6dcdb62 · 777 commits · 166 files
Issued 2026-10-03
Nothing significant. Questions worth asking about Security & Reliability Posture, Product & Engineering Maturity.
104 checks ran across 6 assessable dimensions. None found a significant problem; 6 raised something worth a question. 6 findings, each with evidence. One dimension cannot be assessed without an acquirer.
- 2 submodule(s) this survey does not read: api, front .gitmodules:1
- 2 findings from checks Borehole's calibration found wrong more often than right are no longer published.
| Dimension | Rating | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | adequate | |
| 02 | Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | adequate | |
| 03 | Organization & Key-Person Risk | adequate | |
| 04 | Product & Engineering Maturity | adequate | |
| 05 | Security & Reliability Posture | adequate | |
| 06 | Observability & Operations | adequate | |
| 07 | Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
- 7% of non-merge commits carry any trailer at all
- low trailer coverage: the convention may not be in consistent use
- no widespread author/committer date divergence
- deep scan blamed 163 of 165 counted files
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
01 · adequate · ratings ↑No finding. 11 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
02 · adequate · ratings ↑No finding. 16 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.
Organization & Key-Person Risk
03 · adequate · ratings ↑No finding. 10 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.
Product & Engineering Maturity
04 · adequate · ratings ↑Change keeps returning to the same few files
adequateFive files out of 543 absorb 29% of all file-level change. Concentration like this is where debt is usually being serviced rather than repaid: the same code is reopened because it is load-bearing, fragile, or both. A repository cannot tell you which — that is a conversation with the team.
A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.
| touch-count | docker-compose.yml — 274 commits touched it |
| touch-count | docker-compose.dev.yml — 107 commits touched it |
| touch-count | README.md — 49 commits touched it |
| touch-count | docker-compose.arm64.yml — 38 commits touched it |
| touch-count | .github/workflows/deploy-preview.yml — 35 commits touched it |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Go 1.25 is past end of life
adequateThe code is pinned to Go 1.25 (end of life 2026-08-11). None of these receives security fixes any more; the first stopped on 2026-08-11. Moving off an unsupported runtime is rarely a one-line change, so a buyer should ask whether the upgrade is planned and what it touches.
A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.
| events-processor/Dockerfile | events-processor/Dockerfile — Go 1.25, end of life 2026-08-11 |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Security & Reliability Posture
05 · adequate · ratings ↑None of the standard security guard rails are configured
adequateThere is no disclosure policy, no automated dependency updates, no named code owners and no pre-commit configuration. None of these is load-bearing on its own. Their collective absence says that security posture here is whatever the current team happens to remember to do, which is not a posture that survives the team changing.
| guardrail-scan | checked 5 kinds of guard rail across 166 tracked files; 0 present |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
3 Dockerfiles run the application as root
adequateNo USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.
| no-USER-instruction | connectors/Dockerfile — runs as root |
| no-USER-instruction | docker/Dockerfile — runs as root |
| no-USER-instruction | events-processor/Dockerfile — runs as root |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
The build runs third-party code it does not pin
adequate7 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day; 1 step pipes a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.
A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.
| .github/workflows/docker-build-multi-arch.yaml | .github/workflows/docker-build-multi-arch.yaml:194 — action pinned by tag |
| .github/workflows/docker-build-multi-arch.yaml | .github/workflows/docker-build-multi-arch.yaml:198 — action pinned by tag |
| docker/Dockerfile | docker/Dockerfile:25 — download piped into a shell |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Observability & Operations
06 · adequate · ratings ↑1 of 7 deployed images carry no version, or `latest`
adequate1 images in the deployment configuration are named without a version or as `latest`. A redeploy can change the software without a commit, a rollback has nothing to roll back to, and nobody can say from the repository what is running.
A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.
| deploy/docker-compose.production.yml | deploy/docker-compose.production.yml:457 — image without a version |
Respond to this finding
Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.
An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.
Fit with the Acquirer
07 · not assessable · ratings ↑Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository. What a person adds here.
