Borehole · Risk register · free tier

deepfence/threatmapper

Free reading: not for reliance

657c7c1 · 7,898 commits · 1,946 files
Issued 2026-11-03

Nothing proven significant. 1 finding is worth checking first.

103 checks ran across 6 assessable dimensions. 1 finding is worth checking first. 15 findings, each with evidence. One dimension cannot be assessed without an acquirer. Last commit 13 May 2026.

What the repository says about itself

8 submodule(s) this survey does not read: deepfence_agent/plugins/agent-plugins-grpc, deepfence_agent/plugins/package-scanner, deepfence_agent/plugins/SecretScanner .gitmodules:1

Worth checking first

Borehole's proprietary scoring is calibrated across hundreds of repositories. Each finding here may be significant, and its check has not yet held up often enough in that calibration to rate significant on its own. If one holds when someone checks it, it is significant.

05.45 10 workload settings give a container the host

Published under today's rules. The verification code attests to this reading as it was stored. This page differs from it as follows.

Words about people are today's: bands rather than exact shares, dates or day counts, and what the history measured rather than why.
3 findings from checks Borehole's calibration found wrong more often than right are no longer published.
The file and line of 6 credential-shaped matches are withheld. File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report.

	Dimension	Rating
01	Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance	adequate
02	Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity	strong
03	Organization & Key-Person Risk	adequate
04	Product & Engineering Maturity	adequate
05	Security & Reliability Posture	adequate
06	Observability & Operations	adequate
07	Fit with the Acquirer	not assessable

strong adequate significant findings not assessable from a repository

Provenance disclosure does not affect any rating

0% of the code standing today was written in AI-declared commits

0% of lines still in the tree 0 of 561,066 0% of lines ever added these differ when early hand-written code has since been replaced

0/6,746 commits declaring an agent

confidence: moderate

2% of non-merge commits carry any trailer at all
low trailer coverage: the convention may not be in consistent use
no widespread author/committer date divergence
deep scan blamed 1,671 of 1,679 counted files

2,626,893 lines excluded as lockfiles, vendored or generated.

This is a lower bound. It counts what the repository declares. Undeclared AI authorship is invisible here, and a single rebase removes the trailers this rests on. Absence of a declaration is absence of disclosure, not absence of AI authorship.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · adequate · ratings ↑

01.2

The repository begins with most of itself already written

adequate

The first commit carries 1,663,624 lines — 41% of every line ever added. Whatever happened before that commit happened somewhere this repository cannot show you, so the early history is not available as evidence of how the system was designed.

Evidence

c13979b

2021-10-13T11:29:54+00:00; +1,663,624 across 6185 files; subject: 'initial commit'

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.

Notes that do not affect this rating

01.6

deepfence_utils/postgresql/postgresql-db/queries.sql.go is 3,302 lines, 36× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 90 lines. 21 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 3,302. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

A note that does not affect this rating: measured against its own codebase's median, it is below the 85th percentile of 382 surveyed projects' largest files, where this check begins to count.

Evidence

line-count	`deepfence_utils/postgresql/postgresql-db/queries.sql.go:1` — 3,302 lines (36× median)
line-count	`deepfence_server/handler/scan_reports.go:1` — 2,657 lines (29× median)
line-count	`deepfence_frontend/apps/dashboard/src/features/vulnerabilities/pages/VulnerabilityScanResults.tsx:1` — 2,402 lines (26× median)
line-count	`deepfence_frontend/apps/dashboard/src/features/malwares/pages/MalwareScanResults.tsx:1` — 2,136 lines (23× median)
line-count	`deepfence_frontend/apps/dashboard/src/features/secrets/pages/SecretScanResults.tsx:1` — 2,112 lines (23× median)

