Borehole · Risk register · free tier

gitpod-io/gitpod

Free reading: not for reliance

be07f43 · 12,534 commits · 4,471 files
Issued 2026-10-22

Nothing significant. Questions worth asking about Security & Reliability Posture, Organization & Key-Person Risk.

102 checks ran across 6 assessable dimensions. 2 findings are worth checking first. 20 findings, each with evidence. One dimension cannot be assessed without an acquirer.

What the repository says about itself

04.62 Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed
05.61 36 files are named as enterprise-edition code components/ee/agent-smith/.gitignore

Worth checking first

Borehole's proprietary scoring is calibrated across hundreds of repositories. Each finding here reads significant, but its check has not yet held up often enough in that calibration to rate significant on its own. If one holds when someone checks it, it is significant.

05.26 115 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 7 high or critical in what ships
05.8 Manifest says proprietary, licence file says AGPL-3.0

What this survey read. This commit may not be the product users run: The newest release, 2022.11.3, is not on the branch this survey read; the newest release on it is 2022.05.0. Read this report as describing that commit, not the release users run. Survey the release branch or tag as well.

Published under today's rules. The verification code attests to this reading as it was stored. This page differs from it as follows.

4 findings from checks Borehole's calibration found wrong more often than right are no longer published.

	Dimension	Rating
01	Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance	strong
02	Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity	strong
03	Organization & Key-Person Risk	adequate
04	Product & Engineering Maturity	adequate
05	Security & Reliability Posture	adequate
06	Observability & Operations	adequate
07	Fit with the Acquirer	not assessable

strong adequate significant findings not assessable from a repository

Provenance disclosure does not affect any rating

0% of added lines arrived in commits declaring an AI agent as co-author

The surviving-lines measurement was not run on this repository.

0% of lines added in the last 12 months (since 2025-10-22) arrived in AI-declared commits: 0/118 commits, confidence high. Also a floor.

7/12,533 commits declaring an agent · Claude, Copilot

confidence: low

11% of non-merge commits carry any trailer at all
low trailer coverage: the convention may not be in consistent use
28% of commits show author/committer date divergence, which is the shape of replayed history that can drop trailers

456,633 lines excluded as lockfiles, vendored or generated.

This is a lower bound. It counts what the repository declares. Undeclared AI authorship is invisible here, and a single rebase removes the trailers this rests on. Absence of a declaration is absence of disclosure, not absence of AI authorship.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · strong · ratings ↑

A note that does not affect this rating

01.6

components/server/src/workspace/gitpod-server-impl.ts is 2,874 lines, 44× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 64 lines. 14 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 2,874. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

A note that does not affect this rating: measured against its own codebase's median, it is below the 85th percentile of 382 surveyed projects' largest files, where this check begins to count.

Evidence

line-count	`components/server/src/workspace/gitpod-server-impl.ts:1` — 2,874 lines (44× median)
line-count	`components/gitpod-protocol/go/gitpod-service.go:1` — 2,355 lines (36× median)
line-count	`components/server/src/workspace/workspace-starter.ts:1` — 2,167 lines (33× median)
line-count	`components/supervisor/pkg/supervisor/supervisor.go:1` — 2,031 lines (31× median)
line-count	`components/public-api/typescript-common/src/public-api-converter.ts:1` — 1,994 lines (31× median)

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · strong · ratings ↑

No finding. 16 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · adequate · ratings ↑

03.12

The next contributor after the top one has not committed here for more than a year

adequate

The #2 contributor of the last three years (less than a quarter of the commits) has not committed here for more than a year, while the repository is still active. These are the people a buyer assumes would step up if the top contributor stopped. The history shows only that no commits of theirs landed here, not why.

Evidence

git shortlog -sn

the #2 contributor of the last three years (less than a quarter of the commits) has not committed here for more than a year

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

03.26

The bus factor fell from 7 to 1

adequate

Year by year, newest first, the number of people who wrote half the changes was 1, 3, 3, 7. The team narrowed to one person, which is a different risk from one that always was: the code does not say why.

