Borehole · Risk register · free tier

fosrl/pangolin

Free reading: not for reliance

04bf1e1 · 8,800 commits · 2,001 files
Issued 2026-10-23

Nothing significant. Questions worth asking about Security & Reliability Posture, Product & Engineering Maturity.

101 checks ran across 6 assessable dimensions. 2 findings are worth checking first. 15 findings, each with evidence. One dimension cannot be assessed without an acquirer.

What the repository says about itself

states a policy on AI-generated contributions .github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md:7

Worth checking first

Borehole's proprietary scoring is calibrated across hundreds of repositories. Each finding here reads significant, but its check has not yet held up often enough in that calibration to rate significant on its own. If one holds when someone checks it, it is significant.

05.26 3 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 3 high or critical in what ships
02.3 Tests cover a thin slice of the codebase

Published under today's rules. The verification code attests to this reading as it was stored. This page differs from it as follows.

5 findings from checks Borehole's calibration found wrong more often than right are no longer published.

	Dimension	Rating
01	Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance	strong
02	Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity	adequate
03	Organization & Key-Person Risk	adequate
04	Product & Engineering Maturity	adequate
05	Security & Reliability Posture	adequate
06	Observability & Operations	strong
07	Fit with the Acquirer	not assessable

strong adequate significant findings not assessable from a repository

Provenance disclosure does not affect any rating

1% of the code standing today was written in AI-declared commits

1% of lines still in the tree 3,133 of 481,152 0% of lines ever added these differ when early hand-written code has since been replaced

1% of lines added in the last 12 months (since 2025-10-23) arrived in AI-declared commits: 33/4,990 commits, confidence moderate. Also a floor.

38/7,354 commits declaring an agent · Claude Fable 5, Claude Opus 4.7, Claude Opus 4.8 and 2 more

confidence: moderate

4% of non-merge commits carry any trailer at all
low trailer coverage: the convention may not be in consistent use
no widespread author/committer date divergence
deep scan blamed 1,999 of 1,999 counted files

474,659 lines excluded as lockfiles, vendored or generated.

This is a lower bound. It counts what the repository declares. Undeclared AI authorship is invisible here, and a single rebase removes the trailers this rests on. Absence of a declaration is absence of disclosure, not absence of AI authorship.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · strong · ratings ↑

Notes that do not affect this rating

01.3

Commit messages are templated rather than written

adequate

36% of commit subjects are exact repeats of another subject, and subject length varies by only 15.6 characters. A log written by someone explaining their reasoning to a future reader does not look like this. The log is therefore weak evidence of intent, whatever the code is like.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

commit-subjects	132× 'New translations en-us.json (German)'
commit-subjects	126× 'New translations en-us.json (Portuguese)'
commit-subjects	125× 'New translations en-us.json (Italian)'

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.

01.6

server/lib/rebuildClientAssociations.ts is 3,278 lines, 30× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 106 lines. 27 files exceed 1,060 lines, the largest being 3,278. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

A note that does not affect this rating: measured against its own codebase's median, it is below the 85th percentile of 382 surveyed projects' largest files, where this check begins to count.

Evidence

line-count	`server/lib/rebuildClientAssociations.ts:1` — 3,278 lines (30× median)
line-count	`server/private/routers/hybrid.ts:1` — 2,887 lines (27× median)
line-count	`server/routers/external.ts:1` — 2,467 lines (23× median)
line-count	`server/lib/blueprints/publicResources.ts:1` — 2,375 lines (22× median)
line-count	`server/db/sqlite/schema/schema.ts:1` — 2,251 lines (21× median)

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · adequate · ratings ↑

02.3

Tests cover a thin slice of the codebase

adequate worth checking first

45 test files against 1,829 source files (2.5%). This does not measure whether the tests are good, only whether enough of them exist for the codebase to be changed safely by someone who did not write it — which is exactly the situation after an acquisition.

The check that found this reads significant, but it has not yet held up often enough in Borehole's calibration to rate a finding significant on its own. If it holds when someone checks it, this finding is significant.