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

01.7

6% of code blocks appear verbatim in more than one file

adequate

6,701 distinct 8-line blocks appear in two or more files. Copy-paste is the cheapest thing a generator does and among the more expensive things to inherit: a fix has to be applied everywhere the block landed, and nothing in the repository records where that is. Tests, fixtures and documentation examples are excluded — those repeat by design — so this is duplication in code that ships. Blocks are matched after normalising whitespace and only across different files.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

duplicated-block	identical 8-line block in 23 files: deepfence_frontend/apps/dashboard/src/features/integrations/components/ReportsTable.tsx, deepfence_frontend/apps/dashboard/src/features/malwares/pages/MalwareScanResults.tsx, deepfence_frontend/apps/dashboard/src/features/malwares/pages/MalwareScans.tsx
duplicated-block	identical 8-line block in 23 files: deepfence_frontend/apps/dashboard/src/features/integrations/components/ReportsTable.tsx, deepfence_frontend/apps/dashboard/src/features/malwares/pages/MalwareScanResults.tsx, deepfence_frontend/apps/dashboard/src/features/malwares/pages/MalwareScans.tsx
duplicated-block	identical 8-line block in 23 files: deepfence_frontend/apps/dashboard/src/features/integrations/components/ReportsTable.tsx, deepfence_frontend/apps/dashboard/src/features/malwares/pages/MalwareScanResults.tsx, deepfence_frontend/apps/dashboard/src/features/malwares/pages/MalwareScans.tsx
duplicated-block	identical 8-line block in 23 files: deepfence_frontend/apps/dashboard/src/features/malwares/pages/MalwareScanResults.tsx, deepfence_frontend/apps/dashboard/src/features/malwares/pages/MalwareScans.tsx, deepfence_frontend/apps/dashboard/src/features/malwares/pages/UniqueMalwares.tsx
duplicated-block	identical 8-line block in 23 files: deepfence_frontend/apps/dashboard/src/features/malwares/pages/MalwareScanResults.tsx, deepfence_frontend/apps/dashboard/src/features/malwares/pages/MalwareScans.tsx, deepfence_frontend/apps/dashboard/src/features/malwares/pages/UniqueMalwares.tsx

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · strong · ratings ↑

No finding. 16 checks ran and none fired; the rejection log below says why each did not.

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · adequate · ratings ↑

03.27

Regular contributors fell from 8 to 1 in a year

adequate

7 people who committed regularly the year before made no commits in the last year, and 0 new regular contributors arrived. Ask whether the work they did is still covered.

Evidence

regular contributors by year

8 then 1; 7 stopped committing, 0 began

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · adequate · ratings ↑

04.19

7% of bug fixes add or change a test

adequate

Of 55 fixes in the last 24 months, 4 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.

Evidence

fix commits touching tests

4 of 55

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

A note that does not affect this rating

04.17

3 pinned runtimes are past end of life

adequate

The code is pinned to Go 1.23 (end of life 2025-08-12); Python 3.6 (end of life 2021-12-23); Python 3.9 (end of life 2025-10-31). None of these receives security fixes any more; the first stopped on 2021-12-23. Moving off an unsupported runtime is rarely a one-line change, so a buyer should ask whether the upgrade is planned and what it touches.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

haproxy/Dockerfile	`haproxy/Dockerfile` — Go 1.23, end of life 2025-08-12
ci-cd-integrations/github-actions/Dockerfile	`ci-cd-integrations/github-actions/Dockerfile` — Python 3.6, end of life 2021-12-23
deployment-scripts/sample-applications/flask-echo-server/Dockerfile	`deployment-scripts/sample-applications/flask-echo-server/Dockerfile` — Python 3.9, end of life 2025-10-31

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · adequate · ratings ↑

05.1

1 credential-shaped string in the tree sit in tests, examples, documentation or local development settings

adequate

Strings shaped like credentials appear only where fakes are usual: test fixtures, examples, documentation, placeholders and local stacks. They are almost always fakes. Ask someone to confirm that none of them works anywhere, because a real key in a development file is still a real key.

Evidence

private key block	private key block, where fakes are usual
	File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report.

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.6

14 Dockerfiles run the application as root

adequate

No USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.

