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requarks/wiki
Free reading: not for reliance
7665577 · 2,459 commits · 1,376 files
Read 2026-10-23

requarks/wiki: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in requarks/wiki's code and history at 7665577: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenancestrong
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturityadequate
Product & Engineering Maturityadequate
Security & Reliability Postureadequate
Observability & Operationsadequate
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

What the repository says

  • Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

strong
01.6

backend/models/pages.ts is 3,884 lines, 21× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 184 lines. 17 files exceed 1,840 lines, the largest being 3,884. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

Evidence
backend/models/pages.ts:1 — 3,884 lines (21× median)
frontend/src/components/FileManager.vue:1 — 2,893 lines (15× median)
backend/models/users.ts:1 — 2,781 lines (15× median)
backend/models/import.ts:1 — 2,703 lines (14× median)
frontend/src/components/EditorMarkdown.vue:1 — 2,696 lines (14× median)

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

adequate
02.1

Change lands on the trunk with no trace of review

adequate

In the last 24 months, 4 of 268 commits (1.5%) carry any trace of review: a merge, a pull-request reference, a Reviewed-by or Reviewed-on trailer, a Closes/Fixes reference, a maintainer's sign-off on someone else's change, or a change applied by someone other than its author. Every common review workflow leaves at least one of those, so either review happens somewhere this history cannot see, or it is not happening. A buyer should establish which before relying on the review story they are told.

Evidence
4 of 268 commits in the last 24 months carry review evidence; 28.4% across all 2,459
02.3

Tests are absent or token

adequate

0 test files against 679 source files (0.0%). This does not measure whether the tests are good, only whether enough of them exist for the codebase to be changed safely by someone who did not write it — which is exactly the situation after an acquisition.

Evidence
0 test files / 679 source files
02.24

24% of recent commits change more than 2,000 lines

adequate

57 of 241 commits in the last 24 months changed over 2,000 lines of code, not counting reformatting, renames, vendored or generated code. A change that size is rarely reviewed line by line. Ask how they were reviewed, and what made them that large.

Evidence
57 commits over 2,000 lines

Product & Engineering Maturity

adequate
04.19

2% of bug fixes add or change a test

adequate

Of 107 fixes in the last 24 months, 2 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.

Evidence
2 of 107
04.62

Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed

adequate

The newest release, v2.5.315, is not on the branch this survey read; the newest release on it is v2.5.277. The shipped product may differ from what this report describes. Survey the release branch too.

Evidence
tag v2.5.315

Security & Reliability Posture

adequate
05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

9 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

Evidence
.github/workflows/build.yml:33 — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/build.yml:57 — action pinned by tag
05.26

17 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 51 high or critical in what ships

adequate

17 of 940 locked dependencies match 88 published advisories in OSV, 53 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version.

Evidence
blocks/package-lock.json — dompurify 3.4.12: GHSA-cg2g-xh64-v4q7 (critical), fixed in 3.4.17
frontend/package-lock.json — dompurify 3.4.15: GHSA-cg2g-xh64-v4q7 (critical), fixed in 3.4.17
frontend/package-lock.json — dompurify 3.4.8: GHSA-cg2g-xh64-v4q7 (critical), fixed in 3.4.17
05.48

29 places insert HTML from a variable without sanitising it

adequate

29 places set HTML from a value that is neither a literal nor passed through a sanitiser. Where the value can come from a user, that is stored cross-site scripting, and it is the first thing a buyer's security review looks for in a frontend.

05.65

6 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 5 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-09-21. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 6 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 2.5.277. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version. The record is incomplete: NVD: 118 records name wiki with nothing tying them to this repository (CVE-2002-1070, CVE-2005-1799, CVE-2006-2861, …).

Evidence
2026-09-21: GHSA-98c8-px3r-68c6 (high), fixed in 2.5.315: Stored XSS via Vue Slot Directives in Page Content
2026-09-21: GHSA-45cp-v5ph-2jhm (high), fixed in 2.5.315: Root Administrator Takeover, TFA Bypass and Lock out.
2026-09-16: CVE-2026-92774 (moderate): Wiki.js through 2.5.314 omits page tags from authorization checks in multiple GraphQL resolvers, allowing tag-based access restrictions to be bypassed. Attacker
2026-09-16: CVE-2026-92775 (high): Wiki.js through 2.5.314 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the Image Prefetch renderer that fetches arbitrary URLs without protocol, host,
2026-09-16: CVE-2026-92776 (high): Wiki.js through 2.5.314 fails to require path separators when matching START and END page rules, allowing attackers to access pages sharing a prefix with author

Observability & Operations

adequate
06.2

No structured logging library is in use

adequate

Nothing references a structured logging library. Logs that are written to be read by a person are not searchable by a machine, which means incident response here is proportional to how well someone remembers the codebase rather than to what the tooling can find.

Evidence
searched 867 files for 10 structured logging libraries; 0 matched
06.8

One request cannot be followed through the logs

adequate

Nothing in the service carries a request or correlation id, and there is no tracing. When a customer reports a failure, the log lines that belong to their request cannot be picked out from everyone else's.

Evidence
no request id, correlation id or tracing found
06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

Evidence
no error reporter initialised

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

Read more, or read your own

The full report on requarks/wiki: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.

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