Evidence

bus factor by year

1, 3, 3, 7

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

03.27

Regular contributors fell from 11 to 3 in a year

adequate

6 people who committed regularly the year before made no commits in the last year, and 0 new regular contributors arrived. Ask whether the work they did is still covered.

Evidence

regular contributors by year

11 then 3; 6 stopped committing, 0 began

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · adequate · ratings ↑

04.19

19% of bug fixes add or change a test

adequate

Of 83 fixes in the last 24 months, 16 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.

Evidence

fix commits touching tests

16 of 83

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Notes that do not affect this rating

04.38

97 files still carry code deprecated more than two years ago

adequate

97 files were marked deprecated over two years ago and still are, the oldest since Aug 2020. A deprecation is a promise to remove. Ask what still depends on these, and whether removing them is scheduled.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

components/gitpod-protocol/src/protocol.ts	`components/gitpod-protocol/src/protocol.ts` — deprecated since Aug 2020
components/gitpod-db/src/typeorm/entity/db-identity.ts	`components/gitpod-db/src/typeorm/entity/db-identity.ts` — deprecated since Aug 2020
components/gitpod-protocol/src/gitpod-service.ts	`components/gitpod-protocol/src/gitpod-service.ts` — deprecated since Nov 2020
components/supervisor-api/go/control.pb.go	`components/supervisor-api/go/control.pb.go` — deprecated since Nov 2020
components/supervisor-api/go/status.pb.go	`components/supervisor-api/go/status.pb.go` — deprecated since Nov 2020

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

04.62

Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed

adequate

The newest release, 2022.11.3, is not on the branch this survey read; the newest release on it is 2022.05.0. The shipped product may differ from what this report describes. Survey the release branch too.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

9ae8bfde2

tag 2022.11.3

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · adequate · ratings ↑

05.6

2 Dockerfiles run the application as root

adequate

No USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.

Evidence

no-USER-instruction	`components/ide-proxy/Dockerfile` — runs as root
no-USER-instruction	`components/proxy/Dockerfile` — runs as root

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.26

115 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 7 high or critical in what ships

adequate worth checking first

115 of 3,124 locked dependencies match 196 published advisories in OSV, 98 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.

The check that found this reads significant, but it has not yet held up often enough in Borehole's calibration to rate a finding significant on its own. Opening components/ide-metrics-api/typescript-grpc/yarn.lock and the 1 other file it cites settles it. If it holds when someone checks it, this finding is significant.

Evidence

components/ide-metrics-api/typescript-grpc/yarn.lock	`components/ide-metrics-api/typescript-grpc/yarn.lock` — handlebars 4.7.7: GHSA-2w6w-674q-4c4q (critical), fixed in 4.7.9
components/ide-metrics-api/typescript-grpc/yarn.lock	`components/ide-metrics-api/typescript-grpc/yarn.lock` — tar 6.1.11: GHSA-23hp-3jrh-7fpw (critical), fixed in 7.5.19
components/proxy/plugins/jsonselect/go.mod	`components/proxy/plugins/jsonselect/go.mod` — github.com/buger/jsonparser v1.1.1: GHSA-6g7g-w4f8-9c9x (high), fixed in 1.1.2

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.49

The production build publishes source maps

adequate

The build configuration emits source maps for production, so the original source, with its comments and structure, is downloadable by every visitor. Upload them to an error tracker and keep them off the public server instead.

Evidence

components/ide-metrics-api/typescript-grpcweb/webpack.config.js	`components/ide-metrics-api/typescript-grpcweb/webpack.config.js:12` — source maps in a production build
components/local-app-api/typescript-grpcweb/webpack.config.js	`components/local-app-api/typescript-grpcweb/webpack.config.js:12` — source maps in a production build
components/supervisor/frontend/webpack.config.js	`components/supervisor/frontend/webpack.config.js:45` — source maps in a production build

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.8

Manifest says proprietary, licence file says AGPL-3.0

adequate worth checking first

package.json declares proprietary. LICENSE.md contains the text of AGPL-3.0. Package managers and downstream users read the first; auditors and acquirers read the second. One of them is wrong, and until it is settled the terms this code is offered under are genuinely ambiguous.

