d6d91ed · 3,226 commits · 5,243 files
Issued 2026-11-03
Reads strong: 4 of 6 rated dimensions are strong, 2 are adequate and none is significant.
102 checks ran across 6 assessable dimensions. Security & Reliability Posture and Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity are adequate. 2 findings are worth checking first. 10 findings, each with evidence. One dimension cannot be assessed without an acquirer.
This repository reads strong. Show it in your README: the badge links to a page where anyone can check the reading. If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.
[](https://borehole.dev/verify/SG2CVQ0WR3NY?via=badge)- This repository is a mirror; development happens elsewhere AGENTS.md:157
- 05.66 The licence is Elastic-2.0: source available, not open source LICENSE.md:1
Borehole's proprietary scoring is calibrated across hundreds of repositories. Each finding here reads significant, but its check has not yet held up often enough in that calibration to rate significant on its own. If one holds when someone checks it, it is significant.
- 4 findings from checks Borehole's calibration found wrong more often than right are no longer published.
- The file and line of 5 credential-shaped matches are withheld. File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report.
| Dimension | Rating | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | strong | |
| 02 | Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | adequate | |
| 03 | Organization & Key-Person Risk | strong | |
| 04 | Product & Engineering Maturity | strong | |
| 05 | Security & Reliability Posture | adequate | |
| 06 | Observability & Operations | strong | |
| 07 | Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
- 41% of non-merge commits carry any trailer at all
- low trailer coverage: the convention may not be in consistent use
- no widespread author/committer date divergence
- the declared share is neither decisive nor negligible, so the true figure is more sensitive to undeclared work
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
01 · strong · ratings ↑packages/agents-core/src/validation/schemas.ts is 4,110 lines, 47× this codebase's median file
adequateThe median source file here is 86 lines. 33 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 4,110. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.
A note that does not affect this rating: measured against its own codebase's median, it is below the 85th percentile of 382 surveyed projects' largest files, where this check begins to count.
| line-count | packages/agents-core/src/validation/schemas.ts:1 — 4,110 lines (47× median) |
| line-count | agents-manage-ui/src/lib/api/signoz-stats.ts:1 — 3,563 lines (41× median) |
| line-count | agents-api/src/domains/run/session/AgentSession.ts:1 — 2,197 lines (25× median) |
| line-count | packages/agents-core/src/data-access/manage/agentFull.ts:1 — 2,178 lines (25× median) |
| line-count | agents-api/src/domains/manage/routes/scheduledTriggers.ts:1 — 1,952 lines (22× median) |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
02 · adequate · ratings ↑6% of recent commits change more than 2,000 lines
adequate142 of 2319 commits in the last 24 months changed over 2,000 lines of code, not counting reformatting, renames, vendored or generated code. A change that size is rarely reviewed line by line. Ask how they were reviewed, and what made them that large.
| git log --numstat | 142 commits over 2,000 lines |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Tests are retried until they pass
adequateThe suite is configured to retry failing tests (agents-cli/src/commands/pull-v4/__tests__/credential-generator.test.ts). A retry turns a flaky test green without saying why it failed, so a green build means the tests passed eventually. Ask how many retries a typical run needs, and which tests need them.
A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.
| agents-cli/src/commands/pull-v4/__tests__/credential-generator.test.ts | agents-cli/src/commands/pull-v4/__tests__/credential-generator.test.ts:146 — test retry |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Organization & Key-Person Risk
03 · strong · ratings ↑No finding. 10 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.
Product & Engineering Maturity
04 · strong · ratings ↑No finding. 19 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.
