8816d3a · 7,476 commits · 12 files
Issued 2026-11-03
Nothing significant. Questions worth asking about Organization & Key-Person Risk.
104 checks ran across 6 assessable dimensions. None found a significant problem; 1 raised something worth a question. 4 findings, each with evidence. One dimension cannot be assessed without an acquirer. Last commit 18 October 2026.
- states a policy on AI-generated contributions AI_POLICY.md:1
- 2 findings from checks Borehole's calibration found wrong more often than right are no longer published.
- The file and line of 1 credential-shaped match is withheld. File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report.
| Dimension | Rating | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | not assessable | |
| 02 | Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | strong | |
| 03 | Organization & Key-Person Risk | adequate | |
| 04 | Product & Engineering Maturity | not assessable | |
| 05 | Security & Reliability Posture | strong | |
| 06 | Observability & Operations | not assessable | |
| 07 | Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
- 19% of non-merge commits carry any trailer at all
- low trailer coverage: the convention may not be in consistent use
- 21% of commits show author/committer date divergence, which is the shape of replayed history that can drop trailers
- deep scan blamed 12 of 12 counted files
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
01 · not assessable · ratings ↑Not rated: only 5 of 11 checks could reach a conclusion here; the rest do not apply to this repository or could not read it. What a person adds here.
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
02 · strong · ratings ↑No finding. 16 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.
Organization & Key-Person Risk
03 · adequate · ratings ↑The contributor who wrote a quarter or more of this has not committed here for more than six months
adequateOne person authored a quarter or more of 7,087 commits and has not committed here for more than six months, while the repository has kept moving. The concentration figure alone would not show this. Whoever is changing this code now is not the person who wrote most of it, which is the situation an acquirer is usually told they are avoiding. The history shows only that no commits of theirs landed here, not why.
| last-commit-by-top-author | last commit more than six months ago, measured to the survey |
| git shortlog -sn | top author a quarter or more of 7,087 commits |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Regular contributors fell from 22 to 14 in a year
adequate13 people who committed regularly the year before made no commits in the last year, and 5 new regular contributors arrived. Ask whether the work they did is still covered.
| regular contributors by year | 22 then 14; 13 stopped committing, 5 began |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Product & Engineering Maturity
04 · not assessable · ratings ↑Not rated: only 8 of 19 checks could reach a conclusion here; the rest do not apply to this repository or could not read it. What a person adds here.
Security & Reliability Posture
05 · strong · ratings ↑1 credential-shaped string exists in the history
adequateMatches for private key block were committed at some point across 7,073 commits examined. The files that held them are no longer in the working tree — but removal from a file is not removal from the history, and the history is what transfers with the asset. What matters is whether each was rotated after it was committed. The code cannot tell whether any of them is live, and that decides whether this matters: none sits in production configuration, and none is in a format its provider keeps for live keys. Is any of these live? Show that each was rotated after it was committed, and when.
A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.
| history | private key block pattern added here |
| File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report. |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
5 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 4 high or critical
adequateThe newest was published on 2026-10-20. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 4 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 0.16.8. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version. The record is incomplete: NVD: 3 records name letta with nothing tying them to this repository (CVE-2026-18990, CVE-2026-4964, CVE-2026-4965).
A note that does not affect this rating: it describes the project's advisory record, and no advisory in it is known to affect the surveyed commit.
| CVE-2026-77936 | 2026-10-20: CVE-2026-77936 (critical): Letta through 0.16.8 ships a compose.yaml that does not enable LETTA_SERVER_SECURE, so the password middleware is never added and all API routes are unauthentic |
| CVE-2026-77937 | 2026-10-20: CVE-2026-77937 (high): Letta through 0.16.8 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows API callers to impersonate other users by supplying a self-asserted user_id HTT |
| CVE-2026-77938 | 2026-10-20: CVE-2026-77938 (high): Letta through 0.16.8 contains an information disclosure vulnerability that allows users running tools to read server secrets because LocalSandbox subprocesses i |
| CVE-2025-51482 | 2025-07-22: CVE-2025-51482 (high): Remote Code Execution in letta.server.rest_api.routers.v1.tools.run_tool_from_source in letta-ai Letta 0.7.12 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary Pytho |
| CVE-2025-6101 | 2025-06-16: CVE-2025-6101 (low): A vulnerability classified as critical has been found in letta-ai letta up to 0.4.1. Affected is the function function_message of the file letta/letta/interface |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Observability & Operations
06 · not assessable · ratings ↑Not rated: only 3 of 16 checks could reach a conclusion here; the rest do not apply to this repository or could not read it. What a person adds here.
Fit with the Acquirer
07 · not assessable · ratings ↑Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository. What a person adds here.
