Borehole · Risk register · free tier

higress-group/higress

Free reading: not for reliance

36f2f1a · 1,963 commits · 2,683 files
Issued 2026-10-23

Nothing significant. Questions worth asking about Security & Reliability Posture, Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance.

104 checks ran across 6 assessable dimensions. 1 finding is worth checking first. 14 findings, each with evidence. One dimension cannot be assessed without an acquirer.

What the repository says about itself

03.60 The project says one person maintains it SECURITY.md:88
states a policy on AI-generated contributions .github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md:133
names CNCF README.md:14
names OpenSSF README.md:15
names Cloud Native Computing Foundation README.md:244
names Linux Foundation README.md:252
7 submodule(s) this survey does not read: istio/api, istio/istio, istio/client-go .gitmodules:1

Worth checking first

Borehole's proprietary scoring is calibrated across hundreds of repositories. Each finding here reads significant, but its check has not yet held up often enough in that calibration to rate significant on its own. If one holds when someone checks it, it is significant.

05.26 40 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 7 high or critical in what ships

Published under today's rules. The verification code attests to this reading as it was stored. This page differs from it as follows.

2 findings from checks Borehole's calibration found wrong more often than right are no longer published.
The file and line of 5 credential-shaped matches are withheld. File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report.

	Dimension	Rating
01	Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance	adequate
02	Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity	strong
03	Organization & Key-Person Risk	adequate
04	Product & Engineering Maturity	adequate
05	Security & Reliability Posture	adequate
06	Observability & Operations	strong
07	Fit with the Acquirer	not assessable

strong adequate significant findings not assessable from a repository

Provenance disclosure does not affect any rating

0% of added lines arrived in commits declaring an AI agent as co-author

The surviving-lines measurement was not run on this repository.

5% of lines added in the last 12 months (since 2025-10-23) arrived in AI-declared commits: 19/581 commits, confidence high. Also a floor.

19/1,951 commits declaring an agent · Claude, Claude Opus 4.6, Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) and 3 more

confidence: moderate

28% of non-merge commits carry any trailer at all
low trailer coverage: the convention may not be in consistent use
no widespread author/committer date divergence

61,180 lines excluded as lockfiles, vendored or generated.

This is a lower bound. It counts what the repository declares. Undeclared AI authorship is invisible here, and a single rebase removes the trailers this rests on. Absence of a declaration is absence of disclosure, not absence of AI authorship.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · adequate · ratings ↑

01.25

1 base image floats: no version, or `latest`

adequate

1 of 12 `FROM` lines in product Dockerfiles name an image without a version, or with `latest`. Each build pulls whatever the registry serves that day, so the image that ships can change without a commit, and last month's build cannot be reproduced. Pin a version, or a digest.

Evidence

plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/local/Dockerfile plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/local/Dockerfile:1 — base image without a version

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.

A note that does not affect this rating

01.6

plugins/wasm-cpp/common/nlohmann_json.hpp is 22,876 lines, 140× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 163 lines. 7 files exceed 1,630 lines, the largest being 22,876. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down. Measured against its own codebase's median, it is larger than 85% of 382 surveyed projects' largest files.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

line-count	`plugins/wasm-cpp/common/nlohmann_json.hpp:1` — 22,876 lines (140× median)
line-count	`pkg/ingress/kube/gateway/istio/conversion.go:1` — 2,755 lines (16× median)
line-count	`pkg/ingress/config/ingress_config.go:1` — 2,300 lines (14× median)
line-count	`plugins/wasm-go/extensions/ai-proxy/provider/vertex.go:1` — 1,766 lines (10× median)
line-count	`plugins/wasm-go/extensions/ai-proxy/provider/bedrock.go:1` — 1,757 lines (10× median)

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · strong · ratings ↑

No finding. 16 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · adequate · ratings ↑

03.60

The project says one person maintains it

adequate

Its own files say so. Whatever the commit counts show, the project describes itself as depending on one person.

Evidence

SECURITY.md SECURITY.md:88 — says it has a single maintainer

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · adequate · ratings ↑

04.20

Fixes are 61% of recent work, up from 27%

adequate

In the last two quarters 61% of commits were fixes, against 27% in the quarters before. Rising fix work usually means quality debt is coming due, and it takes time that new work would have had.