Evidence

test-file-ratio

45 test files / 1,829 source files

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · adequate · ratings ↑

03.1

Bus factor 1: recent work is concentrated in one contributor

adequate

In the last 24 months, one contributor authored more than half of 6,894 non-merge commits among 129 authors; across all history, more than half of 7,067. This is the single most expensive thing to discover after closing, and the repository cannot tell you whether that person is part of the transaction.

Evidence

git shortlog -sn

last 24 months: top author more than half of 6,894 commits; bus factor 1; 129 authors

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · adequate · ratings ↑

04.3

105 direct dependencies in a single manifest

adequate

package.json declares 105 direct dependencies. Each one is a maintenance obligation, a supply-chain surface and a potential licence question that transfers with the asset. The count says nothing about whether any given dependency was a good choice; it says how many such choices a buyer inherits.

Evidence

direct-dependencies	`package.json` — 105 declared
direct-dependencies	`install/go.mod` — 4 declared

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

04.19

3% of bug fixes add or change a test

adequate

Of 792 fixes in the last 24 months, 23 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.

Evidence

fix commits touching tests

23 of 792

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · adequate · ratings ↑

05.6

1 Dockerfile runs the application as root

adequate

No USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.

Evidence

no-USER-instruction Dockerfile — runs as root

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.26

3 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 3 high or critical in what ships

adequate worth checking first

3 of 649 locked dependencies match 4 published advisories in OSV, 3 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version.

The check that found this reads significant, but it has not yet held up often enough in Borehole's calibration to rate a finding significant on its own. Opening package-lock.json settles it. If it holds when someone checks it, this finding is significant.

Evidence

package-lock.json	`package-lock.json` — follow-redirects 1.16.0: GHSA-8r9p-f939-6h3c (high), fixed in 1.16.1
package-lock.json	`package-lock.json` — node-forge 1.4.0: GHSA-86w9-cpqp-85rv (high)
package-lock.json	`package-lock.json` — ip-address 10.7.1: GHSA-rxp7-6hxx-x8q5 (moderate), fixed in 10.7.4

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Notes that do not affect this rating

05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

1 third-party CI action is referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day; 1 step pipes a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

.github/workflows/cicd.yml	`.github/workflows/cicd.yml:32` — action pinned by tag
install/get-installer.sh	`install/get-installer.sh:4` — download piped into a shell

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.21

8 shell commands built from strings

adequate

8 places run a command through a shell (`shell=True`, `os.system`, `exec` with a template) rather than passing arguments. Where any part comes from outside, it is command injection. Ask where each one's input comes from.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

install/containers.go	`install/containers.go:74` — command run through a shell
install/containers.go	`install/containers.go:83` — command run through a shell
install/containers.go	`install/containers.go:93` — command run through a shell

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.9

14 vendored components with no licence

adequate

Third-party code is committed into this repository without any statement of the terms it arrived under. Unknown terms are harder to deal with than inconvenient ones: an awkward licence can be complied with, an absent one cannot. Each of these needs its origin established before the code changes hands.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

public/third-party/claude-dark.svg	`public/third-party/claude-dark.svg` — 1 tracked files, no licence file
public/third-party/claude-light.svg	`public/third-party/claude-light.svg` — 1 tracked files, no licence file
public/third-party/dd.png	`public/third-party/dd.png` — 1 tracked files, no licence file
public/third-party/gemini-dark.svg	`public/third-party/gemini-dark.svg` — 1 tracked files, no licence file
public/third-party/gemini-light.svg	`public/third-party/gemini-light.svg` — 1 tracked files, no licence file
public/third-party/incidentio.png	`public/third-party/incidentio.png` — 1 tracked files, no licence file

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.65

3 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 2 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-08-31. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 2 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 1.25.3. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version. The record is incomplete: NVD: 1 record names pangolin with nothing tying it to this repository (CVE-2018-1999032).

A note that does not affect this rating: it describes the project's advisory record, and no advisory in it is known to affect the surveyed commit.