Check it on the running system
1 check against the running system follow from the findings above: what a buyer's engineer will try, how to run it first, and what to have ready. A paid survey of this repository includes them.
A paid survey of a public repository is also reviewed: a language model reads each finding against the code and withdraws only findings it judges the code contradicts, each listed with its reason. The review is a language model's reading of the findings against the code, and it can be wrong. It never adds a finding, never raises a band, and never removes a finding from a proven check or an advisory that affects the surveyed version.
What a person adds
The survey reads what the repository can show. The code cannot settle these questions, and on them this report states nothing. Each says where its answer lives: your own engineer, the company, or an assessor you choose can settle it. Questions marked measured open with something this repository shows.
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
01 · full coverageNot rated: only 5 of 11 checks could reach a conclusion here; the rest do not apply to this repository or could not read it.
- Is the architecture right for the next three years of the product?
- Were the home-grown components reasonable choices when they were made, and are they now?
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
02 · high coverage- Is review real or a rubber stamp? Comment depth and time to approve need the pull request history.
- Is delivery planned and measured, or heroic?
- How are incidents run, reviewed and learned from?
Organization & Key-Person Risk
03 · partial coverage- measured 150 people have committed here. Which of them are you acquiring, and which are you replacing?
- Who mentors whom, and would that survive a departure?
- Can the team grow, and who stands behind the top three contributors?
- Is the seniority mix sound, and will pay survive your salary bands?
- Is the pace sustainable? Commit times cannot say: git keeps no reliable local time.
- Does the team want to stay after close?
- How are decisions made and disagreements resolved?
Product & Engineering Maturity
04 · minimal coverageNot rated: only 8 of 19 checks could reach a conclusion here; the rest do not apply to this repository or could not read it.
- measured 1,729 commits landed in the last year, against 4,173 the year before (-59%). Is that maintenance mode, a pivot, or fewer people working on it? The count looks the same for all three.
- Can this team deliver the stated roadmap on the stated timeline?
- Does leadership know about the debt, and is time budgeted to repay it?
- Is the engineering shape consistent with the commercial story?
Security & Reliability Posture
05 · partial coverage- measured 05.5 found credential-shaped strings in this repository. Was each one revoked at the provider? Deleting it from the code revokes nothing; only the provider's audit log shows that it was.
- What has actually broken, how often, and how badly?
- What did external testing find, and was it fixed?
- What is the SOC 2, ISO 27001 or GDPR status, and where is the evidence?
Observability & Operations
06 · partial coverageNot rated: only 3 of 16 checks could reach a conclusion here; the rest do not apply to this repository or could not read it.
- Are the dashboards opened, the alerts acknowledged and the pages answered?
- Are the service-level objectives actually met?
- Who carries the pager, and how often does it go off?
- What does it cost to run, and how much headroom is there?
Fit with the Acquirer
07 · none coverageNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
- Nothing in the repository says how this is deployed. Is it shipped as a library, a binary or a service, and if it runs somewhere, who owns that environment?
- What is your tolerance for the findings above remaining unaddressed for the first two quarters after close, given everything else that will compete for this team's time?
- Which of these systems duplicate yours, and which get retired?
- What will integration cost, and in what order?
- Where does the team land in your organisation, and who reports to whom?
- Are there earn-outs, retention packages or contractor IP to assign?
- Do customer contracts limit hosting, regions or vendors?
A human assessment is Borehole's own paid service, €12,000+ (total price is determined per engagement; travel billed at cost). It is not independent of this report: the same business produced both. It is a separate contract, with its own scope, terms and reliance.
Embed the badge
Tied to this commit and this date, and it fades after 90 days — an honest badge is one that expires. A repository with significant findings gets a neutral "read" badge rather than a red one: the library is where the range is visible, not someone else's README.
[](/r/letta-ai/letta/8816d3a)If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.
Rejection log — 100 signals that ran and did not fire
Appendix: rejection log — 100 signals that ran and did not fire
Published on purpose. A signal that looked and decided not to fire has told you something, and this is the calibration data behind every threshold above.
