Read 2026-10-23
requarks/wiki: technical due diligence, read from its repository
What Borehole read in requarks/wiki's code and history at 7665577: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.
| Dimension | Rating |
|---|---|
| Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | strong |
| Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | adequate |
| Product & Engineering Maturity | adequate |
| Security & Reliability Posture | adequate |
| Observability & Operations | adequate |
| Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
What the repository says
- Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
strongbackend/models/pages.ts is 3,884 lines, 21× this codebase's median file
adequateThe median source file here is 184 lines. 17 files exceed 1,840 lines, the largest being 3,884. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.
backend/models/pages.ts:1 — 3,884 lines (21× median) |
frontend/src/components/FileManager.vue:1 — 2,893 lines (15× median) |
backend/models/users.ts:1 — 2,781 lines (15× median) |
backend/models/import.ts:1 — 2,703 lines (14× median) |
frontend/src/components/EditorMarkdown.vue:1 — 2,696 lines (14× median) |
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
adequateChange lands on the trunk with no trace of review
adequateIn the last 24 months, 4 of 268 commits (1.5%) carry any trace of review: a merge, a pull-request reference, a Reviewed-by or Reviewed-on trailer, a Closes/Fixes reference, a maintainer's sign-off on someone else's change, or a change applied by someone other than its author. Every common review workflow leaves at least one of those, so either review happens somewhere this history cannot see, or it is not happening. A buyer should establish which before relying on the review story they are told.
| 4 of 268 commits in the last 24 months carry review evidence; 28.4% across all 2,459 |
Tests are absent or token
adequate0 test files against 679 source files (0.0%). This does not measure whether the tests are good, only whether enough of them exist for the codebase to be changed safely by someone who did not write it — which is exactly the situation after an acquisition.
| 0 test files / 679 source files |
24% of recent commits change more than 2,000 lines
adequate57 of 241 commits in the last 24 months changed over 2,000 lines of code, not counting reformatting, renames, vendored or generated code. A change that size is rarely reviewed line by line. Ask how they were reviewed, and what made them that large.
| 57 commits over 2,000 lines |
Product & Engineering Maturity
adequate2% of bug fixes add or change a test
adequateOf 107 fixes in the last 24 months, 2 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.
| 2 of 107 |
Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed
adequateThe newest release, v2.5.315, is not on the branch this survey read; the newest release on it is v2.5.277. The shipped product may differ from what this report describes. Survey the release branch too.
| tag v2.5.315 |
Security & Reliability Posture
adequateThe build runs third-party code it does not pin
adequate9 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.
.github/workflows/build.yml:33 — action pinned by tag |
.github/workflows/build.yml:57 — action pinned by tag |
17 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 51 high or critical in what ships
adequate17 of 940 locked dependencies match 88 published advisories in OSV, 53 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version.
blocks/package-lock.json — dompurify 3.4.12: GHSA-cg2g-xh64-v4q7 (critical), fixed in 3.4.17 |
frontend/package-lock.json — dompurify 3.4.15: GHSA-cg2g-xh64-v4q7 (critical), fixed in 3.4.17 |
frontend/package-lock.json — dompurify 3.4.8: GHSA-cg2g-xh64-v4q7 (critical), fixed in 3.4.17 |
29 places insert HTML from a variable without sanitising it
adequate29 places set HTML from a value that is neither a literal nor passed through a sanitiser. Where the value can come from a user, that is stored cross-site scripting, and it is the first thing a buyer's security review looks for in a frontend.
frontend/src/components/AuthLoginPanel.vue:477 — HTML from a variable |
frontend/src/components/EditorAsciidoc.vue:311 — HTML from a variable |
frontend/src/components/EditorMarkdown.vue:368 — HTML from a variable |
6 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 5 high or critical
adequateThe newest was published on 2026-09-21. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 6 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 2.5.277. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version. The record is incomplete: NVD: 118 records name wiki with nothing tying them to this repository (CVE-2002-1070, CVE-2005-1799, CVE-2006-2861, …).
| 2026-09-21: GHSA-98c8-px3r-68c6 (high), fixed in 2.5.315: Stored XSS via Vue Slot Directives in Page Content |
| 2026-09-21: GHSA-45cp-v5ph-2jhm (high), fixed in 2.5.315: Root Administrator Takeover, TFA Bypass and Lock out. |
| 2026-09-16: CVE-2026-92774 (moderate): Wiki.js through 2.5.314 omits page tags from authorization checks in multiple GraphQL resolvers, allowing tag-based access restrictions to be bypassed. Attacker |
| 2026-09-16: CVE-2026-92775 (high): Wiki.js through 2.5.314 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the Image Prefetch renderer that fetches arbitrary URLs without protocol, host, |
| 2026-09-16: CVE-2026-92776 (high): Wiki.js through 2.5.314 fails to require path separators when matching START and END page rules, allowing attackers to access pages sharing a prefix with author |
Observability & Operations
adequateNo structured logging library is in use
adequateNothing references a structured logging library. Logs that are written to be read by a person are not searchable by a machine, which means incident response here is proportional to how well someone remembers the codebase rather than to what the tooling can find.
| searched 867 files for 10 structured logging libraries; 0 matched |
One request cannot be followed through the logs
adequateNothing in the service carries a request or correlation id, and there is no tracing. When a customer reports a failure, the log lines that belong to their request cannot be picked out from everyone else's.
| no request id, correlation id or tracing found |
No error reporter is wired in
adequateNothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.
| no error reporter initialised |
Fit with the Acquirer
not assessableNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
Read more, or read your own
The full report on requarks/wiki: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.
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