Evidence

CVE-2026-72001	2026-08-31: CVE-2026-72001 (high): Pangolin before 1.22.0 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to access any protected resource by supplying an at
CVE-2026-3209	2026-02-25: CVE-2026-3209 (low): A vulnerability has been found in fosrl Pangolin up to 1.15.4-s.3. This affects the function verifyRoleAccess/verifyApiKeyRoleAccess of the component Role Handl
CVE-2025-56332	2025-12-30: CVE-2025-56332 (critical): Authentication Bypass in fosrl/pangolin v1.6.2 and before allows attackers to access Pangolin resource via Insecure Default Configuration

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Observability & Operations

06 · strong · ratings ↑

Notes that do not affect this rating

06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

error reporting

no error reporter initialised

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

06.18

2 of 8 deployed images carry no version, or `latest`

adequate

2 images in the deployment configuration are named without a version or as `latest`. A redeploy can change the software without a commit, a rollback has nothing to roll back to, and nobody can say from the repository what is running.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

config/ha-reference/node2/docker-compose.yml	`config/ha-reference/node2/docker-compose.yml:18` — image without a version
install/config/crowdsec/docker-compose.yml	`install/config/crowdsec/docker-compose.yml:3` — image without a version

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

06.17

The code branches on the environment's name at 19 places

adequate

19 places outside configuration test whether they are running in production or staging. Staging then does not exercise production's code, and each deploy is the first run of those branches. Differences belong in configuration the code reads, not in the code.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

server/db/names.ts	`server/db/names.ts:18` — branch on the environment name
server/integrationApiServer.ts	`server/integrationApiServer.ts:22` — branch on the environment name
server/lib/billing/features.ts	`server/lib/billing/features.ts:55` — branch on the environment name

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · not assessable · ratings ↑

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository. What a person adds here.

Check it on the running system

7 checks against the running system follow from the findings above: what a buyer's engineer will try, how to run it first, and what to have ready. A paid survey of this repository includes them. See the tiers.

A paid survey of a public repository is also reviewed: a language model reads each finding against the code and withdraws only findings it judges the code contradicts, each listed with its reason. The review is a language model's reading of the findings against the code, and it can be wrong. It never adds a finding, never raises a band, and never removes a finding from a proven check or an advisory that affects the surveyed version.

What a person adds

The survey reads what the repository can show. The code cannot settle these questions, and on them this report states nothing. Each says where its answer lives: your own engineer, the company, or an assessor you choose can settle it. Questions marked measured open with something this repository shows.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · full coverage

measured No architecture or design document is in the tree, across 1,943 product files. Where does the design live, and who holds it? Answer lives in: The team01.38
Is the architecture right for the next three years of the product? Answer lives in: Your architects, with the product roadmap01.39
Were the home-grown components reasonable choices when they were made, and are they now? Answer lives in: The team's reasoning at the time01.40

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · high coverage

Is review real or a rubber stamp? Comment depth and time to approve need the pull request history. Answer lives in: The code host's pull request data02.32
Is delivery planned and measured, or heroic? Answer lives in: The issue tracker: backlog, sprint history, estimate accuracy02.38
How are incidents run, reviewed and learned from? Answer lives in: Tickets, chat and postmortems02.37

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · partial coverage

measured One contributor authored more than half of the commits in this history. Is that person part of the transaction, and for how long after it? Answer lives in: The deal terms03.29
Who mentors whom, and would that survive a departure? Answer lives in: The team; review history only suggests candidates03.28
Can the team grow, and who stands behind the top three contributors? Answer lives in: Recruiting data and the org chart03.30
Is the seniority mix sound, and will pay survive your salary bands? Answer lives in: HR data03.31
Is the pace sustainable? Commit times cannot say: git keeps no reliable local time. Answer lives in: Interviews and on-call history03.14
Does the team want to stay after close? Answer lives in: Interviews03.32
How are decisions made and disagreements resolved? Answer lives in: Time with the team03.33

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · minimal coverage

measured 4,805 commits landed in the last year, against 2,087 the year before (+130%). What drove it: new people, a deadline, or code produced faster than before? Answer lives in: The team04.11
Can this team deliver the stated roadmap on the stated timeline? Answer lives in: The data room and the team's record of estimates04.32
Does leadership know about the debt, and is time budgeted to repay it? Answer lives in: Budget and roadmap decisions04.31
Is the engineering shape consistent with the commercial story? Answer lives in: Revenue, customer and churn data04.33