Check it on the running system
5 checks against the running system follow from the findings above: what a buyer's engineer will try, how to run it first, and what to have ready. A paid survey of this repository includes them.
A paid survey of a public repository is also reviewed: a language model reads each finding against the code and withdraws only findings it judges the code contradicts, each listed with its reason. The review is a language model's reading of the findings against the code, and it can be wrong. It never adds a finding, never raises a band, and never removes a finding from a proven check or an advisory that affects the surveyed version.
What a person adds
The survey reads what the repository can show. The code cannot settle these questions, and on them this report states nothing. Each says where its answer lives: your own engineer, the company, or an assessor you choose can settle it. Questions marked measured open with something this repository shows.
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
01 · full coverage- measured The tree carries design documentation (docs/architecture.md). Does it match what the team believes today? Ask them to walk through it against the code.
- measured The repository pulls code in through git submodules (.gitmodules). A buyer receives pointers, not that code. Can every submodule be fetched without the team's credentials, and who owns each one?
- Is the architecture right for the next three years of the product?
- Were the home-grown components reasonable choices when they were made, and are they now?
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
02 · high coverage- Is review real or a rubber stamp? Comment depth and time to approve need the pull request history.
- Is delivery planned and measured, or heroic?
- How are incidents run, reviewed and learned from?
Organization & Key-Person Risk
03 · partial coverage- measured 48 people have committed here. Which of them are you acquiring, and which are you replacing?
- Who mentors whom, and would that survive a departure?
- Can the team grow, and who stands behind the top three contributors?
- Is the seniority mix sound, and will pay survive your salary bands?
- Is the pace sustainable? Commit times cannot say: git keeps no reliable local time.
- Does the team want to stay after close?
- How are decisions made and disagreements resolved?
Product & Engineering Maturity
04 · minimal coverage- Can this team deliver the stated roadmap on the stated timeline?
- Does leadership know about the debt, and is time budgeted to repay it?
- Is the engineering shape consistent with the commercial story?
Security & Reliability Posture
05 · partial coverage- measured No threat model is in the tree of what looks like a running service. Does one exist elsewhere, and who owns it?
- What has actually broken, how often, and how badly?
- What did external testing find, and was it fixed?
- What is the SOC 2, ISO 27001 or GDPR status, and where is the evidence?
Observability & Operations
06 · partial coverage- measured Nothing in the tree backs up or restores data. How is data backed up, and has a restore ever been rehearsed?
- measured No alert rule is defined in the repository. Where are alerts defined, who receives them, and when did one last fire?
- Are the dashboards opened, the alerts acknowledged and the pages answered?
- Are the service-level objectives actually met?
- Who carries the pager, and how often does it go off?
- What does it cost to run, and how much headroom is there?
Fit with the Acquirer
07 · none coverageNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
- This is primarily a Go codebase. Does your engineering organisation already run Go in production, or would this be the first?
- The bulk of this system sits in events-processor/, deploy/, extra/. Which of your existing systems would each of those have to absorb or replace?
- The repository carries deployment configuration (connectors/Dockerfile and 8 more). Does that match your deployment and on-call model, or does it need rehosting first?
- What is your tolerance for the findings above remaining unaddressed for the first two quarters after close, given everything else that will compete for this team's time?
- Which of these systems duplicate yours, and which get retired?
- What will integration cost, and in what order?
- Where does the team land in your organisation, and who reports to whom?
- Are there earn-outs, retention packages or contractor IP to assign?
- Do customer contracts limit hosting, regions or vendors?
A human assessment is Borehole's own paid service, €12,000+ (total price is determined per engagement; travel billed at cost). It is not independent of this report: the same business produced both. It is a separate contract, with its own scope, terms and reliance.
Embed the badge
Tied to this commit and this date, and it fades after 90 days — an honest badge is one that expires. A repository with significant findings gets a neutral "read" badge rather than a red one: the library is where the range is visible, not someone else's README.
[](/r/getlago/lago/6dcdb62)If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.
