Borehole · Risk register · free tier

erda-project/erda

Free reading: not for reliance

7195c3a · 4,608 commits · 9,491 files
Issued 2026-10-23

Nothing significant. Questions worth asking about Security & Reliability Posture, Product & Engineering Maturity.

104 checks ran across 6 assessable dimensions. 3 findings are worth checking first. 19 findings, each with evidence. One dimension cannot be assessed without an acquirer.

What the repository says about itself

04.62 Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed
05.60 Relicensed: Apache-2.0 → AGPL-3.0 (2021-04-06) → Apache-2.0 (2021-08-23) LICENSE

Worth checking first

Borehole's proprietary scoring is calibrated across hundreds of repositories. Each finding here reads significant, but its check has not yet held up often enough in that calibration to rate significant on its own. If one holds when someone checks it, it is significant.

05.26 45 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 35 high or critical in what ships
05.45 1 workload setting give a container the host
04.3 215 direct dependencies in a single manifest

What this survey read. This commit may not be the product users run: The newest release, v2.2.0, is not on the branch this survey read. Read this report as describing that commit, not the release users run. Survey the release branch or tag as well.

Published under today's rules. The verification code attests to this reading as it was stored. This page differs from it as follows.

Words about people are today's: bands rather than exact shares, dates or day counts, and what the history measured rather than why.
2 findings from checks Borehole's calibration found wrong more often than right are no longer published.

	Dimension	Rating
01	Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance	strong
02	Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity	adequate
03	Organization & Key-Person Risk	adequate
04	Product & Engineering Maturity	adequate
05	Security & Reliability Posture	adequate
06	Observability & Operations	adequate
07	Fit with the Acquirer	not assessable

strong adequate significant findings not assessable from a repository

Provenance disclosure does not affect any rating

0% of added lines arrived in commits declaring an AI agent as co-author

The surviving-lines measurement was not run on this repository.

2% of lines added in the last 12 months (since 2025-10-23) arrived in AI-declared commits: 1/130 commits, confidence moderate. Also a floor.

1/4,608 commits declaring an agent · Claude Opus 4.7

confidence: moderate

14% of non-merge commits carry any trailer at all
low trailer coverage: the convention may not be in consistent use
no widespread author/committer date divergence

464,881 lines excluded as lockfiles, vendored or generated.

This is a lower bound. It counts what the repository declares. Undeclared AI authorship is invisible here, and a single rebase removes the trailers this rests on. Absence of a declaration is absence of disclosure, not absence of AI authorship.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · strong · ratings ↑

A note that does not affect this rating

01.6

internal/apps/cmp/component-protocol/components/cmp-dashboard-workloads-list/addWorkloadFileEditor/workload_template.go is 4,862 lines, 60× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 80 lines. 26 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 4,862. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

A note that does not affect this rating: measured against its own codebase's median, it is below the 85th percentile of 382 surveyed projects' largest files, where this check begins to count.

Evidence

line-count	`internal/apps/cmp/component-protocol/components/cmp-dashboard-workloads-list/addWorkloadFileEditor/workload_template.go:1` — 4,862 lines (60× median)
line-count	`internal/apps/dop/providers/projectpipeline/service_impl.go:1` — 2,195 lines (27× median)
line-count	`internal/apps/dop/dicehub/release/release.service.go:1` — 1,676 lines (20× median)
line-count	`apistructs/cmp.go:1` — 1,661 lines (20× median)
line-count	`internal/core/legacy/services/project/project.go:1` — 1,643 lines (20× median)

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · adequate · ratings ↑

02.24

5% of recent commits change more than 2,000 lines

adequate

13 of 257 commits in the last 24 months changed over 2,000 lines of code, not counting reformatting, renames, vendored or generated code. A change that size is rarely reviewed line by line. Ask how they were reviewed, and what made them that large.

