Borehole · Risk register · free tier

mediacms-io/mediacms

Free reading: not for reliance

9bf46be · 396 commits · 1,882 files
Issued 2026-11-03

Nothing significant. Questions worth asking about Security & Reliability Posture, Observability & Operations.

104 checks ran across 6 assessable dimensions. None found a significant problem; 5 raised something worth a question. 19 findings, each with evidence. One dimension cannot be assessed without an acquirer. Last commit 26 October 2026.

Published under today's rules. The verification code attests to this reading as it was stored. This page differs from it as follows.

2 findings from checks Borehole's calibration found wrong more often than right are no longer published.
The file and line of 3 credential-shaped matches are withheld. File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report.

	Dimension	Rating
01	Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance	strong
02	Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity	adequate
03	Organization & Key-Person Risk	adequate
04	Product & Engineering Maturity	adequate
05	Security & Reliability Posture	adequate
06	Observability & Operations	adequate
07	Fit with the Acquirer	not assessable

strong adequate significant findings not assessable from a repository

Provenance disclosure does not affect any rating

0% of the code standing today was written in AI-declared commits

0% of lines still in the tree 0 of 479,249 0% of lines ever added these differ when early hand-written code has since been replaced

0% of lines added in the last 12 months (since 2025-11-03) arrived in AI-declared commits: 0/101 commits, confidence moderate. Also a floor.

0/388 commits declaring an agent

confidence: moderate

4% of non-merge commits carry any trailer at all
low trailer coverage: the convention may not be in consistent use
no widespread author/committer date divergence
deep scan blamed 1,619 of 1,619 counted files

202,247 lines excluded as lockfiles, vendored or generated.

This is a lower bound. It counts what the repository declares. Undeclared AI authorship is invisible here, and a single rebase removes the trailers this rests on. Absence of a declaration is absence of disclosure, not absence of AI authorship.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · strong · ratings ↑

Notes that do not affect this rating

01.6

frontend/src/static/lib/file-uploader/5.13.0/fine-uploader.js is 7,414 lines, 121× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 61 lines. 15 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 7,414. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

A note that does not affect this rating: measured against its own codebase's median, it is below the 85th percentile of 382 surveyed projects' largest files, where this check begins to count.

Evidence

line-count	`frontend/src/static/lib/file-uploader/5.13.0/fine-uploader.js:1` — 7,414 lines (121× median)
line-count	`frontend-tools/video-editor/client/src/components/TimelineControls.tsx:1` — 5,008 lines (82× median)
line-count	`frontend-tools/chapters-editor/client/src/components/TimelineControls.tsx:1` — 4,110 lines (67× median)
line-count	`static/tinymce/tinymce.d.ts:1` — 3,239 lines (53× median)
line-count	`frontend-tools/video-js/src/components/video-player/VideoJSPlayer.jsx:1` — 2,469 lines (40× median)

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.

01.7

6% of code blocks appear verbatim in more than one file

adequate

4,365 distinct 8-line blocks appear in two or more files. Copy-paste is the cheapest thing a generator does and among the more expensive things to inherit: a fix has to be applied everywhere the block landed, and nothing in the repository records where that is. Tests, fixtures and documentation examples are excluded — those repeat by design — so this is duplication in code that ships. Blocks are matched after normalising whitespace and only across different files.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

duplicated-block	identical 8-line block in 6 files: frontend-tools/chapters-editor/client/src/components/EditingTools.tsx, frontend-tools/chapters-editor/client/src/components/TimelineControls.tsx, frontend-tools/chapters-editor/client/src/components/VideoPlayer.tsx
duplicated-block	identical 8-line block in 6 files: frontend-tools/chapters-editor/client/src/components/EditingTools.tsx, frontend-tools/chapters-editor/client/src/components/TimelineControls.tsx, frontend-tools/chapters-editor/client/src/components/VideoPlayer.tsx
duplicated-block	identical 8-line block in 6 files: frontend/src/static/js/components/item-list/InlineSliderItemList.jsx, frontend/src/static/js/components/item-list/InlineSliderItemListAsync.jsx, frontend/src/static/js/components/item-list/ItemList.jsx
duplicated-block	identical 8-line block in 6 files: frontend/src/static/js/components/management-table/ManageMediaFilters.jsx, frontend/src/static/js/components/management-table/ManageUsersFilters.jsx, frontend/src/static/js/components/search-filters/ProfileMediaFilters.jsx
duplicated-block	identical 8-line block in 6 files: frontend/src/static/js/components/management-table/ManageMediaFilters.jsx, frontend/src/static/js/components/management-table/ManageUsersFilters.jsx, frontend/src/static/js/components/search-filters/ProfileMediaFilters.jsx