Evidence

no-USER-instruction	`ci-cd-integrations/circleci/Dockerfile` — runs as root
no-USER-instruction	`ci-cd-integrations/github-actions/Dockerfile` — runs as root
no-USER-instruction	`ci-cd-integrations/gitlab/Dockerfile` — runs as root
no-USER-instruction	`ci-cd-integrations/jenkins/Dockerfile` — runs as root

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.45

10 workload settings give a container the host

adequate worth checking first

10 places in the deployment configuration run a container privileged or in the host's network, process or IPC namespace. A compromise of that container is a compromise of the machine, and most acquirers' security reviews block it. Node agents (network, storage, monitoring) are excluded.

The check that found this reads significant, but it has not yet held up often enough in Borehole's calibration to rate a finding significant on its own. Opening deployment-scripts/bottlerocket/kubernetes-agent.yml:134 settles it. If it holds when someone checks it, this finding is significant.

Evidence

deployment-scripts/bottlerocket/kubernetes-agent.yml	`deployment-scripts/bottlerocket/kubernetes-agent.yml:134` — privileged or host namespace
deployment-scripts/bottlerocket/kubernetes-agent.yml	`deployment-scripts/bottlerocket/kubernetes-agent.yml:135` — privileged or host namespace
deployment-scripts/bottlerocket/kubernetes-agent.yml	`deployment-scripts/bottlerocket/kubernetes-agent.yml:165` — privileged or host namespace

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.49

The production build publishes source maps

adequate

The build configuration emits source maps for production, so the original source, with its comments and structure, is downloadable by every visitor. Upload them to an error tracker and keep them off the public server instead.

Evidence

deepfence_frontend/packages/ui-components/vite.config.ts deepfence_frontend/packages/ui-components/vite.config.ts:48 — source maps in a production build

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Notes that do not affect this rating

05.5

6 credential-shaped strings exist in the history

adequate

Matches for private key block were committed at some point across 6,719 commits examined. The files that held them are no longer in the working tree — but removal from a file is not removal from the history, and the history is what transfers with the asset. What matters is whether each was rotated after it was committed. The code cannot tell whether any of them is live, and that decides whether this matters: none sits in production configuration, and none is in a format its provider keeps for live keys. Is any of these live? Show that each was rotated after it was committed, and when.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

history	5 cited: private key block pattern added here
	File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report.

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

1 third-party CI action is referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day; 2 steps pipe a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

ci-cd-integrations/github-actions/.github/workflows/malwares.yml	`ci-cd-integrations/github-actions/.github/workflows/malwares.yml:27` — action pinned by tag
deepfence_worker/Dockerfile	`deepfence_worker/Dockerfile:49` — download piped into a shell

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.13

5 outbound calls can wait forever

adequate

5 HTTP calls use a client with no timeout (Python `requests` without `timeout=`, or Go's default client). When a dependency slows down, each one holds a worker until the connection gives up, and enough of them take the service down with the dependency.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

deepfence_bootstrapper/supervisor/process.go	`deepfence_bootstrapper/supervisor/process.go:273` — outbound call without a timeout
deepfence_bootstrapper/supervisor/process.go	`deepfence_bootstrapper/supervisor/process.go:299` — outbound call without a timeout
deepfence_server/pkg/registry/ecr/client.go	`deepfence_server/pkg/registry/ecr/client.go:60` — outbound call without a timeout

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Observability & Operations

06 · adequate · ratings ↑

06.14

Readiness and liveness probes are identical in 4 of 7 workloads

adequate

Both probes call the same endpoint. When a dependency slows down, the liveness probe fails with the readiness probe, so the platform restarts pods that only needed taking out of rotation, and a partial outage becomes a full one. Liveness should ask whether the process is alive; readiness whether it can serve.

