Read 2026-11-03
tduckcloud/tduck-survey-form: technical due diligence, read from its repository
What Borehole read in tduckcloud/tduck-survey-form's code and history at af70fd6: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.
| Dimension | Rating |
|---|---|
| Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | strong |
| Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | adequate |
| Product & Engineering Maturity | not assessable |
| Security & Reliability Posture | adequate |
| Observability & Operations | adequate |
| Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
What the repository says
LICENSE: Relicensed: Apache-2.0 → GPL-3.0 (2021-06-22) → Apache-2.0 (2022-04-07) → MIT (2023-08-07)
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
strongCommit messages are templated rather than written
adequate67% of commit subjects are exact repeats of another subject, and subject length varies by only 22.1 characters. A log written by someone explaining their reasoning to a future reader does not look like this. The log is therefore weak evidence of intent, whatever the code is like.
| 241× 'update README.md.' |
| 15× 'fix' |
| 8× '完善' |
tduck-account/src/main/java/com/tduck/cloud/account/util/NameUtils.java is 6,924 lines, 157× this codebase's median file
adequateThe median source file here is 44 lines. 1 file exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 6,924. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.
tduck-account/src/main/java/com/tduck/cloud/account/util/NameUtils.java:1 — 6,924 lines (157× median) |
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
adequateTests cover a thin slice of the codebase
adequate2 test files against 318 source files (0.6%). This does not measure whether the tests are good, only whether enough of them exist for the codebase to be changed safely by someone who did not write it — which is exactly the situation after an acquisition.
| 2 test files / 318 source files |
Almost no process scaffolding exists in the repository
adequateOf five ordinary markers — CI workflows, CODEOWNERS, a pull-request template, pre-commit hooks, contribution guidance — none are present. Branch protection itself is a GitHub setting rather than a file, so this is a reading of proxies and not of the rules themselves. What it does establish is that the process is not written down anywhere a new engineer would find it.
| 0 of 5 markers present across 379 tracked files |
Product & Engineering Maturity
not assessableNot rated: only 8 of 19 checks could reach a conclusion here; the rest do not apply to this repository or could not read it.
Security & Reliability Posture
adequateNone of the standard security guard rails are configured
adequateThere is no disclosure policy, no automated dependency updates, no named code owners and no pre-commit configuration. None of these is load-bearing on its own. Their collective absence says that security posture here is whatever the current team happens to remember to do, which is not a posture that survives the team changing.
| checked 5 kinds of guard rail across 379 tracked files; 0 present |
1 Dockerfile runs the application as root
adequateNo USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.
tduck-api/Dockerfile — runs as root |
Relicensed: Apache-2.0 → GPL-3.0 (2021-06-22) → Apache-2.0 (2022-04-07) → MIT (2023-08-07)
adequateThe root licence changed 3 time(s). Code taken under earlier terms stays under them; check which terms any fork or customer relied on.
10 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 3 high or critical
adequateThe newest was published on 2026-10-16. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 9 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 5.3.0. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version.
| 2026-10-16: CVE-2026-111621 (moderate): TDuck Survey Form through 5.3 contains a missing authorization vulnerability that allows any authenticated user to read other owners' raw form settings via GET |
| 2026-10-12: CVE-2026-109164 (high): TDuck survey form through 6.0 contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability that allows authenticated users to delete other users' form submissions |
| 2026-10-12: CVE-2026-109165 (moderate): TDuck survey form through 6.0 contains a broken access control vulnerability that allows authenticated users to add fields to other users' forms via POST /user/ |
| 2026-10-12: CVE-2026-109167 (moderate): TDuck survey form through 6.0 contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability in the saveFormTheme handler that allows authenticated users to overwri |
| 2026-09-25: CVE-2026-100303 (moderate): TDuck survey form through 6.0 lacks authorization checks on FormThemeController write endpoints for global form themes and categories. Authenticated non-admin u |
Observability & Operations
adequateNo telemetry or error reporting is wired in anywhere
adequateNone of 344 readable files references an instrumentation, metrics or error-reporting library. If this system is in production, nobody learns that it broke from the system itself — they learn it from a customer. That is a reliability finding before it is an observability one.
| searched 344 tracked text files for 16 known instrumentation libraries; manifests for metrics, tracing and error-reporting families; locked dependencies for the packages that emit; 0 matched |
No structured logging library is in use
adequateNothing references a structured logging library. Logs that are written to be read by a person are not searchable by a machine, which means incident response here is proportional to how well someone remembers the codebase rather than to what the tooling can find.
| searched 344 files for 10 structured logging libraries; 0 matched |
One request cannot be followed through the logs
adequateNothing in the service carries a request or correlation id, and there is no tracing. When a customer reports a failure, the log lines that belong to their request cannot be picked out from everyone else's.
| no request id, correlation id or tracing found |
No error reporter is wired in
adequateNothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.
| no error reporter initialised |
1 of 2 deployed images carry no version, or `latest`
adequate1 images in the deployment configuration are named without a version or as `latest`. A redeploy can change the software without a commit, a rollback has nothing to roll back to, and nobody can say from the repository what is running.
docker/docker-compose.yaml:28 — image without a version |
Fit with the Acquirer
not assessableNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
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