Security & Reliability Posture
05 · adequate · ratings ↑20 credential-shaped strings in the tree sit in tests, examples, documentation or local development settings
adequateStrings shaped like credentials appear only where fakes are usual: test fixtures, examples, documentation, placeholders and local stacks. They are almost always fakes. Ask someone to confirm that none of them works anywhere, because a real key in a development file is still a real key. 4 other matchs set aside: expired tokens, licence tokens a vendor verifies with a public key, or placeholder text where a key would go. None grants access to anything.
| Slack token | 5 cited: Slack token, where fakes are usual |
| File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report. |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
39 SQL statements built from strings
adequate worth checking first39 places in product code build SQL by formatting or joining strings rather than passing parameters, and in 35 of them a value, not a table or column name, goes into the string. Where any of those values comes from a request, it is an injection point. Each site needs a look; the fix, parameters, is small.
The check that found this reads significant, but it has not yet held up often enough in Borehole's calibration to rate a finding significant on its own. Opening packages/agents-core/src/data-access/manage/projectLifecycle.ts:254 and the 1 other file it cites settles it. If it holds when someone checks it, this finding is significant.
| packages/agents-core/src/data-access/manage/projectLifecycle.ts | packages/agents-core/src/data-access/manage/projectLifecycle.ts:254 — SQL built from a string |
| packages/agents-core/src/db/manage/dolt-cleanup.ts | packages/agents-core/src/db/manage/dolt-cleanup.ts:31 — SQL built from a string |
| packages/agents-core/src/db/manage/dolt-cleanup.ts | packages/agents-core/src/db/manage/dolt-cleanup.ts:61 — SQL built from a string |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
75 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 69 high or critical in what ships
adequate worth checking first75 of 3,795 locked dependencies match 185 published advisories in OSV, 80 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version.
The check that found this reads significant, but it has not yet held up often enough in Borehole's calibration to rate a finding significant on its own. Opening create-agents-template/pnpm-lock.yaml settles it. If it holds when someone checks it, this finding is significant.
| create-agents-template/pnpm-lock.yaml | create-agents-template/pnpm-lock.yaml — next 16.3.8: GHSA-2464-fhr4-w9xw (critical), fixed in 16.4.1 |
| create-agents-template/pnpm-lock.yaml | create-agents-template/pnpm-lock.yaml — piscina 4.9.2: GHSA-67c8-pqhq-4rmx (critical), fixed in 4.9.4 |
| create-agents-template/pnpm-lock.yaml | create-agents-template/pnpm-lock.yaml — tinypool 1.1.1: GHSA-5gmw-xhrv-c9v3 (critical), fixed in 2.1.1 |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
The build runs third-party code it does not pin
adequate1 step pipes a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.
A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.
| .ai-dev/Dockerfile | .ai-dev/Dockerfile:35 — download piped into a shell |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
The licence is Elastic-2.0: source available, not open source
adequateLICENSE.md grants Elastic-2.0: source available, not open source; offering it as a managed service is not allowed. The reading comes from the licence's own title and clauses. Whether the terms fit the buyer's intended use, and whether any paid licence transfers with the code, is a question for counsel and the licensor.
A note that does not affect this rating: it names the project's licence, a fact for the first screen rather than a weakness.
| LICENSE.md | LICENSE.md:1 — 49 lines, Elastic-2.0 |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
1 advisory against this project in the last 24 months
adequateThe newest was published on 2026-05-11. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 1 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 0.68.4. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version. The record is incomplete: NVD: 272 records name agents with nothing tying them to this repository (CVE-1999-1355, CVE-2001-0134, CVE-2001-0728, …).
A note that does not affect this rating: it describes the project's advisory record, and no advisory in it is known to affect the surveyed commit.
| CVE-2026-8321 | 2026-05-11: CVE-2026-8321 (moderate): A vulnerability was detected in inkeep agents 0.58.14. This vulnerability affects the function createDevContext of the file agents-api/src/middleware/runAuth.ts |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Observability & Operations
06 · strong · ratings ↑2 of 11 deployed images carry no version, or `latest`
adequate2 images in the deployment configuration are named without a version or as `latest`. A redeploy can change the software without a commit, a rollback has nothing to roll back to, and nobody can say from the repository what is running.
