Read 2026-10-04
umami-software/umami: technical due diligence, read from its repository
What Borehole read in umami-software/umami's code and history at ec0ff50: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.
| Dimension | Rating |
|---|---|
| Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | strong |
| Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | strong |
| Product & Engineering Maturity | adequate |
| Security & Reliability Posture | adequate |
| Observability & Operations | adequate |
| Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
strongsrc/app/(main)/websites/[websiteId]/(reports)/heatmaps/Heatmap.tsx is 1,073 lines, 22× this codebase's median file
adequateThe median source file here is 48 lines. 1 file exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 1,073. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.
src/app/(main)/websites/[websiteId]/(reports)/heatmaps/Heatmap.tsx:1 — 1,073 lines (22× median) |
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
strongTests are retried until they pass
adequateThe suite is configured to retry failing tests (playwright.config.ts). A retry turns a flaky test green without saying why it failed, so a green build means the tests passed eventually. Ask how many retries a typical run needs, and which tests need them.
playwright.config.ts:11 — test retry |
Product & Engineering Maturity
adequate9% of bug fixes add or change a test
adequateOf 572 fixes in the last 24 months, 53 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.
| 53 of 572 |
Security & Reliability Posture
adequateNone of the standard security guard rails are configured
adequateThere is no disclosure policy, no automated dependency updates, no named code owners and no pre-commit configuration. None of these is load-bearing on its own. Their collective absence says that security posture here is whatever the current team happens to remember to do, which is not a posture that survives the team changing.
| checked 5 kinds of guard rail across 2,026 tracked files; 0 present |
The build runs third-party code it does not pin
adequate6 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.
.github/workflows/cd-cloud.yml:21 — action pinned by tag |
.github/workflows/cd.yml:31 — action pinned by tag |
6 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 3 high or critical in what ships
adequate6 of 1,162 locked dependencies match 23 published advisories in OSV, 11 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version.
pnpm-lock.yaml — next 16.3.4: GHSA-vcvr-r3jv-pc5j (critical), fixed in 16.3.6 |
pnpm-lock.yaml — brace-expansion 2.1.4: GHSA-6j4f-fj2g-mc7p (high), fixed in 2.1.5 |
pnpm-lock.yaml — brace-expansion 1.1.18: GHSA-6j4f-fj2g-mc7p (high), fixed in 1.1.19; reached only by the build |
2 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 2 high or critical
adequateThe newest was published on 2026-06-30. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 2 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 3.4.0. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version. The record is incomplete: NVD: 2 records name umami with nothing tying them to this repository (CVE-2025-10931, CVE-2026-88892).
| 2026-06-30: GHSA-3xx8-742v-m4mq (high): [HIGH] Cache token from tracking endpoint reusable as share token grants full analytics access without authentication |
| 2026-03-31: CVE-2026-4317 (critical): SQL inyection (SQLi) vulnerability in Umami Software web application through an improperly sanitized parameter, which could allow an authenticated attacker to e |
Observability & Operations
adequateNo structured logging library is in use
adequateNothing references a structured logging library. Logs that are written to be read by a person are not searchable by a machine, which means incident response here is proportional to how well someone remembers the codebase rather than to what the tooling can find.
| searched 1,644 files for 10 structured logging libraries; 0 matched |
No error reporter is wired in
adequateNothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.
| no error reporter initialised |
1 of 2 deployed images carry no version, or `latest`
adequate1 images in the deployment configuration are named without a version or as `latest`. A redeploy can change the software without a commit, a rollback has nothing to roll back to, and nobody can say from the repository what is running.
docker-compose.yml:4 — image without a version |
Fit with the Acquirer
not assessableNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
Read more, or read your own
The full report on umami-software/umami: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.
Survey a repository: free on public repositories. Private code is read on your own machine by a collector whose source you can read first.