Borehole · Project · free tier
quantumnous/new-api
Free reading: not for reliance
e449cc7 · 6,633 commits · 2,660 files
Read 2026-10-28

quantumnous/new-api: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in quantumnous/new-api's code and history at e449cc7: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenancestrong
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturitystrong
Product & Engineering Maturityadequate
Security & Reliability Postureadequate
Observability & Operationsadequate
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

What the repository says

  • LICENSE: Relicensed: MIT → Apache-2.0 (2024-05-24) → AGPL-3.0 (2026-01-26)
  • .github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE/en.md:10: states a policy on AI-generated contributions

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

strong
01.6

web/src/features/channels/components/drawers/channel-mutate-drawer.tsx is 5,166 lines, 39× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 130 lines. 24 files exceed 1,300 lines, the largest being 5,166. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

Evidence
web/src/features/channels/components/drawers/channel-mutate-drawer.tsx:1 — 5,166 lines (39× median)
web/src/features/channels/components/dialogs/param-override-editor-dialog.tsx:1 — 3,339 lines (25× median)
controller/channel.go:1 — 2,327 lines (17× median)
relay/common/override.go:1 — 2,260 lines (17× median)
pkg/jsplugin/registry.go:1 — 2,152 lines (16× median)

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

strong
02.6

Almost no process scaffolding exists in the repository

adequate

Of five ordinary markers — CI workflows, CODEOWNERS, a pull-request template, pre-commit hooks, contribution guidance — 1 is present: CI workflows. Branch protection itself is a GitHub setting rather than a file, so this is a reading of proxies and not of the rules themselves. What it does establish is that the process is not written down anywhere a new engineer would find it.

Evidence
1 of 5 markers present across 2,660 tracked files

Product & Engineering Maturity

adequate
04.19

19% of bug fixes add or change a test

adequate

Of 1455 fixes in the last 24 months, 272 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.

Evidence
272 of 1455
04.20

Fixes are 54% of recent work, up from 34%

adequate

In the last two quarters 54% of commits were fixes, against 34% in the quarters before. Rising fix work usually means quality debt is coming due, and it takes time that new work would have had.

Evidence
58%, 50%, 43%, 44%, 32%, 30%, 29%, 28%

Security & Reliability Posture

adequate
05.1

2 credential-shaped strings in the tree sit in tests, examples, documentation or local development settings

adequate

Strings shaped like credentials appear only where fakes are usual: test fixtures, examples, documentation, placeholders and local stacks. They are almost always fakes. Ask someone to confirm that none of them works anywhere, because a real key in a development file is still a real key.

Evidence
2 cited: Google API key, where fakes are usual
05.6

1 Dockerfile runs the application as root

adequate

No USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.

Evidence
Dockerfile — runs as root
05.13

3 outbound calls can wait forever

adequate

3 HTTP calls use a client with no timeout (Python `requests` without `timeout=`, or Go's default client). When a dependency slows down, each one holds a worker until the connection gives up, and enough of them take the service down with the dependency.

Evidence
middleware/turnstile-check.go:24 — outbound call without a timeout
relay/channel/ollama/relay-ollama.go:344 — outbound call without a timeout
relay/channel/ollama/relay-ollama.go:511 — outbound call without a timeout
05.20

1 SQL statement built from strings

adequate

1 places in product code build SQL by formatting or joining strings rather than passing parameters. In each, what the code shows going in is a table or column name, a constant, or something the line does not show, not a request's value. Ask whether any value reaches these strings, rather than a parameter.

Evidence
model/db_time.go:14 — SQL built from a string
05.26

2 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 1 high or critical

adequate

2 of 159 locked dependencies match 3 published advisories in OSV, 1 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.

Evidence
go.mod — github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.1.4: GHSA-mgcc-cww5-fp2q (high), fixed in 4.1.6
go.mod — golang.org/x/image v0.41.0: GO-2026-4961 (unrated), fixed in 0.42.0
05.48

8 places insert HTML from a variable without sanitising it

adequate

8 places set HTML from a value that is neither a literal nor passed through a sanitiser. Where the value can come from a user, that is stored cross-site scripting, and it is the first thing a buyer's security review looks for in a frontend.

Evidence
web/src/components/html-content.tsx:96 — HTML from a variable
web/src/components/html-content.tsx:161 — HTML from a variable
web/src/components/html-content.tsx:164 — HTML from a variable
05.60

Relicensed: MIT → Apache-2.0 (2024-05-24) → AGPL-3.0 (2026-01-26)

adequate

The root licence changed 2 time(s). The latest terms restrict what users, hosts or a buyer may do in ways the earlier ones did not. Code taken under the old terms stays under them, so both matter in diligence.

Evidence
LICENSE — MIT from 2023-04-22
LICENSE — Apache-2.0 from 2024-05-24
LICENSE — AGPL-3.0 from 2026-01-26
05.65

16 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 10 high or critical, 5 fixed in no release yet

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-08-31. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. GHSA-j6gc-4893-qwmp (moderate), GHSA-8r8v-xf7q-rcpr (critical), GHSA-6x2c-phff-wx57 (critical) and 2 more affect 0.13.2, the newest release, and not the surveyed commit: their fixes are in the surveyed commit and in no release. Answer lives in: the version you run. The record is incomplete: NVD: 5 records name new-api with nothing tying them to this repository (CVE-2025-12822, CVE-2025-40104, CVE-2026-53627, …).

Evidence
2026-08-07: GHSA-j6gc-4893-qwmp (moderate), fixed in the surveyed commit and in no release: New API: Redis user quota cache overwrite via PUT /api/user/self allows quota bypass
2026-07-09: GHSA-8r8v-xf7q-rcpr (critical), fixed in the surveyed commit and in no release: New API: Integer overflow in quota billing yields negative charges (self-crediting)
2026-07-03: GHSA-6x2c-phff-wx57 (critical), fixed in the surveyed commit and in no release: New API: User List API Leaks Root User Access Token Leading to Privilege Escalation
2026-07-03: GHSA-p845-629j-rcj6 (moderate), fixed in the surveyed commit and in no release: New API: Admin can reset passkeys for same-level or higher-privileged users
2026-07-03: GHSA-v828-m3pf-vq9q (high), fixed in the surveyed commit and in no release: New API: Unauthenticated payment webhooks allow memory and disk DoS via unbounded body reads and full-body logging

Observability & Operations

adequate
06.2

No structured logging library is in use

adequate

Nothing references a structured logging library. Logs that are written to be read by a person are not searchable by a machine, which means incident response here is proportional to how well someone remembers the codebase rather than to what the tooling can find.

Evidence
searched 2,600 files for 10 structured logging libraries; 0 matched
06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

Evidence
no error reporter initialised
06.18

2 of 3 deployed images carry no version, or `latest`

adequate

2 images in the deployment configuration are named without a version or as `latest`. A redeploy can change the software without a commit, a rollback has nothing to roll back to, and nobody can say from the repository what is running.

Evidence
docker-compose.yml:19 — image without a version
docker-compose.yml:70 — image without a version

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

Read more, or read your own

The full report on quantumnous/new-api: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.

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