Borehole · Project · free tier
n8n-io/n8n
Free reading: not for reliance
c1463d0 · 24,863 commits · 29,640 files
Read 2026-10-04

n8n-io/n8n: technical due diligence, read from its repository

What Borehole read in n8n-io/n8n's code and history at c1463d0: its licence, security advisories, releases, review practice, tests, dependencies and operations. Every finding cites the file and line it rests on. The full report also covers the team and asks the questions the code cannot answer.

DimensionRating
Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenancestrong
Engineering Process & SDLC Maturityadequate
Product & Engineering Maturityadequate
Security & Reliability Postureadequate
Observability & Operationsadequate
Fit with the Acquirernot assessable

What the repository says

  • Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed
  • LICENSE.md:1: The licence is SUL-1.0: source available, not open source
  • LICENSE: Relicensed: Apache-2.0 with the Commons Clause and an attribution term → SUL-1.0 (2022-03-17)
  • packages/@n8n/blob-storage/src/azure-blob/azure-blob.service.ee.ts: 138 files are named as enterprise-edition code
  • CONTRIBUTING.md:594: states a policy on AI-generated contributions

Architecture & Codebase — including AI provenance

strong
01.6

packages/frontend/@n8n/design-system/src/components/N8nIconPicker/emojiData.ts is 9,905 lines, 125× this codebase's median file

adequate

The median source file here is 79 lines. 193 files exceed 1,000 lines, the largest being 9,905. Size is not a defect on its own — some problems genuinely live in one place — but these are where merge conflicts, review fatigue and single-owner knowledge concentrate, and they are the first thing that slows an inheriting engineer down.

Engineering Process & SDLC Maturity

adequate
02.24

5% of recent commits change more than 2,000 lines

adequate

565 of 11280 commits in the last 24 months changed over 2,000 lines of code, not counting reformatting, renames, vendored or generated code. A change that size is rarely reviewed line by line. Ask how they were reviewed, and what made them that large.

Evidence
565 commits over 2,000 lines

Product & Engineering Maturity

adequate
04.3

157 direct dependencies in a single manifest

adequate

packages/cli/package.json declares 157 direct dependencies. Each one is a maintenance obligation, a supply-chain surface and a potential licence question that transfers with the asset. The count says nothing about whether any given dependency was a good choice; it says how many such choices a buyer inherits.

04.62

Releases are cut from another branch than the one surveyed

adequate

The newest release, n8n@2.41.6, is not on the branch this survey read; the newest release on it is n8n@2.41.0. The shipped product may differ from what this report describes. Survey the release branch too.

Evidence
tag n8n@2.41.6

Security & Reliability Posture

adequate
05.1

8 credential-shaped strings in the tree sit in tests, examples, documentation or local development settings

adequate

Strings shaped like credentials appear only where fakes are usual: test fixtures, examples, documentation, placeholders and local stacks. They are almost always fakes. Ask someone to confirm that none of them works anywhere, because a real key in a development file is still a real key.

Evidence
GitHub token, where fakes are usual
4 cited: Slack token, where fakes are usual
05.6

2 Dockerfiles run the application as root

adequate

No USER instruction switches away from root, so the process runs with full privileges inside the container. It is a one-line fix and an ordinary expectation, which is why its absence is worth asking about: it usually says more about whether anyone has reviewed the deployment than about this container specifically.

Evidence
docker/images/n8n-base/Dockerfile — runs as root
docker/images/node-pc/Dockerfile — runs as root
05.27

The build runs third-party code it does not pin

adequate

1 third-party CI action is referenced by a tag or branch rather than a commit, so they run whatever that tag points to on the day; 7 steps pipe a download straight into a shell. Tags have been moved to malicious commits in real supply-chain attacks, and a piped script is whatever the server returns that minute. Pinning to a commit is the fix, and it is small.

Evidence
.github/workflows/docker-build-push.yml:543 — action pinned by tag
.githooks/check-pnpm.sh:11 — download piped into a shell
05.20

32 SQL statements built from strings

adequate

32 places in product code build SQL by formatting or joining strings rather than passing parameters, and in 5 of them a value, not a table or column name, goes into the string. Where any of those values comes from a request, it is an injection point. Each site needs a look; the fix, parameters, is small.

05.21

2 shell commands built from strings

adequate

2 places run a command through a shell (`shell=True`, `os.system`, `exec` with a template) rather than passing arguments. Where any part comes from outside, it is command injection. Ask where each one's input comes from.

