Read 2026-10-23
plankanban/planka: technical due diligence, read from its repository
What Borehole read in plankanban/planka's code and history at 4c781f3: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.
| Dimension | Rating |
|---|---|
| Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | strong |
| Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | adequate |
| Product & Engineering Maturity | adequate |
| Security & Reliability Posture | adequate |
| Observability & Operations | adequate |
| Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
What the repository says
LICENSE: Relicensed: MIT → AGPL-3.0 (2023-01-16)
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
strongNo finding.
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
adequateTests cover a thin slice of the codebase
adequate22 test files against 1,234 source files (1.8%). This does not measure whether the tests are good, only whether enough of them exist for the codebase to be changed safely by someone who did not write it — which is exactly the situation after an acquisition.
| 22 test files / 1,234 source files |
Product & Engineering Maturity
adequate83 direct dependencies in a single manifest
adequateclient/package.json declares 83 direct dependencies. Each one is a maintenance obligation, a supply-chain surface and a potential licence question that transfers with the asset. The count says nothing about whether any given dependency was a good choice; it says how many such choices a buyer inherits.
client/package.json — 83 declared |
server/package.json — 37 declared |
package.json — 4 declared |
server/requirements.txt — 1 declared |
2% of bug fixes add or change a test
adequateOf 224 fixes in the last 24 months, 5 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.
| 5 of 224 |
Security & Reliability Posture
adequateThe build runs third-party code it does not pin
adequate8 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.
.github/workflows/build-and-push-docker-image.yml:42 — action pinned by tag |
.github/workflows/build-and-push-docker-image.yml:45 — action pinned by tag |
7 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 5 high or critical in what ships
adequate7 of 1,130 locked dependencies match 16 published advisories in OSV, 5 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version.
server/package-lock.json — proxy-addr 1.1.5: GHSA-jqcg-44mw-7w3h (critical), fixed in 2.0.8 |
server/package-lock.json — compression 1.8.1: GHSA-vc2v-76pw-4v95 (high), fixed in 1.8.2 |
client/package-lock.json — markdown-it 13.0.2: GHSA-r7fv-28h4-cvq7 (high), fixed in 15.0.2 |
Licence text does not match a standard licence
adequateLICENSE.md exists but its text does not match any standard licence. A bespoke or hand-edited licence is not wrong, but it cannot be cleared by recognising its name: counsel has to read it, and until they do neither side knows precisely what rights transfer with the code.
LICENSE.md:1 — 97 lines, unrecognised |
Relicensed: MIT → AGPL-3.0 (2023-01-16)
adequateThe root licence changed 1 time(s). The latest terms restrict what users, hosts or a buyer may do in ways the earlier ones did not. Code taken under the old terms stays under them, so both matter in diligence.
6 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 3 high or critical
adequateThe newest was published on 2026-10-06. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 2 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 2.2.1. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version. The record is incomplete: NVD: 1 record names planka with nothing tying it to this repository (CVE-2026-91970).
| 2026-10-06: CVE-2026-105835 (critical): PLANKA 2.2.0 through 2.2.1 fails to limit incorrect TOTP codes submitted to POST /api/access-tokens/verify-totp, allowing attackers to brute force two-factor au |
| 2026-08-10: GHSA-8jqr-gh78-qjp7 (moderate), fixed in 2.2.1: Path traversal in JWT-protected static file routes allows authenticated arbitrary file read |
| 2026-03-01: GHSA-4mrp-ccp3-78wp (high), fixed in 2.0.3: Unrestricted outgoing proxy exposes server in host-network deployments |
| 2026-02-10: GHSA-c7mq-8hrx-524h (moderate), fixed in 2.0.0: Blind SSRF in outbound request features |
| 2026-01-05: CVE-2025-65922 (moderate): PLANKA 2.0.0 lacks X-Frame-Options and CSP frame-ancestors headers, allowing the application to be embedded within malicious iframes. While this does not lead t |
Observability & Operations
adequateNo error reporter is wired in
adequateNothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.
| no error reporter initialised |
2 of 3 deployed images carry no version, or `latest`
adequate2 images in the deployment configuration are named without a version or as `latest`. A redeploy can change the software without a commit, a rollback has nothing to roll back to, and nobody can say from the repository what is running.
charts/planka/Chart.yaml:37 — image without a version |
docker-compose-dev.yml:84 — image without a version |
Readiness and liveness probes are identical in 1 of 1 workloads
adequateBoth probes call the same endpoint. When a dependency slows down, the liveness probe fails with the readiness probe, so the platform restarts pods that only needed taking out of rotation, and a partial outage becomes a full one. Liveness should ask whether the process is alive; readiness whether it can serve.
charts/planka/values.yaml — same probe endpoint twice |
Fit with the Acquirer
not assessableNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
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