Borehole · Project · free tier
teamhanko/hanko
Free reading: not for reliance
b46b36a · 2,800 commits · 1,232 files
Read 2026-10-23

teamhanko/hanko: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in teamhanko/hanko's code and history at b46b36a: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenancestrong
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturitystrong
Product & Engineering Maturitystrong
Security & Reliability Postureadequate
Observability & Operationsstrong
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

strong

No finding.

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

strong
02.16

Tests are retried until they pass

adequate

The suite is configured to retry failing tests (e2e/playwright.config.ts). A retry turns a flaky test green without saying why it failed, so a green build means the tests passed eventually. Ask how many retries a typical run needs, and which tests need them.

Evidence
e2e/playwright.config.ts:23 — test retry

Product & Engineering Maturity

strong
04.17

2 pinned runtimes are past end of life

adequate

The code is pinned to Node.js 18 (end of life 2025-04-30); Node.js 20 (end of life 2026-04-30). None of these receives security fixes any more; the first stopped on 2025-04-30. Moving off an unsupported runtime is rarely a one-line change, so a buyer should ask whether the upgrade is planned and what it touches.

Evidence
frontend/Dockerfile — Node.js 18, end of life 2025-04-30
frontend/elements/.nvmrc — Node.js 20, end of life 2026-04-30

Security & Reliability Posture

adequate
05.6

1 Dockerfile runs the application as root

adequate

No USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.

Evidence
frontend/Dockerfile — runs as root
05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

9 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

Evidence
.github/workflows/cli-publish.yml:20 — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/cli-publish.yml:33 — action pinned by tag
05.13

4 outbound calls can wait forever

adequate

4 HTTP calls use a client with no timeout (Python `requests` without `timeout=`, or Go's default client). When a dependency slows down, each one holds a worker until the connection gives up, and enough of them take the service down with the dependency.

Evidence
backend/cmd/isready/isready.go:51 — outbound call without a timeout
backend/cmd/user/import.go:64 — outbound call without a timeout
backend/saml/service_metadata.go:41 — outbound call without a timeout
05.34

8 of 9 Kubernetes workloads declare no resource limits

adequate

8 workload manifests set no CPU or memory limits. One pod that leaks memory or spins can starve everything else on its node, and the scheduler cannot plan capacity for what it cannot see.

Evidence
deploy/k8s/base/elements/deployment.yaml — workload with no limits
deploy/k8s/base/hanko/deployment.yaml — workload with no limits
deploy/k8s/base/mailhog/deployment.yaml — workload with no limits
05.26

10 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 14 high or critical in what ships

adequate

10 of 486 locked dependencies match 40 published advisories in OSV, 22 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version.

Evidence
frontend/package-lock.json — @angular/common 21.1.5: GHSA-39pv-4j6c-2g6v (high), fixed in 21.2.17
frontend/package-lock.json — @angular/compiler 21.1.5: GHSA-g93w-mfhg-p222 (high), fixed in 21.2.4
frontend/package-lock.json — @angular/core 21.1.5: GHSA-g93w-mfhg-p222 (high), fixed in 21.2.4
05.49

The production build publishes source maps

adequate

The build configuration emits source maps for production, so the original source, with its comments and structure, is downloadable by every visitor. Upload them to an error tracker and keep them off the public server instead.

Evidence
frontend/elements/webpack.config.dev.cjs:10 — source maps in a production build
05.9

10 vendored components with no licence

adequate

Third-party code is committed into this repository without any statement of the terms it arrived under. Unknown terms are harder to deal with than inconvenient ones: an awkward licence can be complied with, an absent one cannot. Each of these needs its origin established before the code changes hands.

Evidence
backend/thirdparty/claims.go — 1 tracked files, no licence file
backend/thirdparty/custom_claims.go — 1 tracked files, no licence file
backend/thirdparty/provider_apple.go — 1 tracked files, no licence file
backend/thirdparty/provider_custom.go — 1 tracked files, no licence file
backend/thirdparty/provider_discord.go — 1 tracked files, no licence file
backend/thirdparty/provider_facebook.go — 1 tracked files, no licence file

Observability & Operations

strong
06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

Evidence
no error reporter initialised
06.18

4 of 10 deployed images carry no version, or `latest`

adequate

4 images in the deployment configuration are named without a version or as `latest`. A redeploy can change the software without a commit, a rollback has nothing to roll back to, and nobody can say from the repository what is running.

Evidence
deploy/docker-compose/quickstart.yaml:69 — image without a version
deploy/kind/webhook-receiver/webhook-receiver.yaml:23 — image without a version
deploy/k8s/base/mailhog/deployment.yaml:15 — image without a version
06.33

7 of 9 deployments run a single replica

adequate

7 deployments set `replicas: 1`, and nothing (an autoscaler, a disruption budget) adds more. Every deploy and every node drain is downtime, and the availability the buyer inherits has a ceiling.

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

Read more, or read your own

The full report on teamhanko/hanko: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.

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