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

01.15

122 errors caught and discarded in product code

adequate

122 places catch an error and do nothing with it, across 25 files (0.7 per thousand lines). Each is a failure the system will not report. They surface later as problems nobody can explain, and they are cheap to fix now.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

cms/settings.py	`cms/settings.py:386` — error caught and discarded
cms/settings.py	`cms/settings.py:641` — error caught and discarded
cms/settings.py	`cms/settings.py:669` — error caught and discarded

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · adequate · ratings ↑

02.24

10% of recent commits change more than 2,000 lines

adequate

13 of 124 commits in the last 24 months changed over 2,000 lines of code, not counting reformatting, renames, vendored or generated code. A change that size is rarely reviewed line by line. Ask how they were reviewed, and what made them that large.

Evidence

git log --numstat

13 commits over 2,000 lines

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · adequate · ratings ↑

03.1

Bus factor 1: recent work is concentrated in one contributor

adequate

In the last 24 months, one contributor authored three-quarters or more of 146 non-merge commits among 21 authors; across all history, more than half of 350. In a project with 21 recent contributors and 6 years of history, that is a question about one person's role rather than a fragile team — but it is the question to ask.

Evidence

git shortlog -sn

last 24 months: top author three-quarters or more of 146 commits; bus factor 1; 21 authors

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · adequate · ratings ↑

04.19

13% of bug fixes add or change a test

adequate

Of 62 fixes in the last 24 months, 8 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.

Evidence

fix commits touching tests

8 of 62

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · adequate · ratings ↑

05.6

1 Dockerfile runs the application as root

adequate

No USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.

Evidence

no-USER-instruction Dockerfile — runs as root

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Notes that do not affect this rating

05.5

3 credential-shaped strings exist in the history

adequate

Matches for private key block were committed at some point across 385 commits examined. Some of the files that held them are still in the working tree. What matters is whether each was rotated after it was committed. The code cannot tell whether any of them is live, and that decides whether this matters: none sits in production configuration, and none is in a format its provider keeps for live keys. Is any of these live? Show that each was rotated after it was committed, and when.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

history	3 cited: private key block pattern added here
	File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report.

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.25

1 environment file is committed

adequate

frontend/.env is tracked in git. Environment files are where credentials usually live, and committing one usually means nobody decided how secrets reach the running application. Whatever is in it is in the history for good. Check 05.1 says whether it holds anything credential-shaped.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

frontend/.env frontend/.env — committed environment file

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

6 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

.github/workflows/docker-build-push.yml	`.github/workflows/docker-build-push.yml:19` — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/docker-build-push.yml	`.github/workflows/docker-build-push.yml:26` — action pinned by tag

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.13

7 outbound calls can wait forever

adequate

7 HTTP calls use a client with no timeout (Python `requests` without `timeout=`, or Go's default client). When a dependency slows down, each one holds a worker until the connection gives up, and enough of them take the service down with the dependency.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

cli-tool/cli.py	`cli-tool/cli.py:53` — outbound call without a timeout
cli-tool/cli.py	`cli-tool/cli.py:78` — outbound call without a timeout
cli-tool/cli.py	`cli-tool/cli.py:87` — outbound call without a timeout

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.26

12 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 6 high or critical

adequate

12 of 618 locked dependencies match 34 published advisories in OSV, 6 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

frontend-tools/chapters-editor/yarn.lock	`frontend-tools/chapters-editor/yarn.lock` — body-parser 1.20.8: GHSA-27r3-jxmh-p828 (high), fixed in 1.20.9
frontend-tools/video-js/yarn.lock	`frontend-tools/video-js/yarn.lock` — vite 4.5.14: GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm (high), fixed in 8.3.3
frontend-tools/chapters-editor/yarn.lock	`frontend-tools/chapters-editor/yarn.lock` — vite 5.4.19: GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm (high), fixed in 8.3.3