Evidence

deployment-scripts/helm-charts/deepfence-console/templates/database/fileserver/fileserver.yaml	`deployment-scripts/helm-charts/deepfence-console/templates/database/fileserver/fileserver.yaml` — same probe endpoint twice
deployment-scripts/helm-charts/deepfence-console/templates/deepfence-router.yaml	`deployment-scripts/helm-charts/deepfence-console/templates/deepfence-router.yaml` — same probe endpoint twice
deployment-scripts/helm-charts/deepfence-console/templates/deepfence-server.yaml	`deployment-scripts/helm-charts/deepfence-console/templates/deepfence-server.yaml` — same probe endpoint twice

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

A note that does not affect this rating

06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

error reporting

no error reporter initialised

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · not assessable · ratings ↑

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository. What a person adds here.

Check it on the running system

11 checks against the running system follow from the findings above: what a buyer's engineer will try, how to run it first, and what to have ready. A paid survey of this repository includes them. See the tiers.

A paid survey of a public repository is also reviewed: a language model reads each finding against the code and withdraws only findings it judges the code contradicts, each listed with its reason. The review is a language model's reading of the findings against the code, and it can be wrong. It never adds a finding, never raises a band, and never removes a finding from a proven check or an advisory that affects the surveyed version.

What a person adds

The survey reads what the repository can show. The code cannot settle these questions, and on them this report states nothing. Each says where its answer lives: your own engineer, the company, or an assessor you choose can settle it. Questions marked measured open with something this repository shows.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · full coverage

measured The tree carries design documentation (docs/docs/architecture/cloudscanner.md and 4 more). Does it match what the team believes today? Ask them to walk through it against the code. Answer lives in: The team01.38
measured The repository pulls code in through git submodules (.gitmodules). A buyer receives pointers, not that code. Can every submodule be fetched without the team's credentials, and who owns each one? Answer lives in: The team and the submodule owners01.35
Is the architecture right for the next three years of the product? Answer lives in: Your architects, with the product roadmap01.39
Were the home-grown components reasonable choices when they were made, and are they now? Answer lives in: The team's reasoning at the time01.40

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · high coverage

Is review real or a rubber stamp? Comment depth and time to approve need the pull request history. Answer lives in: The code host's pull request data02.32
Is delivery planned and measured, or heroic? Answer lives in: The issue tracker: backlog, sprint history, estimate accuracy02.38
How are incidents run, reviewed and learned from? Answer lives in: Tickets, chat and postmortems02.37

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · partial coverage

measured 51 people have committed here. Which of them are you acquiring, and which are you replacing? Answer lives in: The deal terms03.29
measured pentesting-reports/ (less than a quarter of the files) has not changed in 18 months while the rest of the repository moved. Is that code finished, or abandoned, and who still knows how it works? Answer lives in: The team03.22
Who mentors whom, and would that survive a departure? Answer lives in: The team; review history only suggests candidates03.28
Can the team grow, and who stands behind the top three contributors? Answer lives in: Recruiting data and the org chart03.30
Is the seniority mix sound, and will pay survive your salary bands? Answer lives in: HR data03.31
Is the pace sustainable? Commit times cannot say: git keeps no reliable local time. Answer lives in: Interviews and on-call history03.14
Does the team want to stay after close? Answer lives in: Interviews03.32
How are decisions made and disagreements resolved? Answer lives in: Time with the team03.33

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · minimal coverage

measured 11 commits landed in the last year, against 339 the year before (-97%). Is that maintenance mode, a pivot, or fewer people working on it? The count looks the same for all three. Answer lives in: The team04.11
Can this team deliver the stated roadmap on the stated timeline? Answer lives in: The data room and the team's record of estimates04.32
Does leadership know about the debt, and is time budgeted to repay it? Answer lives in: Budget and roadmap decisions04.31
Is the engineering shape consistent with the commercial story? Answer lives in: Revenue, customer and churn data04.33

