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prowler-cloud/prowler
Free reading: not for reliance
669df91 · 9,309 commits · 13,056 files
Read 2026-10-23

prowler-cloud/prowler: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in prowler-cloud/prowler's code and history at 669df91: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenancestrong
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturityadequate
Product & Engineering Maturityadequate
Security & Reliability Postureadequate
Observability & Operationsadequate
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

What the repository says

  • Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed
  • LICENSE: Relicensed: Apache-2.0 → CC-BY-NC-SA-4.0 (2017-07-24) → Apache-2.0 (2021-11-12)
  • README.md:29: names Linux Foundation
  • docs/AGENTS.md:111: states a policy on AI-generated contributions

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

strong
01.6

api/src/backend/api/v1/views.py is 8,978 lines, 179× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 50 lines. 37 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 8,978. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

Evidence
api/src/backend/api/v1/views.py:1 — 8,978 lines (179× median)
api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/queries/aws.py:1 — 4,957 lines (99× median)
api/src/backend/api/v1/serializers.py:1 — 4,623 lines (92× median)
api/src/backend/api/attack_paths/queries/aws_deprecated.py:1 — 3,820 lines (76× median)
dashboard/common_methods.py:1 — 3,331 lines (66× median)

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

adequate
02.24

6% of recent commits change more than 2,000 lines

adequate

207 of 3625 commits in the last 24 months changed over 2,000 lines of code, not counting reformatting, renames, vendored or generated code. A change that size is rarely reviewed line by line. Ask how they were reviewed, and what made them that large.

Evidence
207 commits over 2,000 lines

Product & Engineering Maturity

adequate
04.3

98 direct dependencies in a single manifest

adequate

pyproject.toml declares 98 direct dependencies. Each one is a maintenance obligation, a supply-chain surface and a potential licence question that transfers with the asset. The count says nothing about whether any given dependency was a good choice; it says how many such choices a buyer inherits.

Evidence
pyproject.toml — 98 declared
ui/package.json — 83 declared
api/pyproject.toml — 41 declared
util/prowler-bulk-provisioning/requirements.txt — 3 declared
04.62

Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed

adequate

The newest release, 5.45.0, is not on the branch this survey read; the newest release on it is 5.1.0. The shipped product may differ from what this report describes. Survey the release branch too.

Evidence
tag 5.45.0

Security & Reliability Posture

adequate
05.1

33 credential-shaped strings in the tree sit in tests, examples, documentation or local development settings

adequate

Strings shaped like credentials appear only where fakes are usual: test fixtures, examples, documentation, placeholders and local stacks. They are almost always fakes. Ask someone to confirm that none of them works anywhere, because a real key in a development file is still a real key. 2 other matchs set aside: expired tokens, licence tokens a vendor verifies with a public key, or placeholder text where a key would go. None grants access to anything.

Evidence
AWS access key, where fakes are usual
4 cited: private key block, where fakes are usual
05.25

1 environment file is committed

adequate

.env is tracked in git. Environment files are where credentials usually live, and committing one usually means nobody decided how secrets reach the running application. Whatever is in it is in the history for good. Check 05.1 says whether it holds anything credential-shaped.

Evidence
.env — committed environment file
05.13

6 outbound calls can wait forever

adequate

6 HTTP calls use a client with no timeout (Python `requests` without `timeout=`, or Go's default client). When a dependency slows down, each one holds a worker until the connection gives up, and enough of them take the service down with the dependency.

Evidence
prowler/providers/azure/azure_provider.py:1314 — outbound call without a timeout
prowler/providers/azure/services/defender/defender_service.py:185 — outbound call without a timeout
prowler/providers/image/lib/registry/base.py:290 — outbound call without a timeout
05.34

5 of 6 Kubernetes workloads declare no resource limits

adequate

5 workload manifests set no CPU or memory limits. One pod that leaks memory or spins can starve everything else on its node, and the scheduler cannot plan capacity for what it cannot see.

05.26

38 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 17 high or critical in what ships

adequate

38 of 1,902 locked dependencies match 75 published advisories in OSV, 26 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version.

Evidence
ui/pnpm-lock.yaml — @sentry/nextjs 10.65.0: GHSA-mchm-gjx6-7h55 (critical), fixed in 10.75.2
ui/pnpm-lock.yaml — dompurify 3.4.13: GHSA-cg2g-xh64-v4q7 (critical), fixed in 3.4.17
ui/pnpm-lock.yaml — next 16.3.8: GHSA-2464-fhr4-w9xw (critical), fixed in 16.4.1
05.45

2 workload settings give a container the host

adequate

2 places in the deployment configuration run a container privileged or in the host's network, process or IPC namespace. A compromise of that container is a compromise of the machine, and most acquirers' security reviews block it. Node agents (network, storage, monitoring) are excluded.

Evidence
contrib/k8s/helm/prowler-cli/values.yaml:7 — privileged or host namespace
kubernetes/job.yaml:55 — privileged or host namespace
05.60

Relicensed: Apache-2.0 → CC-BY-NC-SA-4.0 (2017-07-24) → Apache-2.0 (2021-11-12)

adequate

The root licence changed 2 time(s). Code taken under earlier terms stays under them; check which terms any fork or customer relied on.

Evidence
LICENSE — Apache-2.0 from 2016-06-30
LICENSE — CC-BY-NC-SA-4.0 from 2017-07-24
LICENSE — Apache-2.0 from 2021-11-12
05.65

6 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 4 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-10-14. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 1 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 5.1.0. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version. GHSA-c2jg-2778-ggm4 (moderate), GHSA-ccqh-6cjc-wp4j (critical), GHSA-fhj4-q47f-w7mv (high) and 1 more are fixed in the surveyed commit; which release carries them cannot be told from this history, which does not place the release users run. Answer lives in: the version you run.

Evidence
2026-10-14: CVE-2026-100169 (high): Improper Authentication in the social account linking path of the Prowler API in Prowler from 5.4.0 before 5.35.0 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to ob
2026-09-30: GHSA-89q3-592m-8p4r (moderate), fixed in 5.44.0: Tenant members can revoke privileged provider-deletion jobs without management permission
2026-08-03: GHSA-c2jg-2778-ggm4 (moderate), fixed in 5.37.0: Prowler: Stored XSS in HTML reports through unescaped cloud resource tags
2026-07-29: GHSA-ccqh-6cjc-wp4j (critical), fixed in 5.36.0: RCE on Prowler App workers via kubeconfig auth-provider cmd-path
2026-07-10: GHSA-fhj4-q47f-w7mv (high), fixed in 5.33.1: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in Lighthouse Provider

Observability & Operations

adequate
06.2

No structured logging library is in use

adequate

Nothing references a structured logging library. Logs that are written to be read by a person are not searchable by a machine, which means incident response here is proportional to how well someone remembers the codebase rather than to what the tooling can find.

Evidence
searched 11,552 files for 10 structured logging libraries; 0 matched
06.18

1 of 7 deployed images carry no version, or `latest`

adequate

1 images in the deployment configuration are named without a version or as `latest`. A redeploy can change the software without a commit, a rollback has nothing to roll back to, and nobody can say from the repository what is running.

Evidence
contrib/k8s/cronjob.yml:17 — image without a version
06.14

Readiness and liveness probes are identical in 1 of 3 workloads

adequate

Both probes call the same endpoint. When a dependency slows down, the liveness probe fails with the readiness probe, so the platform restarts pods that only needed taking out of rotation, and a partial outage becomes a full one. Liveness should ask whether the process is alive; readiness whether it can serve.

Evidence
contrib/k8s/helm/prowler-ui/values.yaml — same probe endpoint twice

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

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