Borehole · Risk register · free tier
kubernetes-sigs/aws-iam-authenticator
Free reading: not for reliance
Borehole badge for kubernetes-sigs/aws-iam-authenticator
5936370 · 1,051 commits · 165 files
Issued 2026-10-23

Reads strong: 4 of 6 rated dimensions are strong, 2 are adequate and none is significant.

105 checks ran across 6 assessable dimensions. Security & Reliability Posture and Product & Engineering Maturity are adequate. 1 finding is worth checking first. 5 findings, each with evidence. One dimension cannot be assessed without an acquirer.

This repository reads strong. Show it in your README: the badge links to a page where anyone can check the reading. If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.

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Worth checking first

Borehole's proprietary scoring is calibrated across hundreds of repositories. Each finding here reads significant, but its check has not yet held up often enough in that calibration to rate significant on its own. If one holds when someone checks it, it is significant.

  • 05.45 1 workload setting give a container the host
Published under today's rules. The verification code attests to this reading as it was stored. This page differs from it as follows.
  • 1 finding from checks Borehole's calibration found wrong more often than right is no longer published.
  • The file and line of 4 credential-shaped matches are withheld. File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report.
strong adequate significant findings not assessable from a repository
Provenance disclosure does not affect any rating
0% of the code standing today was written in AI-declared commits
0% of lines still in the tree 0 of 17,738 0% of lines ever added these differ when early hand-written code has since been replaced
0% of lines added in the last 12 months (since 2025-10-23) arrived in AI-declared commits: 0/93 commits, confidence low. Also a floor.
0/626 commits declaring an agent
confidence: moderate
  • 31% of non-merge commits carry any trailer at all
  • low trailer coverage: the convention may not be in consistent use
  • no widespread author/committer date divergence
  • deep scan blamed 140 of 140 counted files
5,805,092 lines excluded as lockfiles, vendored or generated.
This is a lower bound. It counts what the repository declares. Undeclared AI authorship is invisible here, and a single rebase removes the trailers this rests on. Absence of a declaration is absence of disclosure, not absence of AI authorship.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · strong · ratings ↑

No finding. 11 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · strong · ratings ↑

No finding. 16 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · strong · ratings ↑

No finding. 10 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · adequate · ratings ↑
04.2

73 unresolved debt markers, 3.8 per thousand lines

adequate

The codebase carries 73 TODO, FIXME, HACK or XXX markers across 18,985 lines. These are the team's own notes about work they knew was unfinished. A high density is not automatically bad — it can mean an honest team — but every one of them is a decision deferred, and after an acquisition they are deferred onto someone who was not in the room.

Evidence
debt-marker hack/e2e/kops.sh:60 — # TODO: maybe a less hacky way of doing this?
debt-marker hack/e2e/kops.sh:124 — # HACK convert the json array to multiple yaml documents
debt-marker hack/e2e/run.sh:97 — # TODO: validate binary using checksum
debt-marker hack/e2e/run.sh:111 — ## TODO: there should be a way in the makefile to change these values from default
debt-marker pkg/arn/arn.go:83 — // TODO: add strip path functionality Canonicalize after testing it in all mappers - this
Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · adequate · ratings ↑
05.1

4 credential-shaped strings in the tree sit in tests, examples, documentation or local development settings

adequate

Strings shaped like credentials appear only where fakes are usual: test fixtures, examples, documentation, placeholders and local stacks. They are almost always fakes. Ask someone to confirm that none of them works anywhere, because a real key in a development file is still a real key.

Evidence
AWS access key 4 cited: AWS access key, where fakes are usual
File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report.
Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.

05.6

1 Dockerfile runs the application as root

adequate

No USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.

Evidence
no-USER-instruction Dockerfile — runs as root
Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.

05.45

1 workload setting give a container the host

adequate worth checking first

1 places in the deployment configuration run a container privileged or in the host's network, process or IPC namespace. A compromise of that container is a compromise of the machine, and most acquirers' security reviews block it. Node agents (network, storage, monitoring) are excluded.

The check that found this reads significant, but it has not yet held up often enough in Borehole's calibration to rate a finding significant on its own. Opening deploy/example.yaml:210 settles it. If it holds when someone checks it, this finding is significant.

