Read 2026-11-03
opencost/opencost: technical due diligence, read from its repository
What Borehole read in opencost/opencost's code and history at 24b94ef: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.
| Dimension | Rating |
|---|---|
| Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance | strong |
| Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity | adequate |
| Product & Engineering Maturity | strong |
| Security & Reliability Posture | adequate |
| Observability & Operations | strong |
| Fit with the Acquirer | not assessable |
What the repository says
- Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed
AGENTS.md:11: names Cloud Native Computing FoundationAGENTS.md:359: names CNCFREADME.md:2: names OpenSSF
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance
strongcore/pkg/model/kubemodel/kubemodel_codecs.go is 10,566 lines, 81× this codebase's median file
adequateThe median source file here is 129 lines. 16 files exceed 1,290 lines, the largest being 10,566. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.
core/pkg/model/kubemodel/kubemodel_codecs.go:1 — 10,566 lines (81× median) |
core/pkg/opencost/opencost_codecs.go:1 — 9,465 lines (73× median) |
core/pkg/opencost/asset.go:1 — 3,882 lines (30× median) |
core/pkg/opencost/allocation.go:1 — 3,803 lines (29× median) |
modules/collector-source/pkg/collector/collector.go:1 — 3,285 lines (25× median) |
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity
adequate8% of recent commits change more than 2,000 lines
adequate27 of 356 commits in the last 24 months changed over 2,000 lines of code, not counting reformatting, renames, vendored or generated code. A change that size is rarely reviewed line by line. Ask how they were reviewed, and what made them that large.
| 27 commits over 2,000 lines |
Product & Engineering Maturity
strong6 files still carry code deprecated more than two years ago
adequate6 files were marked deprecated over two years ago and still are, the oldest since May 2023. A deprecation is a promise to remove. Ask what still depends on these, and whether removing them is scheduled.
pkg/cloud/alibaba/provider.go — deprecated since May 2023 |
pkg/cloud/aws/provider.go — deprecated since May 2023 |
pkg/cloud/azure/provider.go — deprecated since May 2023 |
pkg/cloud/gcp/provider.go — deprecated since May 2023 |
pkg/cloud/config/configurations.go — deprecated since Oct 2023 |
Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed
adequateThe newest release, v2.5.3, is not on the branch this survey read; the newest release on it is v1.121.3. The shipped product may differ from what this report describes. Survey the release branch too.
| tag v2.5.3 |
Security & Reliability Posture
adequate7 credential-shaped strings exist in the history
adequateMatches for AWS access key, Google API key, private key block were committed at some point across 3,337 commits examined. The files that held them are no longer in the working tree — but removal from a file is not removal from the history, and the history is what transfers with the asset. What matters is whether each was rotated after it was committed. The code cannot tell whether any of them is live, and that decides whether this matters: none sits in production configuration, and none is in a format its provider keeps for live keys. Is any of these live? Show that each was rotated after it was committed, and when. 1 other match set aside: expired tokens, licence tokens a vendor verifies with a public key, or placeholder text where a key would go. None grants access to anything.
| 3 cited: Google API key pattern added here |
| AWS access key pattern added here |
| private key block pattern added here |
The build runs third-party code it does not pin
adequate18 third-party CI actions are referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day; 1 step pipes a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.
.github/workflows/auto_label_issues.yml:14 — action pinned by tag |
.github/workflows/build-and-publish-develop.yml:54 — action pinned by tag |
.github/workflows/vulnerability-scan.yaml:29 — download piped into a shell |
TLS certificate checks can be switched off by the user in 1 place
adequate1 places disable certificate verification only when a setting named for it asks: inside a branch on it, such as an `--insecure` flag, or in a client that such a branch picks, or in a probe the service runs against itself. That is an opt-in for self-signed or test servers, not verification switched off. Worth knowing whether production can reach the setting.
pkg/costmodel/nodeclientconfig.go:39 — verification off behind an opt-in |
3 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 1 high or critical
adequate3 of 320 locked dependencies match 5 published advisories in OSV, 1 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version. This lockfile pins development tools alongside what ships and does not say which is which, so some of these may never reach a user.
core/go.mod — github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.1.4: GHSA-mgcc-cww5-fp2q (high), fixed in 4.1.6 |
core/go.mod — go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk v1.41.0: GHSA-8wmf-6v46-5gfg (low), fixed in 1.45.0 |
go.mod — go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk v1.44.0: GHSA-8wmf-6v46-5gfg (low), fixed in 1.45.0 |
2 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 2 high or critical
adequateThe newest was published on 2026-07-30. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. None of them affects the surveyed version.
| 2026-07-30: CVE-2026-67349 (high): OpenCost before 1.121.0 fails to authenticate the GET /helmValues endpoint, exposing base64-decoded HELM_VALUES environment variable containing cloud provider c |
| 2026-07-14: GHSA-wmj8-9953-vff5 (high), fixed in 1.119.1: OpenCost ServiceKey Endpoint Unauthorized Credential Overwrite/Injection |
Observability & Operations
strongNo error reporter is wired in
adequateNothing in the service initialises an error reporter (Sentry, Rollbar, Bugsnag, Honeybadger or an APM agent). An exception in production reaches a person only if someone is reading the logs, which usually means a customer reports it first.
| no error reporter initialised |
Fit with the Acquirer
not assessableNot rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.
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The full report on opencost/opencost: every dimension, the questions for the room, and the audit log.
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