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · partial coverage

measured 05.5 found credential-shaped strings in this repository. Was each one revoked at the provider? Deleting it from the code revokes nothing; only the provider's audit log shows that it was. Answer lives in: The provider's console and audit log05.38
measured No threat model is in the tree of what looks like a running service. Does one exist elsewhere, and who owns it? Answer lives in: The security owner05.43
What has actually broken, how often, and how badly? Answer lives in: Ticketing and chat05.41
What did external testing find, and was it fixed? Answer lives in: Reports in the data room05.42
What is the SOC 2, ISO 27001 or GDPR status, and where is the evidence? Answer lives in: Audit reports; policy files in the tree are not evidence05.44

Observability & Operations

06 · partial coverage

measured Backup or restore tooling is in the tree (deepfence_neo4j/backup.sh). Has a restore ever been rehearsed, and how long did it take? Answer lives in: The operations team06.19
measured No alert rule is defined in the repository. Where are alerts defined, who receives them, and when did one last fire? Answer lives in: The alerting tool and the on-call rota06.10
Are the dashboards opened, the alerts acknowledged and the pages answered? Answer lives in: Pager history and dashboard logs06.29
Are the service-level objectives actually met? Answer lives in: Production metrics06.30
Who carries the pager, and how often does it go off? Answer lives in: Pager exports and interviews06.31
What does it cost to run, and how much headroom is there? Answer lives in: Cloud billing and capacity plans06.32

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · none coverage

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

This is primarily a TypeScript codebase, with Go alongside (30% of source files). Does your engineering organisation already run TypeScript in production, or would this be the first? 07.1
The bulk of this system sits in deepfence_agent/, deepfence_frontend/, deepfence_server/. Which of your existing systems would each of those have to absorb or replace? 07.10
The repository carries deployment configuration (ci-cd-integrations/circleci/Dockerfile and 23 more). Does that match your deployment and on-call model, or does it need rehosting first? 07.2
What is your tolerance for the findings above remaining unaddressed for the first two quarters after close, given everything else that will compete for this team's time?
Which of these systems duplicate yours, and which get retired? Answer lives in: Your architecture07.11
What will integration cost, and in what order? Answer lives in: The engagement07.12
Where does the team land in your organisation, and who reports to whom? Answer lives in: Your org design07.13
Are there earn-outs, retention packages or contractor IP to assign? Answer lives in: Deal terms07.14
Do customer contracts limit hosting, regions or vendors? Answer lives in: Customer contracts07.15

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Rejection log — 88 signals that ran and did not fire

Appendix: rejection log — 88 signals that ran and did not fire

Published on purpose. A signal that looked and decided not to fire has told you something, and this is the calibration data behind every threshold above.

