Borehole · Risk register · free tier

coaidev/coai

Free reading: not for reliance

3048a49 · 916 commits · 591 files
Issued 2026-10-28

Nothing significant. Questions worth asking about Security & Reliability Posture, Observability & Operations.

102 checks ran across 6 assessable dimensions. 3 findings are worth checking first. 17 findings, each with evidence. One dimension cannot be assessed without an acquirer.

Worth checking first

Borehole's proprietary scoring is calibrated across hundreds of repositories. Each finding here reads significant, but its check has not yet held up often enough in that calibration to rate significant on its own. If one holds when someone checks it, it is significant.

05.26 47 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 22 high or critical in what ships
02.3 Tests are absent or token
03.5 The contributor who wrote three-quarters or more of this has not committed here for more than a year

Published under today's rules. The verification code attests to this reading as it was stored. This page differs from it as follows.

4 findings from checks Borehole's calibration found wrong more often than right are no longer published.

	Dimension	Rating
01	Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance	adequate
02	Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity	adequate
03	Organization & Key-Person Risk	adequate
04	Product & Engineering Maturity	strong
05	Security & Reliability Posture	adequate
06	Observability & Operations	adequate
07	Fit with the Acquirer	not assessable

strong adequate significant findings not assessable from a repository

Provenance disclosure does not affect any rating

0% of the code standing today was written in AI-declared commits

0% of lines still in the tree 0 of 96,773 0% of lines ever added these differ when early hand-written code has since been replaced

0/880 commits declaring an agent

confidence: moderate

4% of non-merge commits carry any trailer at all
low trailer coverage: the convention may not be in consistent use
no widespread author/committer date divergence
deep scan blamed 588 of 588 counted files

43,245 lines excluded as lockfiles, vendored or generated.

This is a lower bound. It counts what the repository declares. Undeclared AI authorship is invisible here, and a single rebase removes the trailers this rests on. Absence of a declaration is absence of disclosure, not absence of AI authorship.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · adequate · ratings ↑

01.25

1 base image floats: no version, or `latest`

adequate

1 of 3 `FROM` lines in product Dockerfiles name an image without a version, or with `latest`. Each build pulls whatever the registry serves that day, so the image that ships can change without a commit, and last month's build cannot be reproduced. Pin a version, or a digest.

Evidence

Dockerfile Dockerfile:39 — base image without a version

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

An owner's response is removed only when it is unlawful, impersonates someone, publishes personal data or a credential, or is not about the finding. Disagreeing with the report is never a reason. To report a response, or to reach us about one, write to takedown@borehole.dev.

A note that does not affect this rating

01.6

app/src/routes/admin/Market.tsx is 1,210 lines, 15× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 77 lines. 2 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 1,210. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

A note that does not affect this rating: measured against its own codebase's median, it is below the 85th percentile of 382 surveyed projects' largest files, where this check begins to count.

Evidence

line-count	`app/src/routes/admin/Market.tsx:1` — 1,210 lines (15× median)
line-count	`app/src/routes/admin/System.tsx:1` — 1,132 lines (14× median)

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · adequate · ratings ↑

02.3

Tests are absent or token

adequate worth checking first

0 test files against 443 source files (0.0%). This does not measure whether the tests are good, only whether enough of them exist for the codebase to be changed safely by someone who did not write it — which is exactly the situation after an acquisition.

The check that found this reads significant, but it has not yet held up often enough in Borehole's calibration to rate a finding significant on its own. If it holds when someone checks it, this finding is significant.

Evidence

test-file-ratio

0 test files / 443 source files

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

A note that does not affect this rating

02.6

Almost no process scaffolding exists in the repository

adequate

Of five ordinary markers — CI workflows, CODEOWNERS, a pull-request template, pre-commit hooks, contribution guidance — 1 is present: CI workflows. Branch protection itself is a GitHub setting rather than a file, so this is a reading of proxies and not of the rules themselves. What it does establish is that the process is not written down anywhere a new engineer would find it.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

process-scaffolding

1 of 5 markers present across 591 tracked files

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · adequate · ratings ↑

03.5

The contributor who wrote three-quarters or more of this has not committed here for more than a year

adequate worth checking first

One person authored three-quarters or more of 880 commits and has not committed here for more than a year, while the repository has kept moving. The concentration figure alone would not show this. Whoever is changing this code now is not the person who wrote most of it, which is the situation an acquirer is usually told they are avoiding. The history shows only that no commits of theirs landed here, not why.

