Borehole · Project · free tier
tutao/tutanota
Free reading: not for reliance
78c264c · 14,526 commits · 3,969 files
Read 2026-11-03

tutao/tutanota: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in tutao/tutanota's code and history at 78c264c: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenancestrong
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturitystrong
Product & Engineering Maturitystrong
Security & Reliability Postureadequate
Observability & Operationsnot assessable
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

What the repository says

  • .gitmodules:1: 3 submodule(s) this survey does not read: libs/webassembly/phc-winner-argon2, libs/webassembly/liboqs, libs/Signal-FTS5-Extension

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

strong
01.6

src/entities/sys/TypeModels.js is 18,803 lines, 244× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 77 lines. 85 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 18,803. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

Evidence
src/entities/sys/TypeModels.js:1 — 18,803 lines (244× median)
src/entities/tutanota/TypeModels.js:1 — 14,896 lines (193× median)
app-ios/Sqlcipher/sqlite3.h:1 — 13,836 lines (179× median)
src/entities/sys/TypeRefs.ts:1 — 11,446 lines (148× median)
src/entities/tutanota/TypeRefs.ts:1 — 8,553 lines (111× median)

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

strong
02.6

Almost no process scaffolding exists in the repository

adequate

Of five ordinary markers — CI workflows, CODEOWNERS, a pull-request template, pre-commit hooks, contribution guidance — 1 is present: CI workflows. Branch protection itself is a GitHub setting rather than a file, so this is a reading of proxies and not of the rules themselves. What it does establish is that the process is not written down anywhere a new engineer would find it.

Evidence
1 of 5 markers present across 3,969 tracked files

Product & Engineering Maturity

strong
04.38

6 files still carry code deprecated more than two years ago

adequate

6 files were marked deprecated over two years ago and still are, the oldest since Jun 2022. A deprecation is a promise to remove. Ask what still depends on these, and whether removing them is scheduled.

Evidence
app-android/app/src/main/java/de/tutao/tutanota/MainActivity.kt — deprecated since Jun 2022
libs/luxon.js — deprecated since Feb 2023
libs/electron-updater.mjs — deprecated since Aug 2023
libs/undici.mjs — deprecated since Nov 2023
app-android/calendar/src/main/java/de/tutao/calendar/MainActivity.kt — deprecated since Jul 2024

Security & Reliability Posture

adequate
05.5

1 credential-shaped string added in the history sit in tests, examples, documentation or local development settings

adequate

Strings shaped like credentials appear only where fakes are usual: test fixtures, examples, documentation, placeholders and local stacks. They are almost always fakes. Ask someone to confirm that none of them works anywhere, because a real key in a development file is still a real key.

Evidence
Google API key, where fakes are usual
05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

1 third-party CI action is referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day; 1 step pipes a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

Evidence
.github/workflows/kotlin-test.yml:68 — action pinned by tag
tuta-sdk/rust/crypto-primitives/.travis.yml:19 — download piped into a shell
05.21

3 shell commands built from strings

adequate

3 places run a command through a shell (`shell=True`, `os.system`, `exec` with a template) rather than passing arguments. Where any part comes from outside, it is command injection. Ask where each one's input comes from.

Evidence
buildSrc/buildWebapp.js:83 — command run through a shell
buildSrc/buildWebapp.js:91 — command run through a shell
buildSrc/updateLibs.js:113 — command run through a shell
05.51

The app allows plain HTTP to any server

adequate

The app's manifest allows unencrypted HTTP app-wide (NSAllowsArbitraryLoads, or cleartext traffic permitted), rather than for named domains. Anything sent over plain HTTP can be read on the network, and enterprise security reviews ask about it. Some apps need it by nature (a podcast or feed reader fetches whatever URL a feed gives), so ask which case this is.

Evidence
app-android/app/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml:49 — cleartext allowed app-wide
app-android/calendar/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml:39 — cleartext allowed app-wide
app-android/drive/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml:32 — cleartext allowed app-wide
05.65

3 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 2 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-10-02. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. None of them affects the surveyed version.

Evidence
2026-10-02: GHSA-mgq4-4gm5-rcw9 (high), fixed in >= 361.260929.0: Signing oracle for 2FA challenges in the Tuta Web app
2025-12-19: GHSA-24v3-254g-jv85 (high), fixed in 314.251111.0: DOM attribute and CSS injection in contact viewer
2025-10-16: GHSA-jj2j-5x96-gf8h (moderate), fixed in 304.250825.0: Relative resource URLs in email body could cause a crash in iOS app

Observability & Operations

not assessable

Not rated: only 5 of 16 checks could reach a conclusion here; the rest do not apply to this repository or could not read it.

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

Read more, or read your own

The full report on tutao/tutanota: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.

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