Evidence

git log --numstat

13 commits over 2,000 lines

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · adequate · ratings ↑

03.1

Bus factor 1: recent work is concentrated in one contributor

adequate

In the last 24 months, one contributor authored more than half of 273 non-merge commits among 10 authors; across all history, less than a quarter of 4,503. This is the single most expensive thing to discover after closing, and the repository cannot tell you whether that person is part of the transaction.

Evidence

git shortlog -sn

last 24 months: top author more than half of 273 commits; bus factor 1; 10 authors

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · adequate · ratings ↑

04.3

215 direct dependencies in a single manifest

adequate worth checking first

go.mod declares 215 direct dependencies. Each one is a maintenance obligation, a supply-chain surface and a potential licence question that transfers with the asset. The count says nothing about whether any given dependency was a good choice; it says how many such choices a buyer inherits.

The check that found this reads significant, but it has not yet held up often enough in Borehole's calibration to rate a finding significant on its own. Opening go.mod and the 3 other files it cites settles it. If it holds when someone checks it, this finding is significant.

Evidence

direct-dependencies	`go.mod` — 215 declared
direct-dependencies	`api/proto-go/go.mod` — 6 declared
direct-dependencies	`.erda/migrations/cmdb/requirements.txt` — 4 declared
direct-dependencies	`.erda/migrations/dicehub/requirements.txt` — 4 declared

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

04.28

26% of the code is legacy or compatibility code, the oldest 51 months old

adequate

1185 of 4537 source files sit in paths named legacy, compat, shim, polyfill or deprecated, and some have been there 51 months. That is usually a migration that never finished. Ask whether finishing it is planned, and what keeping both costs.

Evidence

internal/core/legacy/cache/project/project.go	`internal/core/legacy/cache/project/project.go` — legacy or compatibility code
internal/core/legacy/common/ctxhelper/audit.go	`internal/core/legacy/common/ctxhelper/audit.go` — legacy or compatibility code
internal/core/legacy/conf/conf.go	`internal/core/legacy/conf/conf.go` — legacy or compatibility code

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

04.37

API v2 and v1 have been served together for 56 months

adequate

v1 first appeared in Jan 2022, and v2 is still in the code 56 months later. Two versions mean two surfaces to secure, document and support. Ask who still calls the old one, and whether retiring it is planned.

Evidence

modules/monitor/core/collector/routes.go	`modules/monitor/core/collector/routes.go` — v2 since Jul 2021
modules/oap/collector/plugins/receivers/promremotewrite/provider.go	`modules/oap/collector/plugins/receivers/promremotewrite/provider.go` — v1 since Jan 2022

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Notes that do not affect this rating

04.38

10 files still carry code deprecated more than two years ago

adequate

10 files were marked deprecated over two years ago and still are, the oldest since Mar 2021. A deprecation is a promise to remove. Ask what still depends on these, and whether removing them is scheduled.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

apistructs/runtime_dto.go	`apistructs/runtime_dto.go` — deprecated since Mar 2021
apistructs/deployment.go	`apistructs/deployment.go` — deprecated since Mar 2021
apistructs/member.go	`apistructs/member.go` — deprecated since Mar 2021
bundle/api_asset_operation.go	`bundle/api_asset_operation.go` — deprecated since Mar 2021
pkg/aliyunclient/client.go	`pkg/aliyunclient/client.go` — deprecated since Mar 2021

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

04.62

Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed

adequate

The newest release, v2.2.0, is not on the branch this survey read. The shipped product may differ from what this report describes. Survey the release branch too.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

350ed3605

tag v2.2.0

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · adequate · ratings ↑

05.2

None of the standard security guard rails are configured

adequate

There is no disclosure policy, no automated dependency updates, no named code owners and no pre-commit configuration. None of these is load-bearing on its own. Their collective absence says that security posture here is whatever the current team happens to remember to do, which is not a posture that survives the team changing.

Evidence

guardrail-scan

checked 5 kinds of guard rail across 9,491 tracked files; 0 present

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.26

45 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 35 high or critical in what ships

adequate worth checking first

45 of 519 locked dependencies match 130 published advisories in OSV, 64 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.