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · partial coverage

measured 05.5 found credential-shaped strings in this repository. Was each one revoked at the provider? Deleting it from the code revokes nothing; only the provider's audit log shows that it was. Answer lives in: The provider's console and audit log05.38
measured No threat model is in the tree of what looks like a running service. Does one exist elsewhere, and who owns it? Answer lives in: The security owner05.43
What has actually broken, how often, and how badly? Answer lives in: Ticketing and chat05.41
What did external testing find, and was it fixed? Answer lives in: Reports in the data room05.42
What is the SOC 2, ISO 27001 or GDPR status, and where is the evidence? Answer lives in: Audit reports; policy files in the tree are not evidence05.44

Observability & Operations

06 · partial coverage

measured Nothing in the tree backs up or restores data. How is data backed up, and has a restore ever been rehearsed? Answer lives in: The operations team06.19
measured No alert rule is defined in the repository. Where are alerts defined, who receives them, and when did one last fire? Answer lives in: The alerting tool and the on-call rota06.10
Are the dashboards opened, the alerts acknowledged and the pages answered? Answer lives in: Pager history and dashboard logs06.29
Are the service-level objectives actually met? Answer lives in: Production metrics06.30
Who carries the pager, and how often does it go off? Answer lives in: Pager exports and interviews06.31
What does it cost to run, and how much headroom is there? Answer lives in: Cloud billing and capacity plans06.32

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · none coverage

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

This is primarily a TypeScript codebase. Does your engineering organisation already run TypeScript in production, or would this be the first? 07.1
The bulk of this system sits in src/, server/, messages/. Which of your existing systems would each of those have to absorb or replace? 07.10
The repository carries deployment configuration (Dockerfile and 6 more). Does that match your deployment and on-call model, or does it need rehosting first? 07.2
What is your tolerance for the findings above remaining unaddressed for the first two quarters after close, given everything else that will compete for this team's time?
Which of these systems duplicate yours, and which get retired? Answer lives in: Your architecture07.11
What will integration cost, and in what order? Answer lives in: The engagement07.12
Where does the team land in your organisation, and who reports to whom? Answer lives in: Your org design07.13
Are there earn-outs, retention packages or contractor IP to assign? Answer lives in: Deal terms07.14
Do customer contracts limit hosting, regions or vendors? Answer lives in: Customer contracts07.15

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Rejection log — 86 signals that ran and did not fire

Appendix: rejection log — 86 signals that ran and did not fire

Published on purpose. A signal that looked and decided not to fire has told you something, and this is the calibration data behind every threshold above.

