Borehole · Risk register · free tier

mattermost/mattermost-mobile

Free reading: not for reliance

bc03c18 · 3,565 commits · 4,237 files
Issued 2026-10-02

Nothing significant. Questions worth asking about Security & Reliability Posture, Product & Engineering Maturity.

104 checks ran across 6 assessable dimensions. 1 finding is worth checking first. 10 findings, each with evidence. One dimension cannot be assessed without an acquirer.

What the repository says about itself

1 submodule(s) this survey does not read: libraries/@mattermost/intune .gitmodules:1

Worth checking first

Borehole's proprietary scoring is calibrated across hundreds of repositories. Each finding here reads significant, but its check has not yet held up often enough in that calibration to rate significant on its own. If one holds when someone checks it, it is significant.

05.26 35 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 52 high or critical in what ships

An earlier reading. This is the survey of 2026-10-02 by borehole 0.7.10, which is what its verification code attests to. A newer reading of the same commit exists: read the newest.

Published under today's rules. The verification code attests to this reading as it was stored. This page differs from it as follows.

Words about people are today's: bands rather than exact shares, dates or day counts, and what the history measured rather than why.
2 findings from checks Borehole's calibration found wrong more often than right are no longer published.
The file and line of 2 credential-shaped matches are withheld. File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report.

	Dimension	Rating
01	Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance	strong
02	Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity	adequate
03	Organization & Key-Person Risk	strong
04	Product & Engineering Maturity	adequate
05	Security & Reliability Posture	adequate
06	Observability & Operations	not assessable
07	Fit with the Acquirer	not assessable

strong adequate significant findings not assessable from a repository

Provenance disclosure does not affect any rating

4% of added lines arrived in commits declaring an AI agent as co-author

The surviving-lines measurement was not run on this repository.

68/3,467 commits declaring an agent · Claude, Claude Opus 4.5, Claude Opus 4.6 and 14 more

confidence: low

42% of non-merge commits carry any trailer at all
low trailer coverage: the convention may not be in consistent use
22% of commits show author/committer date divergence, which is the shape of replayed history that can drop trailers

443,227 lines excluded as lockfiles, vendored or generated.

This is a lower bound. It counts what the repository declares. Undeclared AI authorship is invisible here, and a single rebase removes the trailers this rests on. Absence of a declaration is absence of disclosure, not absence of AI authorship.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · strong · ratings ↑

A note that does not affect this rating

01.6

app/components/autocomplete/slash_suggestion/app_command_parser/app_command_parser.ts is 2,021 lines, 23× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 85 lines. 5 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 2,021. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

A note that does not affect this rating: measured against its own codebase's median, it is below the 85th percentile of 382 surveyed projects' largest files, where this check begins to count.

Evidence

line-count	`app/components/autocomplete/slash_suggestion/app_command_parser/app_command_parser.ts:1` — 2,021 lines (23× median)
line-count	`app/actions/remote/channel.ts:1` — 1,593 lines (18× median)
line-count	`app/actions/remote/post.ts:1` — 1,258 lines (14× median)
line-count	`app/products/calls/state/actions.ts:1` — 1,238 lines (14× median)
line-count	`app/managers/security_manager/index.ts:1` — 1,013 lines (11× median)

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · adequate · ratings ↑

02.24

7% of recent commits change more than 2,000 lines

adequate

61 of 866 commits in the last 24 months changed over 2,000 lines of code, not counting reformatting, renames, vendored or generated code. A change that size is rarely reviewed line by line. Ask how they were reviewed, and what made them that large.

Evidence

git log --numstat

61 commits over 2,000 lines

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · strong · ratings ↑

No finding. 10 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · adequate · ratings ↑

04.3

98 direct dependencies in a single manifest

adequate

package.json declares 98 direct dependencies. Each one is a maintenance obligation, a supply-chain surface and a potential licence question that transfers with the asset. The count says nothing about whether any given dependency was a good choice; it says how many such choices a buyer inherits.