The check that found this reads significant, but it has not yet held up often enough in Borehole's calibration to rate a finding significant on its own. Opening go.mod settles it. If it holds when someone checks it, this finding is significant.

Evidence

go.mod	`go.mod` — github.com/docker/docker v25.0.3+incompatible: GHSA-v23v-6jw2-98fq (critical), fixed in 25.0.6
go.mod	`go.mod` — github.com/getkin/kin-openapi v0.76.0: GHSA-r277-6w6q-xmqw (critical), fixed in 0.144.0
go.mod	`go.mod` — github.com/kedacore/keda/v2 v2.15.1: GHSA-637c-6jxx-4rwm (critical), fixed in 2.21.0

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.45

1 workload setting give a container the host

adequate worth checking first

1 places in the deployment configuration run a container privileged or in the host's network, process or IPC namespace. A compromise of that container is a compromise of the machine, and most acquirers' security reviews block it. Node agents (network, storage, monitoring) are excluded.

The check that found this reads significant, but it has not yet held up often enough in Borehole's calibration to rate a finding significant on its own. Opening erda.yml:179 settles it. If it holds when someone checks it, this finding is significant.

Evidence

erda.yml erda.yml:179 — privileged or host namespace

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Notes that do not affect this rating

05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

7 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

.github/workflows/ci-it-noneed.yml	`.github/workflows/ci-it-noneed.yml:46` — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/ci-it-noneed.yml	`.github/workflows/ci-it-noneed.yml:79` — action pinned by tag

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.13

15 outbound calls can wait forever

adequate

15 HTTP calls use a client with no timeout (Python `requests` without `timeout=`, or Go's default client). When a dependency slows down, each one holds a worker until the connection gives up, and enough of them take the service down with the dependency.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

.erda/migrations/cmdb/20211014-project-quota.py	`.erda/migrations/cmdb/20211014-project-quota.py:162` — outbound call without a timeout
internal/apps/ai-proxy/route/filters/common/tts/ttsutil/download.go	`internal/apps/ai-proxy/route/filters/common/tts/ttsutil/download.go:31` — outbound call without a timeout
internal/apps/ai-proxy/route/filters/response/by/service-provider/tts/volcengine-ark/response.go	`internal/apps/ai-proxy/route/filters/response/by/service-provider/tts/volcengine-ark/response.go:135` — outbound call without a timeout

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.20

1 SQL statement built from strings

adequate

1 places in product code build SQL by formatting or joining strings rather than passing parameters. In each, what the code shows going in is a table or column name, a constant, or something the line does not show, not a request's value. Ask whether any value reaches these strings, rather than a parameter.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

internal/apps/dop/dao/testcase.go internal/apps/dop/dao/testcase.go:232 — SQL built from a string

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.21

7 shell commands built from strings

adequate

7 places run a command through a shell (`shell=True`, `os.system`, `exec` with a template) rather than passing arguments. Where any part comes from outside, it is command injection. Ask where each one's input comes from.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

internal/pkg/extension/extension.service.go	`internal/pkg/extension/extension.service.go:795` — command run through a shell
internal/pkg/extension/extension.service.go	`internal/pkg/extension/extension.service.go:804` — command run through a shell
internal/pkg/extension/extension.service.go	`internal/pkg/extension/extension.service.go:812` — command run through a shell

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.60

Relicensed: Apache-2.0 → AGPL-3.0 (2021-04-06) → Apache-2.0 (2021-08-23)

adequate

The root licence changed 2 time(s). Code taken under earlier terms stays under them; check which terms any fork or customer relied on.

A note that does not affect this rating: a licence change is a fact for the first screen, and only a narrowing of rights within two years of the surveyed commit costs "strong".