Looked, and found nothing — 69

Signal	What it found
04.hotspot_concentration	change is spread across the codebase rather than pooling in a few filesfiles 3,410 · top5 share 0.061
04.debt_markers	debt markers are sparsemarkers 53 · per kloc 0.13 · lines read 421,468
04.test_growth	test effort kept pace with code writtenlate test per code 0.015 · early test per code 0.01
04.churn_trend	rework is not rising against new worklate delete per insert 0.475 · early delete per insert 0.481
04.eol_runtime	every pinned runtime is still supportedeol as of 2026-09-24
04.fix_share_trend	fixing is not crowding out building
04.compat_layers	little code is kept for the old wayshare 0.0 · code files 1,784 · compat files 0
04.dependency_redundancy	one library per job, mostly
06.telemetry_presence	a telemetry or error-reporting library is referencednote presence only; whether anyone watches it is not visible here · matches 21
06.structured_logging	a structured logging library is referencedmatches 4
06.healthcheck_presence	a health or readiness check is defined
06.correlation_ids	a request can be followed through the logstracing False · request id sites 2
06.release_markers	releases are markedtags last year 55 · release commits 15 · changelog commits 0
06.migrate_on_start	migrations do not run at container start
03.active_contributors	more than one contributor active in the trailing yearall time 129 · active 12mo 79
03.knowledge_silos	every substantial directory has been touched by more than one personauthors 129 · directories 4
03.drive_by_contributors	an open contributor base, where one-commit contributors are normalauthors 129 · one off share 0.45
03.contributor_attrition	the dominant contributor is still activeauthors 129 · top share more than half · top contributor last committed within the last three months
03.critical_path_ownership	more than one person changes the critical pathsauthors 129
03.second_contributor_attrition	the second and third contributors are still active
03.bus_factor_trend	the team has not narrowed to one person
03.joiners_and_leavers	the team is not shrinkingleft 14 · joined 18 · regular last year 24
02.merge_discipline	a meaningful share of recent change carries evidence of reviewmerges 1,410 · window last 24 months · with tracked 123
02.ci_presence	CI configuration is present in the working treecount 5
02.release_cadence	tags are presenttags 99
02.conventional_commits	commit subjects generally carry contentsampled 7,354 · low content share 0.054
02.branch_protection_hints	process scaffolding is present in the repository
02.skipped_tests	few tests are switched offfocused 0 · skipped 0 · test files 45
02.ci_test_gating	no test run in CI is written so that it cannot failconfigs 5
02.revert_share	change is rarely undoneshare 0.001 · reverts 8 · recent commits 6,894
02.dependency_update_cadence	dependencies move with the codelockfiles 2 · commits since 13 · days since lockfile changed 2
02.flaky_test_markers	tests are not retried until they passtest retries 0 · suite retries 0
02.lint_in_build	a linter or formatter runs in the buildwired 3 · ci configs 5 · product files 1,784
02.long_lived_branches	the typical branch reaches the trunk quicklyshare 0.09 · merges 512 · long lived 46
02.commit_size	changes arrive in reviewable sizesshare 0.01 · commits 6,519 · over 2000 lines 63
01.burst_import	the largest burst was data and assets (100% of it), which explains the rate: translations arrive from a vendor in bulk, dependencies and generated code are committed whole, a merged pull request is dated when it merged, not when it was written, a branch merged by a merge commit was reviewed as one piece, and an export or mirror tool dates history when it replays itlargest commits 7ae4082..8fd990d · bursts explained 8 · largest net added 7,440
01.initial_dump	first commit is not a disproportionate share of the codebaseinsertions 1 · share of insertions 0.0
01.revision_depth	most files were revisited after they were first writtenfiles seen 1,890 · write once share 0.19
01.swallowed_errors	errors are rarely thrown awayloc 423,358 · files 30 · per kloc 0.1
01.build_reproducibility	every base image names a versionfloating 0 · from lines 3
01.unfinished_migration	no language migration is stalled halfway
01.weights_in_git	no model weights are committedfiles 0
05.committed_secrets	no credential-shaped strings outside test and fixture pathsnote the working tree only; the history is 05.5 · patterns 8 · files read 1,917
05.security_guardrails	at least one standard guard rail is configured
05.dependency_pinning	a lockfile is committed, so builds are reproduciblelockfile True
05.license_present	a licence file is presentfound True
05.secrets_management_pattern	no environment file is committed outside tests and examplesenv files 0
05.sql_from_strings	no SQL is assembled from strings in product codefiles 0 · sites 0 · value interpolated 0
05.unsafe_deserialization	no code-executing deserialiser in product codesites 0
05.privileged_workloads	no workload runs privileged or in the host's namespacessites 0 · behind a setting or built here 0
05.credentials_in_deploy_config	deployment configuration references secrets, never holds themfiles 0 · sites 0
05.public_env_secret	only publishable values carry a public prefixnames 0 · sites 0 · not secrets 0
05.unsafe_html	raw HTML is rare, literal or sanitisedsites 1
05.source_maps_shipped	production builds do not publish source mapssites 0
05.signing_material	no signing keystore or profile is committedfiles 0
05.license_copyleft_inherited	every licence found in vendored code is permissive or weak-copyleftvendored paths 14
05.license_grant_unclear	the licence is recognisable as AGPL-3.0class network-copyleft · license AGPL-3.0
05.committed_native_libraries	no widely used compiled library is committed to the productlibraries 0
04.api_versions_coexisting	one API version is served, or none
04.deprecations_lingering	few deprecations have outlived two yearsolder than two years 0 · files with deprecations 14
04.dependency_churn	few dependencies were added and dropped within 60 daysdependencies seen 176 · added in two years 106 · removed within 60 days 5
04.ci_platforms_dropped	no platform was dropped from CI in the last two years
04.repository_status	the README's first screen states no end, move or freezestatements 0
02.development_elsewhere	nothing says development happens elsewhereno pr statements 0 · mirror statements 0 · replayed commit share 0.0
05.licence_changes	the root licence has not changed in the history readlicence versions 1 · unreleased changes 0
05.paid_edition	no directory carries a separate paid-edition licencedirectories 0
04.releases_stopped	releases keep pace with developmentmedian gap days 1.5 · days since last tag 0 · commits last 90 days 1,092
04.release_branch	the newest release was cut from the branch surveyedelsewhere 2 · on branch 97 · tags in window 99
03.single_maintainer	no file says one person maintains itstatements 0

