Borehole · Project · free tier
skyhook-io/radar
Free reading: not for reliance
868e06f · 1,904 commits · 4,193 files
Read 2026-10-28

skyhook-io/radar: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in skyhook-io/radar's code and history at 868e06f: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenancestrong
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturityadequate
Product & Engineering Maturitystrong
Security & Reliability Postureadequate
Observability & Operationsadequate
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

strong
01.6

packages/k8s-ui/src/components/resources/ResourcesView.tsx is 9,915 lines, 70× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 140 lines. 68 files exceed 1,400 lines, the largest being 9,915. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

Evidence
packages/k8s-ui/src/components/resources/ResourcesView.tsx:1 — 9,915 lines (70× median)
pkg/topology/builder.go:1 — 9,065 lines (64× median)
web/src/api/client.ts:1 — 8,092 lines (57× median)
internal/server/server.go:1 — 6,336 lines (45× median)
internal/k8s/history.go:1 — 4,341 lines (31× median)

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

adequate
02.24

10% of recent commits change more than 2,000 lines

adequate

162 of 1614 commits in the last 24 months changed over 2,000 lines of code, not counting reformatting, renames, vendored or generated code. A change that size is rarely reviewed line by line. Ask how they were reviewed, and what made them that large.

Evidence
162 commits over 2,000 lines

Product & Engineering Maturity

strong

No finding.

Security & Reliability Posture

adequate
05.1

8 credential-shaped strings in the tree sit in tests, examples, documentation or local development settings

adequate

Strings shaped like credentials appear only where fakes are usual: test fixtures, examples, documentation, placeholders and local stacks. They are almost always fakes. Ask someone to confirm that none of them works anywhere, because a real key in a development file is still a real key.

Evidence
3 cited: AWS access key, where fakes are usual
2 cited: GitHub token, where fakes are usual
05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

9 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day; 1 step pipes a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

Evidence
.github/workflows/ci.yml:366 — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/ci.yml:447 — action pinned by tag
install.sh:3 — download piped into a shell
05.13

5 outbound calls can wait forever

adequate

5 HTTP calls use a client with no timeout (Python `requests` without `timeout=`, or Go's default client). When a dependency slows down, each one holds a worker until the connection gives up, and enough of them take the service down with the dependency.

Evidence
internal/diagnosecli/diagnosecli.go:362 — outbound call without a timeout
internal/diagnosecli/diagnosecli.go:528 — outbound call without a timeout
internal/diagnosecli/diagnosecli.go:575 — outbound call without a timeout
05.20

3 SQL statements built from strings

adequate

3 places in product code build SQL by formatting or joining strings rather than passing parameters. In each, what the code shows going in is a table or column name, a constant, or something the line does not show, not a request's value. Ask whether any value reaches these strings, rather than a parameter.

Evidence
internal/prometheus/pvc_usage.go:99 — SQL built from a string
internal/prometheus/pvc_usage.go:103 — SQL built from a string
internal/traffic/beyla.go:148 — SQL built from a string
05.48

6 places insert HTML from a variable without sanitising it

adequate

6 places set HTML from a value that is neither a literal nor passed through a sanitiser. Where the value can come from a user, that is stored cross-site scripting, and it is the first thing a buyer's security review looks for in a frontend.

05.65

2 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 2 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-10-16. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. None of them affects the surveyed version. The record is incomplete: NVD: 13 records name radar with nothing tying them to this repository (CVE-2018-6189, CVE-2018-6324, CVE-2020-14943, …).

Evidence
2026-10-16: GHSA-w7q8-74xp-j784 (critical), fixed in 1.17.0: CSRF on the local API lets any website take over the connected Kubernetes cluster
2026-10-14: CVE-2026-82026 (high): Radar before 1.12.2 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in the handleLocalTerminal WebSocket endpoint (/api/local-terminal) that allows authenticated

Observability & Operations

adequate
06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

Evidence
no error reporter initialised
06.35

Sends usage data to usage.radarhq.io by default

adequate

internal/usagedata/usagedata.go sends to usage.radarhq.io, and pkg/health/opentelemetry.go leaves reporting on as shipped. Every installation reports to the vendor unless its operator turns this off. For a buyer running it inside their own product, that is an outbound data flow to a third party: ask what is sent, how often, and whether the buyer's customers were told.

Evidence
internal/usagedata/usagedata.go:34 — reports to usage.radarhq.io
pkg/health/opentelemetry.go:10 — the reporting setting is on by default
06.14

Readiness and liveness probes are identical in 1 of 1 workloads

adequate

Both probes call the same endpoint. When a dependency slows down, the liveness probe fails with the readiness probe, so the platform restarts pods that only needed taking out of rotation, and a partial outage becomes a full one. Liveness should ask whether the process is alive; readiness whether it can serve.

Evidence
deploy/helm/radar/templates/deployment.yaml — same probe endpoint twice

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

Read more, or read your own

The full report on skyhook-io/radar: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.

Survey a repository: free on public repositories. Private code is read on your own machine by a collector whose source you can read first.