Evidence

29471fc84	`LICENSE` — Apache-2.0 from 2021-03-05
f5c43e638	`LICENSE` — AGPL-3.0 from 2021-04-06
2fe2eee38	`LICENSE` — Apache-2.0 from 2021-08-23

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Observability & Operations

06 · adequate · ratings ↑

06.14

Readiness and liveness probes are identical in 1 of 2 workloads

adequate

Both probes call the same endpoint. When a dependency slows down, the liveness probe fails with the readiness probe, so the platform restarts pods that only needed taking out of rotation, and a partial outage becomes a full one. Liveness should ask whether the process is alive; readiness whether it can serve.

Evidence

cmd/monitor/extensions/loghub/log-metrics.deployment.yaml cmd/monitor/extensions/loghub/log-metrics.deployment.yaml — same probe endpoint twice

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Notes that do not affect this rating

06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

error reporting

no error reporter initialised

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

06.33

2 of 2 deployments run a single replica

adequate

2 deployments set `replicas: 1`, and nothing (an autoscaler, a disruption budget) adds more. Every deploy and every node drain is downtime, and the availability the buyer inherits has a ceiling.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

cmd/monitor/extensions/loghub/log-exporter.deployment.yaml	`cmd/monitor/extensions/loghub/log-exporter.deployment.yaml` — replicas: 1
cmd/monitor/extensions/loghub/log-metrics.deployment.yaml	`cmd/monitor/extensions/loghub/log-metrics.deployment.yaml` — replicas: 1

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · not assessable · ratings ↑

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository. What a person adds here.

Check it on the running system

9 checks against the running system follow from the findings above: what a buyer's engineer will try, how to run it first, and what to have ready. A paid survey of this repository includes them. See the tiers.

A paid survey of a public repository is also reviewed: a language model reads each finding against the code and withdraws only findings it judges the code contradicts, each listed with its reason. The review is a language model's reading of the findings against the code, and it can be wrong. It never adds a finding, never raises a band, and never removes a finding from a proven check or an advisory that affects the surveyed version.

What a person adds

The survey reads what the repository can show. The code cannot settle these questions, and on them this report states nothing. Each says where its answer lives: your own engineer, the company, or an assessor you choose can settle it. Questions marked measured open with something this repository shows.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · full coverage

measured No architecture or design document is in the tree, across 6,088 product files. Where does the design live, and who holds it? Answer lives in: The team01.38
Is the architecture right for the next three years of the product? Answer lives in: Your architects, with the product roadmap01.39
Were the home-grown components reasonable choices when they were made, and are they now? Answer lives in: The team's reasoning at the time01.40

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · high coverage

Is review real or a rubber stamp? Comment depth and time to approve need the pull request history. Answer lives in: The code host's pull request data02.32
Is delivery planned and measured, or heroic? Answer lives in: The issue tracker: backlog, sprint history, estimate accuracy02.38
How are incidents run, reviewed and learned from? Answer lives in: Tickets, chat and postmortems02.37

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · partial coverage

measured 54 people have committed here. Which of them are you acquiring, and which are you replacing? Answer lives in: The deal terms03.29
measured conf/ (less than a quarter of the files) has not changed in 18 months while the rest of the repository moved. Is that code finished, or abandoned, and who still knows how it works? Answer lives in: The team03.22
Who mentors whom, and would that survive a departure? Answer lives in: The team; review history only suggests candidates03.28
Can the team grow, and who stands behind the top three contributors? Answer lives in: Recruiting data and the org chart03.30
Is the seniority mix sound, and will pay survive your salary bands? Answer lives in: HR data03.31
Is the pace sustainable? Commit times cannot say: git keeps no reliable local time. Answer lives in: Interviews and on-call history03.14
Does the team want to stay after close? Answer lives in: Interviews03.32
How are decisions made and disagreements resolved? Answer lives in: Time with the team03.33

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · minimal coverage

Can this team deliver the stated roadmap on the stated timeline? Answer lives in: The data room and the team's record of estimates04.32
Does leadership know about the debt, and is time budgeted to repay it? Answer lives in: Budget and roadmap decisions04.31
Is the engineering shape consistent with the commercial story? Answer lives in: Revenue, customer and churn data04.33