Could not conclude, or did not apply — 17

Not a clean result. Each says why it could not answer here.

Signal	Why
04.schema_churn	no schema migrations to read
06.print_logging	a frontend: console output is the browser's, not the server's
06.usage_reporting_default	a reporting host is named, but no setting shows whether it is used by default
06.alert_rules	no alert rules in the repository; they may live in a console
06.probes_identical	no Kubernetes probes
06.single_replica	no Kubernetes deployments
06.feature_flags	no feature-flag service; flags may live elsewhere
01.notebook_outputs	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.outbound_timeouts	not assessed for TypeScript or TSX, the languages the product is written in: this check's patterns read other languages only
05.migration_reversibility	too few migrations to judge
05.resource_limits	no Kubernetes workload manifests
05.cleartext_traffic	not a mobile app
05.dataset_provenance	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.license_manifest_conflict	manifest licence 'SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE AND README.md' is not a recognised SPDX identifier
04.flags_accumulating	few or no feature flags in the history
05.project_advisories	record incomplete: no advisory found in the sources that answered; NVD: 1 record names pangolin with nothing tying it to this repository (CVE-2018-1999032)
05.project_exploited	no affecting advisory is on CISA's Known Exploited list

Anyone can check this report against the authoritative record — click the stamp, or enter F07A-6V9Z-9YMC at borehole.dev/verify.

The code commits to the 106 checks this run performed, the bands they produced, and the commit they were read at. It does not cover checks written since.

Put the mark in your README

The image is wrapped in a link to the verification page, so a reader can check it rather than take it on trust. If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.

[![Borehole reading, not a certification](https://borehole.dev/badge/fosrl/pangolin/04bf1e1.svg "Borehole free reading: not for reliance. See the full report.")](https://borehole.dev/verify/F07A6V9Z9YMC?via=badge)

Where this scan ran

This scan ran on ordinary cloud infrastructure (cloud-run), not in a hardware-isolated confidential VM. Nothing about it is attested by Google.

What an attested survey proves, and what it does not.

What this scan did with the repository — 7 steps

Written by the steps themselves as they ran, not described afterwards. A hand-written account of a data flow drifts the first time somebody changes the flow and not the account.

At	Step	Detail
0.0s	read repository metadata from the GitHub API	size mb: 91.8authenticated: False
13.2s	cloned the repository to a temporary directory	depth: full
23.9s	read the git history	commits: 8800tracked files: 2001
221.9s	ran the deterministic checks	blame pass: Trueread working tree: False
222.0s	recorded where this scan ran	attested: Falseenvironment: cloud-run
312.8s	kept the facts, never the source, for re-reading under new checks
312.8s	deleting the working copy

Total 312.8s ·source content sent off this machine: none · calls to a language model: 0 · the clone was deleted when the survey ended

An automated reading of a repository's code and its history up to one commit, with public advisory records. It may be wrong, it is not legal, financial, investment or security advice, and it does not replace diligence by a qualified person. It is provided for information: nobody may rely on it (Borehole's terms, section 3).

BOREHOLE 0.7.15 DETERMINISTIC LAYER · NO MODEL CALLSREAD ON BOREHOLE'S SERVER · CLONE DELETED TAKEDOWNCONTRIBUTED TO THIS REPOSITORY? YOUR RIGHTS