Borehole · Risk register · free tier

crbnos/carbon

Free reading: not for reliance

038bfc9 · 6,170 commits · 10,090 files
Issued 2026-10-23

Nothing significant. Questions worth asking about Security & Reliability Posture, Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity.

102 checks ran across 6 assessable dimensions. 2 findings are worth checking first. 17 findings, each with evidence. One dimension cannot be assessed without an acquirer.

What the repository says about itself

05.61 Part of the code is under a separate licence: packages/ee/ packages/ee/LICENSE

Worth checking first

Borehole's proprietary scoring is calibrated across hundreds of repositories. Each finding here reads significant, but its check has not yet held up often enough in that calibration to rate significant on its own. If one holds when someone checks it, it is significant.

05.26 27 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 4 high or critical in what ships
05.8 Manifest says MIT, licence file says AGPL-3.0

Published under today's rules. The verification code attests to this reading as it was stored. This page differs from it as follows.

4 findings from checks Borehole's calibration found wrong more often than right are no longer published.
The file and line of 2 credential-shaped matches are withheld. File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report.

	Dimension	Rating
01	Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance	strong
02	Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity	adequate
03	Organization & Key-Person Risk	adequate
04	Product & Engineering Maturity	adequate
05	Security & Reliability Posture	adequate
06	Observability & Operations	adequate
07	Fit with the Acquirer	not assessable

strong adequate significant findings not assessable from a repository

Provenance disclosure does not affect any rating

16% of added lines arrived in commits declaring an AI agent as co-author

The surviving-lines measurement was not run on this repository.

34% of lines added in the last 12 months (since 2025-10-23) arrived in AI-declared commits: 515/2,825 commits, confidence low. Also a floor.

515/5,695 commits declaring an agent · Claude, Claude Fable 5, Claude Fable 5.1 and 13 more

confidence: low

11% of non-merge commits carry any trailer at all
low trailer coverage: the convention may not be in consistent use
no widespread author/committer date divergence
the declared share is neither decisive nor negligible, so the true figure is more sensitive to undeclared work

1,317,012 lines excluded as lockfiles, vendored or generated.

This is a lower bound. It counts what the repository declares. Undeclared AI authorship is invisible here, and a single rebase removes the trailers this rests on. Absence of a declaration is absence of disclosure, not absence of AI authorship.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · strong · ratings ↑

A note that does not affect this rating

01.6

apps/erp/app/modules/inventory/inventory.service.ts is 26,612 lines, 286× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 93 lines. 147 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 26,612. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down. Measured against its own codebase's median, it is larger than 95% of 382 surveyed projects' largest files.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

line-count	`apps/erp/app/modules/inventory/inventory.service.ts:1` — 26,612 lines (286× median)
line-count	`apps/erp/app/modules/production/production.service.ts:1` — 25,073 lines (269× median)
line-count	`apps/erp/app/modules/accounting/accounting.service.ts:1` — 21,603 lines (232× median)
line-count	`apps/erp/app/modules/sales/sales.service.ts:1` — 20,195 lines (217× median)
line-count	`apps/erp/app/modules/shared/shared.service.ts:1` — 17,263 lines (185× median)

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · adequate · ratings ↑

02.4

Nothing in the history is tagged as a release

adequate

Across 3.9 years of history there is not one tag. There may still be a deployment process, but this repository holds no record of what shipped when — which is the record a buyer needs to reconstruct an incident or a regression after the fact.

Evidence

tag-list

0 tags across 6,170 commits and 1418 days

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

02.24

9% of recent commits change more than 2,000 lines

adequate

382 of 4081 commits in the last 24 months changed over 2,000 lines of code, not counting reformatting, renames, vendored or generated code. A change that size is rarely reviewed line by line. Ask how they were reviewed, and what made them that large.

Evidence

git log --numstat

382 commits over 2,000 lines

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

A note that does not affect this rating

02.16

Tests are retried until they pass

adequate

The suite is configured to retry failing tests (packages/jobs/src/workflows/engine/ledger.test.ts). A retry turns a flaky test green without saying why it failed, so a green build means the tests passed eventually. Ask how many retries a typical run needs, and which tests need them.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

packages/jobs/src/workflows/engine/ledger.test.ts packages/jobs/src/workflows/engine/ledger.test.ts:53 — test retry

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · adequate · ratings ↑

03.1

Bus factor 1: recent work is concentrated in one contributor

adequate

In the last 24 months, one contributor authored more than half of 4,445 non-merge commits among 45 authors; across all history, more than half of 5,676. This is the single most expensive thing to discover after closing, and the repository cannot tell you whether that person is part of the transaction.