A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.
| docker-compose.isolated.yml | docker-compose.isolated.yml:17 — image without a version |
| docker-compose.isolated.yml | docker-compose.isolated.yml:75 — image without a version |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Fit with the Acquirer
07 · not assessable · ratings ↑Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository. What a person adds here.
Check it on the running system
4 checks against the running system follow from the findings above: what a buyer's engineer will try, how to run it first, and what to have ready. A paid survey of this repository includes them.
A paid survey of a public repository is also reviewed: a language model reads each finding against the code and withdraws only findings it judges the code contradicts, each listed with its reason. The review is a language model's reading of the findings against the code, and it can be wrong. It never adds a finding, never raises a band, and never removes a finding from a proven check or an advisory that affects the surveyed version.
What a person adds
The survey reads what the repository can show. The code cannot settle these questions, and on them this report states nothing. Each says where its answer lives: your own engineer, the company, or an assessor you choose can settle it. Questions marked measured open with something this repository shows.
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
01 · full coverage- measured No architecture or design document is in the tree, across 3,972 product files. Where does the design live, and who holds it?
- Is the architecture right for the next three years of the product?
- Were the home-grown components reasonable choices when they were made, and are they now?
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
02 · high coverage- Is review real or a rubber stamp? Comment depth and time to approve need the pull request history.
- Is delivery planned and measured, or heroic?
- How are incidents run, reviewed and learned from?
Organization & Key-Person Risk
03 · partial coverage- measured 22 people have committed here. Which of them are you acquiring, and which are you replacing?
- Who mentors whom, and would that survive a departure?
- Can the team grow, and who stands behind the top three contributors?
- Is the seniority mix sound, and will pay survive your salary bands?
- Is the pace sustainable? Commit times cannot say: git keeps no reliable local time.
- Does the team want to stay after close?
- How are decisions made and disagreements resolved?
Product & Engineering Maturity
04 · minimal coverage- Can this team deliver the stated roadmap on the stated timeline?
- Does leadership know about the debt, and is time budgeted to repay it?
- Is the engineering shape consistent with the commercial story?
Security & Reliability Posture
05 · partial coverage- measured No threat model is in the tree of what looks like a running service. Does one exist elsewhere, and who owns it?
- What has actually broken, how often, and how badly?
- What did external testing find, and was it fixed?
- What is the SOC 2, ISO 27001 or GDPR status, and where is the evidence?
Observability & Operations
06 · partial coverage- measured Nothing in the tree backs up or restores data. How is data backed up, and has a restore ever been rehearsed?
- measured No alert rule is defined in the repository. Where are alerts defined, who receives them, and when did one last fire?
- Are the dashboards opened, the alerts acknowledged and the pages answered?
- Are the service-level objectives actually met?
- Who carries the pager, and how often does it go off?
- What does it cost to run, and how much headroom is there?
Fit with the Acquirer
07 · none coverageNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
- This is primarily a TypeScript codebase. Does your engineering organisation already run TypeScript in production, or would this be the first?
- The bulk of this system sits in packages/, agents-api/, agents-manage-ui/. Which of your existing systems would each of those have to absorb or replace?
- 30% of lines added in the last 12 months (23% of added lines) came through AI-declared commits. Does your organisation have a policy on inheriting and maintaining that code, and does your engineering team's tooling match how it was produced?
- The repository carries deployment configuration (.ai-dev/Dockerfile and 12 more). Does that match your deployment and on-call model, or does it need rehosting first?
- What is your tolerance for the findings above remaining unaddressed for the first two quarters after close, given everything else that will compete for this team's time?
- Which of these systems duplicate yours, and which get retired?
- What will integration cost, and in what order?
- Where does the team land in your organisation, and who reports to whom?
- Are there earn-outs, retention packages or contractor IP to assign?
- Do customer contracts limit hosting, regions or vendors?