Evidence

last-commit-by-top-author	last commit more than a year ago, measured to the survey
git shortlog -sn	top author three-quarters or more of 880 commits

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

03.27

Regular contributors fell from 7 to 1 in a year

adequate

6 people who committed regularly the year before made no commits in the last year, and 0 new regular contributors arrived. Ask whether the work they did is still covered.

Evidence

regular contributors by year

7 then 1; 6 stopped committing, 0 began

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · strong · ratings ↑

A note that does not affect this rating

04.17

2 pinned runtimes are past end of life

adequate

The code is pinned to Go 1.20 (end of life 2024-02-06); Node.js 18 (end of life 2025-04-30). None of these receives security fixes any more; the first stopped on 2024-02-06. Moving off an unsupported runtime is rarely a one-line change, so a buyer should ask whether the upgrade is planned and what it touches.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

Dockerfile	`Dockerfile` — Go 1.20, end of life 2024-02-06
Dockerfile	`Dockerfile` — Node.js 18, end of life 2025-04-30

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · adequate · ratings ↑

05.2

None of the standard security guard rails are configured

adequate

There is no disclosure policy, no automated dependency updates, no named code owners and no pre-commit configuration. None of these is load-bearing on its own. Their collective absence says that security posture here is whatever the current team happens to remember to do, which is not a posture that survives the team changing.

Evidence

guardrail-scan

checked 5 kinds of guard rail across 591 tracked files; 0 present

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.6

1 Dockerfile runs the application as root

adequate

No USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.

Evidence

no-USER-instruction Dockerfile — runs as root

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.26

47 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 22 high or critical in what ships

adequate worth checking first

47 of 1,706 locked dependencies match 145 published advisories in OSV, 48 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.

The check that found this reads significant, but it has not yet held up often enough in Borehole's calibration to rate a finding significant on its own. Opening app/pnpm-lock.yaml and the 1 other file it cites settles it. If it holds when someone checks it, this finding is significant.

Evidence

app/pnpm-lock.yaml	`app/pnpm-lock.yaml` — next 14.2.15: GHSA-2464-fhr4-w9xw (critical), fixed in 15.5.28
go.mod	`go.mod` — golang.org/x/crypto v0.13.0: GHSA-5cgq-3rg8-m6cv (critical), fixed in 0.52.0
go.mod	`go.mod` — golang.org/x/net v0.15.0: GHSA-4374-p667-p6c8 (high), fixed in 0.17.0

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Notes that do not affect this rating

05.25

1 environment file is committed

adequate

app/.env.deeptrain is tracked in git. Environment files are where credentials usually live, and committing one usually means nobody decided how secrets reach the running application. Whatever is in it is in the history for good. Check 05.1 says whether it holds anything credential-shaped.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

app/.env.deeptrain app/.env.deeptrain — committed environment file

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

8 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

.github/workflows/app.yaml	`.github/workflows/app.yaml:66` — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/app.yaml	`.github/workflows/app.yaml:69` — action pinned by tag

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.13

3 outbound calls can wait forever

adequate

3 HTTP calls use a client with no timeout (Python `requests` without `timeout=`, or Go's default client). When a dependency slows down, each one holds a worker until the connection gives up, and enough of them take the service down with the dependency.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

utils/image.go	`utils/image.go:45` — outbound call without a timeout
utils/image.go	`utils/image.go:91` — outbound call without a timeout
utils/image.go	`utils/image.go:200` — outbound call without a timeout

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

05.65

1 advisory against this project in the last 24 months

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-10-16. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 1 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 4.0.0. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version.

A note that does not affect this rating: it describes the project's advisory record, and no advisory in it is known to affect the surveyed commit.