Rejection log — 98 signals that ran and did not fire
Appendix: rejection log — 98 signals that ran and did not fire
Published on purpose. A signal that looked and decided not to fire has told you something, and this is the calibration data behind every threshold above.
Looked, and found nothing — 75
| Signal | What it found |
|---|---|
| 04.debt_markers | debt markers are sparsemarkers 4 · per kloc 0.24 · lines read 16,533 |
| 04.dependency_sprawl | direct dependency counts are unremarkable |
| 04.churn_trend | rework is not rising against new worklate delete per insert 0.288 · early delete per insert 0.012 |
| 04.fixes_with_tests | fixes usually come with a testfixes 69 · share 0.246 · with tests 17 |
| 04.fix_share_trend | fixing is not crowding out building |
| 06.telemetry_presence | a telemetry or error-reporting library is referencednote presence only; whether anyone watches it is not visible here · matches 19 |
| 06.structured_logging | a structured logging library is referencedmatches 18 |
| 06.healthcheck_presence | a health or readiness check is defined |
| 06.telemetry_depth | the service is visible in more than one way |
| 06.print_logging | raw prints are few, or outnumbered by logger callsprints 1 · logger calls 57 |
| 06.correlation_ids | a request can be followed through the logstracing True · request id sites 0 |
| 06.error_reporting | an error reporter is initialisedinitialised 1 · config files 0 |
| 06.usage_reporting_default | the product's code names no reporting hostsettings on 0 · settings off 0 |
| 06.environment_branching | environment differences live in configurationsites 0 |
| 06.release_markers | releases are markedtags last year 30 · release commits 8 · changelog commits 0 |
| 06.migrate_on_start | migrations run at start, but as a single instance, where that is safesites 1 · scaled False |
| 03.contributor_concentration | no single contributor dominates the last 24 monthsyears 4.6 · window last 24 months · authors 48 |
| 03.active_contributors | more than one contributor active in the trailing yearall time 48 · active 12mo 21 |
| 03.drive_by_contributors | a healthy share of contributors committed more than onceshare 0.417 · authors 48 · one commit authors 20 |
| 03.contributor_attrition | the dominant contributor is still activeauthors 48 · top share a quarter or more · top contributor last committed within the last three months |
| 03.critical_path_ownership | more than one person changes the critical pathsauthors 31 |
| 03.second_contributor_attrition | the second and third contributors are still active |
| 03.bus_factor_trend | the team has not narrowed to one person |
| 03.joiners_and_leavers | the team is not shrinkingleft 4 · joined 5 · regular last year 12 |
| 02.merge_discipline | a meaningful share of recent change carries evidence of reviewmerges 57 · window last 24 months · with tracked 0 |
| 02.ci_presence | CI configuration is present in the working treecount 10 |
| 02.test_presence | tests are present in a normal proportion to sourcetests 28 · source 73 · test ratio 0.384 |
| 02.release_cadence | tags are presenttags 195 |
| 02.conventional_commits | commit subjects generally carry contentsampled 666 · low content share 0.009 |
| 02.branch_protection_hints | process scaffolding is present in the repository |
| 02.ci_runs_tests | CI invokes a test runnerconfigs 10 · with tests 1 |
| 02.skipped_tests | few tests are switched offfocused 0 · skipped 0 · test files 28 |
| 02.ci_test_gating | no test run in CI is written so that it cannot failconfigs 10 |
| 02.revert_share | change is rarely undoneshare 0.0 · reverts 0 · recent commits 305 |
| 02.dependency_update_cadence | dependencies move with the codelockfiles 1 · commits since 2 · days since lockfile changed 4 |
| 02.flaky_test_markers | tests are not retried until they passtest retries 0 · suite retries 0 |
| 02.long_lived_branches | the typical branch reaches the trunk quicklyshare 0.0 · merges 57 · long lived 0 |
| 02.commit_size | changes arrive in reviewable sizesshare 0.014 · commits 212 · over 2000 lines 3 |
