Read 2026-11-03
semaphoreui/semaphore: technical due diligence, read from its repository
What Borehole read in semaphoreui/semaphore's code and history at 87bcc0c: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.
| Dimension | Rating |
|---|---|
| Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | strong |
| Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | strong |
| Product & Engineering Maturity | adequate |
| Security & Reliability Posture | adequate |
| Observability & Operations | strong |
| Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
What the repository says
- Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed
.gitmodules:1: 2 submodule(s) this survey does not read: docs, pro_impl
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
strongutil/config.go is 2,551 lines, 33× this codebase's median file
adequateThe median source file here is 77 lines. 13 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 2,551. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.
util/config.go:1 — 2,551 lines (33× median) |
web/src/App.vue:1 — 1,799 lines (23× median) |
services/tasks/local_executor.go:1 — 1,461 lines (18× median) |
services/tasks/TaskPool.go:1 — 1,403 lines (18× median) |
web/src/components/TemplateForm.vue:1 — 1,390 lines (18× median) |
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
strongNo finding.
Product & Engineering Maturity
adequate33 of 37 columns added in the last year were dropped within 90 days
adequateMigrations added 37 columns in the last year and removed 33 of them again within three months. The data model is still being found, and anything built against it (reports, integrations, the buyer's own systems) will have to move with it.
| 33 columns added then dropped |
Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed
adequateThe newest release, v2.19.18, is not on the branch this survey read; the newest release on it is v2.19.6. The shipped product may differ from what this report describes. Survey the release branch too.
| tag v2.19.18 |
Security & Reliability Posture
adequate1 Dockerfile runs the application as root
adequateNo USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.
deployment/docker/dredd/Dockerfile — runs as root |
The build runs third-party code it does not pin
adequate5 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day; 3 steps pipe a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.
.github/workflows/community_beta.yml:75 — action pinned by tag |
.github/workflows/community_beta.yml:79 — action pinned by tag |
deployment/docker/dredd/Dockerfile:8 — download piped into a shell |
6 outbound calls can wait forever
adequate6 HTTP calls use a client with no timeout (Python `requests` without `timeout=`, or Go's default client). When a dependency slows down, each one holds a worker until the connection gives up, and enough of them take the service down with the dependency.
services/tasks/alert.go:185 — outbound call without a timeout |
services/tasks/alert.go:251 — outbound call without a timeout |
services/tasks/alert.go:314 — outbound call without a timeout |
12 SQL statements built from strings
adequate12 places in product code build SQL by formatting or joining strings rather than passing parameters, and in 5 of them a value, not a table or column name, goes into the string. Where any of those values comes from a request, it is an injection point. Each site needs a look; the fix, parameters, is small.
db/sql/SqlDb.go:731 — SQL built from a string |
db/sql/SqlDb.go:747 — SQL built from a string |
db/sql/template_vault.go:83 — SQL built from a string |
7 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 9 high or critical in what ships
adequate7 of 136 locked dependencies match 12 published advisories in OSV, 9 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version.
go.mod — github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.1.5: GHSA-mgcc-cww5-fp2q (high), fixed in 4.1.6 |
web/package-lock.json — follow-redirects 1.16.0: GHSA-8r9p-f939-6h3c (high), fixed in 1.16.1 |
web/package-lock.json — nanoid 3.3.15: GHSA-28wg-ghj8-5hjv (high), fixed in 3.3.16 |
11 places insert HTML from a variable without sanitising it
adequate11 places set HTML from a value that is neither a literal nor passed through a sanitiser. Where the value can come from a user, that is stored cross-site scripting, and it is the first thing a buyer's security review looks for in a frontend.
web/src/components/GlobalRolesList.vue:43 — HTML from a variable |
web/src/components/KeyForm.vue:51 — HTML from a variable |
web/src/components/TaskLogView.vue:68 — HTML from a variable |
5 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 5 high or critical
adequateThe newest was published on 2026-10-19. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 2 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 2.19.6. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version. The record is incomplete: NVD: 23 records name semaphore with nothing tying them to this repository (CVE-2023-28609, CVE-2023-39059, CVE-2023-53845, …).
| 2026-10-19: CVE-2026-112305 (high): Semaphore UI through 2.19.16 contains a remote code execution vulnerability that allows users with the task_runner role to override protected Ansible variables |
| 2026-09-15: CVE-2026-91994 (high): Semaphore UI through 2.19.12 exempts GET and HEAD requests from project resource permission checks in GetMustCanMiddleware. Attackers with guest or task_runner |
| 2026-08-01: GHSA-xp7j-h7jc-4w8p (critical), fixed in 0.0.0-20260704181911-7e8a9434bd81: Semaphore U: OS Command Injection |
| 2026-07-13: GHSA-8cj9-r88m-8945 (high), fixed in 0.0.0-20260707190631-c59c3dc9035b: Semaphore UI: CSRF vulnerability on password change endpoint - No CSRF token or password confirmation |
| 2026-07-13: GHSA-cxvf-gvfq-36w2 (high), fixed in 0.0.0-20260705182501-bb2a4e1f08c8: Semaphore UI: Manager-to-owner privilege escalation via custom-role slug collision |
Observability & Operations
strongNo error reporter is wired in
adequateNothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.
| no error reporter initialised |
Fit with the Acquirer
not assessableNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
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