Borehole · Project · free tier
vibrantlabsai/ragas
Free reading: not for reliance
298b682 · 1,147 commits · 694 files
Read 2026-10-23

vibrantlabsai/ragas: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in vibrantlabsai/ragas's code and history at 298b682: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenancestrong
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturityadequate
Product & Engineering Maturityadequate
Security & Reliability Postureadequate
Observability & Operationsnot assessable
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

What the repository says

  • SECURITY.md:62: names OpenSSF

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

strong
01.6

src/ragas/metrics/base.py is 1,479 lines, 10× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 139 lines. 2 files exceed 1,390 lines, the largest being 1,479. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

Evidence
src/ragas/metrics/base.py:1 — 1,479 lines (10× median)
src/ragas/integrations/ag_ui.py:1 — 1,390 lines (10× median)

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

adequate
02.15

15 tests are switched off

adequate

15 skip markers across 9 of 118 test files. Each is a failure somebody chose to stop seeing; the question is whether anyone is tracking them.

Product & Engineering Maturity

adequate
04.19

13% of bug fixes add or change a test

adequate

Of 282 fixes in the last 24 months, 37 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.

Evidence
37 of 282

Security & Reliability Posture

adequate
05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

5 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

Evidence
.github/workflows/ci.yaml:27 — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/ci.yaml:89 — action pinned by tag
05.65

2 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 1 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-04-20. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. The record is incomplete: NVD: 1 record names ragas with nothing tying it to this repository (CVE-2026-6587).

Evidence
2026-04-20: GHSA-95ww-475f-pr4f (low): RAGAS has SSRF via Multi-Modal Faithfulness Collections Module
2026-03-05: GHSA-v2xr-wvrv-p969 (high), fixed in 0.3.0-rc1: RAGAS has an Arbitrary File Read vulnerability

Observability & Operations

not assessable

Not rated: only 5 of 16 checks could reach a conclusion here; the rest do not apply to this repository or could not read it.

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

Read more, or read your own

The full report on vibrantlabsai/ragas: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.

Survey a repository: free on public repositories. Private code is read on your own machine by a collector whose source you can read first.