Evidence
deploy/example.yaml deploy/example.yaml:210 — privileged or host namespace
Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.

Observability & Operations

06 · strong · ratings ↑
A note that does not affect this rating
06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence
error reporting no error reporter initialised
Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · not assessable · ratings ↑

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository. What a person adds here.

Check it on the running system

5 checks against the running system follow from the findings above: what a buyer's engineer will try, how to run it first, and what to have ready. A paid survey of this repository includes them. See the tiers.

A paid survey of a public repository is also reviewed: a language model reads each finding against the code and withdraws only findings it judges the code contradicts, each listed with its reason. The review is a language model's reading of the findings against the code, and it can be wrong. It never adds a finding, never raises a band, and never removes a finding from a proven check or an advisory that affects the surveyed version.

What a person adds

The survey reads what the repository can show. The code cannot settle these questions, and on them this report states nothing. Each says where its answer lives: your own engineer, the company, or an assessor you choose can settle it. Questions marked measured open with something this repository shows.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · full coverage
  1. Is the architecture right for the next three years of the product? Answer lives in: Your architects, with the product roadmap01.39
  2. Were the home-grown components reasonable choices when they were made, and are they now? Answer lives in: The team's reasoning at the time01.40

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · high coverage
  1. Is review real or a rubber stamp? Comment depth and time to approve need the pull request history. Answer lives in: The code host's pull request data02.32
  2. Is delivery planned and measured, or heroic? Answer lives in: The issue tracker: backlog, sprint history, estimate accuracy02.38
  3. How are incidents run, reviewed and learned from? Answer lives in: Tickets, chat and postmortems02.37

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · partial coverage
  1. measured 114 people have committed here. Which of them are you acquiring, and which are you replacing? Answer lives in: The deal terms03.29
  2. Who mentors whom, and would that survive a departure? Answer lives in: The team; review history only suggests candidates03.28
  3. Can the team grow, and who stands behind the top three contributors? Answer lives in: Recruiting data and the org chart03.30
  4. Is the seniority mix sound, and will pay survive your salary bands? Answer lives in: HR data03.31
  5. Is the pace sustainable? Commit times cannot say: git keeps no reliable local time. Answer lives in: Interviews and on-call history03.14
  6. Does the team want to stay after close? Answer lives in: Interviews03.32
  7. How are decisions made and disagreements resolved? Answer lives in: Time with the team03.33

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · minimal coverage
  1. Can this team deliver the stated roadmap on the stated timeline? Answer lives in: The data room and the team's record of estimates04.32
  2. Does leadership know about the debt, and is time budgeted to repay it? Answer lives in: Budget and roadmap decisions04.31
  3. Is the engineering shape consistent with the commercial story? Answer lives in: Revenue, customer and churn data04.33

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · partial coverage
  1. measured 05.5 found credential-shaped strings in this repository. Was each one revoked at the provider? Deleting it from the code revokes nothing; only the provider's audit log shows that it was. Answer lives in: The provider's console and audit log05.38
  2. measured No threat model is in the tree of what looks like a running service. Does one exist elsewhere, and who owns it? Answer lives in: The security owner05.43
  3. What has actually broken, how often, and how badly? Answer lives in: Ticketing and chat05.41
  4. What did external testing find, and was it fixed? Answer lives in: Reports in the data room05.42
  5. What is the SOC 2, ISO 27001 or GDPR status, and where is the evidence? Answer lives in: Audit reports; policy files in the tree are not evidence05.44

Observability & Operations

06 · partial coverage
  1. measured Nothing in the tree backs up or restores data. How is data backed up, and has a restore ever been rehearsed? Answer lives in: The operations team06.19
  2. measured No alert rule is defined in the repository. Where are alerts defined, who receives them, and when did one last fire? Answer lives in: The alerting tool and the on-call rota06.10
  3. Are the dashboards opened, the alerts acknowledged and the pages answered? Answer lives in: Pager history and dashboard logs06.29
  4. Are the service-level objectives actually met? Answer lives in: Production metrics06.30
  5. Who carries the pager, and how often does it go off? Answer lives in: Pager exports and interviews06.31
  6. What does it cost to run, and how much headroom is there? Answer lives in: Cloud billing and capacity plans06.32