Evidence

direct-dependencies package.json — 98 declared

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

A note that does not affect this rating

04.17

Ruby 3.2 is past end of life

adequate

The code is pinned to Ruby 3.2 (end of life 2026-03-31). None of these receives security fixes any more; the first stopped on 2026-03-31. Moving off an unsupported runtime is rarely a one-line change, so a buyer should ask whether the upgrade is planned and what it touches.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

.ruby-version .ruby-version — Ruby 3.2, end of life 2026-03-31

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · adequate · ratings ↑

05.1

2 credential-shaped strings committed to the tree

adequate

Matches for Google API key appear in tracked files outside test and fixture paths. They stay in the history even after they leave the tree, so what matters is whether each was rotated. The code cannot tell whether any of them is live, and that decides whether this matters: none sits in production configuration, and none is in a format its provider keeps for live keys. Is any of these live? Show that each was rotated after it was committed, and when. Only Google API keys matched. Those are often public by design, in a browser app's Firebase or Maps configuration; the question is whether each is restricted to the app's domains and APIs.

Evidence

Google API key	2 cited: Google API key pattern matched
	File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report.

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.26

35 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 52 high or critical in what ships

adequate worth checking first

35 of 1,211 locked dependencies match 106 published advisories in OSV, 58 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.

The check that found this reads significant, but it has not yet held up often enough in Borehole's calibration to rate a finding significant on its own. Opening package-lock.json settles it. If it holds when someone checks it, this finding is significant.

Evidence

package-lock.json	`package-lock.json` — shell-quote 1.8.3: GHSA-w7jw-789q-3m8p (critical), fixed in 1.8.4
package-lock.json	`package-lock.json` — @xmldom/xmldom 0.8.13: GHSA-27p8-2357-5qqv (high), fixed in 0.8.15
package-lock.json	`package-lock.json` — @xmldom/xmldom 0.9.10: GHSA-27p8-2357-5qqv (high), fixed in 0.9.12

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.51

The app allows plain HTTP to any server

adequate

The app's manifest allows unencrypted HTTP app-wide (NSAllowsArbitraryLoads, or cleartext traffic permitted), rather than for named domains. Anything sent over plain HTTP can be read on the network, and enterprise security reviews ask about it. Some apps need it by nature (a podcast or feed reader fetches whatever URL a feed gives), so ask which case this is.

Evidence

android/app/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml	`android/app/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml:57` — cleartext allowed app-wide
android/app/src/main/res/xml/network_security_config.xml	`android/app/src/main/res/xml/network_security_config.xml:3` — cleartext allowed app-wide
ios/Mattermost/Info.plist	`ios/Mattermost/Info.plist:47` — cleartext allowed app-wide

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Notes that do not affect this rating

05.25

7 environment files are committed

adequate

fastlane/.env.android.beta, fastlane/.env.android.pr, fastlane/.env.android.release and more are tracked in git. Environment files are where credentials usually live, and committing one usually means nobody decided how secrets reach the running application. Whatever is in it is in the history for good. Check 05.1 says whether it holds anything credential-shaped.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

fastlane/.env.android.beta	`fastlane/.env.android.beta` — committed environment file
fastlane/.env.android.pr	`fastlane/.env.android.pr` — committed environment file
fastlane/.env.android.release	`fastlane/.env.android.release` — committed environment file

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

2 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day; 2 steps pipe a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

.github/workflows/pr-test-analysis-override.yml	`.github/workflows/pr-test-analysis-override.yml:25` — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/pr-test-analysis.yml	`.github/workflows/pr-test-analysis.yml:40` — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/e2e-maestro-template.yml	`.github/workflows/e2e-maestro-template.yml:174` — download piped into a shell

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.65

9 advisories against this project in the last 24 months

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-05-21. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 9 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 2.44.0. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version.

A note that does not affect this rating: it describes the project's advisory record, and no advisory in it is known to affect the surveyed commit.

Evidence

CVE-2026-22880	2026-05-21: CVE-2026-22880 (moderate): Mattermost Mobile Apps versions <=2.37 11.4 2.0.37 11.0.4 11.1.3 11.3.2 10.11.11.0 fail to properly validate the SSO authentication callback origin which allows
CVE-2025-59480	2025-11-13: CVE-2025-59480 (moderate): Mattermost Mobile Apps versions <=2.32.0 fail to verify that SSO redirect tokens originate from the trusted server, which allows a malicious Mattermost instance
CVE-2025-30516	2025-04-14: CVE-2025-30516 (low): Mattermost Mobile Apps versions <=2.25.0 fail to terminate sessions during logout under certain conditions (e.g. poor connectivity), allowing unauthorized user
CVE-2025-1558	2025-03-24: CVE-2025-1558 (moderate): Mattermost Mobile Apps versions <=2.25.0 fail to properly validate GIF images prior to rendering which allows a malicious user to cause the Android application
CVE-2025-0476	2025-01-16: CVE-2025-0476 (moderate): Mattermost Mobile Apps versions <=2.22.0 fail to properly handle specially crafted attachment names, which allows an attacker to crash the mobile app for any us

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Observability & Operations

06 · not assessable · ratings ↑

Not rated: only 5 of 16 checks could reach a conclusion here; the rest do not apply to this repository or could not read it. What a person adds here.