Looked, and found nothing — 70

Signal	What it found
04.hotspot_concentration	change is spread across the codebase rather than pooling in a few filesfiles 12,256 · top5 share 0.023
04.debt_markers	debt markers are sparsemarkers 86 · per kloc 0.26 · lines read 332,736
04.dependency_sprawl	direct dependency counts are unremarkable
04.test_growth	test effort kept pace with code writtenlate test per code 0.044 · early test per code 0.066
04.churn_trend	rework is not rising against new worklate delete per insert 0.567 · early delete per insert 0.647
04.compat_layers	little code is kept for the old wayshare 0.0 · code files 1,084 · compat files 0
04.dependency_redundancy	one library per job, mostly
06.telemetry_presence	a telemetry or error-reporting library is referencednote presence only; whether anyone watches it is not visible here · matches 28
06.structured_logging	a structured logging library is referencedmatches 30
06.healthcheck_presence	a health or readiness check is defined
06.telemetry_depth	the service is visible in more than one way
06.correlation_ids	a request can be followed through the logstracing True · request id sites 1
06.usage_reporting_default	the product's code names no reporting hostsettings on 0 · settings off 3
06.single_replica	an autoscaler or disruption budget is definedworkloads 14
06.environment_branching	environment differences live in configurationsites 0
06.migrate_on_start	migrations do not run at container start
03.contributor_concentration	no single contributor dominates the last 24 monthsyears 4.6 · window last 24 months · authors 51
03.active_contributors	more than one contributor active in the trailing yearall time 51 · active 12mo 2
03.knowledge_silos	every substantial directory has been touched by more than one personauthors 51 · directories 11
03.drive_by_contributors	an open contributor base, where one-commit contributors are normalauthors 51 · one off share 0.373
03.contributor_attrition	no contributor dominates enough for their absence to matterauthors 51 · top share less than a quarter · top contributor last committed more than six months ago
03.critical_path_ownership	more than one person changes the critical pathsauthors 14
02.merge_discipline	a meaningful share of recent change carries evidence of reviewmerges 43 · window last 24 months · with tracked 0
02.ci_presence	CI configuration is present in the working treecount 10
02.test_presence	tests are present in a normal proportion to sourcetests 138 · source 982 · test ratio 0.141
02.release_cadence	tags are presenttags 777
02.conventional_commits	commit subjects generally carry contentsampled 6,746 · low content share 0.029
02.branch_protection_hints	process scaffolding is present in the repository
02.ci_runs_tests	CI invokes a test runnerconfigs 10 · with tests 1
02.skipped_tests	few tests are switched offfocused 0 · skipped 2 · test files 151
02.ci_test_gating	no test run in CI is written so that it cannot failconfigs 10
02.revert_share	change is rarely undoneshare 0.0 · reverts 0 · recent commits 351
02.dependency_update_cadence	dependencies move with the codelockfiles 19 · commits since 3 · days since lockfile changed 66
02.flaky_test_markers	tests are not retried until they passtest retries 0 · suite retries 0
02.lint_in_build	a linter or formatter runs in the buildwired 4 · ci configs 10 · product files 1,084
02.commit_size	changes arrive in reviewable sizesshare 0.037 · commits 326 · over 2000 lines 12
01.burst_import	no commit run met both the rate and the net-addition thresholdgap seconds 180 · min add ratio 3.0 · min net added 2,000
01.message_uniformity	commit subjects vary in wording and lengthlength stdev 17.6 · repeat share 0.141
01.revision_depth	most files were revisited after they were first writtenfiles seen 1,119 · write once share 0.239
01.swallowed_errors	errors are rarely thrown awayloc 334,276 · files 0 · per kloc 0.0
01.build_reproducibility	every base image names a versionfloating 0 · from lines 25
01.unfinished_migration	no language migration is stalled halfway
01.weights_in_git	no model weights are committedfiles 0
05.security_guardrails	at least one standard guard rail is configured
05.dependency_pinning	a lockfile is committed, so builds are reproduciblelockfile True
05.license_present	a licence file is presentfound True
05.secrets_management_pattern	no environment file is committed outside tests and examplesenv files 0
05.sql_from_strings	no SQL is assembled from strings in product codefiles 0 · sites 0 · value interpolated 0
05.shell_from_strings	product code does not build shell commands from stringssites 0
05.unsafe_deserialization	no code-executing deserialiser in product codesites 0
05.resource_limits	every workload declares limitsworkloads 17 · without limits 0
05.credentials_in_deploy_config	deployment configuration references secrets, never holds themfiles 0 · sites 0
05.public_env_secret	only publishable values carry a public prefixnames 0 · sites 0 · not secrets 0
05.unsafe_html	raw HTML is rare, literal or sanitisedsites 0
05.signing_material	no signing keystore or profile is committedfiles 0
05.license_vendored_unlicensed	no vendored third-party code is committedcomponents 0
05.license_grant_unclear	the licence is recognisable as Apache-2.0class permissive · license Apache-2.0
05.committed_native_libraries	no widely used compiled library is committed to the productlibraries 0
04.deprecations_lingering	few deprecations have outlived two yearsolder than two years 0 · files with deprecations 3
04.dependency_churn	few dependencies were added and dropped within 60 daysdependencies seen 369 · added in two years 96 · removed within 60 days 0
04.repository_status	the README's first screen states no end, move or freezestatements 0
02.development_elsewhere	nothing says development happens elsewhereno pr statements 0 · mirror statements 0 · replayed commit share 0.0
05.licence_changes	the root licence has not changed in the history readlicence versions 1 · unreleased changes 0
05.paid_edition	no directory carries a separate paid-edition licencedirectories 0
04.releases_stopped	releases keep pace with developmentmedian gap days 15.5 · days since last tag 240 · commits last 90 days 0
04.release_branch	the newest release was cut from the branch surveyedelsewhere 7 · on branch 29 · tags in window 36
03.single_maintainer	no file says one person maintains itstatements 0
05.project_advisories	no published advisory affects the surveyed versionaffecting 0 · exploited 0 · advisories 0
05.advisory_record	no advisory against the project in the last 24 monthscritical 0 · affecting 0 · could not tell 0
05.project_exploited	no affecting advisory is on CISA's Known Exploited listexploited 0