Evidence

CVE-2026-111618

2026-10-16: CVE-2026-111618 (moderate): CoAI (Chat Nio) through 4.0.0 contains an unauthenticated path traversal vulnerability in the generation and article archive download endpoints via the hash que

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Observability & Operations

06 · adequate · ratings ↑

06.1

No telemetry or error reporting is wired in anywhere

adequate

None of 485 readable files references an instrumentation, metrics or error-reporting library. If this system is in production, nobody learns that it broke from the system itself — they learn it from a customer. That is a reliability finding before it is an observability one.

Evidence

telemetry-scan

searched 485 tracked text files for 16 known instrumentation libraries; manifests for metrics, tracing and error-reporting families; locked dependencies for the packages that emit; 0 matched

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Notes that do not affect this rating

06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

A note that does not affect this rating: notes like it are common in well-run projects.

Evidence

error reporting

no error reporter initialised

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

06.18

4 of 7 deployed images carry no version, or `latest`

adequate

4 images in the deployment configuration are named without a version or as `latest`. A redeploy can change the software without a commit, a rollback has nothing to roll back to, and nobody can say from the repository what is running.

A note that does not affect this rating: in Borehole's calibration, this check's notes were usually true but overstated.

Evidence

docker-compose.yaml	`docker-compose.yaml:4` — image without a version
docker-compose.yaml	`docker-compose.yaml:21` — image without a version
docker-compose.yaml	`docker-compose.yaml:32` — image without a version

Respond to this finding

Your response is published beside the finding, not instead of it. A finding you can argue with is the point — and a wrong one is calibration data we want.

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · not assessable · ratings ↑

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository. What a person adds here.

Check it on the running system

13 checks against the running system follow from the findings above: what a buyer's engineer will try, how to run it first, and what to have ready. A paid survey of this repository includes them. See the tiers.

A paid survey of a public repository is also reviewed: a language model reads each finding against the code and withdraws only findings it judges the code contradicts, each listed with its reason. The review is a language model's reading of the findings against the code, and it can be wrong. It never adds a finding, never raises a band, and never removes a finding from a proven check or an advisory that affects the surveyed version.

What a person adds

The survey reads what the repository can show. The code cannot settle these questions, and on them this report states nothing. Each says where its answer lives: your own engineer, the company, or an assessor you choose can settle it. Questions marked measured open with something this repository shows.

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

01 · full coverage

measured No architecture or design document is in the tree, across 582 product files. Where does the design live, and who holds it? Answer lives in: The team01.38
Is the architecture right for the next three years of the product? Answer lives in: Your architects, with the product roadmap01.39
Were the home-grown components reasonable choices when they were made, and are they now? Answer lives in: The team's reasoning at the time01.40

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

02 · high coverage

Is review real or a rubber stamp? Comment depth and time to approve need the pull request history. Answer lives in: The code host's pull request data02.32
Is delivery planned and measured, or heroic? Answer lives in: The issue tracker: backlog, sprint history, estimate accuracy02.38
How are incidents run, reviewed and learned from? Answer lives in: Tickets, chat and postmortems02.37

Organization & Key-Person Risk

03 · partial coverage

measured One contributor authored three-quarters or more of the commits in this history. Is that person part of the transaction, and for how long after it? Answer lives in: The deal terms03.29
Who mentors whom, and would that survive a departure? Answer lives in: The team; review history only suggests candidates03.28
Can the team grow, and who stands behind the top three contributors? Answer lives in: Recruiting data and the org chart03.30
Is the seniority mix sound, and will pay survive your salary bands? Answer lives in: HR data03.31
Is the pace sustainable? Commit times cannot say: git keeps no reliable local time. Answer lives in: Interviews and on-call history03.14
Does the team want to stay after close? Answer lives in: Interviews03.32
How are decisions made and disagreements resolved? Answer lives in: Time with the team03.33