Evidence
packages/@n8n/node-cli/src/commands/dev/utils.ts:353 — command run through a shell
packages/@n8n/node-cli/src/commands/dev/utils.ts:464 — command run through a shell
05.26

49 locked dependencies have published vulnerabilities, 29 high or critical in what ships

adequate

49 of 3,880 locked dependencies match 129 published advisories in OSV, 44 of them rated high or critical. A lockfile says which version is installed, not whether the flawed code is reachable from this product, so each needs a look. Most are fixed by an upgrade, and the advisory names the version.

Evidence
packages/@n8n/task-runner-python/uv.lock — urllib3 2.7.0: GHSA-8988-9cw3-xx77 (high), fixed in 2.8.0
pnpm-lock.yaml — @grpc/grpc-js 1.14.4: GHSA-m9gg-hp2v-232j (high), fixed in 1.14.5
pnpm-lock.yaml — @tiptap/core 3.27.0: GHSA-j95f-988m-3j2f (high), fixed in 3.30.5
05.45

1 workload setting give a container the host

adequate

1 places in the deployment configuration run a container privileged or in the host's network, process or IPC namespace. A compromise of that container is a compromise of the machine, and most acquirers' security reviews block it. Node agents (network, storage, monitoring) are excluded.

Evidence
docker/get-n8n-compose.yml:57 — privileged or host namespace
05.48

4 places insert HTML from a variable without sanitising it

adequate

4 places set HTML from a value that is neither a literal nor passed through a sanitiser. Where the value can come from a user, that is stored cross-site scripting, and it is the first thing a buyer's security review looks for in a frontend.

05.9

3 vendored components with no licence

adequate

Third-party code is committed into this repository without any statement of the terms it arrived under. Unknown terms are harder to deal with than inconvenient ones: an awkward licence can be complied with, an absent one cannot. Each of these needs its origin established before the code changes hands.

05.66

The licence is SUL-1.0: source available, not open source

adequate

LICENSE.md grants SUL-1.0: source available, not open source; use limited to internal business purposes. The reading comes from the licence's own title and clauses. Whether the terms fit the buyer's intended use, and whether any paid licence transfers with the code, is a question for counsel and the licensor.

Evidence
LICENSE.md:1 — 88 lines, SUL-1.0
05.60

Relicensed: Apache-2.0 with the Commons Clause and an attribution term → SUL-1.0 (2022-03-17)

adequate

The root licence changed 1 time(s). Code taken under earlier terms stays under them; check which terms any fork or customer relied on.

Evidence
LICENSE — Apache-2.0 with the Commons Clause and an attribution term from 2019-06-23
LICENSE.md — SUL-1.0 from 2022-03-17
05.61

138 files are named as enterprise-edition code

adequate

Files named `.ee.` are, by the common open-core convention, the paid edition's code, usually under a licence that is not open source even where the rest is. What the buyer may do with each part differs.

05.65

100 advisories against this project in the last 24 months, 59 high or critical

adequate

The newest was published on 2026-09-30. A project that publishes advisories is telling its users about its fixes, and the count and pace say how much security work it carries. Whether 100 of them are fixed in the code you ship could not be told from this history: its version is only known to be at least 2.41.0. Answer lives in: the release you run, set against each fixed version.

Evidence
2026-09-30: GHSA-5qpp-pqww-h7fp (high), fixed in >= 2.41.4: SQL Injection in the Microsoft SQL Node via Expression Interpolation into the Query Field
2026-09-30: GHSA-p3pg-xw4f-m72c (moderate), fixed in >= 2.41.4: Cross-User Agent Chat Resume Allows Hijacking Another User's Pending Tool Approval
2026-09-30: GHSA-5jr4-xmvf-frmj (high), fixed in >= 2.41.4: Shared Prototype Mutation Through the MCP Workflow-Validation Interpreter Allows Owner Account Takeover
2026-09-30: GHSA-3qcw-p65v-c7vq (high), fixed in >= 2.41.4: Unauthenticated Unbounded OAuth Client Persistence via the Authorize Endpoint
2026-09-30: GHSA-r6g9-5cpp-ppwr (high), fixed in >= 1.123.83: Shared-Workflow Credential Check Misses Nested and Tool Inline Sub-Workflows

Observability & Operations

adequate
06.35

Sends usage data to telemetry.n8n.io by default

adequate

packages/@n8n/config/src/configs/diagnostics.config.ts sends to telemetry.n8n.io, and packages/@n8n/db/src/migrations/common/1784000000019-AddCustomTelemetryTagsToProject.ts leaves reporting on as shipped. Every installation reports to the vendor unless its operator turns this off. For a buyer running it inside their own product, that is an outbound data flow to a third party: ask what is sent, how often, and whether the buyer's customers were told.

Fit with the Acquirer

not assessable

Not rated: structurally not assessable from a repository.

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