Could not conclude, or did not apply — 18

Not a clean result. Each says why it could not answer here.

Signal	Why
04.fix_share_trend	fewer than six busy quarters to compare
04.schema_churn	no schema migrations to read
06.print_logging	a frontend: console output is the browser's, not the server's
06.alert_rules	no alert rules in the repository; they may live in a console
06.deployed_image_floats	no deployment descriptor names an image
06.release_markers	fewer than 100 commits in the last year
06.feature_flags	no feature-flag service; flags may live elsewhere
03.second_contributor_attrition	the repository itself is quiet
03.bus_factor_trend	fewer than three active years to compare
02.long_lived_branches	too few merges to judge (squash and rebase leave none)
01.notebook_outputs	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.migration_reversibility	too few migrations to judge
05.cleartext_traffic	not a mobile app
05.dataset_provenance	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.license_copyleft_inherited	no third-party code is committed to this repository, so the licences it depends on are resolved at build time and are not readable here
05.license_manifest_conflict	no packaging manifest states a licence
04.flags_accumulating	few or no feature flags in the history
04.api_versions_coexisting	one API version is served, or none

Anyone can check this report against the authoritative record — click the stamp, or enter YBRZ-EDY8-ZYV9 at borehole.dev/verify.

The code commits to the 106 checks this run performed, the bands they produced, and the commit they were read at. It does not cover checks written since.

Put the mark in your README

The image is wrapped in a link to the verification page, so a reader can check it rather than take it on trust. If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.

[![Borehole reading, not a certification](https://borehole.dev/badge/deepfence/threatmapper/657c7c1.svg "Borehole free reading: not for reliance. See the full report.")](https://borehole.dev/verify/YBRZEDY8ZYV9?via=badge)

Where this scan ran

This scan ran on ordinary cloud infrastructure (cloud-run), not in a hardware-isolated confidential VM. Nothing about it is attested by Google.

What an attested survey proves, and what it does not.

What this scan did with the repository — 7 steps

Written by the steps themselves as they ran, not described afterwards. A hand-written account of a data flow drifts the first time somebody changes the flow and not the account.

At	Step	Detail
0.0s	read repository metadata from the GitHub API	size mb: 220.6authenticated: False
12.0s	cloned the repository to a temporary directory	depth: full
19.9s	read the git history	commits: 7898tracked files: 1946
205.9s	ran the deterministic checks	blame pass: Trueread working tree: False
205.9s	recorded where this scan ran	attested: Falseenvironment: cloud-run
277.1s	kept the facts, never the source, for re-reading under new checks
277.1s	deleting the working copy

Total 277.1s ·source content sent off this machine: none · calls to a language model: 0 · the clone was deleted when the survey ended

An automated reading of a repository's code and its history up to one commit, with public advisory records. It may be wrong, it is not legal, financial, investment or security advice, and it does not replace diligence by a qualified person. It is provided for information: nobody may rely on it (Borehole's terms, section 3).

BOREHOLE 0.7.15 DETERMINISTIC LAYER · NO MODEL CALLSREAD ON BOREHOLE'S SERVER · CLONE DELETED TAKEDOWNCONTRIBUTED TO THIS REPOSITORY? YOUR RIGHTS