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · partial coverage

measured No threat model is in the tree of what looks like a running service. Does one exist elsewhere, and who owns it? Answer lives in: The security owner05.43
What has actually broken, how often, and how badly? Answer lives in: Ticketing and chat05.41
What did external testing find, and was it fixed? Answer lives in: Reports in the data room05.42
What is the SOC 2, ISO 27001 or GDPR status, and where is the evidence? Answer lives in: Audit reports; policy files in the tree are not evidence05.44

Observability & Operations

06 · partial coverage

measured Nothing in the tree backs up or restores data. How is data backed up, and has a restore ever been rehearsed? Answer lives in: The operations team06.19
measured Alert rules are defined in the repository. Who receives them, and when did one last fire? Answer lives in: The alerting tool and the on-call rota06.10
Are the dashboards opened, the alerts acknowledged and the pages answered? Answer lives in: Pager history and dashboard logs06.29
Are the service-level objectives actually met? Answer lives in: Production metrics06.30
Who carries the pager, and how often does it go off? Answer lives in: Pager exports and interviews06.31
What does it cost to run, and how much headroom is there? Answer lives in: Cloud billing and capacity plans06.32

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · none coverage

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

This is primarily a Go codebase. Does your engineering organisation already run Go in production, or would this be the first? 07.1
The bulk of this system sits in internal/, api/, pkg/. Which of your existing systems would each of those have to absorb or replace? 07.10
The repository carries deployment configuration (build/dockerfiles/Dockerfile and 35 more). Does that match your deployment and on-call model, or does it need rehosting first? 07.2
What is your tolerance for the findings above remaining unaddressed for the first two quarters after close, given everything else that will compete for this team's time?
Which of these systems duplicate yours, and which get retired? Answer lives in: Your architecture07.11
What will integration cost, and in what order? Answer lives in: The engagement07.12
Where does the team land in your organisation, and who reports to whom? Answer lives in: Your org design07.13
Are there earn-outs, retention packages or contractor IP to assign? Answer lives in: Deal terms07.14
Do customer contracts limit hosting, regions or vendors? Answer lives in: Customer contracts07.15

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Rejection log — 85 signals that ran and did not fire

Appendix: rejection log — 85 signals that ran and did not fire

Published on purpose. A signal that looked and decided not to fire has told you something, and this is the calibration data behind every threshold above.