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · none coverage

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

  1. This is primarily a Go codebase. Does your engineering organisation already run Go in production, or would this be the first? 07.1
  2. The bulk of this system sits in pkg/, cmd/, deploy/. Which of your existing systems would each of those have to absorb or replace? 07.10
  3. The repository carries deployment configuration (Dockerfile). Does that match your deployment and on-call model, or does it need rehosting first? 07.2
  4. What is your tolerance for the findings above remaining unaddressed for the first two quarters after close, given everything else that will compete for this team's time?
  5. Which of these systems duplicate yours, and which get retired? Answer lives in: Your architecture07.11
  6. What will integration cost, and in what order? Answer lives in: The engagement07.12
  7. Where does the team land in your organisation, and who reports to whom? Answer lives in: Your org design07.13
  8. Are there earn-outs, retention packages or contractor IP to assign? Answer lives in: Deal terms07.14
  9. Do customer contracts limit hosting, regions or vendors? Answer lives in: Customer contracts07.15

A human assessment is Borehole's own paid service, €12,000+ (total price is determined per engagement; travel billed at cost). It is not independent of this report: the same business produced both. It is a separate contract, with its own scope, terms and reliance.

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Was this reading useful?
Rejection log — 100 signals that ran and did not fire

Appendix: rejection log — 100 signals that ran and did not fire

Published on purpose. A signal that looked and decided not to fire has told you something, and this is the calibration data behind every threshold above.

