Borehole · Project · free tier
plankanban/planka
Free reading: not for reliance
4c781f3 · 1,223 commits · 1,646 files
Read 2026-10-23

plankanban/planka: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in plankanban/planka's code and history at 4c781f3: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenancestrong
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturityadequate
Product & Engineering Maturityadequate
Security & Reliability Postureadequate
Observability & Operationsadequate
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

What the repository says

  • LICENSE: Relicensed: MIT → AGPL-3.0 (2023-01-16)

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

strong

No finding.

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

adequate
02.3

Tests cover a thin slice of the codebase

adequate

22 test files against 1,234 source files (1.8%). This does not measure whether the tests are good, only whether enough of them exist for the codebase to be changed safely by someone who did not write it — which is exactly the situation after an acquisition.

Evidence
22 test files / 1,234 source files

Product & Engineering Maturity

adequate
04.3

83 direct dependencies in a single manifest

adequate

client/package.json declares 83 direct dependencies. Each one is a maintenance obligation, a supply-chain surface and a potential licence question that transfers with the asset. The count says nothing about whether any given dependency was a good choice; it says how many such choices a buyer inherits.

Evidence
client/package.json — 83 declared
server/package.json — 37 declared
package.json — 4 declared
server/requirements.txt — 1 declared
04.19

2% of bug fixes add or change a test

adequate

Of 224 fixes in the last 24 months, 5 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.

Evidence
5 of 224

Security & Reliability Posture

adequate
05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

8 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

05.26

7 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 5 high or critical in what ships

adequate

7 of 1,130 locked dependencies match 16 published advisories in OSV, 5 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version.

Evidence
server/package-lock.json — proxy-addr 1.1.5: GHSA-jqcg-44mw-7w3h (critical), fixed in 2.0.8
server/package-lock.json — compression 1.8.1: GHSA-vc2v-76pw-4v95 (high), fixed in 1.8.2
client/package-lock.json — markdown-it 13.0.2: GHSA-r7fv-28h4-cvq7 (high), fixed in 15.0.2
05.10

Licence text does not match a standard licence

adequate

LICENSE.md exists but its text does not match any standard licence. A bespoke or hand-edited licence is not wrong, but it cannot be cleared by recognising its name: counsel has to read it, and until they do neither side knows precisely what rights transfer with the code.

Evidence
LICENSE.md:1 — 97 lines, unrecognised
05.60

Relicensed: MIT → AGPL-3.0 (2023-01-16)

adequate

The root licence changed 1 time(s). The latest terms restrict what users, hosts or a buyer may do in ways the earlier ones did not. Code taken under the old terms stays under them, so both matter in diligence.

Evidence
LICENSE — MIT from 2019-08-30
LICENSE — AGPL-3.0 from 2023-01-16
05.65

6 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 3 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-10-06. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 2 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 2.2.1. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version. The record is incomplete: NVD: 1 record names planka with nothing tying it to this repository (CVE-2026-91970).

Evidence
2026-10-06: CVE-2026-105835 (critical): PLANKA 2.2.0 through 2.2.1 fails to limit incorrect TOTP codes submitted to POST /api/access-tokens/verify-totp, allowing attackers to brute force two-factor au
2026-08-10: GHSA-8jqr-gh78-qjp7 (moderate), fixed in 2.2.1: Path traversal in JWT-protected static file routes allows authenticated arbitrary file read
2026-03-01: GHSA-4mrp-ccp3-78wp (high), fixed in 2.0.3: Unrestricted outgoing proxy exposes server in host-network deployments
2026-02-10: GHSA-c7mq-8hrx-524h (moderate), fixed in 2.0.0: Blind SSRF in outbound request features
2026-01-05: CVE-2025-65922 (moderate): PLANKA 2.0.0 lacks X-Frame-Options and CSP frame-ancestors headers, allowing the application to be embedded within malicious iframes. While this does not lead t

Observability & Operations

adequate
06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

Evidence
no error reporter initialised
06.18

2 of 3 deployed images carry no version, or `latest`

adequate

2 images in the deployment configuration are named without a version or as `latest`. A redeploy can change the software without a commit, a rollback has nothing to roll back to, and nobody can say from the repository what is running.

Evidence
charts/planka/Chart.yaml:37 — image without a version
docker-compose-dev.yml:84 — image without a version
06.14

Readiness and liveness probes are identical in 1 of 1 workloads

adequate

Both probes call the same endpoint. When a dependency slows down, the liveness probe fails with the readiness probe, so the platform restarts pods that only needed taking out of rotation, and a partial outage becomes a full one. Liveness should ask whether the process is alive; readiness whether it can serve.

Evidence
charts/planka/values.yaml — same probe endpoint twice

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

Read more, or read your own

The full report on plankanban/planka: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.

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