Read 2026-10-04
readyouapp/readyou: technical due diligence, read from its repository
What Borehole read in readyouapp/readyou's code and history at d2b979c: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.
| Dimension | Rating |
|---|---|
| Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | strong |
| Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | adequate |
| Product & Engineering Maturity | adequate |
| Security & Reliability Posture | adequate |
| Observability & Operations | not assessable |
| Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
strongNo finding.
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
adequateTests cover a thin slice of the codebase
adequate6 test files against 383 source files (1.6%). This does not measure whether the tests are good, only whether enough of them exist for the codebase to be changed safely by someone who did not write it — which is exactly the situation after an acquisition.
| 6 test files / 383 source files |
Almost no process scaffolding exists in the repository
adequateOf five ordinary markers — CI workflows, CODEOWNERS, a pull-request template, pre-commit hooks, contribution guidance — 1 is present: CI workflows. Branch protection itself is a GitHub setting rather than a file, so this is a reading of proxies and not of the rules themselves. What it does establish is that the process is not written down anywhere a new engineer would find it.
| 1 of 5 markers present across 608 tracked files |
Product & Engineering Maturity
adequate1% of bug fixes add or change a test
adequateOf 187 fixes in the last 24 months, 2 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.
| 2 of 187 |
Security & Reliability Posture
adequateNone of the standard security guard rails are configured
adequateThere is no disclosure policy, no automated dependency updates, no named code owners and no pre-commit configuration. None of these is load-bearing on its own. Their collective absence says that security posture here is whatever the current team happens to remember to do, which is not a posture that survives the team changing.
| checked 5 kinds of guard rail across 608 tracked files; 0 present |
The app allows plain HTTP to any server
adequateThe app's manifest allows unencrypted HTTP app-wide (NSAllowsArbitraryLoads, or cleartext traffic permitted), rather than for named domains. Anything sent over plain HTTP can be read on the network, and enterprise security reviews ask about it. Some apps need it by nature (a podcast or feed reader fetches whatever URL a feed gives), so ask which case this is.
app/src/googlePlay/AndroidManifest.xml:26 — cleartext allowed app-wide |
app/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml:42 — cleartext allowed app-wide |
Observability & Operations
not assessableNot rated: only 5 of 16 checks could reach a conclusion here; the rest do not apply to this repository or could not read it.
Fit with the Acquirer
not assessableNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
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The full report on readyouapp/readyou: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.
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