Looked, and found nothing — 48
| Signal | What it found |
|---|---|
| 04.hotspot_concentration | change is spread across the codebase rather than pooling in a few filesfiles 3,758 · top5 share 0.084 |
| 04.test_growth | test effort kept pace with code writtenlate test per code 0.587 · early test per code 0.294 |
| 04.churn_trend | rework is not rising against new worklate delete per insert 0.607 · early delete per insert 0.47 |
| 06.healthcheck_presence | not a running service, so a health endpoint is not expectedbasis nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.usage_reporting_default | the product's code names no reporting hostsettings on 0 · settings off 0 |
| 06.migrate_on_start | migrations do not run at container start |
| 03.contributor_concentration | no single contributor dominates the last 24 monthsyears 3.0 · window last 24 months · authors 150 |
| 03.active_contributors | more than one contributor active in the trailing yearall time 150 · active 12mo 20 |
| 03.drive_by_contributors | an open contributor base, where one-commit contributors are normalauthors 150 · one off share 0.54 |
| 03.critical_path_ownership | more than one person changes the critical pathsauthors 59 |
| 03.second_contributor_attrition | the second and third contributors are still active |
| 03.bus_factor_trend | the team has not narrowed to one person |
| 02.merge_discipline | a meaningful share of recent change carries evidence of reviewmerges 243 · window last 24 months · with tracked 35 |
| 02.ci_presence | CI configuration is present in the working treecount 1 |
| 02.release_cadence | tags are presenttags 179 |
| 02.conventional_commits | commit subjects generally carry contentsampled 7,131 · low content share 0.014 |
| 02.ci_test_gating | no test run in CI is written so that it cannot failconfigs 1 |
| 02.revert_share | change is rarely undoneshare 0.006 · reverts 33 · recent commits 5,774 |
| 02.flaky_test_markers | tests are not retried until they passtest retries 0 · suite retries 0 |
| 02.commit_size | changes arrive in reviewable sizesshare 0.013 · commits 5,206 · over 2000 lines 70 |
| 01.burst_import | no commit run met both the rate and the net-addition thresholdgap seconds 180 · min add ratio 3.0 · min net added 2,000 |
| 01.initial_dump | first commit is not a disproportionate share of the codebaseinsertions 290 · share of insertions 0.0002 |
| 01.message_uniformity | commit subjects vary in wording and lengthlength stdev 19.26 · repeat share 0.066 |
| 01.unfinished_migration | no language migration is stalled halfway |
| 01.weights_in_git | no model weights are committedfiles 0 |
| 05.committed_secrets | no credential-shaped strings outside test and fixture pathsnote the working tree only; the history is 05.5 · patterns 8 · files read 10 |
| 05.security_guardrails | at least one standard guard rail is configured |
| 05.license_present | a licence file is presentfound True |
| 05.secrets_management_pattern | no environment file is committed outside tests and examplesenv files 0 |
| 05.supply_chain_pinning | third-party build steps are pinned, or fewaction refs 2 · pipe to shell 0 · unpinned third party 0 |
| 05.shell_from_strings | product code does not build shell commands from stringssites 0 |
| 05.unsafe_deserialization | no code-executing deserialiser in product codesites 0 |
| 05.tls_verification_off | no TLS verification is switched off in product codefiles 0 · sites 0 · pinned instead 0 |
| 05.privileged_workloads | no workload runs privileged or in the host's namespacessites 0 · behind a setting or built here 0 |
| 05.credentials_in_deploy_config | deployment configuration references secrets, never holds themfiles 0 · sites 0 |
| 05.signing_material | no signing keystore or profile is committedfiles 0 |
| 05.license_vendored_unlicensed | no vendored third-party code is committedcomponents 0 |
| 05.license_grant_unclear | the licence is recognisable as Apache-2.0class permissive · license Apache-2.0 |
| 05.committed_native_libraries | no widely used compiled library is committed to the productlibraries 0 |
| 04.dependency_churn | few dependencies were added and dropped within 60 daysdependencies seen 226 · added in two years 90 · removed within 60 days 7 |
| 04.ci_platforms_dropped | no platform was dropped from CI in the last two years |
| 04.repository_status | the README's first screen states no end, move or freezestatements 0 |
| 02.development_elsewhere | nothing says development happens elsewhereno pr statements 0 · mirror statements 0 · replayed commit share 0.0 |
| 05.licence_changes | the root licence has not changed in the history readlicence versions 1 · unreleased changes 0 |
| 05.paid_edition | no directory carries a separate paid-edition licencedirectories 0 |
| 04.releases_stopped | releases keep pace with developmentmedian gap days 17.5 · days since last tag 173 · commits last 90 days 7 |
| 04.release_branch | the newest release was cut from the branch surveyedelsewhere 2 · on branch 177 · tags in window 179 |
| 03.single_maintainer | no file says one person maintains itstatements 0 |
Could not conclude, or did not apply — 52
Not a clean result. Each says why it could not answer here.