| 01.burst_import | no commit run met both the rate and the net-addition thresholdgap seconds 180 · min add ratio 3.0 · min net added 2,000 |
| 01.initial_dump | first commit is not a disproportionate share of the codebaseinsertions 143 · share of insertions 0.0047 |
| 01.message_uniformity | commit subjects vary in wording and lengthlength stdev 16.1 · repeat share 0.05 |
| 01.revision_depth | most files were revisited after they were first writtenfiles seen 97 · write once share 0.443 |
| 01.oversized_modules | no module is an outlier against this codebase's own normlargest 548 · threshold 1,000 · median lines 92 |
| 01.duplicated_blocks | little shipping code is repeated verbatim across filesshare 0.0012 · product files 45 · distinct blocks 3,396 |
| 01.swallowed_errors | errors are rarely thrown awayloc 16,657 · files 0 · per kloc 0.0 |
| 01.build_reproducibility | every base image names a versionfloating 0 · from lines 7 |
| 01.unfinished_migration | no language migration is stalled halfway |
| 01.weights_in_git | no model weights are committedfiles 0 |
| 05.committed_secrets | no credential-shaped strings outside test and fixture pathsnote the working tree only; the history is 05.5 · patterns 8 · files read 135 |
| 05.license_present | a licence file is presentfound True |
| 05.secrets_in_history | no credential-shaped string was ever added outside test and fixture pathspatterns 8 · truncated False · added lines 26,220 |
| 05.secrets_management_pattern | no environment file is committed outside tests and examplesenv files 0 |
| 05.outbound_timeouts | outbound calls set timeouts, or are fewcalls without timeout 0 |
| 05.sql_from_strings | no SQL is assembled from strings in product codefiles 0 · sites 0 · value interpolated 0 |
| 05.shell_from_strings | product code does not build shell commands from stringssites 0 |
| 05.unsafe_deserialization | no code-executing deserialiser in product codesites 0 |
| 05.known_vulnerabilities | no locked dependency has a published advisoryadvisories 0 · dependencies 117 · high or critical 0 |
| 05.privileged_workloads | no workload runs privileged or in the host's namespacessites 0 · behind a setting or built here 0 |
| 05.credentials_in_deploy_config | deployment configuration references secrets, never holds themfiles 0 · sites 0 |
| 05.signing_material | no signing keystore or profile is committedfiles 0 |
| 05.license_vendored_unlicensed | no vendored third-party code is committedcomponents 0 |
| 05.license_grant_unclear | the licence is recognisable as AGPL-3.0class network-copyleft · license AGPL-3.0 |
| 05.committed_native_libraries | no widely used compiled library is committed to the productlibraries 0 |
| 04.deprecations_lingering | few deprecations have outlived two yearsolder than two years 0 · files with deprecations 1 |
| 04.ci_platforms_dropped | no platform was dropped from CI in the last two years |
| 04.repository_status | the README's first screen states no end, move or freezestatements 0 |
| 02.development_elsewhere | nothing says development happens elsewhereno pr statements 0 · mirror statements 0 · replayed commit share 0.0 |
| 05.licence_changes | the root licence has not changed in the history readlicence versions 1 · unreleased changes 0 |
| 05.paid_edition | no directory carries a separate paid-edition licencedirectories 0 |
| 04.releases_stopped | releases keep pace with developmentmedian gap days 12.5 · days since last tag 13 · commits last 90 days 45 |
| 04.release_branch | the newest release was cut from the branch surveyedelsewhere 2 · on branch 193 · tags in window 195 |
| 03.single_maintainer | no file says one person maintains itstatements 0 |
| 05.project_advisories | no published advisory affects the surveyed versionaffecting 0 · exploited 0 · advisories 0 |
| 05.advisory_record | no advisory against the project in the last 24 monthscritical 0 · affecting 0 · could not tell 0 |
| 05.project_exploited | no affecting advisory is on CISA's Known Exploited listexploited 0 |
Could not conclude, or did not apply — 23
Not a clean result. Each says why it could not answer here.
