or would this be the first? 07.1
The bulk of this system sits in frontend/, server/, collector/. Which of your existing systems would each of those have to absorb or replace? 07.10
The repository carries deployment configuration (cloud-deployments/digitalocean/terraform/DEPLOY.md and 22 more). Does that match your deployment and on-call model, or does it need rehosting first? 07.2
What is your tolerance for the findings above remaining unaddressed for the first two quarters after close, given everything else that will compete for this team's time?
Which of these systems duplicate yours, and which get retired? Answer lives in: Your architecture07.11
What will integration cost, and in what order? Answer lives in: The engagement07.12
Where does the team land in your organisation, and who reports to whom? Answer lives in: Your org design07.13
Are there earn-outs, retention packages or contractor IP to assign? Answer lives in: Deal terms07.14
Do customer contracts limit hosting, regions or vendors? Answer lives in: Customer contracts07.15

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Rejection log — 91 signals that ran and did not fire

Appendix: rejection log — 91 signals that ran and did not fire

Published on purpose. A signal that looked and decided not to fire has told you something, and this is the calibration data behind every threshold above.

Looked, and found nothing — 78

Signal	What it found
04.hotspot_concentration	change is spread across the codebase rather than pooling in a few filesfiles 6,182 · top5 share 0.037
04.debt_markers	debt markers are sparsemarkers 29 · per kloc 0.1 · lines read 303,124
04.dependency_sprawl	direct dependency counts are unremarkable
04.test_growth	test effort kept pace with code writtenlate test per code 0.087 · early test per code 0.0
04.churn_trend	rework is not rising against new worklate delete per insert 0.356 · early delete per insert 0.357
04.fixes_with_tests	fixes usually come with a testfixes 414 · share 0.208 · with tests 86
04.fix_share_trend	fixing is not crowding out building
04.compat_layers	little code is kept for the old wayshare 0.002 · code files 1,206 · compat files 2
04.dependency_redundancy	one library per job, mostly
06.structured_logging	a structured logging library is referencedmatches 4
06.healthcheck_presence	a health or readiness check is defined
06.correlation_ids	a request can be followed through the logstracing False · request id sites 9
06.usage_reporting_default	the product's code names no reporting hostsettings on 4 · settings off 5
06.environment_branching	environment differences live in configurationsites 0
06.release_markers	releases are markedtags last year 17 · release commits 15 · changelog commits 0
06.migrate_on_start	migrations run at start, but as a single instance, where that is safesites 2 · scaled False
03.contributor_concentration	no single contributor dominates the last 24 monthsyears 3.4 · window last 24 months · authors 280
03.active_contributors	more than one contributor active in the trailing yearall time 280 · active 12mo 123
03.knowledge_silos	every substantial directory has been touched by more than one personauthors 280 · directories 3
03.drive_by_contributors	an open contributor base, where one-commit contributors are normalauthors 280 · one off share 0.757
03.contributor_attrition	the dominant contributor is still activeauthors 280 · top share more than half · top contributor last committed within the last three months
03.critical_path_ownership	more than one person changes the critical pathsauthors 208
03.second_contributor_attrition	the second and third contributors are still active
03.bus_factor_trend	the team has not narrowed to one person
03.joiners_and_leavers	the team is not shrinkingleft 3 · joined 16 · regular last year 21
02.merge_discipline	a meaningful share of recent change carries evidence of reviewmerges 120 · window last 24 months · with tracked 104
02.ci_presence	CI configuration is present in the working treecount 9
02.release_cadence	tags are presenttags 38
02.conventional_commits	commit subjects generally carry contentsampled 2,423 · low content share 0.025
02.branch_protection_hints	process scaffolding is present in the repository
02.ci_runs_tests	CI invokes a test runnerconfigs 9 · with tests 1
02.skipped_tests	few tests are switched offfocused 0 · skipped 0 · test files 91
02.ci_test_gating	no test run in CI is written so that it cannot failconfigs 9
02.revert_share	change is rarely undoneshare 0.003 · reverts 4 · recent commits 1,432
02.dependency_update_cadence	dependencies move with the codelockfiles 3 · commits since 41 · days since lockfile changed 8
02.flaky_test_markers	tests are not retried until they passtest retries 0 · suite retries 0
02.lint_in_build	a linter or formatter runs in the buildwired 4 · ci configs 9 · product files 1,206
02.long_lived_branches	the typical branch reaches the trunk quicklyshare 0.0 · merges 25 · long lived 0
02.commit_size	changes arrive in reviewable sizesshare 0.029 · commits 1,336 · over 2000 lines 39
01.burst_import	no commit run met both the rate and the net-addition thresholdgap seconds 180 · min add ratio 3.0 · min net added 2,000
01.initial_dump	first commit is not a disproportionate share of the codebaseinsertions 5,394 · share of insertions 0.01
01.message_uniformity	commit subjects vary in wording and lengthlength stdev 22.18 · repeat share 0.035
01.revision_depth	most files were revisited after they were first writtenfiles seen 1,444 · write once share 0.35
01.duplicated_blocks	little shipping code is repeated verbatim across filesshare 0.0256 · product files 1,205 · distinct blocks 193,095
01.swallowed_errors	errors are rarely thrown awayloc 304,481 · files 35 · per kloc 0.22
01.build_reproducibility	every base image names a versionfloating 0 · from lines 15
01.unfinished_migration	no language migration is stalled halfway
01.weights_in_git	no model weights are committedfiles 0
05.committed_secrets	no credential-shaped strings outside test and fixture pathsnote the working tree only; the history is 05.5 · patterns 8 · files read 1,412
05.security_guardrails	at least one standard guard rail is configured
05.dependency_pinning	a lockfile is committed, so builds are reproduciblelockfile True
05.license_present	a licence file is presentfound True
05.secrets_in_history	no credential-shaped string was ever added outside test and fixture pathspatterns 8 · truncated False · added lines 509,750
05.container_runs_as_root	every shipped Dockerfile drops to a non-root user or builds on a non-root base imagedockerfiles 3
05.secrets_management_pattern	no environment file is committed outside tests and examplesenv files 0
05.unsafe_deserialization	no code-executing deserialiser in product codesites 0
05.resource_limits	every workload declares limitsworkloads 2 · without limits 0
05.privileged_workloads	no workload runs privileged or in the host's namespacessites 0 · behind a setting or built here 0
05.credentials_in_deploy_config	deployment configuration references secrets, never holds themfiles 0 · sites 0
05.public_env_secret	only publishable values carry a public prefixnames 0 · sites 0 · not secrets 0
05.source_maps_shipped	production builds do not publish source mapssites 0
05.signing_material	no signing keystore or profile is committedfiles 0
05.license_manifest_conflict	manifest and licence file agree on MITlicense MIT
05.license_vendored_unlicensed	no vendored third-party code is committedcomponents 0
05.license_grant_unclear	the licence is recognisable as MITclass permissive · license MIT
05.committed_native_libraries	no widely used compiled library is committed to the productlibraries 0
04.api_versions_coexisting	one API version is served, or none
04.deprecations_lingering	few deprecations have outlived two yearsolder than two years 0 · files with deprecations 3
04.dependency_churn	few dependencies were added and dropped within 60 daysdependencies seen 374 · added in two years 59 · removed within 60 days 7
04.ci_platforms_dropped	no platform was dropped from CI in the last two years
04.repository_status	the README's first screen states no end, move or freezestatements 0
02.development_elsewhere	nothing says development happens elsewhereno pr statements 0 · mirror statements 0 · replayed commit share 0.0
05.licence_changes	the root licence has not changed in the history readlicence versions 1 · unreleased changes 0
05.paid_edition	no directory carries a separate paid-edition licencedirectories 0
04.releases_stopped	releases keep pace with developmentmedian gap days 13.0 · days since last tag 10 · commits last 90 days 346
04.release_branch	the newest release was cut from the branch surveyedelsewhere 0 · on branch 38 · tags in window 38
03.single_maintainer	no file says one person maintains itstatements 0
05.project_exploited	no affecting advisory is on CISA's Known Exploited listexploited 0