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.48

102 places insert HTML from a variable without sanitising it

adequate

102 places set HTML from a value that is neither a literal nor passed through a sanitiser. Where the value can come from a user, that is stored cross-site scripting, and it is the first thing a buyer's security review looks for in a frontend.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

frontend-tools/video-js/src/components/controls/CustomSettingsMenu.js	`frontend-tools/video-js/src/components/controls/CustomSettingsMenu.js:320` — HTML from a variable
frontend-tools/video-js/src/components/controls/CustomSettingsMenu.js	`frontend-tools/video-js/src/components/controls/CustomSettingsMenu.js:321` — HTML from a variable
frontend-tools/video-js/src/components/controls/CustomSettingsMenu.js	`frontend-tools/video-js/src/components/controls/CustomSettingsMenu.js:322` — HTML from a variable

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.9

1 vendored component with no licence

adequate

Third-party code is committed into this repository without any statement of the terms it arrived under. Unknown terms are harder to deal with than inconvenient ones: an awkward licence can be complied with, an absent one cannot. Each of these needs its origin established before the code changes hands.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

static/vendor/select2 static/vendor/select2 — 2 tracked files, no licence file

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.65

2 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 2 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-07-21. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 1 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 9.4.0. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version.

A note that does not affect this rating: it describes the project's advisory record, and no advisory in it is known to affect the surveyed commit.

Evidence

CVE-2026-65054	2026-07-21: CVE-2026-65054 (high): MediaCMS 8.2.0 contains an information disclosure vulnerability that allows authenticated users to expose private media metadata belonging to other users by add
GHSA-x3p4-4442-q2c3	2024-11-08: GHSA-x3p4-4442-q2c3 (high), fixed in 4.1.0: Remote code execution vulnerabilities in MediaCMS

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Observability & Operations

06 · adequate · ratings ↑

06.1

No telemetry or error reporting is wired in anywhere

adequate

None of 1,305 readable files references an instrumentation, metrics or error-reporting library. If this system is in production, nobody learns that it broke from the system itself — they learn it from a customer. That is a reliability finding before it is an observability one.

Evidence

telemetry-scan

searched 1,305 tracked text files for 16 known instrumentation libraries; manifests for metrics, tracing and error-reporting families; locked dependencies for the packages that emit; 0 matched

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

06.2

No structured logging library is in use

adequate

Nothing references a structured logging library. Logs that are written to be read by a person are not searchable by a machine, which means incident response here is proportional to how well someone remembers the codebase rather than to what the tooling can find.

Evidence

logging-scan

searched 1,305 files for 10 structured logging libraries; 0 matched

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Notes that do not affect this rating

06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

error reporting

no error reporter initialised

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

06.18

5 of 9 deployed images carry no version, or `latest`

adequate

5 images in the deployment configuration are named without a version or as `latest`. A redeploy can change the software without a commit, a rollback has nothing to roll back to, and nobody can say from the repository what is running.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

docker-compose-dev.yaml	`docker-compose-dev.yaml:76` — image without a version
docker-compose/docker-compose-named-volumes.yaml	`docker-compose/docker-compose-named-volumes.yaml:54` — image without a version
docker-compose/docker-compose-https-proxy.yaml	`docker-compose/docker-compose-https-proxy.yaml:5` — image without a version

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · not assessable · ratings ↑

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository. What a person adds here.

Check it on the running system

13 checks against the running system follow from the findings above: what a buyer's engineer will try, how to run it first, and what to have ready. A paid survey of this repository includes them. See the tiers.

A paid survey of a public repository is also reviewed: a language model reads each finding against the code and withdraws only findings it judges the code contradicts, each listed with its reason. The review is a language model's reading of the findings against the code, and it can be wrong. It never adds a finding, never raises a band, and never removes a finding from a proven check or an advisory that affects the surveyed version.

What a person adds

The survey reads what the repository can show. The code cannot settle these questions, and on them this report states nothing. Each says where its answer lives: your own engineer, the company, or an assessor you choose can settle it. Questions marked measured open with something this repository shows.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · full coverage

measured No architecture or design document is in the tree, across 1,443 product files. Where does the design live, and who holds it? Answer lives in: The team01.38
Is the architecture right for the next three years of the product? Answer lives in: Your architects, with the product roadmap01.39
Were the home-grown components reasonable choices when they were made, and are they now? Answer lives in: The team's reasoning at the time01.40