Evidence

fix share by quarter

66%, 56%, 29%, 20%, 31%, 30%, 21%, 28%

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

A note that does not affect this rating

04.17

Go 1.23 is past end of life

adequate

The code is pinned to Go 1.23 (end of life 2025-08-12). None of these receives security fixes any more; the first stopped on 2025-08-12. Moving off an unsupported runtime is rarely a one-line change, so a buyer should ask whether the upgrade is planned and what it touches.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

plugins/golang-filter/Dockerfile plugins/golang-filter/Dockerfile — Go 1.23, end of life 2025-08-12

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · adequate · ratings ↑

05.1

13 credential-shaped strings in the tree sit in tests, examples, documentation or local development settings

adequate

Strings shaped like credentials appear only where fakes are usual: test fixtures, examples, documentation, placeholders and local stacks. They are almost always fakes. Ask someone to confirm that none of them works anywhere, because a real key in a development file is still a real key. 38 other matchs set aside: expired tokens, licence tokens a vendor verifies with a public key, or placeholder text where a key would go. None grants access to anything.

Evidence

JWT	5 cited: JWT, where fakes are usual
	File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report.

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.6

8 Dockerfiles run the application as root

adequate

No USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.

Evidence

no-USER-instruction	`plugins/golang-filter/Dockerfile` — runs as root
no-USER-instruction	`plugins/wasm-cpp/Dockerfile` — runs as root
no-USER-instruction	`plugins/wasm-go/Dockerfile` — runs as root
no-USER-instruction	`plugins/wasm-go/extensions/api-workflow/Dockerfile` — runs as root

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.26

40 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 7 high or critical in what ships

adequate worth checking first

40 of 647 locked dependencies match 152 published advisories in OSV, 76 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.

The check that found this reads significant, but it has not yet held up often enough in Borehole's calibration to rate a finding significant on its own. Opening hgctl/go.mod and the 2 other files it cites settles it. If it holds when someone checks it, this finding is significant.

Evidence

hgctl/go.mod	`hgctl/go.mod` — github.com/getkin/kin-openapi v0.118.0: GHSA-r277-6w6q-xmqw (critical), fixed in 0.144.0
plugins/golang-filter/go.mod	`plugins/golang-filter/go.mod` — github.com/jackc/pgx/v5 v5.5.5: GHSA-9jj7-4m8r-rfcm (critical), fixed in 5.9.0
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/jsonrpc-converter/go.mod	`plugins/wasm-go/extensions/jsonrpc-converter/go.mod` — golang.org/x/crypto v0.26.0: GHSA-5cgq-3rg8-m6cv (critical), fixed in 0.52.0

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Notes that do not affect this rating

05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

7 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

.github/workflows/build-and-test-plugin.yaml	`.github/workflows/build-and-test-plugin.yaml:47` — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/build-and-test-plugin.yaml	`.github/workflows/build-and-test-plugin.yaml:64` — action pinned by tag

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.13

2 outbound calls can wait forever

adequate

2 HTTP calls use a client with no timeout (Python `requests` without `timeout=`, or Go's default client). When a dependency slows down, each one holds a worker until the connection gives up, and enough of them take the service down with the dependency.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

plugins/wasm-go/mcp-servers/mcp-scripts/translate_readme.py	`plugins/wasm-go/mcp-servers/mcp-scripts/translate_readme.py:45` — outbound call without a timeout
plugins/wasm-go/mcp-servers/mcp-scripts/yaml_to_markdown.py	`plugins/wasm-go/mcp-servers/mcp-scripts/yaml_to_markdown.py:47` — outbound call without a timeout

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.21

5 shell commands built from strings

adequate

5 places run a command through a shell (`shell=True`, `os.system`, `exec` with a template) rather than passing arguments. Where any part comes from outside, it is command injection. Ask where each one's input comes from.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

.agents/skills/agent-session-monitor/main.py	`.agents/skills/agent-session-monitor/main.py:463` — command run through a shell
hgctl/pkg/agent/base.go	`hgctl/pkg/agent/base.go:331` — command run through a shell
hgctl/pkg/agent/base.go	`hgctl/pkg/agent/base.go:461` — command run through a shell

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.65

1 advisory against this project in the last 24 months

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-09-16. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 1 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 2.2.5. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version.