| Signal | Why |
|---|---|
| 04.test_growth | not enough code written in either half to compare |
| 04.schema_churn | no schema migrations to read |
| 04.compat_layers | too little code |
| 04.dependency_redundancy | no JavaScript manifest to read |
| 06.alert_rules | no alert rules in the repository; they may live in a console |
| 06.probes_identical | no Kubernetes probes |
| 06.single_replica | no Kubernetes deployments |
| 06.feature_flags | no feature-flag service; flags may live elsewhere |
| 03.knowledge_silos | too few substantial top-level directories to read ownership |
| 02.lint_in_build | too small, or no CI to wire a linter into (02.2) |
| 01.notebook_outputs | not a data or machine-learning repository |
| 05.dependency_pinning | no manifest whose pinning can be read without a lockfile |
| 05.migration_reversibility | too few migrations to judge |
| 05.resource_limits | no Kubernetes workload manifests |
| 05.public_env_secret | not a frontend |
| 05.unsafe_html | not a frontend |
| 05.source_maps_shipped | not a frontend |
| 05.cleartext_traffic | not a mobile app |
| 05.dataset_provenance | not a data or machine-learning repository |
| 05.license_copyleft_inherited | no third-party code is committed to this repository, so the licences it depends on are resolved at build time and are not readable here |
| 05.license_manifest_conflict | no packaging manifest states a licence |
| 04.flags_accumulating | few or no feature flags in the history |
| 04.api_versions_coexisting | one API version is served, or none |
Anyone can check this report against the authoritative record — click the stamp, or enter X03A-79ME-NKZC at borehole.dev/verify.
The code commits to the 106 checks this run performed, the bands they produced, and the commit they were read at. It does not cover checks written since.
Put the mark in your README
The image is wrapped in a link to the verification page, so a reader can check it rather than take it on trust. If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.
[](https://borehole.dev/verify/X03A79MENKZC?via=badge)
A survey is a reading by a particular version of the assessor. Older readings are kept rather than replaced, because a verification mark attests to the survey it was issued for — overwriting one would make every code already in circulation read as tampered.
| Read | Assessor | Findings | Band |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-03 · shown | borehole 0.7.12 | 8 | adequate |
9 other readings (show)
| 2026-10-04 | borehole 0.7.13 | 8 | adequate |
| 2026-10-03 | borehole 0.7.11 | 8 | adequate |
| 2026-10-02 | borehole 0.7.10 | 8 | adequate |
| 2026-10-01 | borehole 0.7.9 | 8 | adequate |
| 2026-09-30 | borehole 0.7.8 | 8 | adequate |
| 2026-09-29 | borehole 0.7.6 | 8 | adequate |
| 2026-09-28 | borehole 0.7.5 | 8 | adequate |
| 2026-09-28 | borehole 0.7.4 | 8 | adequate |
| 2026-09-27 | borehole 0.7.3 | 8 | adequate |
Where this scan ran
This scan ran on ordinary cloud infrastructure (cloud-run), not in a hardware-isolated confidential VM. Nothing about it is attested by Google.
What an attested survey proves, and what it does not.
What this scan did with the repository — 7 steps
Written by the steps themselves as they ran, not described afterwards. A hand-written account of a data flow drifts the first time somebody changes the flow and not the account.
| At | Step | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0s | read repository metadata from the GitHub API | authenticated: False |
| 5.5s | cloned the repository to a temporary directory | depth: full |
| 7.3s | read the git history | commits: 777tracked files: 166 |
| 15.2s | ran the deterministic checks | blame pass: Trueread working tree: False |
| 15.2s | recorded where this scan ran | attested: Falseenvironment: cloud-run |
| 18.0s | kept the facts, never the source, for re-reading under new checks | |
| 18.0s | deleting the working copy |
Total 18.0s ·source content sent off this machine: none · calls to a language model: 0 · the clone was deleted when the survey ended
An automated reading of a repository's code and its history up to one commit, with public advisory records. It may be wrong, it is not legal, financial, investment or security advice, and it does not replace diligence by a qualified person. It is provided for information: nobody may rely on it (Borehole's terms, section 3).