tiddlywiki/tiddlywiki5: technical due diligence, read from its repository

47 test files against 708 source files (6.6%). This does not measure whether the tests are good, only whether enough of them exist for the codebase to be changed safely by someone who did not write it — which is exactly the situation after an acquisition.

Of 186 fixes in the last 24 months, 33 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.

There is no disclosure policy, no automated dependency updates, no named code owners and no pre-commit configuration. None of these is load-bearing on its own. Their collective absence says that security posture here is whatever the current team happens to remember to do, which is not a posture that survives the team changing.

None of 939 readable files references an instrumentation, metrics or error-reporting library. If this system is in production, nobody learns that it broke from the system itself — they learn it from a customer. That is a reliability finding before it is an observability one.

Nothing references a structured logging library. Logs that are written to be read by a person are not searchable by a machine, which means incident response here is proportional to how well someone remembers the codebase rather than to what the tooling can find.

147 `print` or `console.log` calls in the service's code, and 4 calls through a logger. Printed lines carry no level and no context, cannot be switched off, and are hard to find again in production.

Nothing in the service carries a request or correlation id, and there is no tracing. When a customer reports a failure, the log lines that belong to their request cannot be picked out from everyone else's.