Evidence

git shortlog -sn

last 24 months: top author more than half of 4,445 commits; bus factor 1; 45 authors

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · adequate · ratings ↑

04.3

133 direct dependencies in a single manifest

adequate

apps/erp/package.json declares 133 direct dependencies. Each one is a maintenance obligation, a supply-chain surface and a potential licence question that transfers with the asset. The count says nothing about whether any given dependency was a good choice; it says how many such choices a buyer inherits.

Evidence

direct-dependencies	`apps/erp/package.json` — 133 declared
direct-dependencies	`apps/mes/package.json` — 88 declared
direct-dependencies	`packages/react/package.json` — 88 declared
direct-dependencies	`apps/starter/package.json` — 40 declared

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

04.19

13% of bug fixes add or change a test

adequate

Of 1685 fixes in the last 24 months, 217 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.

Evidence

fix commits touching tests

217 of 1685

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · adequate · ratings ↑

05.1

2 credential-shaped strings in the tree sit in tests, examples, documentation or local development settings

adequate

Strings shaped like credentials appear only where fakes are usual: test fixtures, examples, documentation, placeholders and local stacks. They are almost always fakes. Ask someone to confirm that none of them works anywhere, because a real key in a development file is still a real key.

Evidence

JWT	2 cited: JWT, where fakes are usual
	File and line are shown to whoever GitHub says controls this repository, signed in, and to a buyer of this report.

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.6

3 Dockerfiles run the application as root

adequate

No USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.

Evidence

no-USER-instruction	`.oss-scanner/Dockerfile` — runs as root
no-USER-instruction	`Dockerfile` — runs as root
no-USER-instruction	`packages/database/supabase/edge-runtime/Dockerfile` — runs as root

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.26

27 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 4 high or critical in what ships

adequate worth checking first

27 of 2,919 locked dependencies match 39 published advisories in OSV, 5 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.

The check that found this reads significant, but it has not yet held up often enough in Borehole's calibration to rate a finding significant on its own. Opening pnpm-lock.yaml settles it. If it holds when someone checks it, this finding is significant.

Evidence

pnpm-lock.yaml	`pnpm-lock.yaml` — zod 3.25.76: GHSA-mrhx-c7xc-m3w5 (high), fixed in 4.6.6
pnpm-lock.yaml	`pnpm-lock.yaml` — zod 4.1.11: GHSA-mrhx-c7xc-m3w5 (high), fixed in 4.6.6
pnpm-lock.yaml	`pnpm-lock.yaml` — zod 4.5.4: GHSA-mrhx-c7xc-m3w5 (high), fixed in 4.6.6

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.8

Manifest says MIT, licence file says AGPL-3.0

adequate worth checking first

Cargo.toml declares MIT. LICENSE contains the text of AGPL-3.0. Package managers and downstream users read the first; auditors and acquirers read the second. One of them is wrong, and until it is settled the terms this code is offered under are genuinely ambiguous.

The check that found this reads significant, but it has not yet held up often enough in Borehole's calibration to rate a finding significant on its own. Opening Cargo.toml:8 and the 1 other file it cites settles it. If it holds when someone checks it, this finding is significant.

Evidence

Cargo.toml	`Cargo.toml:8` — declares MIT
LICENSE	`LICENSE` — text of AGPL-3.0

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.61

Part of the code is under a separate licence: packages/ee/

adequate

A directory named for a paid edition carries its own licence. That code is usually not open source even where the rest is; what the buyer may do with each part differs.

Evidence

packages/ee/LICENSE packages/ee/LICENSE — licence: AGPL-3.0

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Notes that do not affect this rating

05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

8 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day; 2 steps pipe a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

.github/workflows/build-images.yml	`.github/workflows/build-images.yml:54` — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/build-images.yml	`.github/workflows/build-images.yml:65` — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/deploy.yml	`.github/workflows/deploy.yml:67` — download piped into a shell