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · not assessable · ratings ↑

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository. What a person adds here.

Check it on the running system

6 checks against the running system follow from the findings above: what a buyer's engineer will try, how to run it first, and what to have ready. A paid survey of this repository includes them. See the tiers.

A paid survey of a public repository is also reviewed: a language model reads each finding against the code and withdraws only findings it judges the code contradicts, each listed with its reason. The review is a language model's reading of the findings against the code, and it can be wrong. It never adds a finding, never raises a band, and never removes a finding from a proven check or an advisory that affects the surveyed version.

What a person adds

The survey reads what the repository can show. The code cannot settle these questions, and on them this report states nothing. Each says where its answer lives: your own engineer, the company, or an assessor you choose can settle it. Questions marked measured open with something this repository shows.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · full coverage

measured No architecture or design document is in the tree, across 2,959 product files. Where does the design live, and who holds it? Answer lives in: The team01.38
measured The repository pulls code in through git submodules (.gitmodules). A buyer receives pointers, not that code. Can every submodule be fetched without the team's credentials, and who owns each one? Answer lives in: The team and the submodule owners01.35
Is the architecture right for the next three years of the product? Answer lives in: Your architects, with the product roadmap01.39
Were the home-grown components reasonable choices when they were made, and are they now? Answer lives in: The team's reasoning at the time01.40

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · high coverage

Is review real or a rubber stamp? Comment depth and time to approve need the pull request history. Answer lives in: The code host's pull request data02.32
Is delivery planned and measured, or heroic? Answer lives in: The issue tracker: backlog, sprint history, estimate accuracy02.38
How are incidents run, reviewed and learned from? Answer lives in: Tickets, chat and postmortems02.37

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · partial coverage

measured 215 people have committed here. Which of them are you acquiring, and which are you replacing? Answer lives in: The deal terms03.29
Who mentors whom, and would that survive a departure? Answer lives in: The team; review history only suggests candidates03.28
Can the team grow, and who stands behind the top three contributors? Answer lives in: Recruiting data and the org chart03.30
Is the seniority mix sound, and will pay survive your salary bands? Answer lives in: HR data03.31
Is the pace sustainable? Commit times cannot say: git keeps no reliable local time. Answer lives in: Interviews and on-call history03.14
Does the team want to stay after close? Answer lives in: Interviews03.32
How are decisions made and disagreements resolved? Answer lives in: Time with the team03.33

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · minimal coverage

Can this team deliver the stated roadmap on the stated timeline? Answer lives in: The data room and the team's record of estimates04.32
Does leadership know about the debt, and is time budgeted to repay it? Answer lives in: Budget and roadmap decisions04.31
Is the engineering shape consistent with the commercial story? Answer lives in: Revenue, customer and churn data04.33

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · partial coverage

measured 05.1 and 05.5 found credential-shaped strings in this repository. Was each one revoked at the provider? Deleting it from the code revokes nothing; only the provider's audit log shows that it was. Answer lives in: The provider's console and audit log05.38
measured The Android app requests 1 sensitive permission: RECORD_AUDIO. Does the product need each one, and has the store's review accepted them? Answer lives in: The mobile team and the store review history05.52
What has actually broken, how often, and how badly? Answer lives in: Ticketing and chat05.41
What did external testing find, and was it fixed? Answer lives in: Reports in the data room05.42
What is the SOC 2, ISO 27001 or GDPR status, and where is the evidence? Answer lives in: Audit reports; policy files in the tree are not evidence05.44

Observability & Operations

06 · partial coverage

Not rated: only 5 of 16 checks could reach a conclusion here; the rest do not apply to this repository or could not read it.