Product & Engineering Maturity

04 · minimal coverage

measured 26 commits landed in the last year, against 173 the year before (-85%). Is that maintenance mode, a pivot, or fewer people working on it? The count looks the same for all three. Answer lives in: The team04.11
Can this team deliver the stated roadmap on the stated timeline? Answer lives in: The data room and the team's record of estimates04.32
Does leadership know about the debt, and is time budgeted to repay it? Answer lives in: Budget and roadmap decisions04.31
Is the engineering shape consistent with the commercial story? Answer lives in: Revenue, customer and churn data04.33

Security & Reliability Posture

05 · partial coverage

measured No threat model is in the tree of what looks like a running service. Does one exist elsewhere, and who owns it? Answer lives in: The security owner05.43
What has actually broken, how often, and how badly? Answer lives in: Ticketing and chat05.41
What did external testing find, and was it fixed? Answer lives in: Reports in the data room05.42
What is the SOC 2, ISO 27001 or GDPR status, and where is the evidence? Answer lives in: Audit reports; policy files in the tree are not evidence05.44

Observability & Operations

06 · partial coverage

measured Nothing in the tree backs up or restores data. How is data backed up, and has a restore ever been rehearsed? Answer lives in: The operations team06.19
measured No alert rule is defined in the repository. Where are alerts defined, who receives them, and when did one last fire? Answer lives in: The alerting tool and the on-call rota06.10
Are the dashboards opened, the alerts acknowledged and the pages answered? Answer lives in: Pager history and dashboard logs06.29
Are the service-level objectives actually met? Answer lives in: Production metrics06.30
Who carries the pager, and how often does it go off? Answer lives in: Pager exports and interviews06.31
What does it cost to run, and how much headroom is there? Answer lives in: Cloud billing and capacity plans06.32

Fit with the Acquirer

07 · none coverage

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

This is primarily a TypeScript codebase, with Go alongside (43% of source files). Does your engineering organisation already run TypeScript in production, or would this be the first? 07.1
The bulk of this system sits in app/, adapter/, manager/. Which of your existing systems would each of those have to absorb or replace? 07.10
The repository carries deployment configuration (Dockerfile and 3 more). Does that match your deployment and on-call model, or does it need rehosting first? 07.2
What is your tolerance for the findings above remaining unaddressed for the first two quarters after close, given everything else that will compete for this team's time?
Which of these systems duplicate yours, and which get retired? Answer lives in: Your architecture07.11
What will integration cost, and in what order? Answer lives in: The engagement07.12
Where does the team land in your organisation, and who reports to whom? Answer lives in: Your org design07.13
Are there earn-outs, retention packages or contractor IP to assign? Answer lives in: Deal terms07.14
Do customer contracts limit hosting, regions or vendors? Answer lives in: Customer contracts07.15

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Rejection log — 85 signals that ran and did not fire

Appendix: rejection log — 85 signals that ran and did not fire

Published on purpose. A signal that looked and decided not to fire has told you something, and this is the calibration data behind every threshold above.