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.20

12 SQL statements built from strings

adequate

12 places in product code build SQL by formatting or joining strings rather than passing parameters. 3 of them put a value into the string; in the rest, what the code shows going in is a table or column name, a constant, or something the line does not show. Ask whether any value reaches these strings, rather than a parameter.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

packages/database/src/datasets/bootstrap.ts	`packages/database/src/datasets/bootstrap.ts:354` — SQL built from a string
packages/database/src/datasets/tiers/08-change-orders.ts	`packages/database/src/datasets/tiers/08-change-orders.ts:206` — SQL built from a string
packages/database/src/seed-printing.ts	`packages/database/src/seed-printing.ts:468` — SQL built from a string

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.48

42 places insert HTML from a variable without sanitising it

adequate

42 places set HTML from a value that is neither a literal nor passed through a sanitiser. Where the value can come from a user, that is stored cross-site scripting, and it is the first thing a buyer's security review looks for in a frontend.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

apps/academy/app/root.tsx	`apps/academy/app/root.tsx:207` — HTML from a variable
apps/erp/app/components/ActionTasks/ActionTaskCard.tsx	`apps/erp/app/components/ActionTasks/ActionTaskCard.tsx:142` — HTML from a variable
apps/erp/app/modules/items/ui/ChangeNotice/ChangeNoticeContent.tsx	`apps/erp/app/modules/items/ui/ChangeNotice/ChangeNoticeContent.tsx:76` — HTML from a variable

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Observability & Operations

06 · adequate · ratings ↑

06.2

No structured logging library is in use

adequate

Nothing references a structured logging library. Logs that are written to be read by a person are not searchable by a machine, which means incident response here is proportional to how well someone remembers the codebase rather than to what the tooling can find.

Evidence

logging-scan

searched 9,507 files for 10 structured logging libraries; 0 matched

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

A note that does not affect this rating

06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

error reporting

no error reporter initialised

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · not assessable · ratings ↑

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository. What a person adds here.

Check it on the running system

9 checks against the running system follow from the findings above: what a buyer's engineer will try, how to run it first, and what to have ready. A paid survey of this repository includes them. See the tiers.

A paid survey of a public repository is also reviewed: a language model reads each finding against the code and withdraws only findings it judges the code contradicts, each listed with its reason. The review is a language model's reading of the findings against the code, and it can be wrong. It never adds a finding, never raises a band, and never removes a finding from a proven check or an advisory that affects the surveyed version.

What a person adds

The survey reads what the repository can show. The code cannot settle these questions, and on them this report states nothing. Each says where its answer lives: your own engineer, the company, or an assessor you choose can settle it. Questions marked measured open with something this repository shows.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · full coverage

measured No architecture or design document is in the tree, across 8,388 product files. Where does the design live, and who holds it? Answer lives in: The team01.38
Is the architecture right for the next three years of the product? Answer lives in: Your architects, with the product roadmap01.39
Were the home-grown components reasonable choices when they were made, and are they now? Answer lives in: The team's reasoning at the time01.40

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · high coverage

Is review real or a rubber stamp? Comment depth and time to approve need the pull request history. Answer lives in: The code host's pull request data02.32
Is delivery planned and measured, or heroic? Answer lives in: The issue tracker: backlog, sprint history, estimate accuracy02.38
How are incidents run, reviewed and learned from? Answer lives in: Tickets, chat and postmortems02.37

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · partial coverage

measured One contributor authored more than half of the commits in this history. Is that person part of the transaction, and for how long after it? Answer lives in: The deal terms03.29
Who mentors whom, and would that survive a departure? Answer lives in: The team; review history only suggests candidates03.28
Can the team grow, and who stands behind the top three contributors? Answer lives in: Recruiting data and the org chart03.30
Is the seniority mix sound, and will pay survive your salary bands? Answer lives in: HR data03.31
Is the pace sustainable? Commit times cannot say: git keeps no reliable local time. Answer lives in: Interviews and on-call history03.14
Does the team want to stay after close? Answer lives in: Interviews03.32
How are decisions made and disagreements resolved? Answer lives in: Time with the team03.33

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · minimal coverage

measured 2,806 commits landed in the last year, against 1,631 the year before (+72%). What drove it: new people, a deadline, or code produced faster than before? Answer lives in: The team04.11
Can this team deliver the stated roadmap on the stated timeline? Answer lives in: The data room and the team's record of estimates04.32
Does leadership know about the debt, and is time budgeted to repay it? Answer lives in: Budget and roadmap decisions04.31
Is the engineering shape consistent with the commercial story? Answer lives in: Revenue, customer and churn data04.33