Looked, and found nothing — 77

SignalWhat it found
04.hotspot_concentration change is spread across the codebase rather than pooling in a few filesfiles 11,801 · top5 share 0.012
04.dependency_sprawl direct dependency counts are unremarkable
04.test_growth test effort kept pace with code writtenlate test per code 1.13 · early test per code 0.606
04.churn_trend rework is not rising against new worklate delete per insert 0.466 · early delete per insert 0.289
04.compat_layers little code is kept for the old wayshare 0.0 · code files 60 · compat files 0
06.telemetry_presence a telemetry or error-reporting library is referencednote presence only; whether anyone watches it is not visible here · matches 5
06.structured_logging a structured logging library is referencedmatches 23
06.healthcheck_presence a health or readiness check is defined
06.telemetry_depth the service is visible in more than one way
06.print_logging raw prints are few, or outnumbered by logger callsprints 0 · logger calls 86
06.correlation_ids a request can be followed through the logstracing False · request id sites 1
06.usage_reporting_default the product's code names no reporting hostsettings on 0 · settings off 0
06.deployed_image_floats every deployed image names a versionimages 1 · floating 0
06.environment_branching environment differences live in configurationsites 0
06.migrate_on_start migrations do not run at container start
03.contributor_concentration no single contributor dominates the last 24 monthsyears 9.0 · window last 24 months · authors 114
03.active_contributors more than one contributor active in the trailing yearall time 114 · active 12mo 18
03.knowledge_silos every substantial directory has been touched by more than one personauthors 114 · directories 4
03.drive_by_contributors an open contributor base, where one-commit contributors are normalauthors 114 · one off share 0.421
03.contributor_attrition no contributor dominates enough for their absence to matterauthors 114 · top share less than a quarter · top contributor last committed more than two years ago
03.critical_path_ownership more than one person changes the critical pathsauthors 27
03.second_contributor_attrition the second and third contributors are still active
03.bus_factor_trend the team has not narrowed to one person
03.joiners_and_leavers the team is not shrinkingleft 3 · joined 7 · regular last year 10
02.merge_discipline a meaningful share of recent change carries evidence of reviewmerges 163 · window last 24 months · with tracked 0
02.ci_presence CI configuration is present in the working treecount 3
02.test_presence tests are present in a normal proportion to sourcetests 31 · source 71 · test ratio 0.437
02.release_cadence tags are presenttags 95
02.conventional_commits commit subjects generally carry contentsampled 626 · low content share 0.021
02.branch_protection_hints process scaffolding is present in the repository
02.ci_runs_tests CI invokes a test runnerconfigs 3 · with tests 1
02.skipped_tests few tests are switched offfocused 0 · skipped 0 · test files 43
02.ci_test_gating no test run in CI is written so that it cannot failconfigs 3
02.revert_share change is rarely undoneshare 0.015 · reverts 2 · recent commits 136
02.dependency_update_cadence dependencies move with the codelockfiles 3 · commits since 8 · days since lockfile changed 10
02.flaky_test_markers tests are not retried until they passtest retries 0 · suite retries 0
02.lint_in_build a linter or formatter runs in the buildwired 2 · ci configs 3 · product files 60
02.long_lived_branches the typical branch reaches the trunk quicklyshare 0.032 · merges 157 · long lived 5
01.burst_import no commit run met both the rate and the net-addition thresholdgap seconds 180 · min add ratio 3.0 · min net added 2,000
01.initial_dump first commit is not a disproportionate share of the codebaseinsertions 6,264 · share of insertions 0.0011
01.message_uniformity commit subjects vary in wording and lengthlength stdev 25.37 · repeat share 0.093
01.revision_depth most files were revisited after they were first writtenfiles seen 56 · write once share 0.089
01.oversized_modules no module is an outlier against this codebase's own normlargest 1,117 · threshold 1,060 · median lines 106
01.duplicated_blocks little shipping code is repeated verbatim across filesshare 0.0046 · product files 40 · distinct blocks 4,162
01.swallowed_errors errors are rarely thrown awayloc 19,135 · files 0 · per kloc 0.0
01.build_reproducibility every base image names a versionfloating 0 · from lines 3
01.unfinished_migration no language migration is stalled halfway
01.weights_in_git no model weights are committedfiles 0
05.security_guardrails at least one standard guard rail is configured
05.license_present a licence file is presentfound True
05.secrets_management_pattern no environment file is committed outside tests and examplesenv files 0
05.supply_chain_pinning third-party build steps are pinned, or fewaction refs 14 · pipe to shell 0 · unpinned third party 0
05.outbound_timeouts outbound calls set timeouts, or are fewcalls without timeout 0
05.sql_from_strings no SQL is assembled from strings in product codefiles 0 · sites 0 · value interpolated 0
05.shell_from_strings product code does not build shell commands from stringssites 0
05.unsafe_deserialization no code-executing deserialiser in product codesites 0
05.tls_verification_off no TLS verification is switched off in product codefiles 0 · sites 0 · pinned instead 0
05.resource_limits every workload declares limitsworkloads 1 · without limits 0
05.known_vulnerabilities no locked dependency has a published advisoryadvisories 0 · dependencies 94 · high or critical 0
05.credentials_in_deploy_config deployment configuration references secrets, never holds themfiles 0 · sites 0
05.signing_material no signing keystore or profile is committedfiles 0
05.license_vendored_unlicensed no vendored third-party code is committedcomponents 0
05.license_grant_unclear the licence is recognisable as Apache-2.0class permissive · license Apache-2.0
05.committed_native_libraries no widely used compiled library is committed to the productlibraries 0
04.deprecations_lingering few deprecations have outlived two yearsolder than two years 1 · files with deprecations 93
04.dependency_churn few dependencies were added and dropped within 60 daysdependencies seen 302 · added in two years 51 · removed within 60 days 1
04.ci_platforms_dropped no platform was dropped from CI in the last two years
04.repository_status the README's first screen states no end, move or freezestatements 0
02.development_elsewhere nothing says development happens elsewhereno pr statements 0 · mirror statements 0 · replayed commit share 0.0
05.licence_changes the root licence has not changed in the history readlicence versions 1 · unreleased changes 0
05.paid_edition no directory carries a separate paid-edition licencedirectories 0
04.releases_stopped releases keep pace with developmentmedian gap days 10.0 · days since last tag 0 · commits last 90 days 32
04.release_branch the newest release was cut from the branch surveyedelsewhere 51 · on branch 44 · tags in window 95
03.single_maintainer no file says one person maintains itstatements 0
05.project_advisories no published advisory affects the surveyed versionaffecting 0 · exploited 0 · advisories 1
05.advisory_record no advisory against the project in the last 24 monthscritical 0 · affecting 0 · could not tell 0
05.project_exploited no affecting advisory is on CISA's Known Exploited listexploited 0

Could not conclude, or did not apply — 23

Not a clean result. Each says why it could not answer here.