Looked, and found nothing — 63

Signal	What it found
04.hotspot_concentration	change is spread across the codebase rather than pooling in a few filesfiles 1,004 · top5 share 0.087
04.debt_markers	debt markers are sparsemarkers 3 · per kloc 0.04 · lines read 67,614
04.dependency_sprawl	direct dependency counts are unremarkable
04.test_growth	test effort kept pace with code writtenlate test per code 0.0 · early test per code 0.0
04.churn_trend	rework is not rising against new worklate delete per insert 0.387 · early delete per insert 0.401
04.compat_layers	little code is kept for the old wayshare 0.0 · code files 443 · compat files 0
04.dependency_redundancy	one library per job, mostly
06.structured_logging	a structured logging library is referencedmatches 2
06.correlation_ids	a request can be followed through the logstracing False · request id sites 4
06.usage_reporting_default	the product's code names no reporting hostsettings on 0 · settings off 0
06.environment_branching	environment differences live in configurationsites 0
06.migrate_on_start	migrations do not run at container start
03.contributor_concentration	no single contributor dominates the last 24 monthsyears 2.7 · window last 24 months · authors 20
03.active_contributors	more than one contributor active in the trailing yearall time 20 · active 12mo 2
03.knowledge_silos	every substantial directory has been touched by more than one personauthors 20 · directories 10
03.drive_by_contributors	a healthy share of contributors committed more than onceshare 0.45 · authors 20 · one commit authors 9
03.critical_path_ownership	more than one person changes the critical pathsauthors 19
02.merge_discipline	a meaningful share of recent change carries evidence of reviewmerges 28 · window last 24 months · with tracked 1
02.ci_presence	CI configuration is present in the working treecount 5
02.release_cadence	tags are presenttags 16
02.conventional_commits	commit subjects generally carry contentsampled 880 · low content share 0.087
02.ci_test_gating	no test run in CI is written so that it cannot failconfigs 5
02.revert_share	change is rarely undoneshare 0.005 · reverts 1 · recent commits 210
02.dependency_update_cadence	dependencies move with the codelockfiles 3 · commits since 8 · days since lockfile changed 138
02.flaky_test_markers	tests are not retried until they passtest retries 0 · suite retries 0
02.lint_in_build	a linter or formatter runs in the buildwired 1 · ci configs 5 · product files 443
02.long_lived_branches	the typical branch reaches the trunk quicklyshare 0.043 · merges 23 · long lived 1
02.commit_size	changes arrive in reviewable sizesshare 0.005 · commits 199 · over 2000 lines 1
01.burst_import	no commit run met both the rate and the net-addition thresholdgap seconds 180 · min add ratio 3.0 · min net added 2,000
01.initial_dump	first commit is not a disproportionate share of the codebaseinsertions 203 · share of insertions 0.0013
01.message_uniformity	commit subjects vary in wording and lengthlength stdev 20.63 · repeat share 0.159
01.revision_depth	most files were revisited after they were first writtenfiles seen 561 · write once share 0.282
01.duplicated_blocks	little shipping code is repeated verbatim across filesshare 0.0141 · product files 443 · distinct blocks 37,983
01.swallowed_errors	errors are rarely thrown awayloc 68,084 · files 0 · per kloc 0.0
01.unfinished_migration	no language migration is stalled halfway
01.weights_in_git	no model weights are committedfiles 0
05.committed_secrets	no credential-shaped strings outside test and fixture pathsnote the working tree only; the history is 05.5 · patterns 8 · files read 485
05.dependency_pinning	a lockfile is committed, so builds are reproduciblelockfile True
05.license_present	a licence file is presentfound True
05.secrets_in_history	no credential-shaped string was ever added outside test and fixture pathspatterns 8 · truncated False · added lines 146,841
05.sql_from_strings	no SQL is assembled from strings in product codefiles 0 · sites 0 · value interpolated 0
05.shell_from_strings	product code does not build shell commands from stringssites 0
05.unsafe_deserialization	no code-executing deserialiser in product codesites 0
05.privileged_workloads	no workload runs privileged or in the host's namespacessites 0 · behind a setting or built here 0
05.credentials_in_deploy_config	deployment configuration references secrets, never holds themfiles 0 · sites 0
05.public_env_secret	only publishable values carry a public prefixnames 0 · sites 0 · not secrets 0
05.unsafe_html	raw HTML is rare, literal or sanitisedsites 0
05.source_maps_shipped	production builds do not publish source mapssites 0
05.signing_material	no signing keystore or profile is committedfiles 0
05.license_vendored_unlicensed	no vendored third-party code is committedcomponents 0
05.license_grant_unclear	the licence is recognisable as Apache-2.0class permissive · license Apache-2.0
05.committed_native_libraries	no widely used compiled library is committed to the productlibraries 0
04.api_versions_coexisting	one API version is served, or none
04.dependency_churn	few dependencies were added and dropped within 60 daysdependencies seen 192 · added in two years 18 · removed within 60 days 0
04.ci_platforms_dropped	no platform was dropped from CI in the last two years
04.repository_status	the README's first screen states no end, move or freezestatements 0
02.development_elsewhere	nothing says development happens elsewhereno pr statements 0 · mirror statements 0 · replayed commit share 0.0
05.licence_changes	the root licence has not changed in the history readlicence versions 1 · unreleased changes 0
05.paid_edition	no directory carries a separate paid-edition licencedirectories 0
04.releases_stopped	releases keep pace with developmentmedian gap days 15.0 · days since last tag 370 · commits last 90 days 0
04.release_branch	the newest release was cut from the branch surveyedelsewhere 0 · on branch 15 · tags in window 15
03.single_maintainer	no file says one person maintains itstatements 0
05.project_exploited	no affecting advisory is on CISA's Known Exploited listexploited 0

