Read 2026-10-04
sxyazi/yazi: technical due diligence, read from its repository
What Borehole read in sxyazi/yazi's code and history at fde2234: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.
| Dimension | Rating |
|---|---|
| Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | strong |
| Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | adequate |
| Product & Engineering Maturity | adequate |
| Security & Reliability Posture | not assessable |
| Observability & Operations | not assessable |
| Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
What the repository says
.github/pull_request_template.md:22: states a policy on AI-generated contributions
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
strongNo finding.
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
adequateTests cover a thin slice of the codebase
adequate32 test files against 1,350 source files (2.4%). This does not measure whether the tests are good, only whether enough of them exist for the codebase to be changed safely by someone who did not write it — which is exactly the situation after an acquisition.
| 32 test files / 1,350 source files |
Product & Engineering Maturity
adequate0% of bug fixes add or change a test
adequateOf 253 fixes in the last 24 months, 0 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.
| 0 of 253 |
Security & Reliability Posture
not assessableThe build runs third-party code it does not pin
adequate15 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day; 1 step pipes a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.
.github/workflows/cachix.yml:21 — action pinned by tag |
.github/workflows/cachix.yml:24 — action pinned by tag |
.github/workflows/test.yml:50 — download piped into a shell |
3 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities
adequate3 of 548 locked dependencies match 3 published advisories in OSV. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.
Cargo.lock — bincode 1.3.3: RUSTSEC-2025-0141 (unrated) |
Cargo.lock — paste 1.0.15: RUSTSEC-2024-0436 (unrated) |
Cargo.lock — rsa 0.10.0-rc.18: RUSTSEC-2023-0071 (unrated) |
Observability & Operations
not assessableNot rated: only 4 of 16 checks could reach a conclusion here; the rest do not apply to this repository or could not read it.
Fit with the Acquirer
not assessableNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
Read more, or read your own
The full report on sxyazi/yazi: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.
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