The check that found this reads significant, but it has not yet held up often enough in Borehole's calibration to rate a finding significant on its own. Opening package.json:5 and the 1 other file it cites settles it. If it holds when someone checks it, this finding is significant.

Evidence

package.json	`package.json:5` — declares UNLICENSED
LICENSE.md	`LICENSE.md` — text of AGPL-3.0

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.61

36 files are named as enterprise-edition code

adequate

Files named `.ee.` are, by the common open-core convention, the paid edition's code, usually under a licence that is not open source even where the rest is. What the buyer may do with each part differs.

Evidence

components/ee/agent-smith/.gitignore	`components/ee/agent-smith/.gitignore` — enterprise-edition file
components/ee/agent-smith/BUILD.yaml	`components/ee/agent-smith/BUILD.yaml` — enterprise-edition file
components/ee/agent-smith/README.md	`components/ee/agent-smith/README.md` — enterprise-edition file

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Notes that do not affect this rating

05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

3 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day; 1 step pipes a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

.github/workflows/branch-build.yml	`.github/workflows/branch-build.yml:71` — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/build.yml	`.github/workflows/build.yml:476` — action pinned by tag
scripts/trivy/trivy-scan-images.sh	`scripts/trivy/trivy-scan-images.sh:52` — download piped into a shell

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.13

8 outbound calls can wait forever

adequate

8 HTTP calls use a client with no timeout (Python `requests` without `timeout=`, or Go's default client). When a dependency slows down, each one holds a worker until the connection gives up, and enough of them take the service down with the dependency.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

components/content-service/pkg/layer/provider.go	`components/content-service/pkg/layer/provider.go:45` — outbound call without a timeout
components/gitpod-cli/pkg/utils/logError.go	`components/gitpod-cli/pkg/utils/logError.go:67` — outbound call without a timeout
components/ide/jetbrains/cli/cmd/open.go	`components/ide/jetbrains/cli/cmd/open.go:34` — outbound call without a timeout

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.20

3 SQL statements built from strings

adequate

3 places in product code build SQL by formatting or joining strings rather than passing parameters. In each, what the code shows going in is a table or column name, a constant, or something the line does not show, not a request's value. Ask whether any value reaches these strings, rather than a parameter.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

components/gitpod-db/src/periodic-deleter.ts	`components/gitpod-db/src/periodic-deleter.ts:60` — SQL built from a string
components/gitpod-db/src/typeorm/user-db-impl.ts	`components/gitpod-db/src/typeorm/user-db-impl.ts:196` — SQL built from a string
components/service-waiter/cmd/database.go	`components/service-waiter/cmd/database.go:134` — SQL built from a string

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.34

2 of 5 Kubernetes workloads declare no resource limits

adequate

2 workload manifests set no CPU or memory limits. One pod that leaks memory or spins can starve everything else on its node, and the scheduler cannot plan capacity for what it cannot see.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

components/ws-manager-mk2/config/default/manager_config_patch.yaml	`components/ws-manager-mk2/config/default/manager_config_patch.yaml` — workload with no limits
components/ws-manager-mk2/config/default/manager_webhook_patch.yaml	`components/ws-manager-mk2/config/default/manager_webhook_patch.yaml` — workload with no limits

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.9

2 vendored components with no licence

adequate

Third-party code is committed into this repository without any statement of the terms it arrived under. Unknown terms are harder to deal with than inconvenient ones: an awkward licence can be complied with, an absent one cannot. Each of these needs its origin established before the code changes hands.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

components/ide-metrics-api/third_party/google	`components/ide-metrics-api/third_party/google` — 4 tracked files, no licence file
components/supervisor-api/third_party/google	`components/supervisor-api/third_party/google` — 4 tracked files, no licence file

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Observability & Operations

06 · adequate · ratings ↑

06.35

Sends usage data to telemetry.authzed.com by default

adequate

install/installer/pkg/components/spicedb/deployment.go sends to telemetry.authzed.com, and components/local-app/cmd/config-set.go leaves reporting on as shipped. Every installation reports to the vendor unless its operator turns this off. For a buyer running it inside their own product, that is an outbound data flow to a third party: ask what is sent, how often, and whether the buyer's customers were told.

