Read 2026-11-03
opensignlabs/opensign: technical due diligence, read from its repository
What Borehole read in opensignlabs/opensign's code and history at 8373f6d: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.
| Dimension | Rating |
|---|---|
| Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | adequate |
| Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | adequate |
| Product & Engineering Maturity | adequate |
| Security & Reliability Posture | adequate |
| Observability & Operations | adequate |
| Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
What the repository says
LICENSE: Relicensed: Unlicense → AGPL-3.0 (2023-10-23)
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
adequateapps/OpenSign/src/constant/Utils.js is 4,964 lines, 78× this codebase's median file
adequateThe median source file here is 63 lines. 12 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 4,964. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.
apps/OpenSign/src/constant/Utils.js:1 — 4,964 lines (78× median) |
apps/OpenSign/src/pages/TemplatePlaceholder.jsx:1 — 2,485 lines (39× median) |
apps/OpenSign/src/pages/PlaceHolderSign.jsx:1 — 2,465 lines (39× median) |
apps/OpenSign/src/pages/PdfRequestFiles.jsx:1 — 2,354 lines (37× median) |
apps/OpenSign/src/components/pdf/WidgetsValueModal.jsx:1 — 2,143 lines (34× median) |
1 base image floats: no version, or `latest`
adequate1 of 1 `FROM` lines in product Dockerfiles name an image without a version, or with `latest`. Each build pulls whatever the registry serves that day, so the image that ships can change without a commit, and last month's build cannot be reproduced. Pin a version, or a digest.
apps/mongo/Dockerfile:2 — base image without a version |
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
adequateTests cover a thin slice of the codebase
adequate1 test files against 419 source files (0.2%). This does not measure whether the tests are good, only whether enough of them exist for the codebase to be changed safely by someone who did not write it — which is exactly the situation after an acquisition.
| 1 test files / 419 source files |
Product & Engineering Maturity
adequate0% of bug fixes add or change a test
adequateOf 44 fixes in the last 24 months, 0 touched a test. A fix without the test that would have caught the bug can quietly come back, and the suite never learns from what went wrong.
| 0 of 44 |
2 jobs are each done by more than one library
adequateWithin a single package: UI component kits: mui, react-bootstrap; state management: redux, zustand. Each duplicate is bundle size, two ways of doing the same thing in one codebase, and two upgrade paths to maintain. It is usually the residue of a migration that stopped halfway.
apps/OpenSign/package.json — several libraries per job |
apps/OpenSignServer/package.json — several libraries per job |
Security & Reliability Posture
adequate1 Dockerfile runs the application as root
adequateNo USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.
apps/mongo/Dockerfile — runs as root |
The build runs third-party code it does not pin
adequate5 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.
.github/workflows/Docker.yml:31 — action pinned by tag |
.github/workflows/Docker.yml:37 — action pinned by tag |
19 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 19 high or critical in what ships
adequate19 of 1,127 locked dependencies match 46 published advisories in OSV, 19 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version.
apps/OpenSignServer/package-lock.json — @graphql-tools/utils 10.11.0: GHSA-7mx3-vvmw-hjmv (high), fixed in 12.0.1 |
apps/OpenSignServer/package-lock.json — @graphql-tools/utils 10.8.6: GHSA-7mx3-vvmw-hjmv (high), fixed in 12.0.1 |
apps/OpenSignServer/package-lock.json — @graphql-tools/utils 9.2.1: GHSA-7mx3-vvmw-hjmv (high), fixed in 12.0.1 |
Relicensed: Unlicense → AGPL-3.0 (2023-10-23)
adequateThe root licence changed 1 time(s). The latest terms restrict what users, hosts or a buyer may do in ways the earlier ones did not. Code taken under the old terms stays under them, so both matter in diligence.
10 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 9 high or critical
adequateThe newest was published on 2026-09-16. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 10 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 3.1.0. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version.
| 2026-09-16: CVE-2026-92794 (high): OpenSign through 2.41.3 fails to validate caller identity in the getDocument cloud function when one-time-password verification is disabled. Attackers can suppl |
| 2026-08-11: CVE-2026-72543 (high): An insecure direct object reference vulnerability in OpenSignLabs OpenSign through 2.37.0 allows unauthenticated remote attackers to retrieve any contact record |
| 2026-08-11: CVE-2026-72544 (high): An integrity verification vulnerability in OpenSignLabs OpenSign through 2.37.0 allows unauthenticated remote attackers to forge document audit-trail entries vi |
| 2026-08-11: CVE-2026-72545 (high): An insecure direct object reference vulnerability in OpenSignLabs OpenSign through 2.37.0 allows unauthenticated remote attackers to write to any contact record |
| 2026-08-11: CVE-2026-72548 (high): An information disclosure vulnerability in OpenSignLabs OpenSign through 2.37.0 allows unauthenticated remote attackers to retrieve any organisation tenant reco |
Observability & Operations
adequateNo structured logging library is in use
adequateNothing references a structured logging library. Logs that are written to be read by a person are not searchable by a machine, which means incident response here is proportional to how well someone remembers the codebase rather than to what the tooling can find.
| searched 485 files for 10 structured logging libraries; 0 matched |
One request cannot be followed through the logs
adequateNothing in the service carries a request or correlation id, and there is no tracing. When a customer reports a failure, the log lines that belong to their request cannot be picked out from everyone else's.
| no request id, correlation id or tracing found |
No error reporter is wired in
adequateNothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.
| no error reporter initialised |
2 of 4 deployed images carry no version, or `latest`
adequate2 images in the deployment configuration are named without a version or as `latest`. A redeploy can change the software without a commit, a rollback has nothing to roll back to, and nobody can say from the repository what is running.
docker-compose.yml:19 — image without a version |
docker-compose.yml:38 — image without a version |
Fit with the Acquirer
not assessableNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
Read more, or read your own
The full report on opensignlabs/opensign: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.
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