A human assessment is Borehole's own paid service, €12,000+ (total price is determined per engagement; travel billed at cost). It is not independent of this report: the same business produced both. It is a separate contract, with its own scope, terms and reliance.
Embed the badge
Tied to this commit and this date, and it fades after 90 days — an honest badge is one that expires. A repository with significant findings gets a neutral "read" badge rather than a red one: the library is where the range is visible, not someone else's README.
[](/r/inkeep/agents/d6d91ed)If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.
Rejection log — 92 signals that ran and did not fire
Appendix: rejection log — 92 signals that ran and did not fire
Published on purpose. A signal that looked and decided not to fire has told you something, and this is the calibration data behind every threshold above.
Looked, and found nothing — 73
| Signal | What it found |
|---|---|
| 04.hotspot_concentration | change is spread across the codebase rather than pooling in a few filesfiles 10,143 · top5 share 0.017 |
| 04.debt_markers | debt markers are sparsemarkers 39 · per kloc 0.04 · lines read 940,450 |
| 04.dependency_sprawl | direct dependency counts are unremarkable |
| 04.test_growth | test effort kept pace with code writtenlate test per code 0.294 · early test per code 0.294 |
| 04.churn_trend | rework is not rising against new worklate delete per insert 0.311 · early delete per insert 0.565 |
| 04.eol_runtime | every pinned runtime is still supportedeol as of 2026-09-24 |
| 04.fixes_with_tests | fixes usually come with a testfixes 770 · share 0.323 · with tests 249 |
| 04.compat_layers | little code is kept for the old wayshare 0.0 · code files 2,774 · compat files 0 |
| 04.dependency_redundancy | one library per job, mostly |
| 06.telemetry_presence | a telemetry or error-reporting library is referencednote presence only; whether anyone watches it is not visible here · matches 276 |
| 06.structured_logging | a structured logging library is referencedmatches 6 |
| 06.healthcheck_presence | a health or readiness check is defined |
| 06.telemetry_depth | the service is visible in more than one way |
| 06.correlation_ids | a request can be followed through the logstracing True · request id sites 65 |
| 06.error_reporting | an error reporter is initialisedinitialised 3 · config files 6 |
| 06.usage_reporting_default | the product's code names no reporting hostsettings on 0 · settings off 2 |
| 06.environment_branching | environment differences live in configurationsites 5 |
| 06.release_markers | releases are markedtags last year 554 · release commits 0 · changelog commits 24 |
| 06.migrate_on_start | migrations do not run at container start |
| 03.contributor_concentration | no single contributor dominates the last 24 monthsyears 1.1 · window last 24 months · authors 22 |
| 03.active_contributors | more than one contributor active in the trailing yearall time 22 · active 12mo 21 |
| 03.knowledge_silos | every substantial directory has been touched by more than one personauthors 22 · directories 9 |
| 03.drive_by_contributors | a healthy share of contributors committed more than onceshare 0.091 · authors 22 · one commit authors 2 |
| 03.contributor_attrition | no contributor dominates enough for their absence to matterauthors 22 · top share less than a quarter · top contributor last committed within the last three months |
| 03.critical_path_ownership | more than one person changes the critical pathsauthors 22 |
| 03.second_contributor_attrition | the second and third contributors are still active |
| 03.joiners_and_leavers | the team is not shrinkingleft 1 · joined 7 · regular last year 19 |
| 02.merge_discipline | a meaningful share of recent change carries evidence of reviewmerges 35 · window last 24 months · with tracked 2 |
| 02.ci_presence | CI configuration is present in the working treecount 9 |
| 02.test_presence | tests are present in a normal proportion to sourcetests 713 · source 3,487 · test ratio 0.204 |
| 02.release_cadence | tags are presenttags 991 |
| 02.conventional_commits | commit subjects generally carry contentsampled 3,191 · low content share 0.018 |