measured Service-level objectives are defined in the tree (eslint/eslint-mattermost.json). Are they met? The repository holds the target, not the measurement. Answer lives in: Production metrics06.12
Are the dashboards opened, the alerts acknowledged and the pages answered? Answer lives in: Pager history and dashboard logs06.29
Who carries the pager, and how often does it go off? Answer lives in: Pager exports and interviews06.31
What does it cost to run, and how much headroom is there? Answer lives in: Cloud billing and capacity plans06.32

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · none coverage

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

This is primarily a TypeScript codebase. Does your engineering organisation already run TypeScript in production, or would this be the first? 07.1
The bulk of this system sits in app/, assets/, ios/. Which of your existing systems would each of those have to absorb or replace? 07.10
The repository carries deployment configuration (.cursor/Dockerfile). Does that match your deployment and on-call model, or does it need rehosting first? 07.2
What is your tolerance for the findings above remaining unaddressed for the first two quarters after close, given everything else that will compete for this team's time?
Which of these systems duplicate yours, and which get retired? Answer lives in: Your architecture07.11
What will integration cost, and in what order? Answer lives in: The engagement07.12
Where does the team land in your organisation, and who reports to whom? Answer lives in: Your org design07.13
Are there earn-outs, retention packages or contractor IP to assign? Answer lives in: Deal terms07.14
Do customer contracts limit hosting, regions or vendors? Answer lives in: Customer contracts07.15

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Rejection log — 94 signals that ran and did not fire

Appendix: rejection log — 94 signals that ran and did not fire

Published on purpose. A signal that looked and decided not to fire has told you something, and this is the calibration data behind every threshold above.