Could not conclude, or did not apply — 22

Not a clean result. Each says why it could not answer here.

Signal	Why
04.fixes_with_tests	no tests to add to (02.3)
04.fix_share_trend	fewer than six busy quarters to compare
04.schema_churn	columns, once added, stay
06.print_logging	a frontend: console output is the browser's, not the server's
06.alert_rules	no alert rules in the repository; they may live in a console
06.probes_identical	no Kubernetes probes
06.single_replica	no Kubernetes deployments
06.release_markers	fewer than 100 commits in the last year
06.feature_flags	no feature-flag service; flags may live elsewhere
03.second_contributor_attrition	the repository itself is quiet
03.bus_factor_trend	fewer than three active years to compare
02.skipped_tests	too few test files to judge how many are switched off
01.notebook_outputs	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.migration_reversibility	too few migrations to judge
05.resource_limits	no Kubernetes workload manifests
05.cleartext_traffic	not a mobile app
05.dataset_provenance	not a data or machine-learning repository
05.license_copyleft_inherited	no third-party code is committed to this repository, so the licences it depends on are resolved at build time and are not readable here
05.license_manifest_conflict	no packaging manifest states a licence
04.flags_accumulating	few or no feature flags in the history
04.deprecations_lingering	few deprecations have outlived two years
05.project_advisories	could not tell whether 1 published advisory affects the surveyed code: its version could not be placed

Anyone can check this report against the authoritative record — click the stamp, or enter HRG4-93NF-E99D at borehole.dev/verify.

The code commits to the 106 checks this run performed, the bands they produced, and the commit they were read at. It does not cover checks written since.

Put the mark in your README

The image is wrapped in a link to the verification page, so a reader can check it rather than take it on trust. If you embed it: link it to the report, remove it if the report is delisted, and do not present it as a certification or an endorsement.

[![Borehole reading, not a certification](https://borehole.dev/badge/coaidev/coai/3048a49.svg "Borehole free reading: not for reliance. See the full report.")](https://borehole.dev/verify/HRG493NFE99D?via=badge)

Where this scan ran

This scan ran on ordinary cloud infrastructure (cloud-run), not in a hardware-isolated confidential VM. Nothing about it is attested by Google.

What an attested survey proves, and what it does not.

What this scan did with the repository — 7 steps

Written by the steps themselves as they ran, not described afterwards. A hand-written account of a data flow drifts the first time somebody changes the flow and not the account.

At	Step	Detail
0.0s	read repository metadata from the GitHub API	size mb: 34.0authenticated: False
3.2s	cloned the repository to a temporary directory	depth: full
4.7s	read the git history	commits: 916tracked files: 591
49.3s	ran the deterministic checks	blame pass: Trueread working tree: False
49.3s	recorded where this scan ran	attested: Falseenvironment: cloud-run
61.4s	kept the facts, never the source, for re-reading under new checks
61.4s	deleting the working copy

Total 61.4s ·source content sent off this machine: none · calls to a language model: 0 · the clone was deleted when the survey ended

An automated reading of a repository's code and its history up to one commit, with public advisory records. It may be wrong, it is not legal, financial, investment or security advice, and it does not replace diligence by a qualified person. It is provided for information: nobody may rely on it (Borehole's terms, section 3).

BOREHOLE 0.7.15 DETERMINISTIC LAYER · NO MODEL CALLSREAD ON BOREHOLE'S SERVER · CLONE DELETED TAKEDOWNCONTRIBUTED TO THIS REPOSITORY? YOUR RIGHTS