A note that does not affect this rating: it describes the project's advisory record, and no advisory in it is known to affect the surveyed commit.

Evidence

CVE-2026-92790

2026-09-16: CVE-2026-92790 (moderate): Higress before 2.2.4 panics when processing a Cookie header segment without an equals sign, causing the plugin wrapper to recover and return a continue action t

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Observability & Operations

06 · strong · ratings ↑

Notes that do not affect this rating

06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

error reporting

no error reporter initialised

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

06.18

5 of 5 deployed images carry no version, or `latest`

adequate

5 images in the deployment configuration are named without a version or as `latest`. A redeploy can change the software without a commit, a rollback has nothing to roll back to, and nobody can say from the repository what is running.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

helm/core/values.yaml	`helm/core/values.yaml:767` — image without a version
helm/core/values.yaml	`helm/core/values.yaml:436` — image without a version
helm/core/values.yaml	`helm/core/values.yaml:580` — image without a version

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · not assessable · ratings ↑

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository. What a person adds here.

Check it on the running system

9 checks against the running system follow from the findings above: what a buyer's engineer will try, how to run it first, and what to have ready. A paid survey of this repository includes them. See the tiers.

A paid survey of a public repository is also reviewed: a language model reads each finding against the code and withdraws only findings it judges the code contradicts, each listed with its reason. The review is a language model's reading of the findings against the code, and it can be wrong. It never adds a finding, never raises a band, and never removes a finding from a proven check or an advisory that affects the surveyed version.

What a person adds

The survey reads what the repository can show. The code cannot settle these questions, and on them this report states nothing. Each says where its answer lives: your own engineer, the company, or an assessor you choose can settle it. Questions marked measured open with something this repository shows.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · full coverage

measured The tree carries design documentation (docs/architecture.md). Does it match what the team believes today? Ask them to walk through it against the code. Answer lives in: The team01.38
measured The repository pulls code in through git submodules (.gitmodules). A buyer receives pointers, not that code. Can every submodule be fetched without the team's credentials, and who owns each one? Answer lives in: The team and the submodule owners01.35
Is the architecture right for the next three years of the product? Answer lives in: Your architects, with the product roadmap01.39
Were the home-grown components reasonable choices when they were made, and are they now? Answer lives in: The team's reasoning at the time01.40

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · high coverage

Is review real or a rubber stamp? Comment depth and time to approve need the pull request history. Answer lives in: The code host's pull request data02.32
Is delivery planned and measured, or heroic? Answer lives in: The issue tracker: backlog, sprint history, estimate accuracy02.38
How are incidents run, reviewed and learned from? Answer lives in: Tickets, chat and postmortems02.37

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · partial coverage

measured One contributor authored a quarter or more of the commits in this history. Is that person part of the transaction, and for how long after it? Answer lives in: The deal terms03.29
Who mentors whom, and would that survive a departure? Answer lives in: The team; review history only suggests candidates03.28
Can the team grow, and who stands behind the top three contributors? Answer lives in: Recruiting data and the org chart03.30
Is the seniority mix sound, and will pay survive your salary bands? Answer lives in: HR data03.31
Is the pace sustainable? Commit times cannot say: git keeps no reliable local time. Answer lives in: Interviews and on-call history03.14
Does the team want to stay after close? Answer lives in: Interviews03.32
How are decisions made and disagreements resolved? Answer lives in: Time with the team03.33

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · minimal coverage

measured A roadmap file is in the tree (ROADMAP.md, last changed August 2026). A file is not a plan. Does it match the roadmap in the data room, and has the team delivered the last one it wrote? Answer lives in: The data room04.22
Does leadership know about the debt, and is time budgeted to repay it? Answer lives in: Budget and roadmap decisions04.31
Is the engineering shape consistent with the commercial story? Answer lives in: Revenue, customer and churn data04.33

