Borehole · Project · free tier
seerr-team/seerr
Free reading: not for reliance
3153656 · 3,215 commits · 975 files
Read 2026-10-23

seerr-team/seerr: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in seerr-team/seerr's code and history at 3153656: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenancestrong
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturityadequate
Product & Engineering Maturityadequate
Security & Reliability Postureadequate
Observability & Operationsadequate
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

What the repository says

  • Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed
  • .github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md:28: states a policy on AI-generated contributions

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

strong
01.6

server/api/themoviedb/index.ts is 1,498 lines, 21× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 69 lines. 10 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 1,498. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

Evidence
server/api/themoviedb/index.ts:1 — 1,498 lines (21× median)
src/components/TvDetails/index.tsx:1 — 1,390 lines (20× median)
server/lib/availabilitySync.ts:1 — 1,219 lines (17× median)
src/components/MovieDetails/index.tsx:1 — 1,157 lines (16× median)
server/subscriber/MediaRequestSubscriber.ts:1 — 1,143 lines (16× median)

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

adequate
02.3

Tests cover a thin slice of the codebase

adequate

42 test files against 636 source files (6.6%). This does not measure whether the tests are good, only whether enough of them exist for the codebase to be changed safely by someone who did not write it — which is exactly the situation after an acquisition.

Evidence
42 test files / 636 source files

Product & Engineering Maturity

adequate
04.19

10% of bug fixes add or change a test

adequate

Of 362 fixes in the last 24 months, 35 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.

Evidence
35 of 362
04.62

Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed

adequate

The newest release, v3.5.1, is not on the branch this survey read; the newest release on it is v1.3.0. The shipped product may differ from what this report describes. Survey the release branch too.

Evidence
tag v3.5.1

Security & Reliability Posture

adequate
05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

18 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

Evidence
.github/workflows/ci.yml:44 — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/ci.yml:172 — action pinned by tag
05.20

1 SQL statement built from strings

adequate

1 places in product code build SQL by formatting or joining strings rather than passing parameters. 1 of them put a value into the string; in the rest, what the code shows going in is a table or column name, a constant, or something the line does not show. Ask whether any value reaches these strings, rather than a parameter.

Evidence
server/lib/overseerrMerge.ts:70 — SQL built from a string
05.26

67 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 65 high or critical in what ships

adequate

67 of 2,721 locked dependencies match 174 published advisories in OSV, 86 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version.

Evidence
pnpm-lock.yaml — handlebars 4.7.8: GHSA-2w6w-674q-4c4q (critical), fixed in 4.7.9
pnpm-lock.yaml — next 16.2.6: GHSA-2464-fhr4-w9xw (critical), fixed in 16.4.1
pnpm-lock.yaml — tar 6.2.1: GHSA-23hp-3jrh-7fpw (critical), fixed in 7.5.19
05.65

6 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 2 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-10-21. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 2 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 1.3.0. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version. GHSA-mc6w-69r3-62h8 (high), GHSA-f7xw-jcqr-57hp (moderate) are fixed in the surveyed commit; which release carries them cannot be told from this history, which does not place the release users run. Answer lives in: the version you run.

Evidence
2026-10-21: GHSA-8j73-j6rc-q8xh (moderate), fixed in 3.5.0: Third-party notification credentials of other users exposed via request detail endpoints
2026-10-21: GHSA-xc6j-6p6h-p799 (moderate), fixed in 3.5.0: Unfiltered User Objects (Email, plexId, Permissions) and Issue Contents Leaked via /movie/:id and /tv/:id mediaInfo
2026-07-28: GHSA-mc6w-69r3-62h8 (high), fixed in 3.4.0: Path traversal to RCE via /avatarproxy image cache filename from upstream ETag
2026-02-27: GHSA-gx3h-3jg5-q65f (moderate), fixed in 3.1.0: Missing authentication on pushSubscription endpoints
2026-02-27: GHSA-f7xw-jcqr-57hp (moderate), fixed in 3.1.0: Broken Object-Level Authorization in User Profile Endpoint Exposes Third-Party Notification Credentials

Observability & Operations

adequate
06.1

No telemetry or error reporting is wired in anywhere

adequate

None of 823 readable files references an instrumentation, metrics or error-reporting library. If this system is in production, nobody learns that it broke from the system itself — they learn it from a customer. That is a reliability finding before it is an observability one.

Evidence
searched 823 tracked text files for 16 known instrumentation libraries; manifests for metrics, tracing and error-reporting families; locked dependencies for the packages that emit; 0 matched
06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

Evidence
no error reporter initialised
06.14

Readiness and liveness probes are identical in 1 of 1 workloads

adequate

Both probes call the same endpoint. When a dependency slows down, the liveness probe fails with the readiness probe, so the platform restarts pods that only needed taking out of rotation, and a partial outage becomes a full one. Liveness should ask whether the process is alive; readiness whether it can serve.

Evidence
charts/seerr-chart/templates/statefulset.yaml — same probe endpoint twice

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

Read more, or read your own

The full report on seerr-team/seerr: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.

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