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · high coverage

Is review real or a rubber stamp? Comment depth and time to approve need the pull request history. Answer lives in: The code host's pull request data02.32
Is delivery planned and measured, or heroic? Answer lives in: The issue tracker: backlog, sprint history, estimate accuracy02.38
How are incidents run, reviewed and learned from? Answer lives in: Tickets, chat and postmortems02.37

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · partial coverage

measured One contributor authored more than half of the commits in this history. Is that person part of the transaction, and for how long after it? Answer lives in: The deal terms03.29
Who mentors whom, and would that survive a departure? Answer lives in: The team; review history only suggests candidates03.28
Can the team grow, and who stands behind the top three contributors? Answer lives in: Recruiting data and the org chart03.30
Is the seniority mix sound, and will pay survive your salary bands? Answer lives in: HR data03.31
Is the pace sustainable? Commit times cannot say: git keeps no reliable local time. Answer lives in: Interviews and on-call history03.14
Does the team want to stay after close? Answer lives in: Interviews03.32
How are decisions made and disagreements resolved? Answer lives in: Time with the team03.33

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · minimal coverage

Can this team deliver the stated roadmap on the stated timeline? Answer lives in: The data room and the team's record of estimates04.32
Does leadership know about the debt, and is time budgeted to repay it? Answer lives in: Budget and roadmap decisions04.31
Is the engineering shape consistent with the commercial story? Answer lives in: Revenue, customer and churn data04.33

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · partial coverage

measured 05.5 found credential-shaped strings in this repository. Was each one revoked at the provider? Deleting it from the code revokes nothing; only the provider's audit log shows that it was. Answer lives in: The provider's console and audit log05.38
measured No threat model is in the tree of what looks like a running service. Does one exist elsewhere, and who owns it? Answer lives in: The security owner05.43
What has actually broken, how often, and how badly? Answer lives in: Ticketing and chat05.41
What did external testing find, and was it fixed? Answer lives in: Reports in the data room05.42
What is the SOC 2, ISO 27001 or GDPR status, and where is the evidence? Answer lives in: Audit reports; policy files in the tree are not evidence05.44

Observability & Operations

06 · partial coverage

measured Nothing in the tree backs up or restores data. How is data backed up, and has a restore ever been rehearsed? Answer lives in: The operations team06.19
measured No alert rule is defined in the repository. Where are alerts defined, who receives them, and when did one last fire? Answer lives in: The alerting tool and the on-call rota06.10
Are the dashboards opened, the alerts acknowledged and the pages answered? Answer lives in: Pager history and dashboard logs06.29
Are the service-level objectives actually met? Answer lives in: Production metrics06.30
Who carries the pager, and how often does it go off? Answer lives in: Pager exports and interviews06.31
What does it cost to run, and how much headroom is there? Answer lives in: Cloud billing and capacity plans06.32

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · none coverage

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

This is primarily a JavaScript codebase, with Python alongside (25% of source files). Does your engineering organisation already run JavaScript in production, or would this be the first? 07.1
The bulk of this system sits in frontend/, static/, frontend-tools/. Which of your existing systems would each of those have to absorb or replace? 07.10
The repository carries deployment configuration (Dockerfile and 8 more). Does that match your deployment and on-call model, or does it need rehosting first? 07.2
What is your tolerance for the findings above remaining unaddressed for the first two quarters after close, given everything else that will compete for this team's time?
Which of these systems duplicate yours, and which get retired? Answer lives in: Your architecture07.11
What will integration cost, and in what order? Answer lives in: The engagement07.12
Where does the team land in your organisation, and who reports to whom? Answer lives in: Your org design07.13
Are there earn-outs, retention packages or contractor IP to assign? Answer lives in: Deal terms07.14
Do customer contracts limit hosting, regions or vendors? Answer lives in: Customer contracts07.15

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Rejection log — 85 signals that ran and did not fire

Appendix: rejection log — 85 signals that ran and did not fire

Published on purpose. A signal that looked and decided not to fire has told you something, and this is the calibration data behind every threshold above.

