Borehole · Project · free tier
tandoorrecipes/recipes
Free reading: not for reliance
664ba40 · 9,091 commits · 1,828 files
Read 2026-10-23

tandoorrecipes/recipes: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in tandoorrecipes/recipes's code and history at 664ba40: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenancestrong
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturityadequate
Product & Engineering Maturitystrong
Security & Reliability Postureadequate
Observability & Operationsadequate
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

What the repository says

  • LICENSE.md:1: The licence is AGPL-3.0 with the Commons Clause and an attribution term: source available, not open source
  • LICENSE.md: Relicensed: MIT → AGPL-3.0 with the Commons Clause and an attribution term (2020-06-29)

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

strong
01.6

vue3/src/openapi/apis/ApiApi.ts is 24,489 lines, 249× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 98 lines. 9 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 24,489. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

Evidence
vue3/src/openapi/apis/ApiApi.ts:1 — 24,489 lines (249× median)
cookbook/static/pdfjs/web/pdf.mjs:1 — 22,734 lines (231× median)
cookbook/static/pdfjs/web/viewer.mjs:1 — 16,936 lines (172× median)
cookbook/views/api.py:1 — 3,542 lines (36× median)
cookbook/serializer.py:1 — 2,272 lines (23× median)

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

adequate
02.3

Tests cover a thin slice of the codebase

adequate

99 test files against 1,169 source files (8.5%). This does not measure whether the tests are good, only whether enough of them exist for the codebase to be changed safely by someone who did not write it — which is exactly the situation after an acquisition.

Evidence
99 test files / 1,169 source files
02.6

Almost no process scaffolding exists in the repository

adequate

Of five ordinary markers — CI workflows, CODEOWNERS, a pull-request template, pre-commit hooks, contribution guidance — 1 is present: CI workflows. Branch protection itself is a GitHub setting rather than a file, so this is a reading of proxies and not of the rules themselves. What it does establish is that the process is not written down anywhere a new engineer would find it.

Evidence
1 of 5 markers present across 1,828 tracked files

Product & Engineering Maturity

strong

No finding.

Security & Reliability Posture

adequate
05.6

1 Dockerfile runs the application as root

adequate

No USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.

Evidence
Dockerfile — runs as root
05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

7 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

Evidence
.github/workflows/build-docker.yml:51 — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/build-docker.yml:53 — action pinned by tag
05.17

38 of 245 migrations cannot be rolled back

adequate

38 schema migrations (16%) have no working way back: an empty `downgrade`, a `down` that does nothing, or a data migration with no reverse. A bad deploy that includes one is recovered from a backup, not reverted. Ask when a restore was last rehearsed.

05.48

7 places insert HTML from a variable without sanitising it

adequate

7 places set HTML from a value that is neither a literal nor passed through a sanitiser. Where the value can come from a user, that is stored cross-site scripting, and it is the first thing a buyer's security review looks for in a frontend.

Evidence
cookbook/static/js/jquery-3.5.1.min.js:2 — HTML from a variable
cookbook/static/js/jquery-3.5.1.min.js:2 — HTML from a variable
cookbook/static/pdfjs/web/viewer.mjs:2388 — HTML from a variable
05.9

2 vendored components with no licence

adequate

Third-party code is committed into this repository without any statement of the terms it arrived under. Unknown terms are harder to deal with than inconvenient ones: an awkward licence can be complied with, an absent one cannot. Each of these needs its origin established before the code changes hands.

Evidence
vue3/.vite/deps/_metadata.json — 1 tracked files, no licence file
vue3/.vite/deps/package.json — 1 tracked files, no licence file
05.66

The licence is AGPL-3.0 with the Commons Clause and an attribution term: source available, not open source

adequate

LICENSE.md grants AGPL-3.0 with the Commons Clause and an attribution term: source available, not open source; selling it, or a service whose value comes from it, is not allowed. The reading comes from the licence's own title and clauses. Whether the terms fit the buyer's intended use, and whether any paid licence transfers with the code, is a question for counsel and the licensor.

Evidence
LICENSE.md:1 — 690 lines, AGPL-3.0 AND LicenseRef-Terms-NoSale AND LicenseRef-Terms-Attribution
05.60

Relicensed: MIT → AGPL-3.0 with the Commons Clause and an attribution term (2020-06-29)

adequate

The root licence changed 1 time(s). The latest terms restrict what users, hosts or a buyer may do in ways the earlier ones did not. Code taken under the old terms stays under them, so both matter in diligence.

Evidence
LICENSE.md — MIT from 2018-01-31
LICENSE.md — AGPL-3.0 with the Commons Clause and an attribution term from 2020-06-29
05.65

39 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 18 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-10-23. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 3 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 2.7.0. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version. The record is incomplete: NVD: 34 records name recipes with nothing tying them to this repository (CVE-2006-6220, CVE-2007-1617, CVE-2007-5449, …).

Evidence
2026-10-23: GHSA-5f74-7rgh-pc97 (high): Recipe import subsystem: XXE local file read via lxml default parser (rezeptsuitede/Cookmate XML importers) and SSRF in the pestle importer left out of the GHSA
2026-10-23: GHSA-pcq2-64qw-jm4x (moderate): Private recipe overview disclosed through ShoppingListRecipe API in 2.6.15
2026-10-23: GHSA-69q3-5q6x-7hmx (high): Group-Permission Cache Key Omits Active Space
2026-10-23: GHSA-xq7g-9q95-vjc6 (moderate): Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in Pestle Recipe Import
2026-10-23: GHSA-748x-xc8h-95hj (moderate): User can move an owned entry into another user’s unshared recipe book

Observability & Operations

adequate
06.2

No structured logging library is in use

adequate

Nothing references a structured logging library. Logs that are written to be read by a person are not searchable by a machine, which means incident response here is proportional to how well someone remembers the codebase rather than to what the tooling can find.

Evidence
searched 1,301 files for 10 structured logging libraries; 0 matched
06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

Evidence
no error reporter initialised

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

Read more, or read your own

The full report on tandoorrecipes/recipes: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.

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