Looked, and found nothing — 70

Signal	What it found
04.hotspot_concentration	change is spread across the codebase rather than pooling in a few filesfiles 6,291 · top5 share 0.036
04.debt_markers	debt markers are sparsemarkers 26 · per kloc 0.05 · lines read 567,045
04.test_growth	test effort kept pace with code writtenlate test per code 1.578 · early test per code 0.182
04.churn_trend	rework is not rising against new worklate delete per insert 0.405 · early delete per insert 0.371
04.fixes_with_tests	fixes usually come with a testfixes 205 · share 0.478 · with tests 98
04.fix_share_trend	fixing is not crowding out building
04.compat_layers	little code is kept for the old wayshare 0.0 · code files 2,414 · compat files 0
06.telemetry_presence	this repository does not deploy a running service, so instrumentation is not expected of itbasis nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere · files read 3,826
06.structured_logging	not a running service; structured logging is not expected of a librarybasis nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere
06.healthcheck_presence	not a running service, so a health endpoint is not expectedbasis nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere
06.usage_reporting_default	the product's code names no reporting hostsettings on 0 · settings off 0
06.migrate_on_start	migrations do not run at container start
03.contributor_concentration	no single contributor dominates the last 24 monthsyears 5.9 · window last 24 months · authors 215
03.active_contributors	more than one contributor active in the trailing yearall time 215 · active 12mo 54
03.drive_by_contributors	an open contributor base, where one-commit contributors are normalauthors 215 · one off share 0.414
03.contributor_attrition	no contributor dominates enough for their absence to matterauthors 215 · top share less than a quarter · top contributor last committed within the last three months
03.critical_path_ownership	more than one person changes the critical pathsauthors 91
03.second_contributor_attrition	the second and third contributors are still active
03.bus_factor_trend	the team has not narrowed to one person
03.joiners_and_leavers	the team is not shrinkingleft 14 · joined 15 · regular last year 28
02.merge_discipline	a meaningful share of recent change carries evidence of reviewmerges 0 · window last 24 months · with tracked 1
02.ci_presence	CI configuration is present in the working treecount 21
02.test_presence	tests are present in a normal proportion to sourcetests 1,090 · source 3,498 · test ratio 0.312
02.release_cadence	tags are presenttags 182
02.conventional_commits	commit subjects generally carry contentsampled 3,467 · low content share 0.013
02.branch_protection_hints	process scaffolding is present in the repository
02.ci_runs_tests	CI invokes a test runnerconfigs 21 · with tests 3
02.skipped_tests	few tests are switched offfocused 0 · skipped 10 · test files 1,169
02.ci_test_gating	no test run in CI is written so that it cannot failconfigs 21
02.revert_share	change is rarely undoneshare 0.004 · reverts 4 · recent commits 901
02.dependency_update_cadence	dependencies move with the codelockfiles 5 · commits since 10 · days since lockfile changed 7
02.flaky_test_markers	tests are not retried until they passtest retries 0 · suite retries 0
02.lint_in_build	a linter or formatter runs in the buildwired 4 · ci configs 21 · product files 2,414
01.burst_import	the largest burst was translation files (100% of it), which explains the rate: translations arrive from a vendor in bulk, dependencies and generated code are committed whole, a merged pull request is dated when it merged, not when it was written, a branch merged by a merge commit was reviewed as one piece, and an export or mirror tool dates history when it replays itlargest commits 5427468..95759a5 · bursts explained 1 · largest net added 5,357
01.initial_dump	first commit is not a disproportionate share of the codebaseinsertions 75,871 · share of insertions 0.0552
01.message_uniformity	commit subjects vary in wording and lengthlength stdev 17.52 · repeat share 0.261
01.revision_depth	most files were revisited after they were first writtenfiles seen 2,848 · write once share 0.304
01.duplicated_blocks	little shipping code is repeated verbatim across filesshare 0.0081 · product files 2,412 · distinct blocks 169,870
01.swallowed_errors	errors are rarely thrown awayloc 570,838 · files 2 · per kloc 0.01
01.build_reproducibility	every base image names a versionfloating 0 · from lines 1
01.unfinished_migration	no language migration is stalled halfway
01.weights_in_git	no model weights are committedfiles 0
05.security_guardrails	at least one standard guard rail is configured
05.dependency_pinning	a lockfile is committed, so builds are reproduciblelockfile True
05.license_present	a licence file is presentfound True
05.container_runs_as_root	every shipped Dockerfile drops to a non-root user or builds on a non-root base imagedockerfiles 1
05.shell_from_strings	product code does not build shell commands from stringssites 0
05.unsafe_deserialization	no code-executing deserialiser in product codesites 0
05.tls_verification_off	no TLS verification is switched off in product codefiles 0 · sites 0 · pinned instead 0
05.privileged_workloads	no workload runs privileged or in the host's namespacessites 0 · behind a setting or built here 0
05.credentials_in_deploy_config	deployment configuration references secrets, never holds themfiles 0 · sites 0
05.public_env_secret	only publishable values carry a public prefixnames 0 · sites 0 · not secrets 0
05.unsafe_html	raw HTML is rare, literal or sanitisedsites 0
05.source_maps_shipped	production builds do not publish source mapssites 0
05.signing_material	no signing keystore or profile is committedfiles 0
05.license_copyleft_inherited	every licence found in vendored code is permissive or weak-copyleftvendored paths 1
05.license_vendored_unlicensed	all 1 vendored components state their terms, in a licence file, their own headers or a notices filecomponents 1 · stated in headers or notices 1
05.license_grant_unclear	the licence is recognisable as Apache-2.0class permissive · license Apache-2.0
05.committed_native_libraries	no widely used compiled library is committed to the productlibraries 0
04.deprecations_lingering	few deprecations have outlived two yearsolder than two years 0 · files with deprecations 1
04.dependency_churn	few dependencies were added and dropped within 60 daysdependencies seen 224 · added in two years 37 · removed within 60 days 1
04.ci_platforms_dropped	no platform was dropped from CI in the last two years
04.repository_status	the README's first screen states no end, move or freezestatements 0
02.development_elsewhere	nothing says development happens elsewhereno pr statements 0 · mirror statements 0 · replayed commit share 0.0
05.licence_changes	the root licence has not changed in the history readlicence versions 1 · unreleased changes 0
05.paid_edition	no directory carries a separate paid-edition licencedirectories 0
04.releases_stopped	releases keep pace with developmentmedian gap days 10.0 · days since last tag 9 · commits last 90 days 109
04.release_branch	the newest release was cut from the branch surveyedelsewhere 110 · on branch 1 · tags in window 111
03.single_maintainer	no file says one person maintains itstatements 0
05.project_exploited	no affecting advisory is on CISA's Known Exploited listexploited 0

Could not conclude, or did not apply — 24

Not a clean result. Each says why it could not answer here.