| Signal | Why |
|---|---|
| 04.debt_markers | codebase too small to judge debt-marker density |
| 04.dependency_sprawl | no recognised dependency manifest found |
| 04.eol_runtime | no pinned runtime version to check |
| 04.fixes_with_tests | no tests to add to (02.3) |
| 04.fix_share_trend | fewer than six busy quarters to compare |
| 04.schema_churn | no schema migrations to read |
| 04.compat_layers | a library, whose compatibility code is usually deliberate |
| 04.dependency_redundancy | no JavaScript manifest to read |
| 06.telemetry_presence | too few readable files to judge instrumentation |
| 06.structured_logging | too few readable files to judge logging |
| 06.telemetry_depth | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.print_logging | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.correlation_ids | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.error_reporting | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.alert_rules | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.deployed_image_floats | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.probes_identical | no Kubernetes probes |
| 06.single_replica | no Kubernetes deployments |
| 06.environment_branching | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.release_markers | not expected of it: nothing in this repository deploys a long-running server; if it runs as one, its deployment lives elsewhere |
| 06.feature_flags | no feature-flag service; flags may live elsewhere |
| 03.knowledge_silos | too few substantial top-level directories to read ownership |
| 02.test_presence | too few source files to judge test proportion |
| 02.branch_protection_hints | repository too small to expect process scaffolding |
| 02.skipped_tests | too few test files to judge how many are switched off |
| 02.dependency_update_cadence | no lockfile to date |
| 02.lint_in_build | too small, or no CI to wire a linter into (02.2) |
| 01.revision_depth | too few tracked files to judge revision depth |
| 01.oversized_modules | too few source files to establish a norm to compare against |
| 01.duplicated_blocks | too few source files to look for duplication across them |
| 01.swallowed_errors | too little code to judge a rate |
| 01.build_reproducibility | no product Dockerfile to read |
| 01.notebook_outputs | not a data or machine-learning repository |
| 05.dependency_pinning | no manifest whose pinning can be read without a lockfile |
| 05.container_runs_as_root | no Dockerfile to read |
| 05.outbound_timeouts | not a running service |
| 05.migration_reversibility | too few migrations to judge |
| 05.sql_from_strings | not a running service; a library that builds SQL is doing its job |
| 05.resource_limits | no Kubernetes workload manifests |
| 05.known_vulnerabilities | no lockfile this survey can read, or a collector older than 0.4.0 |
| 05.public_env_secret | not a frontend |
| 05.unsafe_html | not a frontend |
| 05.source_maps_shipped | not a frontend |
| 05.cleartext_traffic | not a mobile app |
| 05.dataset_provenance | not a data or machine-learning repository |
| 05.license_copyleft_inherited | no third-party code is committed to this repository, so the licences it depends on are resolved at build time and are not readable here |
| 05.license_manifest_conflict | no packaging manifest states a licence |
| 04.flags_accumulating | few or no feature flags in the history |
| 04.api_versions_coexisting | not a running service |
| 04.deprecations_lingering | a library, which keeps deprecated interfaces for its users |
| 05.project_advisories | record incomplete: no advisory found in the sources that answered; NVD: 3 records name letta with nothing tying them to this repository (CVE-2026-18990, CVE-2026-4964, CVE-2026-4965) |
| 05.project_exploited | no affecting advisory is on CISA's Known Exploited list |
Anyone can check this report against the authoritative record — click the stamp, or enter 7QH3-YFA3-CD7G at borehole.dev/verify.
The code commits to the 106 checks this run performed, the bands they produced, and the commit they were read at. It does not cover checks written since.
Put the mark in your README
The image is wrapped in a link to the verification page, so a reader can check it rather than take it on trust. If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.
[](https://borehole.dev/verify/7QH3YFA3CD7G?via=badge)
Where this scan ran
This scan ran on ordinary cloud infrastructure (cloud-run), not in a hardware-isolated confidential VM. Nothing about it is attested by Google.
What an attested survey proves, and what it does not.
What this scan did with the repository — 7 steps
Written by the steps themselves as they ran, not described afterwards. A hand-written account of a data flow drifts the first time somebody changes the flow and not the account.
| At | Step | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0s | read repository metadata from the GitHub API | size mb: 286.8authenticated: False |
| 17.6s | cloned the repository to a temporary directory | depth: full |
| 28.4s | read the git history | commits: 7476tracked files: 12 |
| 98.2s | ran the deterministic checks | blame pass: Trueread working tree: False |
| 98.2s | recorded where this scan ran | attested: Falseenvironment: cloud-run |
| 124.3s | kept the facts, never the source, for re-reading under new checks | |
| 124.3s | deleting the working copy |
Total 124.3s ·source content sent off this machine: none · calls to a language model: 0 · the clone was deleted when the survey ended
An automated reading of a repository's code and its history up to one commit, with public advisory records. It may be wrong, it is not legal, financial, investment or security advice, and it does not replace diligence by a qualified person. It is provided for information: nobody may rely on it (Borehole's terms, section 3).