Borehole · Project · free tier
opencost/opencost
Free reading: not for reliance
24b94ef · 5,171 commits · 1,017 files
Read 2026-11-03

opencost/opencost: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in opencost/opencost's code and history at 24b94ef: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenancestrong
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturityadequate
Product & Engineering Maturitystrong
Security & Reliability Posturestrong
Observability & Operationsstrong
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

What the repository says

  • Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed
  • AGENTS.md:11: names Cloud Native Computing Foundation
  • AGENTS.md:359: names CNCF
  • README.md:2: names OpenSSF

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

strong
01.6

core/pkg/model/kubemodel/kubemodel_codecs.go is 10,566 lines, 81× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 129 lines. 16 files exceed 1,290 lines, the largest being 10,566. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

Evidence
core/pkg/model/kubemodel/kubemodel_codecs.go:1 — 10,566 lines (81× median)
core/pkg/opencost/opencost_codecs.go:1 — 9,465 lines (73× median)
core/pkg/opencost/asset.go:1 — 3,882 lines (30× median)
core/pkg/opencost/allocation.go:1 — 3,803 lines (29× median)
modules/collector-source/pkg/collector/collector.go:1 — 3,285 lines (25× median)

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

adequate
02.24

8% of recent commits change more than 2,000 lines

adequate

27 of 356 commits in the last 24 months changed over 2,000 lines of code, not counting reformatting, renames, vendored or generated code. A change that size is rarely reviewed line by line. Ask how they were reviewed, and what made them that large.

Evidence
27 commits over 2,000 lines

Product & Engineering Maturity

strong
04.38

6 files still carry code deprecated more than two years ago

adequate

6 files were marked deprecated over two years ago and still are, the oldest since May 2023. A deprecation is a promise to remove. Ask what still depends on these, and whether removing them is scheduled.

Evidence
pkg/cloud/alibaba/provider.go — deprecated since May 2023
pkg/cloud/aws/provider.go — deprecated since May 2023
pkg/cloud/azure/provider.go — deprecated since May 2023
pkg/cloud/gcp/provider.go — deprecated since May 2023
pkg/cloud/config/configurations.go — deprecated since Oct 2023
04.62

Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed

adequate

The newest release, v2.5.3, is not on the branch this survey read; the newest release on it is v1.121.3. The shipped product may differ from what this report describes. Survey the release branch too.

Evidence
tag v2.5.3

Security & Reliability Posture

strong
05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

18 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day; 1 step pipes a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

Evidence
.github/workflows/auto_label_issues.yml:14 — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/build-and-publish-develop.yml:54 — action pinned by tag
.github/workflows/vulnerability-scan.yaml:29 — download piped into a shell
05.26

3 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 1 high or critical

adequate

3 of 320 locked dependencies match 5 published advisories in OSV, 1 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.

Evidence
core/go.mod — github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.1.4: GHSA-mgcc-cww5-fp2q (high), fixed in 4.1.6
core/go.mod — go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk v1.41.0: GHSA-8wmf-6v46-5gfg (low), fixed in 1.45.0
go.mod — go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk v1.44.0: GHSA-8wmf-6v46-5gfg (low), fixed in 1.45.0
05.65

2 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 2 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-07-30. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. None of them affects the surveyed version.

Evidence
2026-07-30: CVE-2026-67349 (high): OpenCost before 1.121.0 fails to authenticate the GET /helmValues endpoint, exposing base64-decoded HELM_VALUES environment variable containing cloud provider c
2026-07-14: GHSA-wmj8-9953-vff5 (high), fixed in 1.119.1: OpenCost ServiceKey Endpoint Unauthorized Credential Overwrite/Injection

Observability & Operations

strong
06.9

No error reporter is wired in

adequate

Nothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.

Evidence
no error reporter initialised

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

Read more, or read your own

The full report on opencost/opencost: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.

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