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · partial coverage

measured 05.1 and 05.5 found credential-shaped strings in this repository. Was each one revoked at the provider? Deleting it from the code revokes nothing; only the provider's audit log shows that it was. Answer lives in: The provider's console and audit log05.38
measured No threat model is in the tree of what looks like a running service. Does one exist elsewhere, and who owns it? Answer lives in: The security owner05.43
What has actually broken, how often, and how badly? Answer lives in: Ticketing and chat05.41
What did external testing find, and was it fixed? Answer lives in: Reports in the data room05.42
What is the SOC 2, ISO 27001 or GDPR status, and where is the evidence? Answer lives in: Audit reports; policy files in the tree are not evidence05.44

Observability & Operations

06 · partial coverage

measured Nothing in the tree backs up or restores data. How is data backed up, and has a restore ever been rehearsed? Answer lives in: The operations team06.19
measured No alert rule is defined in the repository. Where are alerts defined, who receives them, and when did one last fire? Answer lives in: The alerting tool and the on-call rota06.10
Are the dashboards opened, the alerts acknowledged and the pages answered? Answer lives in: Pager history and dashboard logs06.29
Are the service-level objectives actually met? Answer lives in: Production metrics06.30
Who carries the pager, and how often does it go off? Answer lives in: Pager exports and interviews06.31
What does it cost to run, and how much headroom is there? Answer lives in: Cloud billing and capacity plans06.32

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · none coverage

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

This is primarily a Go codebase. Does your engineering organisation already run Go in production, or would this be the first? 07.1
The bulk of this system sits in plugins/, pkg/, istio/. Which of your existing systems would each of those have to absorb or replace? 07.10
The repository carries deployment configuration (docker/Dockerfile.base and 72 more). Does that match your deployment and on-call model, or does it need rehosting first? 07.2
What is your tolerance for the findings above remaining unaddressed for the first two quarters after close, given everything else that will compete for this team's time?
Which of these systems duplicate yours, and which get retired? Answer lives in: Your architecture07.11
What will integration cost, and in what order? Answer lives in: The engagement07.12
Where does the team land in your organisation, and who reports to whom? Answer lives in: Your org design07.13
Are there earn-outs, retention packages or contractor IP to assign? Answer lives in: Deal terms07.14
Do customer contracts limit hosting, regions or vendors? Answer lives in: Customer contracts07.15

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Rejection log — 90 signals that ran and did not fire

Appendix: rejection log — 90 signals that ran and did not fire

Published on purpose. A signal that looked and decided not to fire has told you something, and this is the calibration data behind every threshold above.