Looked, and found nothing — 66

Signal	What it found
04.hotspot_concentration	change is spread across the codebase rather than pooling in a few filesfiles 2,303 · top5 share 0.048
04.debt_markers	debt markers are sparsemarkers 70 · per kloc 0.41 · lines read 170,918
04.dependency_sprawl	direct dependency counts are unremarkable
04.test_growth	test effort kept pace with code writtenlate test per code 0.406 · early test per code 0.002
04.churn_trend	rework is not rising against new worklate delete per insert 0.28 · early delete per insert 0.116
04.eol_runtime	every pinned runtime is still supportedeol as of 2026-09-24
04.compat_layers	little code is kept for the old wayshare 0.0 · code files 834 · compat files 0
04.dependency_redundancy	one library per job, mostly
06.healthcheck_presence	a health or readiness check is defined
06.correlation_ids	a request can be followed through the logstracing False · request id sites 5
06.usage_reporting_default	the product's code names no reporting hostsettings on 0 · settings off 0
06.environment_branching	environment differences live in configurationsites 0
06.migrate_on_start	migrations do not run at container start
03.active_contributors	more than one contributor active in the trailing yearall time 46 · active 12mo 9
03.drive_by_contributors	a healthy share of contributors committed more than onceshare 0.609 · authors 46 · one commit authors 28
03.contributor_attrition	the dominant contributor is still activeauthors 46 · top share more than half · top contributor last committed within the last three months
03.critical_path_ownership	more than one person changes the critical pathsauthors 21
03.second_contributor_attrition	the second and third contributors are still active
02.merge_discipline	a meaningful share of recent change carries evidence of reviewmerges 0 · window last 24 months · with tracked 2
02.ci_presence	CI configuration is present in the working treecount 7
02.test_presence	tests are present in a normal proportion to sourcetests 253 · source 1,027 · test ratio 0.246
02.release_cadence	tags are presenttags 87
02.conventional_commits	commit subjects generally carry contentsampled 388 · low content share 0.044
02.branch_protection_hints	process scaffolding is present in the repository
02.ci_runs_tests	CI invokes a test runnerconfigs 7 · with tests 2
02.skipped_tests	few tests are switched offfocused 0 · skipped 0 · test files 259
02.ci_test_gating	no test run in CI is written so that it cannot failconfigs 7
02.revert_share	change is rarely undoneshare 0.0 · reverts 0 · recent commits 146
02.dependency_update_cadence	dependencies move with the codelockfiles 6 · commits since 5 · days since lockfile changed 5
02.flaky_test_markers	tests are not retried until they passtest retries 0 · suite retries 0
02.lint_in_build	a linter or formatter runs in the buildwired 8 · ci configs 7 · product files 834
01.burst_import	no commit run met both the rate and the net-addition thresholdgap seconds 180 · min add ratio 3.0 · min net added 2,000
01.initial_dump	first commit is not a disproportionate share of the codebaseinsertions 10,558 · share of insertions 0.0142
01.message_uniformity	commit subjects vary in wording and lengthlength stdev 19.17 · repeat share 0.072
01.build_reproducibility	every base image names a versionfloating 0 · from lines 3
01.unfinished_migration	no language migration is stalled halfway
01.weights_in_git	no model weights are committedfiles 0
05.committed_secrets	no credential-shaped strings outside test and fixture pathsnote the working tree only; the history is 05.5 · patterns 8 · files read 1,305
05.security_guardrails	at least one standard guard rail is configured
05.dependency_pinning	a lockfile is committed, so builds are reproduciblelockfile True
05.license_present	a licence file is presentfound True
05.migration_reversibility	migrations can be rolled backshare 0.0 · migrations 36 · irreversible 0
05.sql_from_strings	no SQL is assembled from strings in product codefiles 0 · sites 0 · value interpolated 0
05.shell_from_strings	product code does not build shell commands from stringssites 0
05.unsafe_deserialization	no code-executing deserialiser in product codesites 0
05.tls_verification_off	no TLS verification is switched off in product codefiles 0 · sites 0 · pinned instead 0
05.privileged_workloads	no workload runs privileged or in the host's namespacessites 0 · behind a setting or built here 0
05.credentials_in_deploy_config	deployment configuration references secrets, never holds themfiles 0 · sites 0
05.public_env_secret	only publishable values carry a public prefixnames 0 · sites 0 · not secrets 0
05.source_maps_shipped	production builds do not publish source mapssites 0
05.signing_material	no signing keystore or profile is committedfiles 0
05.license_copyleft_inherited	every licence found in vendored code is permissive or weak-copyleftvendored paths 42
05.license_grant_unclear	the licence is recognisable as AGPL-3.0class network-copyleft · license AGPL-3.0
05.committed_native_libraries	no widely used compiled library is committed to the productlibraries 0
04.api_versions_coexisting	one API version is served, or none
04.deprecations_lingering	few deprecations have outlived two yearsolder than two years 0 · files with deprecations 5
04.dependency_churn	few dependencies were added and dropped within 60 daysdependencies seen 193 · added in two years 111 · removed within 60 days 0
04.ci_platforms_dropped	no platform was dropped from CI in the last two years
04.repository_status	the README's first screen states no end, move or freezestatements 0
02.development_elsewhere	nothing says development happens elsewhereno pr statements 0 · mirror statements 0 · replayed commit share 0.0
05.licence_changes	the root licence has not changed in the history readlicence versions 1 · unreleased changes 0
05.paid_edition	no directory carries a separate paid-edition licencedirectories 0
04.releases_stopped	releases keep pace with developmentmedian gap days 2.5 · days since last tag 8 · commits last 90 days 27
04.release_branch	the newest release was cut from the branch surveyedelsewhere 0 · on branch 85 · tags in window 85
03.single_maintainer	no file says one person maintains itstatements 0
05.project_exploited	no affecting advisory is on CISA's Known Exploited listexploited 0