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · partial coverage

measured 05.5 found credential-shaped strings in this repository. Was each one revoked at the provider? Deleting it from the code revokes nothing; only the provider's audit log shows that it was. Answer lives in: The provider's console and audit log05.38
measured A threat model is in the tree (.oss-scanner/threat_model.md). Does it name the assets this code actually handles, and is it current against the deployment? Answer lives in: The security owner05.43
What has actually broken, how often, and how badly? Answer lives in: Ticketing and chat05.41
What did external testing find, and was it fixed? Answer lives in: Reports in the data room05.42
What is the SOC 2, ISO 27001 or GDPR status, and where is the evidence? Answer lives in: Audit reports; policy files in the tree are not evidence05.44

Observability & Operations

06 · partial coverage

measured Backup or restore tooling is in the tree (packages/database/supabase/migrations/20260204065851_restore_default_cc_views.sql). Has a restore ever been rehearsed, and how long did it take? Answer lives in: The operations team06.19
measured No alert rule is defined in the repository. Where are alerts defined, who receives them, and when did one last fire? Answer lives in: The alerting tool and the on-call rota06.10
Are the dashboards opened, the alerts acknowledged and the pages answered? Answer lives in: Pager history and dashboard logs06.29
Are the service-level objectives actually met? Answer lives in: Production metrics06.30
Who carries the pager, and how often does it go off? Answer lives in: Pager exports and interviews06.31
What does it cost to run, and how much headroom is there? Answer lives in: Cloud billing and capacity plans06.32

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · none coverage

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

This is primarily a TypeScript codebase. Does your engineering organisation already run TypeScript in production, or would this be the first? 07.1
The bulk of this system sits in packages/, apps/, crates/. Which of your existing systems would each of those have to absorb or replace? 07.10
34% of lines added in the last 12 months (16% of added lines) came through AI-declared commits. Does your organisation have a policy on inheriting and maintaining that code, and does your engineering team's tooling match how it was produced? 07.9
The repository carries deployment configuration (.oss-scanner/Dockerfile and 7 more). Does that match your deployment and on-call model, or does it need rehosting first? 07.2
What is your tolerance for the findings above remaining unaddressed for the first two quarters after close, given everything else that will compete for this team's time?
Which of these systems duplicate yours, and which get retired? Answer lives in: Your architecture07.11
What will integration cost, and in what order? Answer lives in: The engagement07.12
Where does the team land in your organisation, and who reports to whom? Answer lives in: Your org design07.13
Are there earn-outs, retention packages or contractor IP to assign? Answer lives in: Deal terms07.14
Do customer contracts limit hosting, regions or vendors? Answer lives in: Customer contracts07.15

Request a human assessment Download JSON Badge PDF

A human assessment is Borehole's own paid service, €12,000+ (total price is determined per engagement; travel billed at cost). It is not independent of this report: the same business produced both. It is a separate contract, with its own scope, terms and reliance.

Embed the badge

Tied to this commit and this date, and it fades after 90 days — an honest badge is one that expires. A repository with significant findings gets a neutral "read" badge rather than a red one: the library is where the range is visible, not someone else's README.

[![Borehole](/badge/crbnos/carbon.svg "Borehole free reading: not for reliance. See the full report.")](/r/crbnos/carbon/038bfc9)

If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.

Rejection log — 85 signals that ran and did not fire

Appendix: rejection log — 85 signals that ran and did not fire

Published on purpose. A signal that looked and decided not to fire has told you something, and this is the calibration data behind every threshold above.

