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paca-ai/paca
Free reading: not for reliance
8be753e · 2,140 commits · 2,050 files
Read 2026-11-03

paca-ai/paca: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in paca-ai/paca's code and history at 8be753e: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenancestrong
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturityadequate
Product & Engineering Maturitystrong
Security & Reliability Postureadequate
Observability & Operationsadequate
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

strong
01.6

services/api/internal/service/agent/agent_service.go is 3,947 lines, 28× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 139 lines. 16 files exceed 1,390 lines, the largest being 3,947. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

adequate
02.16

Tests are retried until they pass

adequate

The suite is configured to retry failing tests (apps/e2e/playwright.config.ts). A retry turns a flaky test green without saying why it failed, so a green build means the tests passed eventually. Ask how many retries a typical run needs, and which tests need them.

Evidence
apps/e2e/playwright.config.ts:39 — test retry
02.24

8% of recent commits change more than 2,000 lines

adequate

98 of 1289 commits in the last 24 months changed over 2,000 lines of code, not counting reformatting, renames, vendored or generated code. A change that size is rarely reviewed line by line. Ask how they were reviewed, and what made them that large.

Evidence
98 commits over 2,000 lines

Product & Engineering Maturity

strong

No finding.

Security & Reliability Posture

adequate
05.1

4 credential-shaped strings in the tree sit in tests, examples, documentation or local development settings

adequate

Strings shaped like credentials appear only where fakes are usual: test fixtures, examples, documentation, placeholders and local stacks. They are almost always fakes. Ask someone to confirm that none of them works anywhere, because a real key in a development file is still a real key.

Evidence
4 cited: GitHub token, where fakes are usual
05.5

3 credential-shaped strings added in the history sit in tests, examples, documentation or local development settings

adequate

Strings shaped like credentials appear only where fakes are usual: test fixtures, examples, documentation, placeholders and local stacks. They are almost always fakes. Ask someone to confirm that none of them works anywhere, because a real key in a development file is still a real key.

Evidence
3 cited: GitHub token, where fakes are usual
05.6

4 Dockerfiles run the application as root

adequate

No USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.

Evidence
apps/web/Dockerfile — runs as root
services/agent-runner/Dockerfile — runs as root
services/agent-server/Dockerfile — runs as root
services/api/Dockerfile — runs as root
05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

9 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day; 10 steps pipe a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

Evidence
.github/workflows/agent-runner-pr-ci.yml:146 — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/agent-runner-pr-ci.yml:153 — action pinned by tag
scripts/install-acp-bridge.sh:9 — download piped into a shell
05.20

3 SQL statements built from strings

adequate

3 places in product code build SQL by formatting or joining strings rather than passing parameters. 1 of them put a value into the string; in the rest, what the code shows going in is a table or column name, a constant, or something the line does not show. Ask whether any value reaches these strings, rather than a parameter.

05.26

1 locked dependency has published vulnerabilities

adequate

1 of 170 locked dependencies match 2 published advisories in OSV. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.

Evidence
services/agent-runner/go.mod — golang.org/x/crypto v0.55.0: GO-2026-6354 (unrated), fixed in 0.56.0
05.48

12 places insert HTML from a variable without sanitising it

adequate

12 places set HTML from a value that is neither a literal nor passed through a sanitiser. Where the value can come from a user, that is stored cross-site scripting, and it is the first thing a buyer's security review looks for in a frontend.

Evidence
apps/extension/src/content/ui.ts:413 — HTML from a variable
apps/extension/src/content/ui.ts:424 — HTML from a variable
apps/extension/src/content/ui.ts:481 — HTML from a variable
05.65

11 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 10 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-10-13. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 2 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 0.19.2. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version. The record is incomplete: NVD: 2 records name paca with nothing tying them to this repository (CVE-2023-54267, CVE-2026-98395).

Evidence
2026-10-13: GHSA-7f97-wf96-gmjm (high), fixed in v0.19.0: A static agent API key sent without X-Agent-ID is authenticated as the built-in SUPER_ADMIN bot (whole-instance takeover)
2026-10-06: GHSA-f2mf-mg99-22w5 (high), fixed in v0.18.6: Paca plugin paca.send_email host function bypasses netguard enabling internal TCP SSRF
2026-10-04: GHSA-ph34-wrxh-vwxc (high), fixed in v0.18.4: Paca plugin name lacks format validation: filepath.Join + os.RemoveAll in Uninstall enables arbitrary host file deletion
2026-10-04: GHSA-x5v3-9j39-fq73 (moderate), fixed in v0.18.4: Paca plugin WASM SQL sensitive-column redaction keyed on output column names is bypassed by expression wrapping, leaking users.password_hash and other core cred
2026-10-02: GHSA-vp6r-f2jv-9p9q (high), fixed in v0.18.4: Paca plugin db_exec/db_query statement-type prefix blacklist gap allows WASM sandbox escape (postgres container RCE and arbitrary file read)

Observability & Operations

adequate
06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

Evidence
no error reporter initialised
06.14

Readiness and liveness probes are identical in 3 of 7 workloads

adequate

Both probes call the same endpoint. When a dependency slows down, the liveness probe fails with the readiness probe, so the platform restarts pods that only needed taking out of rotation, and a partial outage becomes a full one. Liveness should ask whether the process is alive; readiness whether it can serve.

Evidence
deploy/helm/paca/templates/agent-runner/deployment.yaml — same probe endpoint twice
deploy/helm/paca/templates/api/deployment.yaml — same probe endpoint twice
deploy/helm/paca/templates/realtime/deployment.yaml — same probe endpoint twice
06.33

2 of 7 deployments run a single replica

adequate

2 deployments set `replicas: 1`, and nothing (an autoscaler, a disruption budget) adds more. Every deploy and every node drain is downtime, and the availability the buyer inherits has a ceiling.

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

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