Read 2026-10-04
teableio/teable: technical due diligence, read from its repository
What Borehole read in teableio/teable's code and history at 5ef2238: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.
| Dimension | Rating |
|---|---|
| Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | strong |
| Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | adequate |
| Product & Engineering Maturity | adequate |
| Security & Reliability Posture | adequate |
| Observability & Operations | strong |
| Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
What the repository says
LICENSE:1: The licence is AGPL-3.0 with additional termsLICENSE: Relicensed: AGPL-3.0 → AGPL-3.0 with additional terms (2025-04-01)
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
strongapps/nestjs-backend/src/features/space/space-data-db-migration.service.ts is 9,079 lines, 144× this codebase's median file
adequateThe median source file here is 63 lines. 88 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 9,079. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.
apps/nestjs-backend/src/features/space/space-data-db-migration.service.ts:1 — 9,079 lines (144× median) |
packages/v2/adapter-table-repository-postgres/src/record/repository/PostgresTableRecordRepository.ts:1 — 5,853 lines (92× median) |
apps/nestjs-backend/src/features/record/open-api/record-open-api-v2.service.ts:1 — 4,896 lines (77× median) |
packages/v2/adapter-table-repository-postgres/src/record/computed/outbox/ComputedUpdateOutbox.ts:1 — 4,630 lines (73× median) |
packages/v2/adapter-table-repository-postgres/src/record/computed/ComputedFieldUpdater.ts:1 — 4,085 lines (64× median) |
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
adequate1 committed .only switches other tests off
adequate1 test file commits a focused `.only`, which runs that test and silently skips the rest of its suite. 19 skip markers across 13 of 1877 test files. Each is a failure somebody chose to stop seeing; the question is whether anyone is tracking them.
apps/nestjs-backend/test/aggregation.e2e-spec.ts:1411 — committed .only: other tests do not run |
apps/nestjs-backend/test/aggregation-search.e2e-spec.ts:71 — skipped test |
apps/nestjs-backend/test/computed-orchestrator.e2e-spec.ts:3171 — skipped test |
apps/nestjs-backend/test/db-connection.e2e-spec.ts:11 — skipped test |
Tests are retried until they pass
adequateThe suite is configured to retry failing tests (apps/nextjs-app/playwright.config.ts). A retry turns a flaky test green without saying why it failed, so a green build means the tests passed eventually. Ask how many retries a typical run needs, and which tests need them.
apps/nextjs-app/playwright.config.ts:28 — test retry |
Product & Engineering Maturity
adequate161 direct dependencies in a single manifest
adequateapps/nestjs-backend/package.json declares 161 direct dependencies. Each one is a maintenance obligation, a supply-chain surface and a potential licence question that transfers with the asset. The count says nothing about whether any given dependency was a good choice; it says how many such choices a buyer inherits.
apps/nestjs-backend/package.json — 161 declared |
apps/nextjs-app/package.json — 99 declared |
packages/sdk/package.json — 89 declared |
packages/ui-lib/package.json — 55 declared |
2 jobs are each done by more than one library
adequateWithin a single package: HTTP clients: axios, node-fetch; dates: date-fns, dayjs. Each duplicate is bundle size, two ways of doing the same thing in one codebase, and two upgrade paths to maintain. It is usually the residue of a migration that stopped halfway.
apps/nestjs-backend/package.json — several libraries per job |
apps/nextjs-app/package.json — several libraries per job |
Security & Reliability Posture
adequate1 Dockerfile runs the application as root
adequateNo USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.
dockers/teable/Dockerfile — runs as root |
2 environment files are committed
adequateapps/nextjs-app/.env, dockers/.env are tracked in git. Environment files are where credentials usually live, and committing one usually means nobody decided how secrets reach the running application. Whatever is in it is in the history for good. Check 05.1 says whether it holds anything credential-shaped.
apps/nextjs-app/.env — committed environment file |
dockers/.env — committed environment file |
The build runs third-party code it does not pin
adequate7 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.
.github/workflows/docker-push.yml:96 — action pinned by tag |
.github/workflows/docker-push.yml:107 — action pinned by tag |
40 SQL statements built from strings
adequate40 places in product code build SQL by formatting or joining strings rather than passing parameters, and in 12 of them a value, not a table or column name, goes into the string. Where any of those values comes from a request, it is an injection point. Each site needs a look; the fix, parameters, is small.
104 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 67 high or critical in what ships
adequate104 of 4,261 locked dependencies match 197 published advisories in OSV, 96 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version.
pnpm-lock.yaml — handlebars 4.7.8: GHSA-2w6w-674q-4c4q (critical), fixed in 4.7.9 |
pnpm-lock.yaml — i18next-fs-backend 2.6.0: GHSA-2933-q333-qg83 (critical), fixed in 2.6.6 |
pnpm-lock.yaml — next 16.1.6: GHSA-2xp9-vwfh-vxw4 (critical), fixed in 16.3.3 |
14 places insert HTML from a variable without sanitising it
adequate14 places set HTML from a value that is neither a literal nor passed through a sanitiser. Where the value can come from a user, that is stored cross-site scripting, and it is the first thing a buyer's security review looks for in a frontend.
apps/nextjs-app/src/components/Metrics.tsx:136 — HTML from a variable |
apps/nextjs-app/src/components/Metrics.tsx:289 — HTML from a variable |
apps/nextjs-app/src/components/Metrics.tsx:435 — HTML from a variable |
The production build publishes source maps
adequateThe build configuration emits source maps for production, so the original source, with its comments and structure, is downloadable by every visitor. Upload them to an error tracker and keep them off the public server instead.
apps/nestjs-backend/webpack.dev.js:26 — source maps in a production build |
The licence is AGPL-3.0 with additional terms
adequateLICENSE grants AGPL-3.0 with additional terms: open source; offering it over a network counts as distributing it, so a hosted product's changes must be published. The reading comes from the licence's own title and clauses. Whether the terms fit the buyer's intended use, and whether any paid licence transfers with the code, is a question for counsel and the licensor.
LICENSE:1 — 37 lines, AGPL-3.0 AND LicenseRef-Terms-Additional |
Relicensed: AGPL-3.0 → AGPL-3.0 with additional terms (2025-04-01)
adequateThe root licence changed 1 time(s). Code taken under earlier terms stays under them; check which terms any fork or customer relied on.
4 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 2 high or critical
adequateThe newest was published on 2026-08-26. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 4 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 1.10.0. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version.
| 2026-08-26: GHSA-h4hg-45pv-pv8j (high), fixed in release.2026-07-20T11-53-25Z.2296: Arbitrary root file write via attachment presign hash path traversal |
| 2026-06-29: CVE-2026-56781 (moderate): Teable before 2026-06-15T04-43-24Z.1912 contains an improper access control vulnerability that allows anonymous attackers to access hidden field data by supplyi |
| 2026-06-26: CVE-2026-56773 (high): Teable's v2 REST API controller lacks @Permissions metadata on ORPC endpoints, allowing any authenticated user to bypass authorization checks. Attackers can rea |
| 2026-05-26: CVE-2026-9566 (low): A vulnerability was identified in teableio teable up to 1.9.x. This impacts an unknown function of the file apps/nextjs-app/src/features/auth/pages/LoginPage.ts |
Observability & Operations
strongNo finding.
Fit with the Acquirer
not assessableNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
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