Looked, and found nothing — 62

Signal	What it found
04.hotspot_concentration	change is spread across the codebase rather than pooling in a few filesfiles 22,585 · top5 share 0.03
04.debt_markers	debt markers are sparsemarkers 237 · per kloc 0.12 · lines read 2,046,060
04.churn_trend	rework is not rising against new worklate delete per insert 0.715 · early delete per insert 0.689
04.eol_runtime	every pinned runtime is still supportedeol as of 2026-09-24
04.fix_share_trend	fixing is not crowding out building
04.schema_churn	columns, once added, staydropped within 90 days 43 · columns added last year 561
04.compat_layers	little code is kept for the old wayshare 0.001 · code files 7,104 · compat files 7
04.dependency_redundancy	one library per job, mostly
06.telemetry_presence	a telemetry or error-reporting library is referencednote presence only; whether anyone watches it is not visible here · matches 53
06.healthcheck_presence	a health or readiness check is defined
06.telemetry_depth	the service is visible in more than one way
06.correlation_ids	a request can be followed through the logstracing True · request id sites 42
06.usage_reporting_default	the product's code names no reporting hostsettings on 0 · settings off 0
06.deployed_image_floats	every deployed image names a versionimages 15 · floating 0
06.environment_branching	environment differences live in configurationsites 9
06.release_markers	releases are markedtags last year 0 · release commits 0 · changelog commits 11
06.migrate_on_start	migrations do not run at container start
03.active_contributors	more than one contributor active in the trailing yearall time 50 · active 12mo 41
03.knowledge_silos	every substantial directory has been touched by more than one personauthors 50 · directories 7
03.drive_by_contributors	a healthy share of contributors committed more than onceshare 0.38 · authors 50 · one commit authors 19
03.contributor_attrition	the dominant contributor is still activeauthors 50 · top share more than half · top contributor last committed within the last three months
03.critical_path_ownership	more than one person changes the critical pathsauthors 45
03.second_contributor_attrition	the second and third contributors are still active
03.bus_factor_trend	the team has not narrowed to one person
02.merge_discipline	a meaningful share of recent change carries evidence of reviewmerges 414 · window last 24 months · with tracked 19
02.ci_presence	CI configuration is present in the working treecount 10
02.test_presence	tests are present in a normal proportion to sourcetests 996 · source 8,071 · test ratio 0.123
02.conventional_commits	commit subjects generally carry contentsampled 5,695 · low content share 0.01
02.branch_protection_hints	process scaffolding is present in the repository
02.ci_runs_tests	CI invokes a test runnerconfigs 10 · with tests 1
02.skipped_tests	few tests are switched offfocused 0 · skipped 6 · test files 1,149
02.ci_test_gating	no test run in CI is written so that it cannot failconfigs 10
02.revert_share	change is rarely undoneshare 0.003 · reverts 12 · recent commits 4,445
02.dependency_update_cadence	dependencies move with the codelockfiles 3 · commits since 12 · days since lockfile changed 0
02.lint_in_build	a linter or formatter runs in the buildwired 39 · ci configs 10 · product files 7,104
02.long_lived_branches	the typical branch reaches the trunk quicklyshare 0.019 · merges 215 · long lived 4
01.burst_import	the largest burst was data and assets (64% of it), which explains the rate: translations arrive from a vendor in bulk, dependencies and generated code are committed whole, a merged pull request is dated when it merged, not when it was written, a branch merged by a merge commit was reviewed as one piece, and an export or mirror tool dates history when it replays itlargest commits 8eef0ef..a34042e · bursts explained 1 · largest net added 10,248
01.initial_dump	first commit is not a disproportionate share of the codebaseinsertions 22,954 · share of insertions 0.0023
01.message_uniformity	commit subjects vary in wording and lengthlength stdev 27.11 · repeat share 0.053
01.revision_depth	most files were revisited after they were first writtenfiles seen 8,189 · write once share 0.288
01.swallowed_errors	errors are rarely thrown awayloc 2,055,286 · files 10 · per kloc 0.01
01.build_reproducibility	every base image names a versionfloating 0 · from lines 20
01.unfinished_migration	no language migration is stalled halfway
01.weights_in_git	no model weights are committedfiles 0
05.security_guardrails	at least one standard guard rail is configured
05.dependency_pinning	a lockfile is committed, so builds are reproduciblelockfile True
05.license_present	a licence file is presentfound True
05.secrets_management_pattern	no environment file is committed outside tests and examplesenv files 0
05.shell_from_strings	product code does not build shell commands from stringssites 0
05.unsafe_deserialization	no code-executing deserialiser in product codesites 0
05.privileged_workloads	no workload runs privileged or in the host's namespacessites 0 · behind a setting or built here 0
05.public_env_secret	only publishable values carry a public prefixnames 0 · sites 0 · not secrets 0
05.source_maps_shipped	production builds do not publish source mapssites 0
05.signing_material	no signing keystore or profile is committedfiles 0
05.license_copyleft_inherited	the project is itself AGPL-3.0, so copyleft components carry no obligation it has not already acceptedown license AGPL-3.0 · copyleft components 1
05.license_vendored_unlicensed	no vendored third-party code is committedcomponents 0
05.license_grant_unclear	the licence is recognisable as AGPL-3.0class network-copyleft · license AGPL-3.0
05.committed_native_libraries	no widely used compiled library is committed to the productlibraries 0
04.repository_status	the README's first screen states no end, move or freezestatements 0
02.development_elsewhere	nothing says development happens elsewhereno pr statements 0 · mirror statements 0 · replayed commit share 0.0
05.licence_changes	the root licence has not changed in the history readlicence versions 1 · unreleased changes 0
03.single_maintainer	no file says one person maintains itstatements 0

Could not conclude, or did not apply — 23

Not a clean result. Each says why it could not answer here.