Looked, and found nothing — 73

Signal	What it found
04.hotspot_concentration	change is spread across the codebase rather than pooling in a few filesfiles 3,478 · top5 share 0.054
04.debt_markers	debt markers are sparsemarkers 184 · per kloc 0.33 · lines read 551,168
04.dependency_sprawl	direct dependency counts are unremarkable
04.churn_trend	rework is not rising against new worklate delete per insert 0.242 · early delete per insert 0.09
04.fixes_with_tests	fixes usually come with a testfixes 423 · share 0.381 · with tests 161
04.compat_layers	little code is kept for the old wayshare 0.0 · code files 705 · compat files 0
06.telemetry_presence	a telemetry or error-reporting library is referencednote presence only; whether anyone watches it is not visible here · matches 21
06.structured_logging	a structured logging library is referencedmatches 8
06.healthcheck_presence	a health or readiness check is defined
06.telemetry_depth	the service is visible in more than one way
06.print_logging	raw prints are few, or outnumbered by logger callsprints 209 · logger calls 1,550
06.correlation_ids	a request can be followed through the logstracing True · request id sites 18
06.usage_reporting_default	the product's code names no reporting hostsettings on 0 · settings off 1
06.probes_identical	readiness and liveness are distinct, or not both setidentical 0 · workloads with both 1
06.single_replica	an autoscaler or disruption budget is definedworkloads 5
06.environment_branching	environment differences live in configurationsites 0
06.release_markers	releases are markedtags last year 9 · release commits 7 · changelog commits 24
06.migrate_on_start	migrations do not run at container start
03.contributor_concentration	no single contributor dominates the last 24 monthsyears 4.0 · window last 24 months · authors 217
03.active_contributors	more than one contributor active in the trailing yearall time 217 · active 12mo 83
03.drive_by_contributors	an open contributor base, where one-commit contributors are normalauthors 217 · one off share 0.535
03.contributor_attrition	the dominant contributor is still activeauthors 217 · top share a quarter or more · top contributor last committed within the last three months
03.critical_path_ownership	more than one person changes the critical pathsauthors 139
03.second_contributor_attrition	the second and third contributors are still active
03.bus_factor_trend	the team has not narrowed to one person
03.joiners_and_leavers	the team is not shrinkingleft 17 · joined 16 · regular last year 23
02.merge_discipline	a meaningful share of recent change carries evidence of reviewmerges 0 · window last 24 months · with tracked 3
02.ci_presence	CI configuration is present in the working treecount 29
02.test_presence	tests are present in a normal proportion to sourcetests 498 · source 1,134 · test ratio 0.439
02.release_cadence	tags are presenttags 83
02.conventional_commits	commit subjects generally carry contentsampled 1,951 · low content share 0.001
02.branch_protection_hints	process scaffolding is present in the repository
02.ci_runs_tests	CI invokes a test runnerconfigs 29 · with tests 6
02.skipped_tests	few tests are switched offfocused 0 · skipped 0 · test files 739
02.ci_test_gating	no test run in CI is written so that it cannot failconfigs 29
02.revert_share	change is rarely undoneshare 0.005 · reverts 6 · recent commits 1,153
02.dependency_update_cadence	dependencies move with the codelockfiles 94 · commits since 3 · days since lockfile changed 0
02.flaky_test_markers	tests are not retried until they passtest retries 0 · suite retries 0
02.lint_in_build	a linter or formatter runs in the buildwired 1 · ci configs 29 · product files 705
02.commit_size	changes arrive in reviewable sizesshare 0.036 · commits 1,030 · over 2000 lines 37
01.burst_import	no commit run met both the rate and the net-addition thresholdgap seconds 180 · min add ratio 3.0 · min net added 2,000
01.initial_dump	first commit is not a disproportionate share of the codebaseinsertions 201 · share of insertions 0.0001
01.message_uniformity	commit subjects vary in wording and lengthlength stdev 25.36 · repeat share 0.113
01.revision_depth	most files were revisited after they were first writtenfiles seen 1,385 · write once share 0.467
01.duplicated_blocks	little shipping code is repeated verbatim across filesshare 0.0238 · product files 652 · distinct blocks 125,666
01.swallowed_errors	errors are rarely thrown awayloc 553,319 · files 3 · per kloc 0.01
01.unfinished_migration	no language migration is stalled halfway
01.weights_in_git	no model weights are committedfiles 0
05.security_guardrails	at least one standard guard rail is configured
05.dependency_pinning	a lockfile is committed, so builds are reproduciblelockfile True
05.license_present	a licence file is presentfound True
05.secrets_management_pattern	no environment file is committed outside tests and examplesenv files 0
05.sql_from_strings	no SQL is assembled from strings in product codefiles 0 · sites 0 · value interpolated 0
05.unsafe_deserialization	no code-executing deserialiser in product codesites 0
05.tls_verification_off	no TLS verification is switched off in product codefiles 0 · sites 0 · pinned instead 0
05.resource_limits	every workload declares limitsworkloads 6 · without limits 0
05.privileged_workloads	no workload runs privileged or in the host's namespacessites 0 · behind a setting or built here 0
05.credentials_in_deploy_config	deployment configuration references secrets, never holds themfiles 0 · sites 0
05.signing_material	no signing keystore or profile is committedfiles 0
05.license_vendored_unlicensed	no vendored third-party code is committedcomponents 0
05.license_grant_unclear	the licence is recognisable as Apache-2.0class permissive · license Apache-2.0
05.committed_native_libraries	no widely used compiled library is committed to the productlibraries 0
04.api_versions_coexisting	one API version is served, or none
04.deprecations_lingering	few deprecations have outlived two yearsolder than two years 3 · files with deprecations 6
04.dependency_churn	few dependencies were added and dropped within 60 daysdependencies seen 395 · added in two years 131 · removed within 60 days 0
04.ci_platforms_dropped	no platform was dropped from CI in the last two years
04.repository_status	the README's first screen states no end, move or freezestatements 0
02.development_elsewhere	nothing says development happens elsewhereno pr statements 0 · mirror statements 0 · replayed commit share 0.0
05.licence_changes	the root licence has not changed in the history readlicence versions 1 · unreleased changes 0
05.paid_edition	no directory carries a separate paid-edition licencedirectories 0
04.releases_stopped	releases keep pace with developmentmedian gap days 34.0 · days since last tag 18 · commits last 90 days 229
04.release_branch	the newest release was cut from the branch surveyedelsewhere 2 · on branch 69 · tags in window 71
05.project_exploited	no affecting advisory is on CISA's Known Exploited listexploited 0