Looked, and found nothing — 64

Signal	What it found
04.hotspot_concentration	change is spread across the codebase rather than pooling in a few filesfiles 35,709 · top5 share 0.011
04.debt_markers	debt markers are sparsemarkers 1,062 · per kloc 0.9 · lines read 1,181,060
04.test_growth	test effort kept pace with code writtenlate test per code 0.691 · early test per code 0.22
04.churn_trend	rework is not rising against new worklate delete per insert 0.447 · early delete per insert 0.288
04.fixes_with_tests	fixes usually come with a testfixes 88 · share 0.443 · with tests 39
06.telemetry_presence	a telemetry or error-reporting library is referencednote presence only; whether anyone watches it is not visible here · matches 32
06.structured_logging	a structured logging library is referencedmatches 926
06.healthcheck_presence	a health or readiness check is defined
06.telemetry_depth	the service is visible in more than one way
06.print_logging	raw prints are few, or outnumbered by logger callsprints 114 · logger calls 2,716
06.correlation_ids	a request can be followed through the logstracing True · request id sites 89
06.usage_reporting_default	the product's code names no reporting hostsettings on 0 · settings off 0
06.alert_rules	alert rules are defined as codealert files 3
06.environment_branching	environment differences live in configurationsites 0
06.release_markers	releases are markedtags last year 0 · release commits 0 · changelog commits 2
06.migrate_on_start	migrations do not run at container start
03.active_contributors	more than one contributor active in the trailing yearall time 54 · active 12mo 7
03.knowledge_silos	every substantial directory has been touched by more than one personauthors 54 · directories 9
03.drive_by_contributors	an open contributor base, where one-commit contributors are normalauthors 54 · one off share 0.185
03.contributor_attrition	no contributor dominates enough for their absence to matterauthors 54 · top share less than a quarter · top contributor last committed more than six months ago
03.critical_path_ownership	more than one person changes the critical pathsauthors 10
03.second_contributor_attrition	the second and third contributors are still active
03.bus_factor_trend	the team has not narrowed to one person
03.joiners_and_leavers	the team is not shrinkingleft 2 · joined 1 · regular last year 4
02.merge_discipline	a meaningful share of recent change carries evidence of reviewmerges 0 · window last 24 months · with tracked 0
02.ci_presence	CI configuration is present in the working treecount 6
02.test_presence	tests are present in a normal proportion to sourcetests 1,496 · source 6,027 · test ratio 0.248
02.release_cadence	tags are presenttags 19
02.conventional_commits	commit subjects generally carry contentsampled 4,608 · low content share 0.001
02.branch_protection_hints	process scaffolding is present in the repository
02.ci_runs_tests	CI invokes a test runnerconfigs 6 · with tests 3
02.skipped_tests	few tests are switched offfocused 0 · skipped 0 · test files 1,531
02.ci_test_gating	no test run in CI is written so that it cannot failconfigs 6
02.revert_share	change is rarely undoneshare 0.004 · reverts 1 · recent commits 273
02.dependency_update_cadence	dependencies move with the codelockfiles 4 · commits since 14 · days since lockfile changed 134
02.flaky_test_markers	tests are not retried until they passtest retries 0 · suite retries 0
02.lint_in_build	a linter or formatter runs in the buildwired 4 · ci configs 6 · product files 4,537
01.burst_import	no commit run met both the rate and the net-addition thresholdgap seconds 180 · min add ratio 3.0 · min net added 2,000
01.initial_dump	first commit is not a disproportionate share of the codebaseinsertions 202 · share of insertions 0.0001
01.message_uniformity	commit subjects vary in wording and lengthlength stdev 19.63 · repeat share 0.0
01.revision_depth	most files were revisited after they were first writtenfiles seen 3,706 · write once share 0.484
01.swallowed_errors	errors are rarely thrown awayloc 1,189,849 · files 1 · per kloc 0.0
01.unfinished_migration	no language migration is stalled halfway
01.weights_in_git	no model weights are committedfiles 0
05.committed_secrets	no credential-shaped strings outside test and fixture pathsnote the working tree only; the history is 05.5 · patterns 8 · files read 9,119
05.dependency_pinning	dependencies are substantially pinnedunpinned 0
05.license_present	a licence file is presentfound True
05.secrets_in_history	no credential-shaped string was ever added outside test and fixture paths; the only other matches are expired or licence tokens or placeholders, which grant nothingpatterns 8 · truncated False · added lines 2,173,668
05.secrets_management_pattern	no environment file is committed outside tests and examplesenv files 0
05.unsafe_deserialization	no code-executing deserialiser in product codesites 0
05.resource_limits	every workload declares limitsworkloads 2 · without limits 0
05.credentials_in_deploy_config	deployment configuration references secrets, never holds themfiles 0 · sites 0
05.signing_material	no signing keystore or profile is committedfiles 0
05.license_copyleft_inherited	every licence found in vendored code is permissive or weak-copyleftvendored paths 7
05.license_vendored_unlicensed	all 1 vendored components state their terms, in a licence file, their own headers or a notices filecomponents 1 · stated in headers or notices 1
05.license_grant_unclear	the licence is recognisable as Apache-2.0class permissive · license Apache-2.0
05.committed_native_libraries	no widely used compiled library is committed to the productlibraries 0
04.dependency_churn	few dependencies were added and dropped within 60 daysdependencies seen 400 · added in two years 32 · removed within 60 days 0
04.ci_platforms_dropped	no platform was dropped from CI in the last two years
04.repository_status	the README's first screen states no end, move or freezestatements 0
02.development_elsewhere	nothing says development happens elsewhereno pr statements 0 · mirror statements 0 · replayed commit share 0.0
05.paid_edition	no directory carries a separate paid-edition licencedirectories 0
04.releases_stopped	releases keep pace with developmentmedian gap days 22.0 · days since last tag 1,578 · commits last 90 days 3
03.single_maintainer	no file says one person maintains itstatements 0