Evidence

install/installer/pkg/components/spicedb/deployment.go	`install/installer/pkg/components/spicedb/deployment.go:96` — reports to telemetry.authzed.com
components/local-app/cmd/config-set.go	`components/local-app/cmd/config-set.go:29` — the reporting setting is on by default

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Notes that do not affect this rating

06.9

An error reporter is installed but never initialised

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

error reporting

no error reporter initialised

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

06.33

1 of 5 deployments run a single replica

adequate

1 deployments set `replicas: 1`, and nothing (an autoscaler, a disruption budget) adds more. Every deploy and every node drain is downtime, and the availability the buyer inherits has a ceiling.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

components/ws-manager-mk2/config/manager/manager.yaml components/ws-manager-mk2/config/manager/manager.yaml — replicas: 1

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · not assessable · ratings ↑

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository. What a person adds here.

Check it on the running system

12 checks against the running system follow from the findings above: what a buyer's engineer will try, how to run it first, and what to have ready. A paid survey of this repository includes them. See the tiers.

A paid survey of a public repository is also reviewed: a language model reads each finding against the code and withdraws only findings it judges the code contradicts, each listed with its reason. The review is a language model's reading of the findings against the code, and it can be wrong. It never adds a finding, never raises a band, and never removes a finding from a proven check or an advisory that affects the surveyed version.

What a person adds

The survey reads what the repository can show. The code cannot settle these questions, and on them this report states nothing. Each says where its answer lives: your own engineer, the company, or an assessor you choose can settle it. Questions marked measured open with something this repository shows.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · full coverage

measured No architecture or design document is in the tree, across 3,500 product files. Where does the design live, and who holds it? Answer lives in: The team01.38
Is the architecture right for the next three years of the product? Answer lives in: Your architects, with the product roadmap01.39
Were the home-grown components reasonable choices when they were made, and are they now? Answer lives in: The team's reasoning at the time01.40

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · high coverage

Is review real or a rubber stamp? Comment depth and time to approve need the pull request history. Answer lives in: The code host's pull request data02.32
Is delivery planned and measured, or heroic? Answer lives in: The issue tracker: backlog, sprint history, estimate accuracy02.38
How are incidents run, reviewed and learned from? Answer lives in: Tickets, chat and postmortems02.37

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · partial coverage

measured 140 people have committed here. Which of them are you acquiring, and which are you replacing? Answer lives in: The deal terms03.29
Who mentors whom, and would that survive a departure? Answer lives in: The team; review history only suggests candidates03.28
Can the team grow, and who stands behind the top three contributors? Answer lives in: Recruiting data and the org chart03.30
Is the seniority mix sound, and will pay survive your salary bands? Answer lives in: HR data03.31
Is the pace sustainable? Commit times cannot say: git keeps no reliable local time. Answer lives in: Interviews and on-call history03.14
Does the team want to stay after close? Answer lives in: Interviews03.32
How are decisions made and disagreements resolved? Answer lives in: Time with the team03.33

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · minimal coverage

measured 117 commits landed in the last year, against 360 the year before (-68%). Is that maintenance mode, a pivot, or fewer people working on it? The count looks the same for all three. Answer lives in: The team04.11
Can this team deliver the stated roadmap on the stated timeline? Answer lives in: The data room and the team's record of estimates04.32
Does leadership know about the debt, and is time budgeted to repay it? Answer lives in: Budget and roadmap decisions04.31
Is the engineering shape consistent with the commercial story? Answer lives in: Revenue, customer and churn data04.33