Signal	Why
04.test_growth	tests are kept inside the files they test, which a count by file name cannot see
06.print_logging	a frontend: console output is the browser's, not the server's
06.alert_rules	no alert rules in the repository; they may live in a console
06.probes_identical	no Kubernetes probes
06.single_replica	no Kubernetes deployments
06.feature_flags	no feature-flag service; flags may live elsewhere
03.joiners_and_leavers	too few regular contributors to see a trend
01.notebook_outputs	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.outbound_timeouts	not assessed for TSX or TypeScript, the languages the product is written in: this check's patterns read other languages only
05.migration_reversibility	too few migrations to judge
05.resource_limits	no Kubernetes workload manifests
05.cleartext_traffic	not a mobile app
05.dataset_provenance	not a data or machine-learning repository
04.flags_accumulating	the history scanned covers 6 months, less than the 12 this question needs
04.api_versions_coexisting	the history scanned covers 6 months, less than the 18 this question needs
04.deprecations_lingering	the history scanned covers 6 months, less than the 24 this question needs
04.dependency_churn	the history scanned covers 6 months, less than the 24 this question needs
04.ci_platforms_dropped	the history scanned covers 6 months, less than the 24 this question needs
04.releases_stopped	too few tagged releases to judge a cadence
04.release_branch	too few release tags to tell
05.project_advisories	record incomplete: no advisory found in the sources that answered; NVD: 32 records name carbon with nothing tying them to this repository (CVE-2004-1624, CVE-2008-1895, CVE-2008-1896, …)
05.advisory_record	record incomplete: no advisory against the project in the last 24 months; NVD: 32 records name carbon with nothing tying them to this repository (CVE-2004-1624, CVE-2008-1895, CVE-2008-1896, …)
05.project_exploited	no affecting advisory is on CISA's Known Exploited list

Anyone can check this report against the authoritative record — click the stamp, or enter T5CA-6YTT-MYPY at borehole.dev/verify.

The code commits to the 106 checks this run performed, the bands they produced, and the commit they were read at. It does not cover checks written since.

Put the mark in your README

The image is wrapped in a link to the verification page, so a reader can check it rather than take it on trust. If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.

[![Borehole reading, not a certification](https://borehole.dev/badge/crbnos/carbon/038bfc9.svg "Borehole free reading: not for reliance. See the full report.")](https://borehole.dev/verify/T5CA6YTTMYPY?via=badge)

Where this scan ran

This scan ran on ordinary cloud infrastructure (cloud-run), not in a hardware-isolated confidential VM. Nothing about it is attested by Google.

What an attested survey proves, and what it does not.

What this scan did with the repository — 7 steps

Written by the steps themselves as they ran, not described afterwards. A hand-written account of a data flow drifts the first time somebody changes the flow and not the account.

At	Step	Detail
0.0s	read repository metadata from the GitHub API	size mb: 394.6authenticated: False
133.3s	cloned the repository to a temporary directory	depth: full
197.1s	read the git history	commits: 6170tracked files: 10090
618.7s	ran the deterministic checks	blame pass: Falseread working tree: False
618.8s	recorded where this scan ran	attested: Falseenvironment: cloud-run
947.2s	kept the facts, never the source, for re-reading under new checks
947.2s	deleting the working copy

Total 947.2s ·source content sent off this machine: none · calls to a language model: 0 · the clone was deleted when the survey ended

An automated reading of a repository's code and its history up to one commit, with public advisory records. It may be wrong, it is not legal, financial, investment or security advice, and it does not replace diligence by a qualified person. It is provided for information: nobody may rely on it (Borehole's terms, section 3).

BOREHOLE 0.7.15 DETERMINISTIC LAYER · NO MODEL CALLSREAD ON BOREHOLE'S SERVER · CLONE DELETED TAKEDOWNCONTRIBUTED TO THIS REPOSITORY? YOUR RIGHTS