SignalWhy
04.eol_runtimeno pinned runtime version to check
04.fixes_with_teststoo few fixes in 24 months to judge
04.fix_share_trendfewer than six busy quarters to compare
04.schema_churnno schema migrations to read
04.dependency_redundancyno JavaScript manifest to read
06.alert_rulesno alert rules in the repository; they may live in a console
06.probes_identicalno Kubernetes probes
06.single_replicano Kubernetes deployments
06.release_markersfewer than 100 commits in the last year
06.feature_flagsno feature-flag service; flags may live elsewhere
02.commit_sizetoo few recent commits
01.notebook_outputsnot a data or machine-learning repository
05.dependency_pinningno manifest whose pinning can be read without a lockfile
05.migration_reversibilitytoo few migrations to judge
05.public_env_secretnot a frontend
05.unsafe_htmlnot a frontend
05.source_maps_shippednot a frontend
05.cleartext_trafficnot a mobile app
05.dataset_provenancenot a data or machine-learning repository
05.license_copyleft_inheritedno third-party code is committed to this repository, so the licences it depends on are resolved at build time and are not readable here
05.license_manifest_conflictno packaging manifest states a licence
04.flags_accumulatingfew or no feature flags in the history
04.api_versions_coexistingone API version is served, or none
BOREHOLE READING NOT A CERTIFICATION Z3DG-N12C-FA05 2026-10-23 · 5936370 BOREHOLE.DEV/VERIFY

Anyone can check this report against the authoritative record — click the stamp, or enter Z3DG-N12C-FA05 at borehole.dev/verify.

The code commits to the 106 checks this run performed, the bands they produced, and the commit they were read at. It does not cover checks written since.

Put the mark in your README

The image is wrapped in a link to the verification page, so a reader can check it rather than take it on trust. If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.

[![Borehole reading, not a certification](https://borehole.dev/badge/kubernetes-sigs/aws-iam-authenticator/5936370.svg "Borehole free reading: not for reliance. See the full report.")](https://borehole.dev/verify/Z3DGN12CFA05?via=badge)

Borehole reading Z3DG-N12C-FA05, not a certification

Quoted evidence

5 pieces of evidence on this report quote the repository directly. Four checks quote text: up to five TODO-style comments, up to four commit subjects, up to five unpinned dependency lines and one status line from the README's first screen, such as “no longer maintained”. In each case the text is the evidence, which is why it is kept by default.

This rewrites every stored reading of this repository, and every later reading, including a re-read, is stored without the quoted text. The facts we keep to re-read it still hold the lines, as the privacy notice says. The pointers stay.

Where this scan ran

This scan ran on ordinary cloud infrastructure (cloud-run), not in a hardware-isolated confidential VM. Nothing about it is attested by Google.

What an attested survey proves, and what it does not.

What this scan did with the repository — 7 steps

Written by the steps themselves as they ran, not described afterwards. A hand-written account of a data flow drifts the first time somebody changes the flow and not the account.

AtStepDetail
0.0s read repository metadata from the GitHub API size mb: 39.4authenticated: False
4.1s cloned the repository to a temporary directory depth: full
9.6s read the git history commits: 1051tracked files: 165
128.0s ran the deterministic checks blame pass: Trueread working tree: False
128.0s recorded where this scan ran attested: Falseenvironment: cloud-run
172.9s kept the facts, never the source, for re-reading under new checks
172.9s deleting the working copy

Total 172.9s ·source content sent off this machine: none · calls to a language model: 0 · the clone was deleted when the survey ended

An automated reading of a repository's code and its history up to one commit, with public advisory records. It may be wrong, it is not legal, financial, investment or security advice, and it does not replace diligence by a qualified person. It is provided for information: nobody may rely on it (Borehole's terms, section 3).

BOREHOLE 0.7.15 DETERMINISTIC LAYER · NO MODEL CALLSREAD ON BOREHOLE'S SERVER · CLONE DELETED TAKEDOWNCONTRIBUTED TO THIS REPOSITORY? YOUR RIGHTS