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · partial coverage

measured 05.5 found credential-shaped strings in this repository. Was each one revoked at the provider? Deleting it from the code revokes nothing; only the provider's audit log shows that it was. Answer lives in: The provider's console and audit log05.38
measured No threat model is in the tree of what looks like a running service. Does one exist elsewhere, and who owns it? Answer lives in: The security owner05.43
What has actually broken, how often, and how badly? Answer lives in: Ticketing and chat05.41
What did external testing find, and was it fixed? Answer lives in: Reports in the data room05.42
What is the SOC 2, ISO 27001 or GDPR status, and where is the evidence? Answer lives in: Audit reports; policy files in the tree are not evidence05.44

Observability & Operations

06 · partial coverage

measured Nothing in the tree backs up or restores data. How is data backed up, and has a restore ever been rehearsed? Answer lives in: The operations team06.19
measured Alert rules are defined in the repository. Who receives them, and when did one last fire? Answer lives in: The alerting tool and the on-call rota06.10
measured Service-level objectives are defined in the tree (operations/observability/mixins/cross-teams/dashboards/SLOs/workspace-startup-time.libsonnet). Are they met? The repository holds the target, not the measurement. Answer lives in: Production metrics06.12
Are the dashboards opened, the alerts acknowledged and the pages answered? Answer lives in: Pager history and dashboard logs06.29
Who carries the pager, and how often does it go off? Answer lives in: Pager exports and interviews06.31
What does it cost to run, and how much headroom is there? Answer lives in: Cloud billing and capacity plans06.32

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · none coverage

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

This is primarily a TypeScript codebase, with Go alongside (42% of source files). Does your engineering organisation already run TypeScript in production, or would this be the first? 07.1
The bulk of this system sits in components/, install/, operations/. Which of your existing systems would each of those have to absorb or replace? 07.10
The repository carries deployment configuration (components/blobserve/leeway.Dockerfile and 45 more). Does that match your deployment and on-call model, or does it need rehosting first? 07.2
What is your tolerance for the findings above remaining unaddressed for the first two quarters after close, given everything else that will compete for this team's time?
Which of these systems duplicate yours, and which get retired? Answer lives in: Your architecture07.11
What will integration cost, and in what order? Answer lives in: The engagement07.12
Where does the team land in your organisation, and who reports to whom? Answer lives in: Your org design07.13
Are there earn-outs, retention packages or contractor IP to assign? Answer lives in: Deal terms07.14
Do customer contracts limit hosting, regions or vendors? Answer lives in: Customer contracts07.15

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Rejection log — 82 signals that ran and did not fire

Appendix: rejection log — 82 signals that ran and did not fire

Published on purpose. A signal that looked and decided not to fire has told you something, and this is the calibration data behind every threshold above.