Signal	Why
04.schema_churn	no schema migrations to read
04.dependency_redundancy	no JavaScript manifest to read
06.telemetry_depth	not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere
06.print_logging	not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere
06.correlation_ids	not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere
06.error_reporting	not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere
06.alert_rules	not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere
06.deployed_image_floats	not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere
06.probes_identical	no Kubernetes probes
06.single_replica	no Kubernetes deployments
06.environment_branching	not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere
06.release_markers	not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere
06.feature_flags	no feature-flag service; flags may live elsewhere
02.long_lived_branches	too few merges to judge (squash and rebase leave none)
01.notebook_outputs	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.outbound_timeouts	not a running service
05.migration_reversibility	too few migrations to judge
05.sql_from_strings	not a running service; a library that builds SQL is doing its job
05.resource_limits	no Kubernetes workload manifests
05.dataset_provenance	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.license_manifest_conflict	manifest licence 'Apache 2.0' is not a recognised SPDX identifier
04.flags_accumulating	few or no feature flags in the history
04.api_versions_coexisting	not a running service
05.project_advisories	could not tell whether 20 published advisories affect the surveyed code: its version could not be placed

Anyone can check this report against the authoritative record — click the stamp, or enter WXFK-8GWZ-KEH4 at borehole.dev/verify.

The code commits to the 106 checks this run performed, the bands they produced, and the commit they were read at. It does not cover checks written since.

Put the mark in your README

The image is wrapped in a link to the verification page, so a reader can check it rather than take it on trust. If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.

[![Borehole reading, not a certification](https://borehole.dev/badge/mattermost/mattermost-mobile/bc03c18.svg "Borehole free reading: not for reliance. See the full report.")](https://borehole.dev/verify/WXFK8GWZKEH4?via=badge)

This commit has been surveyed 16 times

A survey is a reading by a particular version of the assessor. Older readings are kept rather than replaced, because a verification mark attests to the survey it was issued for — overwriting one would make every code already in circulation read as tampered.

Read	Assessor	Findings	Band
2026-10-02 · shown	borehole 0.7.10	12	adequate

15 other readings (show)

2026-10-04	borehole 0.7.13	12	adequate
2026-10-03	borehole 0.7.12	12	adequate
2026-10-03	borehole 0.7.11	12	adequate
2026-10-01	borehole 0.7.9	12	adequate
2026-09-30	borehole 0.7.8	11	adequate
2026-09-29	borehole 0.7.6	11	adequate
2026-09-28	borehole 0.7.5	11	adequate
2026-09-28	borehole 0.7.4	11	adequate
2026-09-27	borehole 0.7.3	11	adequate
2026-09-27	borehole 0.7.2	11	adequate
2026-09-27	borehole 0.7.1	11	adequate
2026-09-26	borehole 0.7.0	11	adequate
2026-09-26	borehole 0.6.3	11	adequate
2026-09-26	borehole 0.6.2	11	adequate
2026-09-25	borehole 0.6.1	13	adequate

Where this scan ran

This scan ran on ordinary cloud infrastructure (cloud-run), not in a hardware-isolated confidential VM. Nothing about it is attested by Google.

What an attested survey proves, and what it does not.

What this scan did with the repository — 7 steps

Written by the steps themselves as they ran, not described afterwards. A hand-written account of a data flow drifts the first time somebody changes the flow and not the account.

At	Step	Detail
0.0s	read repository metadata from the GitHub API	authenticated: False
20.4s	cloned the repository to a temporary directory	depth: full
28.2s	read the git history	commits: 3565tracked files: 4237
139.3s	ran the deterministic checks	blame pass: Falseread working tree: False
139.3s	recorded where this scan ran	attested: Falseenvironment: cloud-run
233.8s	kept the facts, never the source, for re-reading under new checks
233.8s	deleting the working copy

Total 233.8s ·source content sent off this machine: none · calls to a language model: 0 · the clone was deleted when the survey ended

An automated reading of a repository's code and its history up to one commit, with public advisory records. It may be wrong, it is not legal, financial, investment or security advice, and it does not replace diligence by a qualified person. It is provided for information: nobody may rely on it (Borehole's terms, section 3).

BOREHOLE 0.7.10 DETERMINISTIC LAYER · NO MODEL CALLSREAD ON BOREHOLE'S SERVER · CLONE DELETED TAKEDOWNCONTRIBUTED TO THIS REPOSITORY? YOUR RIGHTS