Could not conclude, or did not apply — 13

Not a clean result. Each says why it could not answer here.

Signal	Why
04.schema_churn	columns, once added, stay
06.print_logging	a frontend: console output is the browser's, not the server's
06.alert_rules	no alert rules in the repository; they may live in a console
06.deployed_image_floats	no deployment descriptor names an image
06.feature_flags	no feature-flag service; flags may live elsewhere
01.notebook_outputs	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.outbound_timeouts	not assessed for JavaScript, the language the product is written in: this check's patterns read other languages only
05.migration_reversibility	too few migrations to judge
05.cleartext_traffic	not a mobile app
05.dataset_provenance	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.license_copyleft_inherited	no third-party code is committed to this repository, so the licences it depends on are resolved at build time and are not readable here
04.flags_accumulating	few or no feature flags in the history
05.project_advisories	could not tell whether 1 published advisory affects the surveyed code: its version could not be placed

Anyone can check this report against the authoritative record — click the stamp, or enter K8VS-CG1M-G1DW at borehole.dev/verify.

The code commits to the 106 checks this run performed, the bands they produced, and the commit they were read at. It does not cover checks written since.

Put the mark in your README

The image is wrapped in a link to the verification page, so a reader can check it rather than take it on trust. If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.

[![Borehole reading, not a certification](https://borehole.dev/badge/mintplex-labs/anything-llm/8239cd8.svg "Borehole free reading: not for reliance. See the full report.")](https://borehole.dev/verify/K8VSCG1MG1DW?via=badge)

Where this scan ran

This scan ran on ordinary cloud infrastructure (cloud-run), not in a hardware-isolated confidential VM. Nothing about it is attested by Google.

What an attested survey proves, and what it does not.

What this scan did with the repository — 7 steps

Written by the steps themselves as they ran, not described afterwards. A hand-written account of a data flow drifts the first time somebody changes the flow and not the account.

At	Step	Detail
0.0s	read repository metadata from the GitHub API	size mb: 93.3authenticated: False
8.5s	cloned the repository to a temporary directory	depth: full
12.9s	read the git history	commits: 2578tracked files: 1582
176.9s	ran the deterministic checks	blame pass: Trueread working tree: False
176.9s	recorded where this scan ran	attested: Falseenvironment: cloud-run
238.2s	kept the facts, never the source, for re-reading under new checks
238.2s	deleting the working copy

Total 238.2s ·source content sent off this machine: none · calls to a language model: 0 · the clone was deleted when the survey ended

An automated reading of a repository's code and its history up to one commit, with public advisory records. It may be wrong, it is not legal, financial, investment or security advice, and it does not replace diligence by a qualified person. It is provided for information: nobody may rely on it (Borehole's terms, section 3).

BOREHOLE 0.7.15 DETERMINISTIC LAYER · NO MODEL CALLSREAD ON BOREHOLE'S SERVER · CLONE DELETED TAKEDOWNCONTRIBUTED TO THIS REPOSITORY? YOUR RIGHTS