Looked, and found nothing — 74

Signal	What it found
04.hotspot_concentration	change is spread across the codebase rather than pooling in a few filesfiles 9,770 · top5 share 0.024
04.debt_markers	debt markers are sparsemarkers 503 · per kloc 0.55 · lines read 917,077
04.dependency_sprawl	direct dependency counts are unremarkable
04.churn_trend	rework is not rising against new worklate delete per insert 0.118 · early delete per insert 0.577
04.eol_runtime	every pinned runtime is still supportedeol as of 2026-09-24
04.fix_share_trend	fixing is not crowding out building
04.compat_layers	little code is kept for the old wayshare 0.0 · code files 2,517 · compat files 0
04.dependency_redundancy	one library per job, mostly
06.telemetry_presence	a telemetry or error-reporting library is referencednote presence only; whether anyone watches it is not visible here · matches 102
06.structured_logging	a structured logging library is referencedmatches 190
06.healthcheck_presence	a health or readiness check is defined
06.telemetry_depth	the service is visible in more than one way
06.correlation_ids	a request can be followed through the logstracing True · request id sites 23
06.alert_rules	alert rules are defined as codealert files 35
06.deployed_image_floats	every deployed image names a versionimages 1 · floating 0
06.probes_identical	readiness and liveness are distinct, or not both setidentical 0 · workloads with both 2
06.environment_branching	environment differences live in configurationsites 0
06.release_markers	releases are markedtags last year 101 · release commits 0 · changelog commits 0
06.migrate_on_start	migrations do not run at container start
06.feature_flags	a feature-flag service is configured and usedsdk files 46 · evaluation sites 2
03.contributor_concentration	no single contributor dominates the last 24 monthsyears 6.2 · window last 24 months · authors 140
03.active_contributors	more than one contributor active in the trailing yearall time 140 · active 12mo 7
03.knowledge_silos	every substantial directory has been touched by more than one personauthors 140 · directories 6
03.drive_by_contributors	an open contributor base, where one-commit contributors are normalauthors 140 · one off share 0.421
03.contributor_attrition	no contributor dominates enough for their absence to matterauthors 140 · top share less than a quarter · top contributor last committed within the last three months
03.critical_path_ownership	more than one person changes the critical pathsauthors 18
02.merge_discipline	a meaningful share of recent change carries evidence of reviewmerges 0 · window last 24 months · with tracked 0
02.ci_presence	CI configuration is present in the working treecount 25
02.test_presence	tests are present in a normal proportion to sourcetests 397 · source 2,801 · test ratio 0.142
02.release_cadence	tags are presenttags 1,982
02.conventional_commits	commit subjects generally carry contentsampled 12,533 · low content share 0.006
02.branch_protection_hints	process scaffolding is present in the repository
02.ci_runs_tests	CI invokes a test runnerconfigs 25 · with tests 4
02.skipped_tests	few tests are switched offfocused 0 · skipped 0 · test files 499
02.ci_test_gating	no test run in CI is written so that it cannot failconfigs 25
02.revert_share	change is rarely undoneshare 0.006 · reverts 3 · recent commits 479
02.dependency_update_cadence	dependencies move with the codelockfiles 86 · commits since 2 · days since lockfile changed 0
02.flaky_test_markers	tests are not retried until they passtest retries 0 · suite retries 0
02.lint_in_build	a linter or formatter runs in the buildwired 15 · ci configs 25 · product files 2,517
02.commit_size	changes arrive in reviewable sizesshare 0.023 · commits 437 · over 2000 lines 10
01.burst_import	no commit run met both the rate and the net-addition thresholdgap seconds 180 · min add ratio 3.0 · min net added 2,000
01.initial_dump	first commit is not a disproportionate share of the codebaseinsertions 244,095 · share of insertions 0.0742
01.message_uniformity	commit subjects vary in wording and lengthlength stdev 17.88 · repeat share 0.047
01.revision_depth	most files were revisited after they were first writtenfiles seen 3,252 · write once share 0.215
01.duplicated_blocks	little shipping code is repeated verbatim across filesshare 0.0122 · product files 2,179 · distinct blocks 175,453
01.swallowed_errors	errors are rarely thrown awayloc 920,976 · files 12 · per kloc 0.01
01.build_reproducibility	every base image names a versionfloating 0 · from lines 5
01.unfinished_migration	Java to Kotlin: the new language's share has not risen steadily, so the two are deliberate layers, not a migrationmigration Java to Kotlin · new share now 0.021 · new share at start 0.004
01.weights_in_git	no model weights are committedfiles 0
05.committed_secrets	no credential-shaped strings outside test and fixture pathsnote the working tree only; the history is 05.5 · patterns 8 · files read 3,982
05.security_guardrails	at least one standard guard rail is configured
05.dependency_pinning	a lockfile is committed, so builds are reproduciblelockfile True
05.license_present	a licence file is presentfound True
05.secrets_management_pattern	no environment file is committed outside tests and examplesenv files 0
05.migration_reversibility	migrations can be rolled backshare 0.0 · migrations 199 · irreversible 0
05.shell_from_strings	product code does not build shell commands from stringssites 0
05.unsafe_deserialization	no code-executing deserialiser in product codesites 0
05.privileged_workloads	no workload runs privileged or in the host's namespacessites 0 · behind a setting or built here 0
05.credentials_in_deploy_config	deployment configuration references secrets, never holds themfiles 0 · sites 0
05.public_env_secret	only publishable values carry a public prefixnames 0 · sites 0 · not secrets 0
05.unsafe_html	raw HTML is rare, literal or sanitisedsites 2
05.signing_material	no signing keystore or profile is committedfiles 0
05.license_copyleft_inherited	every licence found in vendored code is permissive or weak-copyleftvendored paths 20
05.license_grant_unclear	the licence is recognisable as AGPL-3.0class network-copyleft · license AGPL-3.0
05.committed_native_libraries	no widely used compiled library is committed to the productlibraries 0
04.flags_accumulating	flags are retired about as fast as they are addedlive 12 · retired 27 · flags seen 39
04.api_versions_coexisting	one API version is served, or none
04.dependency_churn	few dependencies were added and dropped within 60 daysdependencies seen 390 · added in two years 73 · removed within 60 days 0
04.ci_platforms_dropped	no platform was dropped from CI in the last two years
04.repository_status	the README's first screen states no end, move or freezestatements 0
02.development_elsewhere	nothing says development happens elsewhereno pr statements 0 · mirror statements 0 · replayed commit share 0.0
05.licence_changes	the root licence has not changed in the history readlicence versions 1 · unreleased changes 0
04.releases_stopped	releases keep pace with developmentmedian gap days 0.5 · days since last tag 1 · commits last 90 days 24
03.single_maintainer	no file says one person maintains itstatements 0