Could not conclude, or did not apply — 17

Not a clean result. Each says why it could not answer here.

Signal	Why
04.test_growth	tests are kept inside the files they test, which a count by file name cannot see
04.schema_churn	no schema migrations to read
04.dependency_redundancy	no JavaScript manifest to read
06.alert_rules	no alert rules in the repository; they may live in a console
06.feature_flags	no feature-flag service; flags may live elsewhere
02.long_lived_branches	too few merges to judge (squash and rebase leave none)
01.notebook_outputs	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.migration_reversibility	too few migrations to judge
05.public_env_secret	not a frontend
05.unsafe_html	not a frontend
05.source_maps_shipped	not a frontend
05.cleartext_traffic	not a mobile app
05.dataset_provenance	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.license_copyleft_inherited	no third-party code is committed to this repository, so the licences it depends on are resolved at build time and are not readable here
05.license_manifest_conflict	no packaging manifest states a licence
04.flags_accumulating	few or no feature flags in the history
05.project_advisories	could not tell whether 1 published advisory affects the surveyed code: its version could not be placed

Anyone can check this report against the authoritative record — click the stamp, or enter 35RN-D3RY-5EJX at borehole.dev/verify.

The code commits to the 106 checks this run performed, the bands they produced, and the commit they were read at. It does not cover checks written since.

Put the mark in your README

The image is wrapped in a link to the verification page, so a reader can check it rather than take it on trust. If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.

[![Borehole reading, not a certification](https://borehole.dev/badge/higress-group/higress/36f2f1a.svg "Borehole free reading: not for reliance. See the full report.")](https://borehole.dev/verify/35RND3RY5EJX?via=badge)

Where this scan ran

This scan ran on ordinary cloud infrastructure (cloud-run), not in a hardware-isolated confidential VM. Nothing about it is attested by Google.

What an attested survey proves, and what it does not.

What this scan did with the repository — 7 steps

Written by the steps themselves as they ran, not described afterwards. A hand-written account of a data flow drifts the first time somebody changes the flow and not the account.

At	Step	Detail
0.0s	read repository metadata from the GitHub API	size mb: 42.2authenticated: False
3.9s	cloned the repository to a temporary directory	depth: full
6.1s	read the git history	commits: 1963tracked files: 2683
108.2s	ran the deterministic checks	blame pass: Falseread working tree: False
108.2s	recorded where this scan ran	attested: Falseenvironment: cloud-run
173.8s	kept the facts, never the source, for re-reading under new checks
173.8s	deleting the working copy

Total 173.8s ·source content sent off this machine: none · calls to a language model: 0 · the clone was deleted when the survey ended

An automated reading of a repository's code and its history up to one commit, with public advisory records. It may be wrong, it is not legal, financial, investment or security advice, and it does not replace diligence by a qualified person. It is provided for information: nobody may rely on it (Borehole's terms, section 3).

BOREHOLE 0.7.15 DETERMINISTIC LAYER · NO MODEL CALLSREAD ON BOREHOLE'S SERVER · CLONE DELETED TAKEDOWNCONTRIBUTED TO THIS REPOSITORY? YOUR RIGHTS