Read 2026-10-23
owasp/wrongsecrets: technical due diligence, read from its repository
What Borehole read in owasp/wrongsecrets's code and history at 1b51b6f: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.
| Dimension | Rating |
|---|---|
| Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | strong |
| Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | strong |
| Product & Engineering Maturity | adequate |
| Security & Reliability Posture | adequate |
| Observability & Operations | adequate |
| Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
What the repository says
LICENSE: Relicensed: MIT → AGPL-3.0 (2023-02-22)README.md:13: names OpenSSF
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
strongNo finding.
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
strongNo finding.
Product & Engineering Maturity
adequateEffort is shifting from building to rewriting
adequateDeleted lines per line added rose from 0.56 to 0.75 between the first and second halves of this history. Rework is normal and often healthy, but a rising ratio means an increasing share of the team's time is spent replacing code that already exists rather than building what does not. Whether that is deliberate repayment or churn is a question for the team.
| first half 0.56, second half 0.75 (split 2023-09-21) |
11% of bug fixes add or change a test
adequateOf 185 fixes in the last 24 months, 21 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.
| 21 of 185 |
Security & Reliability Posture
adequate1 Dockerfile runs the application as root
adequateNo USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.
k8s/challenge53/Dockerfile — runs as root |
The build runs third-party code it does not pin
adequate20 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.
.github/workflows/build-devcontainer.yml:55 — action pinned by tag |
.github/workflows/build-devcontainer.yml:59 — action pinned by tag |
3 of 9 Kubernetes workloads declare no resource limits
adequate3 workload manifests set no CPU or memory limits. One pod that leaks memory or spins can starve everything else on its node, and the scheduler cannot plan capacity for what it cannot see.
k8s/challenge53/secret-challenge53-sidecar.yml — workload with no limits |
k8s/challenge53/secret-challenge53.yml — workload with no limits |
k8s/sealed-secret-controller.yaml — workload with no limits |
1 locked dependency has published vulnerabilities
adequate1 of 31 locked dependencies match 1 published advisories in OSV. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.
aws/go.mod — golang.org/x/crypto v0.58.0: GO-2026-5932 (unrated) |
Relicensed: MIT → AGPL-3.0 (2023-02-22)
adequateThe root licence changed 1 time(s). The latest terms restrict what users, hosts or a buyer may do in ways the earlier ones did not. Code taken under the old terms stays under them, so both matter in diligence.
Observability & Operations
adequateNo structured logging library is in use
adequateNothing references a structured logging library. Logs that are written to be read by a person are not searchable by a machine, which means incident response here is proportional to how well someone remembers the codebase rather than to what the tooling can find.
| searched 551 files for 10 structured logging libraries; 0 matched |
One request cannot be followed through the logs
adequateNothing in the service carries a request or correlation id, and there is no tracing. When a customer reports a failure, the log lines that belong to their request cannot be picked out from everyone else's.
| no request id, correlation id or tracing found |
No error reporter is wired in
adequateNothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.
| no error reporter initialised |
1 of 6 deployed images carry no version, or `latest`
adequate1 images in the deployment configuration are named without a version or as `latest`. A redeploy can change the software without a commit, a rollback has nothing to roll back to, and nobody can say from the repository what is running.
k8s/sealed-secret-controller.yaml:31 — image without a version |
Readiness and liveness probes are identical in 2 of 7 workloads
adequateBoth probes call the same endpoint. When a dependency slows down, the liveness probe fails with the readiness probe, so the platform restarts pods that only needed taking out of rotation, and a partial outage becomes a full one. Liveness should ask whether the process is alive; readiness whether it can serve.
k8s/challenge74/wrongsecrets-llama-deployment.yaml — same probe endpoint twice |
k8s/sealed-secret-controller.yaml — same probe endpoint twice |
9 of 9 deployments run a single replica
adequate9 deployments set `replicas: 1`, and nothing (an autoscaler, a disruption budget) adds more. Every deploy and every node drain is downtime, and the availability the buyer inherits has a ceiling.
aws/k8s/secret-challenge-vault-deployment.yml — replicas: 1 |
k8s/challenge53/secret-challenge53-sidecar.yml — replicas: 1 |
k8s/challenge53/secret-challenge53.yml — replicas: 1 |
Fit with the Acquirer
not assessableNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
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The full report on owasp/wrongsecrets: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.
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