Could not conclude, or did not apply — 8

Not a clean result. Each says why it could not answer here.

Signal	Why
04.schema_churn	columns, once added, stay
06.print_logging	a frontend: console output is the browser's, not the server's
02.long_lived_branches	too few merges to judge (squash and rebase leave none)
01.notebook_outputs	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.cleartext_traffic	not a mobile app
05.dataset_provenance	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.advisory_record	1 advisory in the last 24 months, none high or critical, none affecting the surveyed version; the newest on 2025-08-29
05.project_exploited	no affecting advisory is on CISA's Known Exploited list

Anyone can check this report against the authoritative record — click the stamp, or enter SFTG-YCKD-2QE6 at borehole.dev/verify.

The code commits to the 106 checks this run performed, the bands they produced, and the commit they were read at. It does not cover checks written since.

Put the mark in your README

The image is wrapped in a link to the verification page, so a reader can check it rather than take it on trust. If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.

[![Borehole reading, not a certification](https://borehole.dev/badge/gitpod-io/gitpod/be07f43.svg "Borehole free reading: not for reliance. See the full report.")](https://borehole.dev/verify/SFTGYCKD2QE6?via=badge)

Where this scan ran

This scan ran on ordinary cloud infrastructure (cloud-run), not in a hardware-isolated confidential VM. Nothing about it is attested by Google.

What an attested survey proves, and what it does not.

What this scan did with the repository — 7 steps

Written by the steps themselves as they ran, not described afterwards. A hand-written account of a data flow drifts the first time somebody changes the flow and not the account.

At	Step	Detail
0.0s	read repository metadata from the GitHub API	size mb: 106.2authenticated: False
23.8s	cloned the repository to a temporary directory	depth: full
48.7s	read the git history	commits: 12534tracked files: 4471
356.3s	ran the deterministic checks	blame pass: Falseread working tree: False
356.4s	recorded where this scan ran	attested: Falseenvironment: cloud-run
543.4s	kept the facts, never the source, for re-reading under new checks
543.4s	deleting the working copy

Total 543.4s ·source content sent off this machine: none · calls to a language model: 0 · the clone was deleted when the survey ended

An automated reading of a repository's code and its history up to one commit, with public advisory records. It may be wrong, it is not legal, financial, investment or security advice, and it does not replace diligence by a qualified person. It is provided for information: nobody may rely on it (Borehole's terms, section 3).

BOREHOLE 0.7.15 DETERMINISTIC LAYER · NO MODEL CALLSREAD ON BOREHOLE'S SERVER · CLONE DELETED TAKEDOWNCONTRIBUTED TO THIS REPOSITORY? YOUR RIGHTS