| 02.branch_protection_hints | process scaffolding is present in the repository |
| 02.skipped_tests | few tests are switched offfocused 0 · skipped 129 · test files 864 |
| 02.ci_test_gating | no test run in CI is written so that it cannot failconfigs 9 |
| 02.revert_share | change is rarely undoneshare 0.013 · reverts 34 · recent commits 2,601 |
| 02.dependency_update_cadence | dependencies move with the codelockfiles 3 · commits since 11 · days since lockfile changed 23 |
| 02.lint_in_build | a linter or formatter runs in the buildwired 16 · ci configs 9 · product files 2,774 |
| 02.long_lived_branches | the typical branch reaches the trunk quicklyshare 0.0 · merges 22 · long lived 0 |
| 01.burst_import | no commit run met both the rate and the net-addition thresholdgap seconds 180 · min add ratio 3.0 · min net added 2,000 |
| 01.initial_dump | first commit is not a disproportionate share of the codebaseinsertions 188,812 · share of insertions 0.0854 |
| 01.message_uniformity | commit subjects vary in wording and lengthlength stdev 26.91 · repeat share 0.02 |
| 01.revision_depth | most files were revisited after they were first writtenfiles seen 3,769 · write once share 0.402 |
| 01.duplicated_blocks | little shipping code is repeated verbatim across filesshare 0.0285 · product files 2,774 · distinct blocks 257,980 |
| 01.swallowed_errors | errors are rarely thrown awayloc 944,577 · files 16 · per kloc 0.02 |
| 01.build_reproducibility | every base image names a versionfloating 0 · from lines 1 |
| 01.unfinished_migration | no language migration is stalled halfway |
| 01.weights_in_git | no model weights are committedfiles 0 |
| 05.security_guardrails | at least one standard guard rail is configured |
| 05.dependency_pinning | a lockfile is committed, so builds are reproduciblelockfile True |
| 05.license_present | a licence file is presentfound True |
| 05.container_runs_as_root | every shipped Dockerfile drops to a non-root user or builds on a non-root base imagedockerfiles 1 |
| 05.secrets_management_pattern | no environment file is committed outside tests and examplesenv files 0 |
| 05.shell_from_strings | product code does not build shell commands from stringssites 0 |
| 05.unsafe_deserialization | no code-executing deserialiser in product codesites 0 |
| 05.tls_verification_off | no TLS verification is switched off in product codefiles 0 · sites 0 · pinned instead 0 |
| 05.privileged_workloads | no workload runs privileged or in the host's namespacessites 0 · behind a setting or built here 0 |
| 05.credentials_in_deploy_config | deployment configuration references secrets, never holds themfiles 0 · sites 0 |
| 05.unsafe_html | raw HTML is rare, literal or sanitisedsites 2 |
| 05.source_maps_shipped | production builds do not publish source mapssites 0 |
| 05.signing_material | no signing keystore or profile is committedfiles 0 |
| 05.license_vendored_unlicensed | no vendored third-party code is committedcomponents 0 |
| 05.committed_native_libraries | no widely used compiled library is committed to the productlibraries 0 |
| 04.api_versions_coexisting | one API version is served, or none |
| 04.deprecations_lingering | few deprecations have outlived two yearsolder than two years 0 · files with deprecations 14 |
| 04.dependency_churn | few dependencies were added and dropped within 60 daysdependencies seen 326 · added in two years 326 · removed within 60 days 24 |
| 04.ci_platforms_dropped | no platform was dropped from CI in the last two years |
| 04.repository_status | the README's first screen states no end, move or freezestatements 0 |
| 05.licence_changes | the root licence has not changed in the history readlicence versions 1 · unreleased changes 0 |
| 05.paid_edition | no directory carries a separate paid-edition licencedirectories 0 |
| 04.releases_stopped | releases keep pace with developmentmedian gap days 0.0 · days since last tag 202 · commits last 90 days 59 |
| 04.release_branch | the newest release was cut from the branch surveyedelsewhere 0 · on branch 96 · tags in window 96 |
| 03.single_maintainer | no file says one person maintains itstatements 0 |
Could not conclude, or did not apply — 19
Not a clean result. Each says why it could not answer here.