Could not conclude, or did not apply — 21

Not a clean result. Each says why it could not answer here.

Signal	Why
04.eol_runtime	no pinned runtime version to check
04.fix_share_trend	fewer than six busy quarters to compare
04.schema_churn	columns, once added, stay
04.dependency_redundancy	no JavaScript manifest to read
06.deployed_image_floats	no deployment descriptor names an image
06.feature_flags	no feature-flag service; flags may live elsewhere
02.long_lived_branches	too few merges to judge (squash and rebase leave none)
01.build_reproducibility	no product Dockerfile to read
01.notebook_outputs	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.container_runs_as_root	no Dockerfile to read
05.migration_reversibility	too few migrations to judge
05.public_env_secret	not a frontend
05.unsafe_html	not a frontend
05.source_maps_shipped	not a frontend
05.cleartext_traffic	not a mobile app
05.dataset_provenance	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.license_manifest_conflict	no packaging manifest states a licence
04.flags_accumulating	few or no feature flags in the history
05.project_advisories	record incomplete: no advisory found in the sources that answered; OSV Go github.com/erda-project/erda (an empty record for a package published here) did not
05.advisory_record	record incomplete: no advisory against the project in the last 24 months; OSV Go github.com/erda-project/erda (an empty record for a package published here) did not answer
05.project_exploited	no affecting advisory is on CISA's Known Exploited list

Anyone can check this report against the authoritative record — click the stamp, or enter WFR5-3H01-112N at borehole.dev/verify.

The code commits to the 106 checks this run performed, the bands they produced, and the commit they were read at. It does not cover checks written since.

Put the mark in your README

The image is wrapped in a link to the verification page, so a reader can check it rather than take it on trust. If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.

[![Borehole reading, not a certification](https://borehole.dev/badge/erda-project/erda/7195c3a.svg "Borehole free reading: not for reliance. See the full report.")](https://borehole.dev/verify/WFR53H01112N?via=badge)

Where this scan ran

This scan ran on ordinary cloud infrastructure (cloud-run), not in a hardware-isolated confidential VM. Nothing about it is attested by Google.

What an attested survey proves, and what it does not.

What this scan did with the repository — 7 steps

Written by the steps themselves as they ran, not described afterwards. A hand-written account of a data flow drifts the first time somebody changes the flow and not the account.

At	Step	Detail
0.0s	read repository metadata from the GitHub API	size mb: 60.7authenticated: False
9.7s	cloned the repository to a temporary directory	depth: full
19.3s	read the git history	commits: 4608tracked files: 9491
318.2s	ran the deterministic checks	blame pass: Falseread working tree: False
318.2s	recorded where this scan ran	attested: Falseenvironment: cloud-run
509.5s	kept the facts, never the source, for re-reading under new checks
509.5s	deleting the working copy

Total 509.5s ·source content sent off this machine: none · calls to a language model: 0 · the clone was deleted when the survey ended

An automated reading of a repository's code and its history up to one commit, with public advisory records. It may be wrong, it is not legal, financial, investment or security advice, and it does not replace diligence by a qualified person. It is provided for information: nobody may rely on it (Borehole's terms, section 3).

BOREHOLE 0.7.15 DETERMINISTIC LAYER · NO MODEL CALLSREAD ON BOREHOLE'S SERVER · CLONE DELETED TAKEDOWNCONTRIBUTED TO THIS REPOSITORY? YOUR RIGHTS