Could not conclude, or did not apply — 19

Not a clean result. Each says why it could not answer here.

Signal	Why
04.fix_share_trend	fewer than six busy quarters to compare
04.schema_churn	columns, once added, stay
06.telemetry_depth	none at all is 06.1
06.print_logging	a frontend: console output is the browser's, not the server's
06.alert_rules	no alert rules in the repository; they may live in a console
06.probes_identical	no Kubernetes probes
06.single_replica	no Kubernetes deployments
06.release_markers	fewer than 100 commits in the last year
06.feature_flags	no feature-flag service; flags may live elsewhere
03.bus_factor_trend	fewer than three active years to compare
03.joiners_and_leavers	too few regular contributors to see a trend
02.long_lived_branches	too few merges to judge (squash and rebase leave none)
01.notebook_outputs	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.resource_limits	no Kubernetes workload manifests
05.cleartext_traffic	not a mobile app
05.dataset_provenance	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.license_manifest_conflict	no packaging manifest states a licence
04.flags_accumulating	few or no feature flags in the history
05.project_advisories	could not tell whether 1 published advisory affects the surveyed code: its version could not be placed

Anyone can check this report against the authoritative record — click the stamp, or enter TMRF-73B8-DSD2 at borehole.dev/verify.

The code commits to the 106 checks this run performed, the bands they produced, and the commit they were read at. It does not cover checks written since.

Put the mark in your README

The image is wrapped in a link to the verification page, so a reader can check it rather than take it on trust. If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.

[![Borehole reading, not a certification](https://borehole.dev/badge/mediacms-io/mediacms/9bf46be.svg "Borehole free reading: not for reliance. See the full report.")](https://borehole.dev/verify/TMRF73B8DSD2?via=badge)

Where this scan ran

This scan ran on ordinary cloud infrastructure (cloud-run), not in a hardware-isolated confidential VM. Nothing about it is attested by Google.

What an attested survey proves, and what it does not.

What this scan did with the repository — 7 steps

Written by the steps themselves as they ran, not described afterwards. A hand-written account of a data flow drifts the first time somebody changes the flow and not the account.

At	Step	Detail
0.0s	read repository metadata from the GitHub API	size mb: 66.9authenticated: False
7.1s	cloned the repository to a temporary directory	depth: full
10.4s	read the git history	commits: 396tracked files: 1882
126.0s	ran the deterministic checks	blame pass: Trueread working tree: False
126.1s	recorded where this scan ran	attested: Falseenvironment: cloud-run
203.4s	kept the facts, never the source, for re-reading under new checks
203.4s	deleting the working copy

Total 203.4s ·source content sent off this machine: none · calls to a language model: 0 · the clone was deleted when the survey ended

An automated reading of a repository's code and its history up to one commit, with public advisory records. It may be wrong, it is not legal, financial, investment or security advice, and it does not replace diligence by a qualified person. It is provided for information: nobody may rely on it (Borehole's terms, section 3).

BOREHOLE 0.7.15 DETERMINISTIC LAYER · NO MODEL CALLSREAD ON BOREHOLE'S SERVER · CLONE DELETED TAKEDOWNCONTRIBUTED TO THIS REPOSITORY? YOUR RIGHTS