| Signal | Why |
|---|---|
| 04.fix_share_trend | fewer than six busy quarters to compare |
| 04.schema_churn | no schema migrations to read |
| 06.print_logging | a frontend: console output is the browser's, not the server's |
| 06.alert_rules | no alert rules in the repository; they may live in a console |
| 06.probes_identical | no Kubernetes probes |
| 06.single_replica | no Kubernetes deployments |
| 06.feature_flags | no feature-flag service; flags may live elsewhere |
| 03.bus_factor_trend | fewer than three active years to compare |
| 01.notebook_outputs | not a data or machine-learning repository |
| 05.outbound_timeouts | not assessed for TypeScript, the language the product is written in: this check's patterns read other languages only |
| 05.migration_reversibility | too few migrations to judge |
| 05.resource_limits | no Kubernetes workload manifests |
| 05.cleartext_traffic | not a mobile app |
| 05.dataset_provenance | not a data or machine-learning repository |
| 05.license_copyleft_inherited | no third-party code is committed to this repository, so the licences it depends on are resolved at build time and are not readable here |
| 05.license_manifest_conflict | manifest licence 'SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE.md' is not a recognised SPDX identifier |
| 04.flags_accumulating | few or no feature flags in the history |
| 05.project_advisories | record incomplete: no advisory found in the sources that answered; OSV npm @inkeep/agents-api (an empty record for a package published here), OSV npm @inkeep/agents-cli (an empty record for a package published here), OSV npm @inkeep/agents-manage-ui (an empty record for a package published here), OSV npm @inkeep/agents-core (an empty record for a package published here), OSV npm @inkeep/agents-email (an empty record for a package published here), OSV npm @inkeep/agents-mcp (an empty record for a package published here), OSV npm @inkeep/agents-sdk (an empty record for a package published here), OSV npm @inkeep/agents-work-apps (an empty record for a package published here), OSV npm @inkeep/ai-sdk-provider (an empty record for a package published here), OSV npm @inkeep/create-agents (an empty record for a package published here) did not; NVD: 272 records name agents with nothing tying them to this repository (CVE-1999-1355, CVE-2001-0134, CVE-2001-0728, …) |
| 05.project_exploited | no affecting advisory is on CISA's Known Exploited list |
Anyone can check this report against the authoritative record — click the stamp, or enter SG2C-VQ0W-R3NY at borehole.dev/verify.
The code commits to the 106 checks this run performed, the bands they produced, and the commit they were read at. It does not cover checks written since.
Put the mark in your README
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Where this scan ran
This scan ran on ordinary cloud infrastructure (cloud-run), not in a hardware-isolated confidential VM. Nothing about it is attested by Google.
What an attested survey proves, and what it does not.
What this scan did with the repository — 7 steps
Written by the steps themselves as they ran, not described afterwards. A hand-written account of a data flow drifts the first time somebody changes the flow and not the account.
| At | Step | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0s | read repository metadata from the GitHub API | size mb: 348.9authenticated: False |
| 18.7s | cloned the repository to a temporary directory | depth: full |
| 28.2s | read the git history | commits: 3226tracked files: 5243 |
| 223.8s | ran the deterministic checks | blame pass: Falseread working tree: False |
| 223.8s | recorded where this scan ran | attested: Falseenvironment: cloud-run |
| 340.0s | kept the facts, never the source, for re-reading under new checks | |
| 340.0s | deleting the working copy |
Total 340.0s ·source content sent off this machine: none · calls to a language model: 0 · the clone was deleted when the survey ended
An automated reading of a repository's code and its history up to one commit, with public advisory records. It may be wrong, it is not legal, financial, investment or security advice, and it does not replace diligence by a qualified person. It is provided for information: nobody may rely on it (Borehole's terms, section 3).